ADJUSTMENT IN THE EAST.

In Asia Minor during the same period decisive events had occurred. After all the preparations at Trebizonde and in the neighbourhood were not so purely imaginary as the descent of the English Army on Bulgaria had led us all to suppose. It appears that ever since the beginning of the War a vast number of labourers, under the direction of English engineer officers, had been employed in improving the communications between the neighbourhood of Erzeroum and Trebizonde. Under the protection of Moukhtar Pasha’s Army, these preparations had gone on from Erzeroum even during the time when the Black Sea was temporarily abandoned by the English Fleet. As soon as it was possible to do so, landing-stages had been multiplied, and other steps taken to improve the facilities for disembarking at Trebizonde. By the time that the English Army had finished its little campaign in Bulgaria, all these improvements were so far advanced that a light railway had been constructed almost throughout the whole distance, giving the greatest possible facilities for the accumulation of supplies. Huts had been built, and a series of stations arranged for the advance of the English Army in successive bodies as soon as it landed. The landing itself, however, even with all the improvements made, could not be a very rapid operation. Thus it was that, as soon as the surrender of the Russian Army was secured, the portion of the English Army nearest to the coast, and such troops as had arrived from England too late to join in the campaign, were at once dispatched direct to Trebizonde. These were followed by others in regular succession.

The actual disembarkation at Trebizonde occupied about a fortnight, being interrupted for about four days by a very dangerous gale, which obliged the troopers to put to sea. During all that time, however, the movement inland proceeded rapidly, thanks to the arrangements which had been previously made. The English Army advanced by rapid stages towards the neighbourhood of Erzeroum, into a position where it was able to concentrate within half a day’s march of the left flank of the position, towards which, in a short time, the Turkish Army slowly and deliberately fell back. The front of the English Army was at right angles to that of the Turkish, and withdrawn from it some four miles, but there was ample telegraphic communication between the two forces. A few Turkish scouts under English officers covered the front of the English. The Russians, in advancing, drove in such of these scouts as they saw. These retired as if upon the Turks. Others, withdrawn behind the features of the ground, were not observed.

The Russians made a mistake not very different from, but much more fatal than, that which they committed in 1877, when they advanced against Moukhtar Pasha, ignoring the force that was threatening the communications of their left wing. In that case Moukhtar had designedly fallen back in order to facilitate the operations against them of the Van force. In the present instance he similarly retired in order to facilitate the aggressive movement of the English Army, of whose presence within the region of operations they were as little aware as they had been in 1877 of the approaching arrival of the Van force. They had much more excuse in the present instance for not knowing of the existence of the English column, both because all its previous doings had been completely concealed from them, while the movements of the Van force in 1877 were known in every intelligence department in Europe, and also because the English Army had only recently and very rapidly arrived at the prepared rendezvous. The Russian Army, therefore, finding Moukhtar Pasha in a position apparently open to attack, and presenting facilities especially for the turning of his left flank, towards which all his dispositions tempted them, committed themselves boldly to a movement in that direction, employing a very large portion of their force in an extended movement round his left. According to an agreement between the Turkish Commander and the English General, the Russian Army was allowed to involve itself for nearly two hours in an apparently very successful attack upon the centre and left of the Turkish position.

All its movements had been well reported, by help of the dirigible balloon which had been captured from the Russians in Varna. Lord Wolseley was therefore able to determine with some accuracy the right moment for making an attack with his entire strength, first upon the flank and rear of the right wing of the Russians; and when the latter, completely surprised and attacked on all sides, because of the simultaneous advance of the Turks, were broken and thrown into hopeless disorder, he was able by simply advancing his front to drive the fugitives in upon the hitherto untouched centre, which in its turn, assailed in flank by the English Army, and in front by the left wing and centre of the Turkish, was crushed. Thus the left wing was left a helpless prey to the armies which now triumphantly occupied the field.

The English Government, made anxious by the protests which had been directed against a campaign in Asia Minor or the Caucasus, had ordered Lord Wolseley not to remain more than a month on shore unless in the very heat of operations at the time. As the crushing defeat of the Russian Army had left Moukhtar Pasha in absolute command of the whole field of operations as far as Kars, and as it was exceedingly unlikely that, after such a defeat, the Russians would be able, in their exhausted condition, to place another army in the field against him, the Turkish General was well content to carry on the war for himself. The English troops, therefore, were simply placed in healthy quarters until instructions for their future disposition should be received. The immediate object with which England had engaged in the war having been secured by the relief of Bulgaria and the defeat of the Russians in Asia Minor, it was decided to recall the army home. It was considered that a victorious force, easily made up again to 70,000 strong by home reinforcements, might become an important element in assisting the Belgians to bring that additional pressure upon France which might be necessary in order to ensure the acceptance of satisfactory terms of peace.

This further blow in Asia Minor, and the exhausted condition of his country, induced the Czar to make the preliminary proposals for a general peace. It was very soon found, however, that practically Russia was isolated—France was thoroughly disenchanted with the alliance. Russia had attempted too much and too many things at first, and had consequently suffered everywhere. It was evident that, if on the merits of the question either of the two allies was to suffer, it was Russia who would have to pay the piper. The Austrian and German Governments were too deeply pledged to the Poles, and had too much interest in being secure from Russian aggression, not to insist definitely upon the creation of Poland into a buffer State. Though Russia demurred to these terms as long as she could, the unanimity of the allies in insisting upon them, and the secret sympathy with Poland of a large proportion of the French people, obliged her to give way.