Events in India had not developed with any great rapidity—in fact, all those who have studied the question were fully aware that, rapid as has been the approach of Russia towards India, the two Powers are as yet too far distant to be able to come into collision in a single campaign. The first indication of Russian intrigue which reached us was the announcement that the Ameer had been suddenly murdered, and that general anarchy had ensued in Afghanistan. The enormous efforts which Russia is making in other directions appear to have prevented her, so far as we at present know, from attempting several of the routes by which she might cross the mountains into Afghanistan. But an advance was immediately made upon Herat, and the siege of that fortress has been going on for some time. Fortunately two young English officers, Major Craygrove, and Captain Greekill, had been employed on some duty for the Government in the neighbourhood. They immediately threw themselves into Herat, and, inspiring the garrison with the greatest confidence, have been the life and soul of the defence ever since. We hear the most amusing accounts of the mode in which they diversify the rigour of their defence by starting races of all kinds within the place, and by various other forms of sport. On the whole, the Russians seem as yet to have made very little way. The only danger has been lest the English public, excited by the vigour of the defence, should insist upon an expedition being dispatched to Herat. For that we are by no means in a condition as yet. The movement would be a most hazardous one. A force of observation has been assembled at Quetta, and the whole Indian Army is ready to advance at a moment’s notice. But it was clearly unadvisable to throw ourselves into the seething cauldron of Afghanistan whilst the tribes were all fighting with one another, and no possible ruler had appeared on whose behalf we could effectually act.

It was under these circumstances that the expedition to Vladivostock was decided upon, and that the reinforcement of native troops was dispatched to Egypt. It would have been preposterous to make these detachments from the army in India had it not very soon become clear that for the first year of the war, at all events, our position in India must be that of playing a waiting game. We have assured Russia that we shall on no terms make peace as long as she holds a foot of Afghan territory. In view of her failure in Europe, and of the services which we have been able to render to the Central Powers, the zeal of the Russians in the invasion of Afghanistan appears to have materially cooled. They begin to see that whatever successes they may achieve during the course of the campaign, they are likely to have to surrender their conquests at the end of it.

Nevertheless, as the demands of India for reinforcements of officers and non-commissioned officers to fill up the various posts which become necessary when an army is organised for war are very considerable, it has been a great advantage to us to be able to send out these men by the new line. Moreover, it is to a certain extent an experiment which shows how much larger forces could be sent in the event of necessity.