The preceding chapters have been mainly statistical. Their object has been to show, by producing the best evidence available, that alarmists like the author of “Made in Germany” have no real ground for their fears, that British trade is not going to the devil, but that, on the contrary, the nation as a whole is in a condition of marvellous and still rapidly-growing prosperity. If that be so, if there be no disease, then obviously is there no need for the remedy which Mr. Williams and other Protectionists are anxious to foist upon the country. But though that conclusion will be sufficiently obvious to most minds, there are among us hypochondriacal persons who never think that they are quite well, and these unfortunates will still hanker after some patent medicine to cure their imaginary ills. It is worth while, therefore, briefly to point out how utterly unsuited to our alleged ailments, even if they existed, is the remedy which the Protectionists propose.

THE CASE FOR PROTECTION.

Personally I am not a fanatical believer in Free Trade, or, for that matter, in anything else except the law of gravitation and the rules of arithmetic. I am quite willing to admit that there are circumstances under which a Protectionist tariff might be advantageous to a country. But the practical question is whether, under the present circumstances of Great Britain, Protection is likely to bring any advantage to her. In dealing with that question I will venture at the outset to deny that Protection has been any real advantage to Germany. The Protectionists are fond of arguing that the heavy import duties which Germany levies on British goods have enabled German manufacturers in the first place to secure their home market, and in the second place to build up an enormous export trade at our expense. The argument is plausible, but it suffers from one fatal defect: it is unsupported by facts. As one reads the writings and listens to the talk of Protectionists, one’s mind becomes unconsciously saturated with the notion that British trade is rapidly declining and German trade as rapidly increasing. It is upon this implied proposition that all their arguments are based; this is the primary postulate upon which rests their whole house of cards.

THE ALLEGED EXPANSION OF GERMAN TRADE.

But what are the facts? I have looked carefully through the figures showing the progress of German trade during the last ten or fifteen years, and I can discover no difference in character from the figures which show the progress of British trade. Let the reader look for himself. He will find the figures for fifteen years set out in the following table, and a diagram to illustrate them. Let him notice that what is called the entrepÔt trade, consisting of goods merely passing through the one country or the other, is in these figures excluded from the comparison. Thus “British imports” here means the total imports into the United Kingdom, minus those goods which are subsequently re-exported; “British exports” means all articles of British production exported from the United Kingdom. The same interpretation applies to the German figures, all goods in transit through Germany one way or the other being excluded. The comparison is therefore complete. And what does it show? That, so far from Germany’s export trade increasing by leaps and bounds, while ours is steadily declining, German trade has followed, though at a lower level, the same general course as British trade. Therefore, whatever else Protection may have done for Germany, it certainly has not improved her export trade as compared with that of the United Kingdom. An even more striking demonstration of the utter hollowness of the Protectionist case can be seen when we turn from exports to imports. If Protection is to do anything for a country it must at least diminish imports from abroad while increasing exports from home. That is the whole object of Protection, the great ambition which every Protectionist statesman sets before him. Has Protection done this for Germany? Once again let the reader look for himself at the figures and the diagram. He will see that while German exports have remained stationary, German imports have very largely increased, and moreover that their increase has been relatively greater than the increase of imports into Free-Trade England.

British and German Trade Compared.

Fifteen Years’ Imports and Exports, exclusive of Goods in Transit.
In Millions Sterling.

These figures may be illustrated diagrammatically as follows:—

WOULD PROTECTION HELP US?

So far, therefore, as Germany is concerned, Protection has been, for the general ends for which it was intended, a complete failure. Is there any reason to believe that it would be more successful in Great Britain? Every consideration of common sense points the other way. What Germany had to do was to build up comparatively new industries, in face of the overwhelming competition of Great Britain. In some instances she has been successful, and in some instances it is possible that Protection may have helped her by giving particular manufacturers an advantage in their home market at the expense of the whole German nation. But in England we have no such task to undertake. Our industries are already established; our wares are already known in every quarter of the globe; it is our competition that every other manufacturing country dreads. Nor is that the only difference. In Germany and in France and in the United States it is the home market that Protectionist manufacturers and Protectionist statesmen are anxious to secure. All their efforts are directed towards preventing their own citizens from purchasing British or other foreign goods. But with us the home market is not the primary consideration. Our business is with the whole world: our customers are of every race and colour from the patient Chinaman to the restless New Englander, from the supple Bengalee to the African savage. If we can keep their custom we need have no fear of our power to satisfy the wants of our own countrymen.

ON WHAT SHALL WE LAY A TAX?

It is, indeed, just because the advance of Germany in a few limited directions has scared some people into the belief that we are losing our foreign trade, that such books as Mr. Williams’s “Made in Germany” are written. The whole point of their lament is that Germany is ousting us from neutral markets. Assume that it is so—though it is not—what then? How will Protection help us to maintain the hold we are said to be losing? All that Protection can do is to make more difficult the entry of foreign goods into our own country. But what are the foreign goods that enter our country? Four-fifths at least are food or the raw materials of manufacture. In support of this statement I must refer the reader to the Custom House returns to make his own classification. After going through the figures carefully I arrive at the following rough result for 1895:—

Colonel Howard Vincent, I see, puts the total of manufactured goods at 80 millions. His figure will serve as well as mine. Either shows clearly enough the character of the great mass of our imports. On which of the two main branches, on food or on raw materials, do the Protectionists propose to levy a tax? It is a strange way of helping our manufacturers in their struggle for the markets of the world to impose additional taxation on the food of their workpeople or on the raw materials of their industry.

A NEW ROAD TO FORTUNE.

There remains the comparatively small amount of manufactured goods we import, representing articles which our manufacturers cannot or will not produce at all, or cannot produce so cheaply as the foreigner does. Supposing we taxed every one of these articles as it entered our ports, where would the advantage be to British manufacturers whose main ambition is to send their goods abroad? There is, it is true, just one possibility of benefit to them. It is possible that the imposition of a tax on some of these foreign manufactured articles would enable the British manufacturer so to raise his prices in the home market that he could afford to forego all profit on his sales abroad and sell to his foreign customers at or below cost price. That is the only conceivable way in which a Protective tariff could help the British manufacturer in his rivalry with his German competitors for the markets of the world. As for the cost of this topsy-turvy system of trade it is to be borne of course by that patient ass the British public. The British consumer is to be compelled to pay more dearly for certain goods in order that some other people, Japs or Chinamen, may be able to buy those goods below cost price. Here, again, I will not assert that such an apparent act of folly is not worth committing under given conditions. I can imagine a firm or a country consenting for a time to work for less than no profit in order to get a foothold in a new market. But we already have the foothold, and have already worked it for what it is worth. If now we discover that, for one reason or another, there is no more profit in it, surely our wisest policy is to try something else. Otherwise we might continue for ever to sell at a loss—individual or national—for the sole pleasure of adding to the total figures of our turnover. Even the Protectionists would hardly contend that along such lines lay national prosperity.

INTER-IMPERIAL TRADE.

There is, however, another, though not entirely distinct, proposal for dealing with the alleged mischief of German competition. It is this—that we should try and persuade our Colonies and Possessions to give preferential treatment to our goods in return for a similar preference accorded by us to their goods. It would be unfair to call this scheme Protectionist in the ordinary sense of the term, for it is inspired as much by the desire to bring about a closer union of different portions of the empire as by the fear of foreign competition; but as it is with the question of foreign competition that we are here primarily concerned, we will deal first with the Protectionist side of the proposal. On this side the object aimed at is the destruction or diminution of foreign competition in our Colonial markets. Undoubtedly, were the Colonies willing to make the necessary tariff adjustments in our favour, that object could be attained and our German rivals could be excluded in part or in whole from Canada, from Australia, from India, or from the Cape. So far so good. But what would that exclusion be worth to us? In a previous article I referred to figures showing how insignificant as compared with our own is German trade with our Colonies. It is worth while to present these figures in a fuller form. They will be found in the following table:—

Imports into the following British Possessions.

Average of the Three Years—1890, 1891, 1892.
In Millions Sterling.

These figures are, unfortunately, two or three years behind date, and probably a later return would show that the proportion of British exports to our principal Colonies had fallen off and the German proportion somewhat increased, but this change has certainly not been sufficiently great to affect the general aspect of the table. That table shows that more than half of the total import trade of our Colonies is in our hands, and that our three principal rivals together have little more than a tenth of the whole trade. Indeed, were it not for the inevitably big trade of the United States with Canada, our three rivals together would only have about one-fifteenth of the trade of our Colonies. As for Germany in particular the table shows that the amount of the trade she has so far been able to secure is absolutely insignificant in comparison with our figures.

THE COST TO THE COLONIES.

“But,” argue the preferentialists, “German trade with our Colonies has been growing rapidly, and may continue to grow.” Possibly it may, if our manufacturers go to sleep; but what we have here to consider is whether it is worth while to take any political action to stop the possible growth of a competing trade which at present is insignificant in amount. Remember that if such action is taken by the Colonies to please us, we shall have to pay a price for their complaisance—for their loss by the exclusion of German or any other foreign goods would be twofold. In the first place the Colonial consumer would suffer. He now buys certain German goods because they suit him best, either in quality or in price. That privilege it is proposed to take from him. His loss is therefore certain. Secondly, there is a considerable danger of injury to the Colonial producer. If the Colonies close their markets to German goods Germany may retaliate by closing her markets to Colonial goods; and Germany is, so far as the trade goes, a fair customer to the British Colonies. Here are the figures:—

Trade of British Possessions with Germany.

Average of Three Years (1890, 1891, 1892).—In Thousands Sterling.

WHAT CAN WE OFFER?

This table shows that the Colonial producer stands to lose as much, or more, than the Colonial consumer by cutting off trade connections with Germany. What can we offer in return? It is suggested by the advocates of preferential trade that we should offer better terms to Colonial products in our markets. But already all Colonial products, except tea and coffee, enter the United Kingdom free, therefore we can only give better terms to the Colonies by imposing a tax on those foreign products which compete with the principal Colonial products. What, then, are these competing products? With some trouble I have extracted from the Custom House returns the following list of articles in which there seems to be tangible competition between foreign countries and British Possessions:—

Colonial versus Foreign Goods.

Principal Competing Articles Imported into the United Kingdom in 1895.
Millions Sterling.

It will be seen that without exception the articles in the above list belong either to the category of raw materials or to that of food. Any taxation therefore imposed upon any portion of these articles for the benefit of the Colonial producer would be a disadvantage to the British manufacturer, either by increasing the cost of his raw material or by diminishing the effective wages of his workpeople. Remembering that the main object of the British manufacturer is to keep his hold on the markets of the world, is it likely that he would ever consent to allow himself to be handicapped by such taxation? For all you can offer him in return is preferential treatment in Colonial markets, whereas more than three-quarters of the trade he wishes to retain is with foreign countries.

DIVERGENT AMBITIONS.

There is, however, an even more fundamental difficulty, which neither Colonial nor British preferentialists have yet had the courage to face. It is this:—That the Colonist and the Britisher are aiming at different ends. The Britisher wishes to expand in ever-increasing proportions his manufacturing business, and it is solely because he thinks that he may possibly get a better market for his manufactures in the Colonies than in foreign countries that he gives even momentary approval to the idea of preferential trade. But no Colonist looks forward to his country remaining for ever the dumping ground for British manufactures. He wishes, and wisely wishes, to manufacture for himself, and he has deliberately arranged his tariffs with that end. Towards realising this ambition it will advance him nothing to shut out the puny Teutonic infant and let in the British giant. In like manner, if we turn from manufactures to agriculture we find the same essential divergence of view. The Colonial producer regards England as the best market for his meat and corn and butter. But the British farmer wants none of it. If he is to be ruined by competition from abroad he would as lief that the last nail were driven into his coffin by Argentine beef as by New Zealand mutton.

A DREAM OR A NIGHTMARE?

These objections go to the root of the matter, and show how futile it is to hope that the Mother Country and the Colonies will ever agree on any scheme of preferential trade. But need we, therefore, sit down sorrowing? Does the dream of inter-Imperial trade, if we come to examine it closely, really hold all the beauties that its shadowy shape suggests? Take it either way. Take the scheme either as an end in itself, or as a means to an end. As for the first hypothesis, if trade is itself an end, it matters to us nothing whether we trade with foreigners or fellow subjects; all we have to think of is the profitableness, immediate or prospective, of the trade itself. And from this point of view a growing trade with Germany is worth a good deal more than a declining trade with Australasia. But most advocates of inter-Imperial trade would not admit that their dream is an end in itself. They adopt the second of the two hypotheses just mentioned, and look upon the expansion of inter-Imperial trade as the most convenient means of drawing the Colonies closer to the Mother Country, and to one another.

DOES TRADE UNITE?

With that end no one will quarrel; but how will preferential trade promote it? The preferentialists assume that mutual trade must of necessity promote the closer union of different parts of the Empire. Neither in individual life nor in national life can any fact be found to support that assumption. A man does not necessarily make a bosom friend of his baker and his butcher; he may even be at daggers drawn with his tailor. As for nations it might almost be said that there is the least love exchanged between those who exchange most goods. We are splendid customers to France; we buy French goods with open hands and ask for more, yet where is the love of France for England? Never for a moment do the French cease to gird at us and to try and thwart our national projects solely because we are doing in Egypt what they have done in Tunis and are on the way to do in Madagascar. Germany, on the other hand, is one of our best customers; yet at the beginning of this year, when there seemed to be a chance of war with Germany, a feeling of elation ran through the whole of England. One more illustration: when in December, 1895, President Cleveland’s Message aroused all decent folk on both sides the Atlantic to protest that war between the United Kingdom and the United States was impossible, was it of trade interests that all men thought, or of the tie of common blood? Or, again, did Canada pause to calculate that her best customer was her Southern neighbour, or did she for a moment weigh that fact against the loyalty she owed to the Mother Country?

A NEXUS STRONGER THAN CASH.

The simple truth is that trade has no feelings. We all of us buy and sell to the best advantage we can, and on the whole we do wisely. It is a shrewd saying that warns men to beware of business transactions with their own kinsfolk; nor do we need a prophet to tell us that an attempt to fetter Colonial trade for our own benefit may lose us more affection than it wins us custom. After all, why worry? Our world-embracing commerce is to-day as prosperous as ever it has been. The loyalty of our Colonists no one questions. Let well alone. Our industrial success has not hitherto been dependent on favouring tariffs, nor is there the slightest evidence that old age has yet laid his hand upon our powers. As for the closer union between our Colonists and ourselves, it will hardly be promoted by asking them to sacrifice their commercial freedom to increase the profits of our manufacturers, nor by taxing our food to please their farmers. It is indeed a sign of little faith to even look for a new bond of empire in an arrangement of tariffs. The tie that binds our Colonists to us will not be found in any ledger account, nor is ink the fluid in which that greater Act of Union is writ.