  The state of the Police, with regard to the detection of different classes of offenders, explained.—The necessity, under the present circumstances, of having recourse to the known Receivers of stolen Goods, for the purpose of discovering Offenders, as well as the property stolen.—The great utility of Officers of Justice as safeguards of the Community.—The advantages to be derived from rendering them respectable in the opinion of the Public. Their powers, by the common and statute law, are extensive.—The great antiquity of the Office of Constable, exemplified by different Ancient Statutes.—The authority of Officers and others explained, in apprehending persons accused of felony.—Rewards granted in certain cases as encouragements to Officers to lie vigilant:—The statutes quoted, applicable to such rewards, shewing that they apply to ten different offences.—The utility of parochial Constables, under a well-organized Police, explained.—A fund for this purpose would arise from the reduction of the expences of the Police by the diminution of Crimes.—The necessity of a competent fund explained.—The deficiency of the present System exemplified in the effect of the presentments by Constables to the Grand Inquest.—A new System proposed.—The functions of the different classes of Officers, explained.—Salaries necessary to all.—The System of rewards, as now established, shewn to be AS it must be admitted, that the evils arising from the multiplied crimes detailed in the preceding Chapters, render a correct and energetic System of Police with regard to the detection, discovery, and apprehension of offenders, indispensably necessary for the safety and well-being of Society; it follows of course, in the When robberies or burglaries have been committed in or near the Metropolis, where the property is of considerable value, the usual method at present, is to apply to the City Magistrates, if in London; or otherwise, to the Justices at one of the Public Offices, In many cases of importance, to the reproach of the Police, recourse is had to noted and known Receivers of stolen Goods for their assistance in discovering such offenders, and of pointing out the means by which the property may be recovered: this has on many occasions been productive of success to the parties who have been robbed; as well as to the ends of public justice; for however lamentable it is to think that Magistrates are compelled to have recourse to such expedients, yet while the present System continues, and while robberies and burglaries are so frequent, without the means of prevention, there is no alternative on many occasions but to employ a thief to catch a thief. It is indeed so far fortunate, that when the influence of Magistrates is judiciously and zealously employed in this way, it is productive in many instances of considerable success, not only in the recovery of property stolen, but also in the detection and punishment of atrocious offenders. Wherever activity and zeal are manifested on the part of the Magistrates, the Peace Officers, under their immediate direction, seldom fail to exhibit a similar desire to promote the ends of public justice. And when it is considered that these Officers, while Every thing that can heighten in any degree the respectability of the office of Constable, adds to the security of the State, and the safety of the life and property of every individual. Under such circumstances, it cannot be sufficiently regretted that these useful constitutional officers, destined for the protection of the Public, have been (with a very few exceptions) so little regarded, so carelessly selected, and so ill supported and rewarded for the imminent risques which they run, and the services they perform in the execution of their duty. The common Law, as well as the ancient Statutes of the kingdom, having placed extensive powers in the hands of Constables and Peace Officers;—they are, in this point of view, to be considered as respectable;—and it is the interest of the Community, that they should support that rank and character in society, which corresponds with the authority with which they are invested.—If this were attended to, men of credit and discretion would not be so averse to This absurd prejudice against the office of Constable, and the small encouragement which the major part receive, is one of the chief reasons why unworthy characters have filled such situations; and why the public interest has suffered by the increase of crimes. The office of Constable is as old as the Monarchy of England;—and certainly existed in the time of the Saxons. The Statute of Winchester, made in the 13th year of Edward the First (anno 1285) appoints two Constables to be chosen in every Hundred; and such seems to have been the attention of the Legislature to the Police of the Country at that early period of The Statute of 5 Edward III. cap. 14, (anno 1332) empowers Constables "to arrest persons suspected of man-slaughter, felonies, and robberies, and to deliver them to the Sheriff, to be kept in prison till the coming of the Justices:" and another Act of the 34th of the same reign, cap. 1, (made anno 1361,) empowers Justices, (inter alia) "to inquire after wanderers, to arrest and imprison suspicious persons, and to oblige persons of evil fame to give security for good behaviour; so that the People may not be troubled by rioters, nor the peace blemished; nor Merchants and others travelling on the highways be disturbed or put in peril by such offenders." By the common law, every person committing a felony may be arrested by any person whomsoever present at the fact, who may secure the prisoner in gaol, or carry him before a Magistrate, In arresting persons on suspicion of a felony, actually committed, common fame has been adjudged to be a reasonable cause. There are four methods, known in law, by which When a warrant is received by an Officer, he is bound to execute it, so far as the jurisdiction of the Magistrate and himself extends.—But the Constable having great original and inherent authority, may, without warrant, apprehend any person for a breach of the Peace: and in case of felony, actually committed, he may, on probable suspicion, arrest the felon: and for that purpose (as upon the warrant of a Magistrate,) he is authorised to break open doors, and even justified in killing the felon, if he cannot otherwise be taken. All persons present, when a felony is committed, are bound to arrest the felon, on pain of fine and imprisonment, if he escapes through negligence of the by-standers; who will (the same as a constable) in such case be justified in breaking open doors, to follow such felon, and even to kill him if he cannot be taken otherwise. The other species of arrest is called Hue-and-Cry, which is an alarm raised in the country upon any felony being committed. This was an ancient practice in use as far back as the reign of Edward the First, (1285) by which, in the then infant state of society, However doubtful the utility of this ancient method of detecting offenders may be, in a great Metropolis, in the present extended state of Society, it is plain, that it has been considered as an important regulation of Police so late as the 8th George II. (1735;) since it was enacted in that year, (stat. 8, George II. cap. 16.) that the Constable who neglects making hue-and-cry, shall forfeit five pounds; and even the district is liable to be fined (according to the law of Alfred) if the felony be committed therein, and the felon escapes. When a hue-and-cry is raised, every person, by command of the Constable, must pursue the felon, on pain of fine and imprisonment. In this pursuit also, Constables may search suspected houses if the doors be open: but unless the felon is actually in the house, it will not be justifiable to use force; nor even then, except where admittance has been demanded and refused. A Constable, even without any warrant, may break open a door for the purpose of apprehending a felon; but to justify this measure, he must not only shew that the felon was in the house, but also that access was denied after giving notice that he was a Con Such are the powers with which Constables are invested,—and which are, in many instances, enforced by penalties; that public justice may not be defeated. In addition to this, the wisdom of the Legislature, as an encouragement to officers and others to do their duty in apprehending and prosecuting offenders, has granted rewards in certain cases; Namely,
These rewards apply to ten different offences, and ought, no doubt, to be a considerable spur to Officers to do their duty; but it may be doubted whether this measure has not, in some degree, tended to the increase of a multitude of smaller crimes which are pregnant with the greatest mischiefs to Society.—It is by deterring men from the commission of smaller crimes (says the Marquis Beccaria) that greater ones are prevented. If small rewards were given in cases of Grand Larceny, (now very numerous,) as well as of several other felonies, frauds, and misdemeanors, a species of activity would enter into the system of detection, which has not heretofore been experienced. While rewards are limited to higher offences, and conviction is the indispensable condition upon which they are granted, it is much to be feared that lesser crimes are overlooked; and the Public subjected, in many instances, to the intermediate depredations of a rogue, from his first starting upon the town until he shall be worth 40l. This system of giving high rewards only on conviction, also tends to weaken evidence: since it is obvious that the Counsel for all Prisoners, whose offences entitle the Prosecutors and Officers to a re By altering the system entirely, and leaving it in the breast of the Judge who tries the offence, to determine what reward shall be allowed, with a power to grant or withhold, or to limit and increase the same, according to circumstances connected with the trouble and risk of the parties, whether there is a conviction or not, a fairer measure of recompence would be dealt out;—the public money would be more beneficially distributed, For the purpose of elucidating these suggestions, it may be useful to examine the different offences With this view the following statement is offered to the consideration of the Reader.—It refers to a period of profound peace (as most likely to exhibit a true average) and contains a register of the trials, published by authority, including eight sessions from September 1790 to 1791. From this it appears that 1088 prisoners were tried for different offences in that year, and that 711 were discharged! and yet, striking as this may appear, it may be asserted on good grounds, that the following melancholy Catalogue (extensive as it seems to be) does not probably contain even one-tenth part of the offences which are actually committed!
Disposed of as follows, viz.
Thus it appears that murders, as well as several other very atrocious crimes, are committed, where officers of justice are not entitled to any reward for their trouble and risque in apprehending the offenders. Receivers of stolen Goods in particular, who, as has been repeatedly stated, are the nourishers and supporters of thieves, and who, of all other offenders, are of that class where the greatest benefit to the public is to arise from their discovery and apprehension, seem to be totally overlooked. If it should be thought too loose a system to allow rewards not exceeding a certain sum in any one case, to be distributed according to the discretion of the Judges who try the offence; perhaps it might be possible to form a scale of premiums from one guinea up to fifty pounds, which, by holding out certain encouragement in all cases whatsoever, might not only excite a desire on the part of men of some property and respectability to become Officers of Justice: but would create that species of constant vigilance and attention to the means of apprehending every class of The Officers of Justice, (parochial and stipendiary) who are appointed to watch over the Police of the Metropolis and its environs, in keeping the peace, and in detecting and apprehending offenders, amount at present (as near as possible) to 1040 individuals, under five separate jurisdictions, and are arranged as follows: Officers, &c.
To which are to be added the stated Officers of Police, specially appointed for the purpose of preventing crimes, and of detecting and apprehending offenders.
Of these 1040 Officers the Reader will observe, that only 89 (exclusive of the thirty-two extra officers in the City of London; and the sixty-eight patroles at Bow-street; making in the whole no more than 189,) are Stipendiary Officers, particularly pledged to devote their whole time to the service of the Public:—and hence a question arises, Whether so small a number are sufficient for the purpose of watching and detecting the hordes of villains who infest the Metropolis, and who must be considerably increased on the return of peace? Little assistance can be expected under the present System from parochial officers; who, depending on their daily labour principally for their support, can afford to devote no more time than is absolutely necessary for their indispensable duties, during the 12 months they are in office: and more especially since Magistrates have no power, or funds, to remunerate such parochial officers for extraordinary exertions in the Public service, however meritorious they may be;—hence it is, that their zeal and activity are checked in many instances; when under proper regulations (such as are hereafter suggested) and subject to a certain degree of control and discipline, and properly remunerated for their services they might be rendered extremely useful. These facts, joined to the further elucidation of this particular branch of the subject, it is earnestly to be hoped, may produce an arrangement of more energy and effect than exists under the present system. Officers of Justice, who are subjected not only to considerable risks, but also to want of rest, and to the inconvenience of being exposed much in the night-time, ought certainly to be liberally paid; so as to make it an object to good and able men even to look up to such situations. It having been thus shewn that the Stipendiary Constables are so inconsiderable in point of numbers, and their duty confined to particular objects, it follows that on the parochial officers the Public ought, in a considerable degree, to depend for the general prevention of offences, and particularly for defeating It would seem, therefore, of the highest importance that arrangements should be formed, calculated to give to these constitutional safe-guards of the peaceful subject, that utility, energy, and effect, which originally resulted from the exercise of their functions,—which the present state of Society imperiously calls for, and without which the preventive System of Police can never be effectual. On looking accurately into the nature and effect of the institution of Constables, it will be found that the vigor and efficacy of the Civil Power, the security of innocence,—the preservation of good order, and the attainment of justice, depend in a great measure on the accuracy of the System, with respect to these Officers assigned to keep the peace in the respective parishes of the Metropolis; and it is because the original spirit of the design has been, in so many instances, abandoned that crimes have multiplied, and that the public are so insecure. The evil, however, admits of practicable remedies, which the Superintending Board of Police, recom Preparatory to this object, however, the System in the respective parishes must be greatly improved, before a co-operation can be expected that will prove extensively beneficial to the Public. The first step to be pursued, is to establish a fund for the remuneration of Constables of every description. It will not be difficult to demonstrate that a resource may be found for this purpose, which will not impose any new burden on the Country, provided these Officers do their duty. The enormous expence at present incurred, and which is either defrayed from the County Rates, or the general Revenue of the Country, arises chiefly after offenders are detected and punished. Out of 234,153l. a year stated by the Committee on Finance, to be the annual amount of the Police expences, only 26,183l. is incurred previous to detection.—By diminishing crimes, therefore, the chief part of the burden upon the Country will be taken away; and hence in this saving will be established a resource for the remuneration of those who may contribute to so important an object. The present expenditure of the County Rates for criminal offences, is estimated to amount to 50,000l. a year. In proportion as offences diminish, through the medium of a well-organized and energetic Po Independent, therefore, of the policy of improving the system with respect to parochial Constables, by attaching a greater degree of responsibility to their situation, and introducing that discipline and systematic activity, which can alone render their services effectual—the plan may even be recommended as a proper arrangement in point of oeconomy. It is in vain to expect energy or attention in the execution of any Public duty, unless there be that personal responsibility which is not to be obtained without emolument. To render Officers of Justice, therefore, useful to the Public, they must be stimulated by interest:—they must, in fact, be paid for devoting a portion of their time to the comfort and security of others. The Law may inflict, and, indeed, has inflicted, penalties for the neglect of specific duties; but this will not establish that sort of Police which the present state of Society requires.—This is strongly exemplified in what may not be improperly called the Mockery of Police, which is exhibited in the periodical presentments by Constables, of public grievances and nuisances, before the Grand Inquest, four times a year at Westminster-hall, and twice before the Magistrates of the Sessions held at Guildhall in the City of Westminster. These presentments, although in themselves of the highest importance, have degenerated into what may now be considered as an useless and The fact is, that in a great majority of instances where presentments are made, the evils they describe, though often highly prejudicial, are suffered to accumulate with increasing malignity, at the same time frequently generating other mischiefs and pressures of a tendency equally pernicious to the Community. It is admitted, that the proper Officer of the Crown notifies to the parties implicated in the presentment, the determination of the Inquest; but a prosecution seldom ensues. The Constable has neither money nor time to follow it up; and the matter is discharged when the customary term expires, on the payment of a Fee of 16s. 9d. or more, according to the length of the presentment; and thus the business terminates in the emolument of an individual, and in the continuance of the abuse. The same system prevails at the Sessions at Westminster. When Juries make presentments of nuisances or evils in their respective districts, the Constables have general orders to prosecute, which is not done; and, indeed, to compel an Officer serving gratuitously, to incur an expence for the Public interest which he cannot afford, would be an act of But would it not be far better to bring such minor offences at once under the cognizance of Magistrates, with the power of appeal to the Quarter Sessions?—This is already the case in Spitalfields, under a parochial Act, where nuisances and annoyances are in consequence instantly removed. Matters of much greater importance are submitted to the same authority. The advantage in this case would be, that justice would be promptly administered at a small expence, and the evil would be put an end to, instead of remaining as at present a reproach to the Police, arming at the same time every noxious and bad member of Society, with a kind of licence to do offensive acts to the neighbourhood, and the Public at large, with impunity. To render parochial Constables useful, rules must be established to compel every qualified person to serve in his turn, or pay a fine. No person should be empowered to offer a Substitute.—It is of the highest importance that an Office invested with so much power should be executed by reputable men, if possible of pure morals, and not with hands open to receive bribes.—This important office in the Metropolis at least, has too long been degraded by the introduction, in many instances, of men of loose principles, undeserving of public confidence. The reason is obvious:—A man in the more reputable classes on To render this branch of Police pure and efficient, an Act of Parliament should enforce the following or similar regulations: 1st. To assign a competent number of local Constables to each parish, in proportion to the number of inhabited houses; to be chosen by the whole number of qualified inhabitants paying parish Rates—to be presented to the Court Leet, or to the Magistrates of the Division, according to a prescribed rule, which shall preclude the possibility of exemptions or preferences; for which purposes the qualifications shall be clearly defined in the Act.—Thus might the abuses which at present prevail, in the selection and choice of Constables, cease to be felt and complained of: an equal distribution of the burden would take place, and the duty be confined to men sufficiently respectable, to establish in the Public mind a confidence that it would be executed with fidelity, and an attention to the Public interest. 2d. That with a view to that necessary discipline, and knowledge of the duty to be performed, without which Officers of Justice can be of little use, 3d. That the different High Constables should return to the Commissioners of Police annually, after a change of Officers has taken place, a list of the number of persons who compose the Civil Force, under their direction in their respective divisions; and regularly, every quarter, a list of the Publicans, with such facts as have occurred, re 4th. It is humbly suggested, that the Salaries and allowances to be paid to the High Constables and parochial Chief Constables should be paid out of the General Police Fund, under the Management of the Board, and the gratuities and allowances to the petty Constables out of the County Rate. It might be expedient that the Stipend of the petty Constables should be very moderate, and that their remunerations should, partly at least, arise from premiums and gratuities, granted by the Judges and Magistrates, for meritorious services to the Public, The invariable rule of rewarding, in every case where it can be made appear that any useful Public service has been performed, would have a most wonderful effect in preventing crimes: The expence, if judiciously and oeconomically managed, need not exceed, in any material degree, the present aggregate of what is disbursed in different ways, in all the branches of the Police and Criminal Establishment; it might, in fact, be defrayed, as well as every other charge, by the Police itself, under the direction of the Central Board, hereafter more particularly alluded to, from the produce of the Licences proposed to be granted for regulating particular classes of Dealers, by whose aid and assistance, in supporting Thieves and Pilferers, such a system is rendered necessary. Nor should the rewards be wholly confined to Officers of Justice, either parochial or stipendiary. The Public Good requires, that they should extend also to Watchmen and Patroles, who should have every reasonable encouragement held out to them to be honest and vigilant, by small premiums paid down immediately, for every service they may render the Public; either in detecting or apprehending persons who are guilty of felonies, or other offences against the public peace. At present, the watchmen destined to guard the lives and properties of the inhabitants residing in near eight thousand streets, lanes, courts, and alleys, and about 160,000 houses, composing the whole of the Metropolis and its environs, are under the direction of no less than above seventy different Trusts; regulated by perhaps double the number of local acts of Parliament, (varying in many particulars from one another,) under which the directors, guardians, governors, trustees, or vestries, according to the title they assume, are authorised to act,—each attending only to their own particular Ward, Parish, Hamlet, Liberty, or Precinct; and varying the payment according to local circumstances, and the opulence of the particular district, from 8½d. up to 2s. each night. The encouragement being, in many instances, so Thus circumstanced, and thus encouraged, what can be expected from such watchmen?— Aged in general;—often feeble:—and almost, on every occasion, half starved, from the limited allowance they receive; without any claim upon the Public, or the least hope of reward held out, even if they perform any meritorious service, by the detection of Thieves and Receivers of stolen Goods, or idle and disorderly persons: and above all, making so many separate parts of an immense system, without any general superintendance, disjointed from the nature of its organization, it is only a matter of wonder, that the protection afforded is what it really is. Money is also received from disorderly persons in the night, to permit them to escape from the just punishment of the Laws; while on the other hand, unfortunate females are often cruelly oppressed and laid under contribution, for permission to infringe the very laws, which it is the duty of these nocturnal guardians of the Police to put in execution. Excepting in the city of London, under the jurisdiction of the Lord Mayor and Aldermen, (where there are, in the 25 wards, 765 watchmen, and 38 patroles) and the parishes and liberties combined by the act of the 14th Geo. III. cap. 90, it will not be easy to ascertain the exact number of watchmen, &c. employed by the great variety of different Trusts, in every part of the Metropolis; more especially, as in several instances they vary in their numbers according to the season of the year, and other circumstances; but the following statement is believed to be very near truth:
Nothing can certainly be better calculated for complete protection against acts of violence in the streets, than the System of a well-regulated Stationary Watch; Let the same system of moderate rewards also be extended to beadles, It is in vain to expect that the Public can be well served, unless the emolument becomes an object to good and able men; but these extraordinary rewards (as has already been observed) should always depend upon the vigilance and exertion of the parties themselves, in detecting offenders of every description: and should be paid, on its appearing to the Magistrate, that no impropriety or indiscretion has marked their conduct. If, on the contrary, they should be proved to have acted oppressively or improperly, a power of immediate dismission and punishment Having thus stated the civil force of the Metropolis, in peace-officers, watchmen and patroles, making an aggregate of 3084 men—it may be necessary and useful to give such information relative to the Magistracy, as may tend to shew the present state of the Police, and to illustrate what remains to be further suggested on the subject of its improvement; for the preservation of the Public peace, and the detection and apprehension of every class of offenders. There exist at present no less than five separate jurisdictions within the limits of the Metropolis—namely,—
But, notwithstanding the great number of respectable names, which are in the different commissions in and near the Metropolis; and although all who have qualified have equal jurisdiction with the Police Justices, within their respective districts; yet the efficient duty for the whole of the Metropolis, so far as it relates to the detection of offenders, is principally limited to two classes of Magistrates—namely,
The jurisdiction of the Magistrates presiding at the seven Public Offices, not only extends to Westminster and Middlesex; (and, in most instances, lately, to the liberty of the Tower:) but also to the counties of Surry, Kent, and Essex, from which considerable advantages in the prompt detection and ap Where the object is to do good;—and where not even the shadow of harm can arise, no limits should be set to local jurisdictions; especially where privileges are proposed to be given; (as in this case, to the city of London;)—and where none are to be taken away. For the purpose of establishing a complete and well-connected System of detection, some means ought certainly to be adopted, more closely to unite the City and Police Magistrates, | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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