CHAPTER XIV. THE PHILOSOPHERS OF THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY.--CONDILLAC, DIDEROT, HELVETIUS, AND KANT.

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338. The Philosophers of the Eighteenth Century.—If there has been considerable progress made in education in the eighteenth century, it is due, in great part, to the efforts of the philosophers of that age. It is no longer alone the men who are actually engaged in the schools that are preoccupied with education; but nearly all the illustrious thinkers of the eighteenth century have discussed these great questions with more or less thoroughness. The subject is far from being exhausted by the study of Rousseau. Besides the educational current set in movement by the Émile, the other philosophers of that period, in their isolated and independent march, left original routes which it remains to follow. From out their errors and conceptions of systems there emerge some new outlooks and some definite truths.

339. Condillac (1715-1780).—An acute and ingenious psychologist, a competitor and rival of Locke in philosophy, Condillac is far from having the same authority in matters pertaining to education; but still there is profit to be derived from the reading of his Course of Study, which includes not less than thirteen volumes. This important work is a collection of the lessons which he had composed for the education of the infant Ferdinand, the grandson of Louis XV., and heir of the dukedom of Parma, whose preceptor he became in 1757.

340. Abuse of the Philosophic Spirit.—It is certainly a matter of congratulation that the philosophical spirit is entering more and more largely into the theories of education, and there would be only words of commendation for Condillac had he restricted himself to this excellent declaration, that pedagogy is nothing if it is not a deduction from psychology. But he does not stop there, but with an indiscretion that is to be regretted, he arbitrarily transports into education certain philosophical principles which it is not proper to apply to the art of educating men, whatever may be their theoretical truth; thus Condillac, having established the natural order of the development of the sciences and the arts in the history of humanity, presumes to impose the same law of progress upon the child.

“The method which I have followed does not resemble the usual manner of teaching; but it is the very way in which men were led to create the arts and the sciences.”[177]

In other terms, the child must do over again, on his own account, “that which the race has done.” He must be compelled to follow, step by step, in its long gropings, the slow progress made by the race.[178]

There is, doubtless, an element of truth in the error of Condillac. The sciences and the arts began with the observation of particulars, and thence slowly rose to general principles; and to-day no one thinks of denying the necessity of proceeding in the same manner in education, so far as this is possible. It is well at the first to present facts to the child, and to lead him step by step, from observation to observation, to the law which governs them and includes them; but there is a wide distance between the discreet use of the inductive and experimental method, and the exaggerations of Condillac. No one should seriously think of absolutely suppressing the synthetic method of exposition, which, taking advantage of the work accomplished through the centuries, teaches at the outset the truths that have been already acquired. It would be absurd to compel the child painfully to recommence the toil of the race.[179]

Graver still, Condillac, led astray by his love for philosophizing, presumes to initiate the child, from the very beginning of his studies, into psychological analysis.

“The first thing to be done is to make the child acquainted with the faculties of his soul, and to make him feel the need of making use of them.”

In other terms, the analysis of the soul shall be the first object proposed to the reflection of the child. It is not proposed to make him attentive, but to teach him what attention is.

How can one seriously think of making of the child a little psychologist, and of choosing as the first element of his education the very science that is the most difficult of all, the one which can be but the coronation of his studies?

341. Must we reason with Children?—Rousseau had sharply criticised the famous maxim of Locke: “We must reason with children.” Condillac tries to restore it to credit, and for this purpose he invokes the pretended demonstrations of a superficial and inexact psychology.

“It has been proved,” he says, “that the faculty of reasoning begins as soon as the senses commence to develop; and we have the early use of our senses only because we early began to reason.” Strange assertions, which are disproved by the most elementary observation of the facts in the case. Condillac here allows himself to be imposed upon by his sensational psychology, the tendency of which is to efface the peculiar character of the different intellectual faculties, to derive them all from the senses, and, consequently, to suppress the distance which separates a simple sensation from the subtile, reflective, and abstract process which is called reasoning. It cannot be admitted for a single instant that the faculties of the understanding are, as he says, “the same in the child as in the mature man.” There is, doubtless, in the child a beginning of reasoning, a sort of instinctive logic; but this infantile reasoning can be applied only to familiar objects, such as are sensible and concrete. It were absurd to employ it on general and abstract ideas.

342. Preliminary Lessons.—We shall quote, without comment, the first subjects of instruction which, under the title of LeÇons prÉliminaires, Condillac proposes to his pupil: 1. the nature of ideas; 2. the operations of the soul; 3. the habits; 4. the difference between the soul and the body; 5. the knowledge of God.

How are we to conceive that Condillac had the pretension to place these high philosophical speculations within the reach of a child of seven years who has not yet studied the grammar of his native language! How much better some fables or historical narratives would answer his purpose!

But Condillac does not stop there. When his pupil has a systematic knowledge of the operations of the soul, when he has comprehended the genesis of ideas; in a word, when, towards the age of eight or ten, he is as proficient in philosophy as his master, and almost as capable of writing the Treatise on Sensations, what do you think he is invited to study? Something which very much resembles the philosophy of history:—

“After having made him reflect on his own infancy, I thought that the infancy of the world would be the most interesting subject for him, and the easiest to study.”

343. The Art of Thinking.—It is only when he judges that the mind of his pupil is sufficiently prepared by psychological analysis and by general reflections on the progress of humanity, that Condillac decides to have him enter upon the ordinary course of study. Here the spirit of system disappears, and gives place to more judicious and more practical ideas. Thus Condillac thinks that “the study of grammar would be more wearisome than useful if it come too early.” Would that he had applied this principle to psychology! Before studying grammar, then, Condillac’s pupil reads the poets,—the French poets, of course,—and preferably the dramatic authors, Racine especially, whom he reads for the twelfth time. The real knowledge of the language precedes the abstract study of the rules. Condillac himself composed a grammar entitled the Art of Speaking. In this he imitates the authors of Port Royal, “who,” he says, “were the first to write elementary books on an intelligent plan.” After the Art of Speaking he calls the attention of his pupil to three other treatises in succession,—the Art of Writing, or rhetoric, the Art of Reasoning, or logic, and the Art of Thinking. We shall not attempt an analysis of these works, which have gone out of date, notwithstanding the value of certain portions of them. The general characteristic of these treatises on intellectual education is that the author is pre-occupied with the relations of ideas more than with the exterior elegancies of style, with the development of thought more than with the beauties of language:—

“Especially must the intelligence be nourished, even as the body is nourished. We must present to it knowledge, which is the wholesome aliment of spirit, opinions and errors being aliment that is poisonous. It is also necessary that the intelligence be active, for the thought remains imbecile as long as, passive rather than active, it moves at random.”

344. Other Parts of the Course of Study.—It seems that Condillac is in pursuit of but one single purpose,—to make of his pupil a thinking being. The study of Latin is postponed till the time when the intelligence, being completely formed, will find in the study of that language only the difficulty of learning words. Condillac has but little taste for the study of the ancient languages. He relegates the study of Latin to the second place, and omits Greek entirely. But he accords a great importance to historical studies.

“After having learned to think, the Prince made the study of history his principal object for six years.”

Twelve volumes of the Course of Study have transmitted to us Condillac’s lessons in history. In this he does not take delight, as Rollin does, in long narrations; but he analyzes, multiplies his reflections, and abridges facts; he philosophizes more than he recites the facts of history.

345. Personal Reflection.—What we have said of Condillac’s Course of Study suffices to justify the judgment expressed of his pedagogy by one of his disciples, GÉrando, when he wrote: “He who had so thoroughly studied the manner in which ideas are formed in the human mind, had but little skill in calling them into being in the intelligence of his pupil.”

But we would judge our author unjustly if, after the criticisms we have made of him, we were not to accord him the praise he deserves, especially for having comprehended, as he has done, the value of personal reflection, and the superiority of judgment over memory. A few quotations will rehabilitate the pedagogy of Condillac in the minds of our readers.

Above all else there must be an exercise in personal reflection:—

“I grant that the education which cultivates only the memory may make prodigies, and that it has done so; but these prodigies last only during the time of infancy.... He who knows only by heart, knows nothing.... He who has not learned to reflect has not been instructed, or, what is still worse, has been poorly instructed.”

“True knowledge is in the reflection, which has acquired it, much more than in the memory, which holds it in keeping; and the things which we are capable of recovering are better known than those of which we have a recollection. It does not suffice, then, to give a child knowledge. It is necessary that he instruct himself by seeking knowledge on his own account, and the essential point is to guide him properly. If he is led in an orderly way, he will acquire exact ideas, and will seize their succession and relation. Then, able to call them up for review, he will be able to compare them with others that are more remote, and to make a final choice of those which he wishes to study. Reflection can always recover the things it has known, because it knows how it originally found them; but the memory does not so recover the things it has learned, because it does not know how it learns.”

This is why Condillac places far above the education we receive, the education that we give ourselves:—

“Henceforth, Sir, it remains for you alone to instruct yourself. Perhaps you imagine you have finished; but it is I who have finished. You are to begin anew!”

346. Excessive Devotion Criticised.—What beautiful lessons Condillac also addresses to his pupil to induce him to enfranchise himself from ecclesiastical tutelage! Written by an abbot, the eloquent page we are about to read proves how the lay spirit tended to pronounce itself in the eighteenth century.

“You cannot be too pious, Sir; but if your piety is not enlightened, you will so far forget your duties as to be engrossed in the little things of devotion. Because prayer is necessary, you will think you ought always to be praying, not considering that true devotion consists first of all in fulfilling the duties of your station in life: it will not be your fault that you do not live in your heart as in a cloister. Hypocrites will swarm around you, the monks will issue from their cells. The priests will abandon the service of the altar in order to be edified with the sight of your holy works. Blind prince! you will not perceive how their conduct is in contradiction with their language. You will not even observe that the men who praise you for always being at the foot of the altar, themselves forget that it is their own duty to be there. You will unconsciously take their place and leave to them your own. You will be continually at prayer, and you will believe that you assure your salvation. They will cease to pray, and you will believe that they assure their salvation. Strange contradiction, which turns aside ministers from the Church to give bad ministers to the State.”[180]

347. Diderot (1713-1784).—To him who knows nothing of Diderot save his works of imagination, often so licentious, it will doubtless be a surprise to see the name of this fantastic writer inscribed in the catalogue of educators. But this astonishment will disappear if we will take the trouble to recollect with what versatility this mighty spirit could vary the subject of his reflections, and pass from the gay to the solemn, and especially with what ardor, in conjunction with D’Alembert, he was the principal founder of the EncyclopÉdie, and the indefatigable contributor to it.

348. His Pedagogical Works.—But there is no room for doubt. Diderot has written at least two treatises that belong to the history of education: first, about 1773, The Systematic Refutation of the Book of Helvetius on Man, an incisive and eloquent criticism of the paradoxes and errors of Helvetius; and, in the second place, about 1776, a complete scheme of education, composed at the request of Catherine II., under the title, Plan of a University.[181]

349. His Merits as an Educator.—Doubtless Diderot did not have sufficient gravity of character or sufficiently definite ideas to be a perfect educator; but, by way of compensation, the natural and acquired qualities of his mind made him worthy of the confidence placed in him by Catherine II. in entrusting him with the organization, at least in theory, of the instruction of the Russian people. First of all, he had the merit of being a universal thinker, “sufficiently versed in all the sciences to know their value, and not sufficiently profound in any one to give it a preference inspired by predilection.” Engaged in the scientific movement, of which the EncyclopÉdie was the centre, he at the same time cherished an enthusiastic passion for letters. He worshipped Shakespeare and modern poetry, but he was not less enamored of classical antiquity, and for several years, he says, “he thought it as much a religious duty to read a song of Homer as a good priest would to recite his breviary.”

350. Necessity of Instruction.—Diderot, and this is to his praise, is distinguished from the most of his contemporaries, and especially from Rousseau, by his ardent faith in the moral efficacy of instruction:—

“Far from corrupting,” he exclaims, “instruction sweetens character, throws light on duty, makes vice less gross, and either chokes it or conceals it.... I dare assert that purity of morals has followed the progress of dress, from the skin of animals to fabrics of silk.”

Hence he decides on the necessity of instruction for all:—

“From the prime minister to the lowest peasant, it is good for every one to know how to read, write, and count.”

And he proposes to all people the example of Germany, with her strongly organized system of primary instruction. He demands schools open to all children, “schools of reading, writing, arithmetic, and religion,” in which will be studied both a moral and a political catechism. Attendance on these schools shall be obligatory, and to make compulsion possible, Diderot demands gratuity. He goes even farther, and would have the child fed at school, and with his books would have him find bread.

351. The Conception of Public Instruction.—Like all who sincerely desire a strong organization of instruction, Diderot assigns the direction of it to the State. His ideal of a Russian university bears a strong resemblance to the French University of 1808. He would have at its head a politician, a statesman, to whom should be submitted all the affairs of public instruction. He even went so far as to entrust to this general master of the university the duty of presiding over the examinations, of appointing the presidents of colleges, of excluding bad pupils, and of deposing professors and tutors.

352. Criticism of French Colleges.—Secondary instruction, what was then called the Faculty of Arts, is the principal object of Diderot’s reflections. He criticises the traditional system with extreme severity, and his charge, thought sometimes unjust, deserves to be quoted:—

“It is in the Faculty of Arts that there are still taught to-day, under the name of belles-lettres, two dead languages which are of use only to a small number of citizens; it is there that they are studied for six or seven years without being learned; under the name of rhetoric, the art of speaking is taught before the art of thinking, and that of speaking elegantly before having ideas; under the name of logic, the head is filled with the subtilties of Aristotle, and of his very sublime and very useless theory of the syllogism, and there is spread over a hundred obscure pages what might have been clearly stated in four; under the name of ethics, I do not know what is said, but I know that there is not a word said either of the qualities of mind or heart; under the name of metaphysics, there are discussed theses as trifling as they are knotty, the first elements of scepticism and bigotry, and the germ of the unfortunate gift of replying to everything; under the name of physics, there is endless dispute about the elements of matter and the system of the world; but not a word on natural history, not a word on real chemistry, very little on the movement and fall of bodies; very few experiments, less still of anatomy, and nothing of geography.”[182]

353. Proposed Reforms.—After such a spirited criticism, it was Diderot’s duty to propose earnest and radical reforms; but all of those which he suggests are not equally commendable.

Let us first note the idea revived in our day by Auguste Comte and the school of positivists, of a connection and a subordination of the sciences, classified in a certain order, according as they presuppose the science which has preceded, or as they facilitate the study of the science which follows, and also according to the measure of their utility.[183] It is according to this last principle in particular, that Diderot distributes the work of the school, after having called attention to the fact that the order of the sciences, as determined by the needs of the school, is not their logical order:—

“The natural connection of one science with the others designates for it a place, and the principle of utility, more or less general, determines for it another place.”

But Diderot forgets that we must take into account, not alone the principle of utility in the distribution of studies, but that the essential thing of all others is to adapt the order of studies to the progress of the child in age and aptitudes.

354. Preferences for the Sciences.—Although equally enamored of letters and the sciences, Diderot did not know how to hold a just balance between a literary and a scientific education. Anticipating Condorcet and Auguste Comte, he displaces the centre of instruction, and gives a preponderance to the sciences. Of the eight classes comprised in his Faculty of Arts, the first five are devoted to the mathematics, to mechanics, to astronomy, to physics, and to chemistry. Grammar and the ancient languages are relegated to the last three years, which nearly correspond to what are called in our colleges the “second” and “rhetoric.”[184]

The charge that must be brought against Diderot in this place, is not merely that he puts an unreasonable restriction on literary studies, but also that he makes a bad distribution of scientific studies in placing the mathematics before physics. It is useless for him to assert that “it is easier to learn geometry than to learn to read.” He does not convince us of this. It is a grave error to begin by keeping the child’s attention on numerical abstractions, by leaving his senses unemployed, by postponing so long the study of natural history and experimental physics, those sciences expressly adapted to children, because, as Diderot himself expresses it, “they involve a continuous exercise of sight, smell, taste, and memory.”

To excuse Diderot’s error, it does not suffice to state that his pupil does not enter the Faculty of Arts till his twelfth year. Till that period, he will learn only reading, writing, and orthography. There is ground for thinking that these first years will be rather poorly employed; but besides this, it is evident that even at the age of twelve the mind is not sufficiently mature to be plunged into the cold deductions of mathematics.

355. Incomplete Views as to the Scope of Literary Studies.—Diderot’s attitude with respect to classical studies is a matter of surprise. On the one hand, he postpones their study till the pupil’s nineteenth and twentieth year. On the other, with what enthusiasm this eloquent scholar speaks of the ancients, particularly of Homer!

“Homer is the master to whom I am indebted for whatever merit I have, if indeed I have any at all. It is difficult to attain to excellence in taste without a knowledge of the Greek and Latin languages. I early drew my intellectual nourishment from Homer, Virgil, Horace, Terence, Anacreon, Plato, and Euripides on the one hand, and from Moses and the Prophets on the other.”

How are we to explain this contradiction of an inconsistent and ungrateful humanist who extols the humanities to the skies, and at the same time puts such restrictions on the teaching of them as almost to annihilate them? The reason for this is, that, in his opinion, the belles-lettres are useful only for the training of orators and poets, but are not serviceable in the general development of the mind. Consequently, being fancy studies, so to speak, they are fit only for a small minority of pupils, and have no right to the first place in a common education, destined for men in general. Diderot is not able to discern what, in pedagogy, is their true title to nobility,—that they are an admirable instrument of intellectual gymnastics, and the surest and also the most convenient means of acquiring those qualities of justness, of precision, and of clearness, which are needed by all conditions of men, and are applicable to all the special employments of life.[185]

356. Opinion of Marmontel.—Diderot seems to reduce the office of letters to a study of words, and to an exercise of memory. He might have learned a lesson from one of his contemporaries, Marmontel, whose intellect, though less brilliant, was sometimes more just, an advantage which the intelligence gains from early discipline in the study of the languages:—

“The choice and use of words, in translating from one language to another, and even then some degree of elegance in the construction of sentences, began to interest me; and this work, which did not proceed without the analysis of ideas, fortified my memory. I perceived that it was the idea attached to the word which made it take root, and reflection soon made me feel that the study of the languages was also the study of the art of distinguishing shades of thought, of decomposing it, of forming its texture, and of catching with precision its spirit and its relations; and that along with words, an equal number of new ideas were introduced and developed in the heads of the young,[186] and that in this way the early classes were a course in elementary philosophy, much more rich, more extended, and of greater real utility than we think, when we complain that in our colleges nothing is learned but Latin.”[187]

357. Other Novelties in Diderot’s Plan.—Without entering into the details of the very elaborate organization of Diderot’s Russian University, we shall call attention to some other novelties of his system:—

1. The division of the classes into several series of parallel courses: first, the series of scientific and literary courses; then, the series of lectures devoted to religion, to ethics, and to history; and finally, courses in drawing, music, etc.

2. The whimsical idea of teaching history in an inverted order, so to speak, in beginning with the most recent events, and little by little going back to antiquity.

3. His extreme estimate of the art of reading: “Let a teacher of reading be associated with a professor of drawing; there are so few men, even the most enlightened, who know how to read well, a gift always so agreeable, and often so necessary.”

4. A special regard for the study of art and for Æsthetic education, which could not be a matter of indifference to the great art critic who wrote the Salons.

5. A reform in the system of ushers.[188] Diderot would have for supervising assistants in colleges, educated men, capable on occasion of supplying the places of the professors themselves. To attach them to their duties, he requires that some dignity be given to their modest and useful functions, and that the usher be a sort of supernumerary, or “professor in reversion,” who aspires to the chair of the professor, whose place he supplies from time to time, and which he may finally attain.

358. Helvetius (1715-1771).—In undertaking the study of the thoughts of Helvetius on education, and the rapid analysis of his Treatise on Man, we shall not take leave of Diderot, for the work of Helvetius has had the good or the bad fortune of being commented on and criticised by his illustrious contemporary. Thanks to the Systematic Refutation of the Book of Helvetius on Man, which forms a charming accompaniment of pungent or vigorous reflections to a dull and languid book, the reading of the monotonous treatise of Helvetius becomes easy and almost agreeable.

359. The Treatise on Man.—Under this title, a little long, De l’homme, de ses facultÉs intellectuelles et de son Éducation, Helvetius has composed a large work which he had in contemplation for fifteen years, and which did not appear till after his death, in 1772. As a matter of fact, education does not directly occupy the author’s attention except in the first and the last chapters (sections I. and X.). With this exception, the whole book is devoted to long developments of the favorite maxims of his philosophy: as the intellectual equality of all men, and the reduction of all the passions to the pursuit of pleasure; or to platitudes, such as the influence of laws on the happiness of people, and the evils which result from ignorance.

360. Potency of Education.—When he does not fall into platitudes, Helvetius goes off into paradoxes that are presumptuous and systematic. His habitual characteristic is pedantry in what is false. According to him, for example, education is all-powerful; it is the sole cause of the difference between minds. The mind of the child is but an empty capacity, something indeterminate, without predisposition. The impressions of the senses are the only elements of the intelligence; so that the acquisitions of the five senses are the only thing that is of moment; “the senses are all that there is of man.” It is not possible to push sensationalism further than this.

The impressions of the senses are, then, the basis of human nature, and as these impressions vary with circumstances, Helvetius arrives at this conclusion, that chance is the great master in the formation of mind and character. Consequently, he undertakes to produce at will men of genius, or, at least, men of talent. For this purpose, it suffices to ascertain, by repeated observations, the means which chance employs for making great men. These means once discovered, it remains only to set them at work artificially and to combine them, in order to produce the same effects.

“Genius is a product of chance. Rousseau, like a countless number of illustrious men, may be regarded as one of the masterpieces of chance.”

361. Helvetius refuted by Diderot.—It is easy to reply to extravagant statements of this sort. Had Helvetius consulted teachers and parents, had he observed himself, had he simply reflected on his two daughters, so unequally endowed though identically educated, he would doubtless have felt constrained to acknowledge the limitations of education; he would have comprehended that it cannot give imagination to minds of sluggish temperament, nor enthusiasm and sensibility to inert souls, and that the most marvellously helpful circumstances will not make of a Helvetius a Montesquieu or a Voltaire.

But if it is easy to refute Helvetius, it is impossible to criticise him with more brilliancy and eloquence than Diderot has done. With what perfection of reason he restores to nature, to innate and irresistible inclinations, the influence which Helvetius denies to them in the formation of character!

“The accidents of Helvetius,” he says, “are like the spark which sets on fire a cask of wine, and which is extinguished in a bucket of water.”

“For thousands of centuries the dew of heaven has fallen on the rocks without making them fertile. The sown fields await it in order to become productive, but it is not the dew that scatters the seed. Accidents themselves no more produce anything, than the pick of the laborer who delves in the mines of Golconda produces the diamond that it brings to the surface.”

Doubtless education has a more radical effect than that which is attributed to it by La BruyÈre when he said that “it touches only the surface of the soul.” But if it can do much, it cannot do all. It perfects if it is good; it deadens and it perverts if it is bad; but it can never be a substitute for lacking aptitude, and can never replace nature.

362. Secularized Instruction.—In other parts of his system Helvetius is in accord with Diderot. Like him, he believes the necessary condition of progress in education is that it be made secular and entrusted to the civil power. The vices of education come from the opposition of the two powers, spiritual and temporal, that assume to direct it. Between the Church and the State there is an opposition of interests and views. The State would have the nation become brave, industrious, and enlightened. The Church demands a blind submission and unlimited credulity. Hence there is contradiction in pedagogical precepts, diversity in the means that are employed, and, consequently, an education that is hesitating, that is pulled in opposite directions, that does not know definitely where it is going, that misses its way, that gropes and wastes time.

But the conclusion of Helvetius is not as we might expect,—the separation of Church and State in the matter of instruction and education, such as recent laws have established in France. No; Helvetius would have the State absorb the Church, and have religious power and civil power lodged in the same hands and both belong to those who control the government,—a vexatious confusion that would end in the oppression of consciences.

Helvetius, whatever may be thought of him, does not deserve to claim our attention for any length of time, and we cannot seriously consider as an authority in pedagogy a writer who, in intellectual as in moral education, reduces everything to a single principle, the development and the satisfaction of physical sensibility.[189]

363. The EncyclopÆdists.—The vast collection which, under the name EncyclopÉdie, sums up the science and the philosophy of the eighteenth century, touches educational questions only in passing. Properly speaking, the EncyclopÉdie contains no system of pedagogy. The principal fragment is the article Éducation, written by the grammarian and Latinist Dumarsais.

But this piece of work is little worthy of its author, and little worthy in particular of the EncyclopÉdie. It contains scarcely anything but vague and trite generalities, and belongs to the category of those articles for padding which caused Voltaire to say: “You accept articles worthy of the Journal of TrÉvoux.” We shall notice, however, in this article, the importance accorded to the study of physics, and to the practice of the arts, even the most common, and the marked purpose to “subordinate” knowledges and studies, or to distribute them in a logical, or rather psychological, order; for example, to cause the concrete always to precede the abstract. But, after having lost himself in considerations of but little interest on the development of ideas and sentiments in the human soul, the author, who is decidedly far below his task, concludes by recommending to young people “the reading of newspapers.”

The other pedagogical articles of the EncyclopÉdie are equally deficient in striking novelties. If the great work of D’Alembert and Diderot has contributed something to the progress of education, it is less through the insufficient efforts which it has directly attempted in this direction, than through the general influence which it has exercised on the French mind in extolling the sciences in their theoretical study as well as in their practical applications, in diffusing technical knowledge, in glorifying the industrial arts, and in thus preparing for the coming of a scientific and positive education in place of an education exclusively literary and of pure form.

364. Kant (1724-1804).—We know the considerable influence which, for a century, Kant has exercised on the development of philosophy. Since Descartes, no thinker had to the same degree excited an interest in the great problems of philosophy, nor more vigorously obliged the human reason to render an account of itself. It is then a piece of good fortune for the science of education that a philosopher of this order has taken up the discussion of pedagogical questions, and has thrown upon them the light of his penetrating criticism. The admiration which he felt for Rousseau, his attentive and impassioned reading of the Émile, his own reflections on the monastic education which he had received at the Collegium Fredericianum, a sort of small seminary conducted by the Pietists, the experience which he had had as a preceptor in several families that entrusted him with their children, and finally, above all else, his profound studies on human nature and his exalted moral philosophy, had given him a capital preparation for treating educational questions. Professor at the University of KÖnigsberg, he several times resumes the discussion of pedagogical subjects with a marked predilection for them, and the notes of his lectures, collected by one of his colleagues, formed the little Treatise on Pedagogy which we are about to analyze.[190]

365. High Conception of Education.—In the opinion of Kant, the art of educating men, with that of governing them, is the most difficult and the most important of all. It is by education alone that humanity can be perfected and regenerated:—

“It is pleasant to think that human nature will always be better and better developed by education, and that at last there will thus be given it the form which best befits it.

“To know how far the omnipotence of education can go, it would be necessary that a being of a superior order should undertake the bringing up of men.”

But in order that it may attain this exalted end, education must be set free from routine and traditional methods. It must bring up children, not in view of their success in the present state of human society, but “in view of a better state, possible in the future, and according to an ideal conception of humanity and of its complete destination.”

366. Psychological Optimism.—Kant comes near accepting the opinion of Rousseau on the original innocence of man and the perfect goodness of his natural inclinations:—

“It is said in medicine that the physician is but the servant of nature. This is true of the moralist. Ward off the bad influences from without, and nature can be trusted to find for herself the best way.”[191]

Thus Kant does not tire of exalting the service which Rousseau had rendered pedagogy, in recalling educators to the confidence and respect that are due to calumniated human nature. Let us add, however, that the German philosopher is not content to repeat Rousseau. He corrects him in affirming that man, at his birth, is neither good nor evil, because he is not naturally a moral being. He does not become such till he raises his reason to the conception of duty and law. In other terms, in the infant everything is in germ. The infant is a being in preparation. The future alone, the development which he will receive from his education, will make him good or bad. At the beginning, he has but indeterminate dispositions, and evil will come, not from a definite inclination of nature, but solely from the fact that we will not have known how to direct it,—from the fact, according to Kant’s own expression, that we will not have “subjected nature to rules.”

367. Respect for the Liberty of the Child.—The psychological optimism of Kant inspires him, as it does Rousseau, with the idea of a negative education, respectful of the liberty of the child:—

“In general, it must be noted that the earliest education should be negative; that is to say, nothing should be added to the precautions taken by nature, and that the effort should be limited to the preservation of her work.... It is well to employ at first but few helps, and to leave children to learn for themselves. Much of the weakness of man is due, not to the fact that nothing is taught him, but to the fact that false impressions are communicated to him.”

Without going so far as to say with Rousseau that all dependence with respect to men is contrary to order, Kant took great care to respect the liberty of the pupil. He complains of parents who are always talking about “breaking the wills of their sons.” He maintains, not without reason, that it is not necessary to offer much resistance to children, if we have not begun by yielding too readily to their caprices, and by always responding to their cries. Nothing is more harmful to them than a discipline which is provoking and degrading. But, in his zeal for human liberty, the theorist of the autonomy of wills goes a little too far. He fears, for example, the tyranny of habits. He requires that they be prevented from being formed, and that children be accustomed to nothing. He might as well demand the suppression of all education, since education should be but the acquisition of a body of good habits.

368. Stories Interdicted.—In the education of the intellectual faculties or talents, which he calls the physical culture of the soul, as distinguished from moral culture, which is the education of the will, Kant also approaches Rousseau. He proscribes romances and stories. “Children have an extremely active imagination which has no need of being developed by stories.” It may be said in reply, that fables and fictions, at the same time that they develop the imagination, also direct it and adorn it with their own proper grace, and may even lend it moral support. Rousseau, notwithstanding the ardor of his criticisms on the Fables of La Fontaine, himself admitted the moral value of the apologue.

369. Culture of the Faculties.—That which distinguishes Kant as an educator is that he is pre-occupied with the culture of the faculties much more than with the acquisition of knowledge. He passes in review the different intellectual forces, and his reflections on each of them might be collected as the elements of an excellent system of educational psychology. He will criticise, for example, the abuse of memory:—

“Men who have nothing but memory,” he says, “are but living lexicons, and, as it were, the pack-horses of Parnassus.”

For the culture of the understanding, Kant proposes “at first to train it passively to some degree,” by requiring of the child examples which illustrate a rule, or, on the contrary, the rule which applies to particular examples.

For the exercise of the reason, he recommends the Socratic method, and, in general, for the development of all the faculties of the mind, he thinks that the best way of proceeding is to cause the pupil to be active:—

“The best way to comprehend is to do. What we learn the most thoroughly is what we learn to some extent by ourselves.”

370. Different Kinds of Punishments.—Kant has made a subtile analysis of the different qualities with which punishment may be invested. He distinguishes from physical punishment, moral punishment, which is the better. It consists in humiliating the pupil, in greeting him coolly, “in encouraging the disposition of the child to be honored and loved, that auxiliary of morality.” Physical punishments ought to be employed with precaution, “to the end that they may not entail servile dispositions.”

Another distinction is that of natural punishments and artificial punishments. The first are preferable to the second, because they are the very consequences of the faults which have been committed; “indigestion, for example, which a child brings on himself when he eats too much.” Another advantage of natural punishment, Kant justly remarks, “is that man submits to it all his life.”[192]

Finally, Kant divides punishments into negative and positive. The first are to be used for minor faults, and the others are to be reserved for the punishment of conduct that is absolutely bad.

Moreover, whatever punishment may be applied, Kant advises the teacher to avoid the appearance of feeling malice towards the pupil:—

“The punishments we inflict while exhibiting signs of anger have a wrong tendency.”

371. Religious Education.—At first view, we might be tempted to think that Kant has adopted the conclusions of Rousseau, and that, like him, he refuses to take an early occasion to inculcate in the child’s mind the notion of a Supreme Being:—

“Religious ideas always suppose some system of theology. Now, how are we to teach theology to the young, who, far from knowing the world, do not yet know themselves? How shall the young who do not yet know what duty is, be in a condition to comprehend an immediate duty towards God?”

To speak of religion to a young man, it would then be logical to wait till he is in a condition to form a clear and fixed conception of the nature of God. But it is impossible to do this, says Kant, because the young man lives in a society where he hears the name of the Divinity spoken at each moment, and where he takes part in continual observances of piety. It is better, then, to teach him at an early hour true religious notions, for fear that he may borrow from other men notions that are superstitious and false. In reality, Kant dissents from Rousseau only because, re-establishing the conditions of real life, he restores Émile to society, no longer keeping him in a fancied state of isolation. What a broad and noble way, moreover, of conceiving religious education! The best way of making clear to the mind of children the idea of God, is, according to Kant, to seek an analogy in the idea of a human father. It is necessary, moreover, that the conception of duty precede the conception of God; that morality precede, and that theology follow. Without morality, religion is but superstition; without morality, the pretended religious man is but a courtier, a suitor for divine favor.

372. Moral Catechism.—Those who know to what a height Kant could raise the theory of morality, will not be surprised at the importance which he ascribes to the teaching of morals.

“Our schools,” he says, “are almost entirely lacking in one thing which, however, would be very useful for training children in probity,—I mean a catechism on duty. It should contain, in a popular form, cases concerning the conduct to be observed in ordinary life, and which would always naturally raise this question: Is this right or not?”

He had begun to write a book of this kind under the title Moral Catechism;[193] and he would have desired that an hour a day of school time be given to its study, “in order to teach pupils to know and to learn by heart their duty to men,—that power of God on the earth.” The child, he says again, would there learn to substitute the fear of his own conscience for that of men and divine punishment, inward dignity for the opinion of others, the intrinsic value of actions for the apparent value of words, and, finally, a serene and cheerful piety for a sad and gloomy devotion.

[373. Analytical Summary.—1. This study exhibits the influence of philosophical systems on education. New conceptions of human destiny, new theories with respect to the composition of human nature, or a new hypothesis concerning man’s place in nature, determine corresponding changes in educational theory.

2. Perhaps the broadest generalization yet reached in educational theory is the assumption made by Condillac, that the education of each individual should be a repetition of civilization in petto. With Mr. Spencer this hypothesis becomes a law.

3. In theory, the secularization of education has begun. The Church is to lose one of its historical prerogatives, and the modern State is to become an educator.

4. Helvetius typifies what may be called the plastic theory in education, or the conception that the teacher, if wise enough, may ignore all differences in natural endowment. This makes man the victim of his environment. The truth evidently is that man is the only creature which can bend circumstances to his will; and he has such an endowment of power in this direction that he can virtually recreate his environment and thus rise superior to it. And farther than this, there are innate differences in endowment that will persist in spite of all that education can do.

5. The culture value of literary studies is justly exhibited in the quotation from Marmontel, and in particular the disciplinary value of translation.

6. Education for training, discipline, or culture, as distinguished from an education whose chief aim is to impart knowledge, receives definite recognition from Kant.]