Paine's determination to make no money by his early pamphlets arose partly from his religious and Quaker sentiments. He could not have entered into any war that did not appear to him sacred, and in such a cause his "testimony" could not be that of a "hireling." His "Common Sense," his first Crisis, were inspirations, and during all the time of danger his pen was consecrated to the cause. He had, however, strict and definite ideas of copyright, and was the first to call attention of the country to its necessity, and even to international justice in literary property. In the chaotic condition of such matters his own sacrifices for the national benefit had been to some extent defeated by the rapacity of his first publisher, Bell, who pocketed much of what Paine had intended for the nation. After he had left Bell for Bradford, the former not only published another edition of "Common Sense," but with "large additions," as if from Paine's pen. When the perils of the cause seemed past Paine still desired to continue his literary record clear of any possible charge of payment, but he believed that the country would appreciate this sensitiveness, and, while everybody was claiming something for services, would take care that he did not starve. In this he was mistaken. In that very winter, after he had ventured across the Atlantic and helped to obtain the six million livres, he suffered want. Washington appears to have been the first to consider his case. In the diary of Robert Morris, Superintendent of Finance, there is an entry of January 26, 1782, in which he mentions that Washington had twice expressed to him a desire that some provision should be made for Paine.*

Morris sent for Paine and, in the course of a long conversation, expressed a wish that the author's pen should continue its services to the country; adding that though he had no position to offer him something might turn up. In February Morris mentions further interviews with Paine, in which his assistant, Gouverneur Morris, united; they expressed their high appreciation of his services to the country, and their desire to have the aid of his pen in promoting measures necessary to draw out the resources of the country for the completion of its purpose. They strongly disclaimed any private or partial ends, or a wish to bind his pen to any particular plans. They proposed that he should be paid eight hundred dollars per annum from some national fund. Paine having consented, Robert Morris wrote to Robert R. Livingston on the subject, and the result was a meeting of these two with Washington, at which the following was framed:

"Philadelphia, Feb. 10, 1782.—The subscribers, taking into consideration the important situation of affairs at the present moment, and the propriety and even necessity of informing the people and rousing them into action; considering also the abilities of Mr. Thomas Paine as a writer, and that he has been of considerable utility to the common cause by several of his publications: They are agreed that it will be much for the interest of the United States that Mr. Paine be engaged in their service for the purpose above mentioned. They are therefore agreed that Mr. Paine be offered a salary of $800 per annum, and that the same be paid him by the Secretary of Foreign Affairs. The salary to commence from this day, and to be paid by the Secretary of Foreign Affairs out of monies to be allowed by the Superintendent of Finance for secret services. The subscribers being of opinion that a salary publicly and avowedly given for the above purpose would injure the effect of Mr. Paine's publications, and subject him to injurious personal reflections.

"Robt. Morris.

"Robt. Livingston.

"Go. Washington."

Before this joint note was written, Paine's pen had been resumed. March 5th is the date of an extended pamphlet, that must long have been in hand. It is introduced by some comments on the King's speech, which concludes with a quotation of Smollett's fearful description of the massacres and rapine which followed the defeat of the Stuarts at Culloden in 1746. This, a memory from Paine's boyhood at Thetford, was an effective comment on the King's expression of his desire "to restore the public tranquillity," though poor George III., who was born in the same year as Paine, would hardly have countenanced such vengeance. He then deals—no doubt after consultation with Robert Morris, Superintendent of Finance—with the whole subject of finance and taxation, in the course of which he sounds a brave note for a more perfect union of the States, which must be the foundation-stone of their independence. As Paine was the first to raise the flag of republican independence he was the first to raise that of a Union which, above the States, should inherit the supremacy wrested from the Crown. These passages bear witness by their nicety to the writer's consciousness that he was touching a sensitive subject. The States were jealous of their "sovereignty," and he could only delicately intimate the necessity of surrendering it But he manages to say that "each state (with a small s) is to the United States what each individual is to the state he lives in. And it is on this grand point, this movement upon one centre, that our existence as a nation, our happiness as a people, and our safety as individuals, depend." He also strikes the federal keynote by saying: "The United States will become heir to an extensive quantity of vacant land"—the doctrine of national inheritance which cost him dear.

Before the Declaration, Paine minted the phrases "Free and Independent States of America," and "The Glorious Union." In his second Crisis, dated January 13, 1777, he says to Lord Howe: "'The United States of America' will sound as pompously in the world or in history as 'the kingdom of Great Britain.'"

The friendliness of Robert Morris to the author is creditable to him. In the Deane controversy, Paine had censured him and other members of Congress for utilizing that agent of the United States to transact their commercial business in Europe. Morris frankly stated the facts, and, though his letter showed irritation, he realized that Paine was no respecter of persons where the American cause was concerned.* In 1782 the Revolution required nicest steering. With the port in sight, the people were prone to forget that it is on the coast that dangerous rocks are to be found. Since the surrender of Cornwallis they were over-confident, and therein likely to play into the hands of the enemy, which had lost confidence in its power to conquer the States by arms. England was now making efforts to detach America and France from each other by large inducements. In France Paine was shown by Franklin and Vergennes the overtures that had been made, and told the secret history of the offers of mediation from Russia and Austria. With these delicate matters he resolved to deal, but before using the documents in his possession consulted Washington and Morris. This, I suppose, was the matter alluded to in a note of March 17, 1782, to Washington, then in Philadelphia:

"You will do me a great deal of pleasure if you can make it convenient to yourself to spend a part of an evening at my apartments, and eat a few oysters or a crust of bread and cheese; for besides the favour you will do me, I want much to consult with you on a matter of public business, tho' of a secret nature, which I have already mentioned to Mr. Morris, whom I likewise intend to ask, as soon as yourself shall please to mention the evening when."

A similar note was written to Robert Morris four days before. No doubt after due consultation the next Crisis, dated May 22, 1782, appeared. It dealt with the duties of the alliance:

"General Conway," he says, "who made the motion in the British parliament for discontinuing offensive war in America, is a gentleman of an amiable character. We have no personal quarrel with him. But he feels not as we feel; he is not in our situation, and that alone without any other explanation is enough. The British parliament suppose they have many friends in America, and that, when all chance of conquest is over, they will be able to draw her from her alliance with France. Now if I have any conception of the human heart, they will fail in this more than in anything that they have yet tried. This part of the business is not a question of policy only, but of honor and honesty."

Paine's next production was a public letter to Sir Guy Carleton, commanding in New York, concerning a matter which gave Washington much anxiety. On April 12th Captain Huddy had been hanged by a band of "refugees," who had sallied from New York into New Jersey (April 12th). The crime was traced to one Captain Lippencott, and, after full consultation with his officers, Washington demanded the murderer. Satisfaction not being given, Washington and his generals determined on retaliation, and Colonel Hazen, who had prisoners under guard at Lancaster, was directed to have an officer of Captain Huddy's rank chosen by lot to suffer death. Hazen included the officers who had capitulated with Cornwallis, though they were expressly relieved from liability to reprisals (Article 14). The lot fell upon one of these, young Captain Asgill (May 27th). It sufficiently proves the formidable character of the excitement Huddy's death had caused in the army that Washington did not at once send Asgill back. The fact that he was one of the capitulation officers was not known outside the military circle. Of this circumstance Paine seems ignorant when he wrote his letter to Sir Guy Carleton, in which he expresses profound sympathy with Captain Huddy, and warns Carle-ton that by giving sanctuary to the murderer he becomes the real executioner of the innocent youth. Washington was resolved to hang this innocent man, and, distressing as the confession is, no general appears to have warned him of the wrong he was about to commit.* But Paine, with well-weighed words, gently withstood the commander, prudently ignoring the legal point, if aware of it.

This was written on September 7th, and on the 30th Washington, writing to a member of Congress, for the first time intimates a desire that Asgill shall be released by that body.

In October came from Vergennes a letter, inspired by Marie Antoinette, to whom Lady Asgill had appealed, in which he reminds Washington that the Captain is a prisoner whom the King's arms contributed to surrender into his hands. That he had a right, therefore, to intercede for his life. This letter (of July 29, 1782) was laid before Congress, which at once set Asgill at liberty. Washington was relieved, and wrote the Captain a handsome congratulation.

Although Paine could never find the interval of leisure necessary to write consecutively his "History of the Revolution," it is to a large extent distributed through his writings. From these and his letters a true history of that seven years can be gathered, apart from the details of battles; and even as regards these his contributions are of high importance, notably as regards the retreat across the Delaware, the affairs at Trenton and Princeton, and the skirmishes near Philadelphia following the British occupation of that city. The latter are vividly described in his letter to Franklin (p. 104), and the former in his review of the AbbÉ' Raynal.

In his letter to Washington, of November 30, 1781, Paine mentioned that he had begun "some remarks" on the AbbÉ's work "On the Revolution of the English Colonies in North America." It was published early in September, 1782. The chief interest of the pamphlet, apart from the passages concerning the military events of 1776, lies in its reflections of events in the nine months during which the paper lingered on his table. In those months he wrote four numbers of the Crisis, one of urgent importance on the financial situation. The review of the AbbÉ's history was evidently written at intervals. As a literary production it is artistic. With the courtliness of one engaged in "an affair of honor," he shakes the AbbÉ's hand, sympathizes with his misfortune in having his manuscript stolen, and thus denied opportunity to revise the errors for which he must be called to account. His main reason for challenging the historian is an allegation that the Revolution originated in the question "whether the mother country had, or had not, a right to lay, directly or indirectly, a slight tax upon the colonies." The quantity of the tax had nothing to do with it The tax on tea was a British experiment to test its declaratory Act affirming the right of Parliament "to bind America in all cases whatever," and that claim was resisted in the first stage of its execution. Secondly, the AbbÉ suffers for having described the affair at Trenton as accidental. Paine's answer is an admirable piece of history. Thirdly, the AbbÉ suggests that the Americans would probably have accommodated their differences with England when commissioners visited them in April, 1778, but for their alliance with France. Paine affirms that Congress had rejected the English proposals (afterwards brought by the commissioners) on April 22d, eleven days before news arrived of the French alliance.*

The AbbÉ is metaphysically punished for assuming that a French monarchy in aiding defenders of liberty could have no such motive as "the happiness of mankind." Not having access to the archives of France, Paine was able to endow Vergennes with the enthusiasm of Lafayette, and to see in the alliance a new dawning era of international affection. All such alliances are republican. The AbbÉ is leniently dealt with for his clear plagiarisms from Paine, and then left for a lecture to England. That country is advised to form friendship with France and Spain; to expand its mind beyond its island, and improve its manners. This is the refrain of a previous passage.

"If we take a review of what part Britain has acted we shall find everything which should make a nation blush. The most vulgar abuse, accompanied by that species of haughtiness which distinguishes the hero of a mob from the character of a gentleman; it was equally as much from her manners as her injustice that she lost the colonies. By the latter she provoked their principle, by the former she wore out their temper; and it ought to be held out as an example to the world, to show how necessary it is to conduct the business of government with civility."

The close of this essay, written with peace in the air, contains some friendly advice to England. She is especially warned to abandon Canada, which, after loss of the thirteen colonies, will be a constant charge. Canada can never be populous, and of all that is done for it "Britain will sustain the expense, and America reap the advantage."

In a letter dated "Bordentown, September 7, 1782," Paine says to Washington:

"I have the honour of presenting you with fifty copies of my Letter to the AbbÉ Raynal, for the use of the army, and to repeat to you my acknowledgments for your friendship.

"I fully believe we have seen our worst days over. The spirit of the war, on the part of the enemy, is certainly on the decline full as much as we think. I draw this opinion not only from the present promising appearance of things, and the difficulties we know the British Cabinet is in; but I add to it the peculiar effect which certain periods of time have, more or less, on all men. The British have accustomed themselves to think of seven years in a manner different to other portions of time. They acquire this partly by habit, by reason, by religion, and by superstition. They serve seven years' apprenticeship—they elect their parliament for seven years—they punish by seven years' transportation, or the duplicate or triplicate of that term—they let their leases in the same manner, and they read that Jacob served seven years for one wife, and after that seven years for another; and the same term likewise extinguishes all obligations (in certain cases) of debt, or matrimony: and thus this particular period of time, by a variety of concurrences, has obtained an influence on their mind. They have now had seven years of war, and are no farther on the Continent than when they began. The superstitious and populous part will therefore conclude that it is not to be, and the rational part of them will think they have tried an unsuccessful and expensive experiment long enough, and that it is in vain to try it any longer, and by these two joining in the same eventual opinion the obstinate part among them will be beaten out, unless, consistent with their former sagacity, they get over the matter at once by passing a new declaratory Act to bind Time in all casts whatsoever, or declare him a rebel."

The rest of this letter is the cautious and respectful warning against the proposed execution of Captain Asgill, quoted elsewhere. Washington's answer is cheerful, and its complimentary close exceptionally cordial.

Head-Quarters, Verplank's Point, 18 September, 1782.—Sir,—I have the pleasure to acknowledge your favor, informing me of your proposal to present me with fifty copies of your last publication for the amusement of the army. For this intention you have my sincere thanks, not only on my own account, but for the pleasure, which I doubt not the gentlemen of the army will receive from the perusal of your pamphlets. Your observations on the period of seven years, as it applies itself to and affects British minds, are ingenious, and I wish it may not fail of its effects in the present instance. The measures and the policy of the enemy are at present in great perplexity and embarrassment—but I have my fears, whether their necessities (which are the only operating motives with them) are yet arrived to that point, which must drive them unavoidably into what they will esteem disagreeable and dishonorable terms of peace,—such, for instance, as an absolute, unequivocal admission of American Independence, upon the terms on which she can accept it. For this reason, added to the obstinacy of the King, and the probable consonant principles of some of the principal ministers, I have not so full a confidence in the success of the present negociation for peace as some gentlemen entertain. Should events prove my jealousies to be ill founded, I shall make myself happy under the mistake, consoling myself with the idea of having erred on the safest side, and enjoying with as much satisfaction as any of my countrymen the pleasing issue of our severe contest.

"The case of Captain Asgill has indeed been spun out to a great length—but, with you, I hope that its termination will not be unfavourable to this country.

"I am, sir, with great esteem and regard,

"Your most obedient servant,

"G. Washington."

A copy of the answer to the AbbÉ Raynal was sent by Paine to Lord Shelburne, and with it in manuscript his newest Crisis, dated October 29, 1782. This was suggested by his lordship's speech of July 10th, in which he was reported to have said: "The independence of America would be the ruin of England." "Was America then," asks Paine, "the giant of empire, and England only her dwarf in waiting? Is the case so strangely altered, that those who once thought we could not live without them are now brought to declare that they cannot exist without us?"

Paine's prediction that it would be a seven years' war was nearly true. There was indeed a dismal eighth year, the army not being able to disband until the enemy had entirely left the country,—a year when peace seemed to "break out" like another war. The army, no longer uplifted by ardors of conflict with a foreign foe, became conscious of its hunger, its nakedness, and the prospect of returning in rags to pauperized homes. They saw all the civil officers of the country paid, while those who had defended them were unpaid; and the only explanations that could be offered—the inability of Congress, and incoherence of the States—formed a new peril. The only hope of meeting an emergency fast becoming acute, was the unanimous adoption by the States of the proposal of Congress for a five-per-cent. duty on imported articles, the money to be applied to the payment of interest on loans to be made in Holland. Several of the States had been dilatory in their consent, but Rhode Island absolutely refused, and Paine undertook to reason with that State. In the Providence Gazette, December 21st, appeared the following note, dated "Philadelphia, November 27, 1782 ":

"Sir,—Inclosed I send you a Philadelphia paper of this day's date, and desire you to insert the piece signed 'A Friend to Rhode Island and the Union.' I am concerned that Rhode Island should make it necessary to address a piece to her, on a subject which the rest of the States are agreed in.—Yours &c. Thomas Paine."

The insertion of Paine's letter led to a fierce controversy, the immediate subject of which is hardly of sufficient importance to detain us long.*

Yet this controversy, which presently carried Paine to Providence, where he wrote and published six letters, raised into general discussion the essential principles of Union. Rhode Island's jealousy of its "sovereignty"—in the inverse ratio of its size,—made it the last to enter a Union which gave it equal legislative power with the greatest States; it need not be wondered then that at this earlier period, when sovereignty and self-interest combined, our pioneer of nationality had to undergo some martyrdom. "What," he asked, "would the sovereignity of any individual state be, if left to itself to contend with a foreign power? It is on our united sovereignty that our greatness and safety, and the security of our foreign commerce, rest. This united sovereignty then must be something more than a name, and requires to be as completely organized for the line it is to act in as that of any individual state, and, if anything, more so, because more depends on it." He received abuse, and such ridicule as this (February 1st):

"In the Name of Common Sense, Amen, I, Thomas Paine, having according to appointment, proceeded with all convenient speed to answer the objections to the five per cent, by endeavouring to cover the design and blind the subject, before I left Philadelphia, and having proceeded to a convenient place of action in the State of Rhode Island, and there republished my first letter," etc.