At length we have great news to report from the British Army. A great battle has been fought and won. Nay, more—the whole Russian Army in Bulgaria, caught like rats in a trap, has, after two days of fierce fighting, laid down its arms. It will be seen, therefore, that the British Army has, after all, not turned up in Asia Minor, but in Bulgaria. All the rumours and apparent demonstrations which led to the belief that a great campaign in Asia Minor was intended, were merely designed to distract attention from the real objects of the expedition. Those who are familiar with Lord Wolseley’s methods now profess to have been always made suspicious by the fact that, as we reported in our issue of June 4th, he had been talking a great deal of the advantages of a campaign in Asia Minor. They say that it is notorious that he holds strongly to the belief that what is supposed in your own army to be about to happen will soon be believed by the enemy. He succeeded in this way in imposing on Arabi so completely during the ’82 campaign, that (extraordinary as it may appear) the Egyptian leader was a prisoner in Ceylon, when he was for the first time made acquainted with the great movement of the English expedition from Alexandria to Ismalia. Lord Wolseley then succeeded in deceiving Arabi because he had imposed upon the world at large, although precisely in a similar manner he had, by spreading reports of a call from Captain Glover during the Ashantee campaign, managed to embark his troops for the surprise of the coast towns from which the Ashantees were drawing their supplies, without any one suspecting the direction in which he was going to strike. The former ruse had been forgotten, and caused no suspicion as to the second. If we may judge by the comments of our contemporaries on the reports which have been hitherto furnished of the war, they have been either very discreet and loyal, or have been completely bamboozled. And yet it was tolerably plain that the direction in which an English Army could at the moment be most effectively employed was in clearing Bulgaria of the aggressive force of Russians, which, from the peculiar circumstances of the case, she had not force to dispose of alone.

Seeing that it is immediately in behalf of Bulgaria, and only secondarily in behalf of Turkey, because of the support she had offered to Bulgaria, that we were engaged in the struggle, there was, independently of the military advantages of the movement, an important political object to be gained by exercising our strength at once in support of the gallant Bulgarian forces. Even if it had been altogether politically convenient to allow the Turkish Army to enter Bulgaria and move upon Tirnova and Shumla, the material obstacles in the way were very serious. On the other hand, twenty-four hours’ easy steaming would bring our troops to the place at which the Russians had originally landed. It was almost certain that as soon as the Russian General found that our ships had again cut his communications by sea, he would abandon his attempt to move upon Sofia and endeavour to make good his retreat by the Dobrudja. From Kavarna we could easily cut across such a movement, which it was to be hoped that the Roumanians would endeavour to delay by every means in their power. It appears that Lord Wolseley, all the time that he was at Constantinople, was in full and direct communication with the Bulgarian Generals, and that all movements were concerted in connection with them; while the Roumanians, assured of English support both by sea and land, were ready to do their utmost to hamper the Russian movements should any attempt be made, either from north or south, to force the passage of the Dobrudja.

Without entering into further details, it will be sufficient to say that Lord Wolseley’s delay at Constantinople was mainly in order to receive the very latest reports from Bulgaria as to the exact position and movements of the Russian Army. From the nearest point on the coast to which telegraphic communication has been carried from Constantinople swift dispatch boats were to bring off the cypher messages, either to the fleet or to Kavarna, whence, as the army advanced inland, the news would be carried. A second line of communication was also established by way of Kustenjeh and Bucharest. Thus the General had the great advantage of knowing more precisely than would usually be the case what the exact movements of his enemy were. To a certain extent those movements were tied. Detachments of too large force to be left to take their fate had been placed to watch Shumla and Varna. From the reports which reached Lord Wolseley, it was clear that the Russians having broken up their camp at Tirnova were marching by way of Shumla—either intending to call in their detachment from Varna and move from Shumla direct upon the Dobrudja, or to advance upon Varna.

In either case, an immediate landing at Kavarna would apparently be out of reach of any serious disturbance from the Russian forces until the landing was effected, and was extremely likely to tempt the Russians to move to attack us in that position. In that case, if we were only able to hold our own in a position already examined and surveyed, it was probable that our force would be amply sufficient to deal with the Russians, even alone, and that within forty-eight hours the Bulgarians who had undertaken to hang closely upon the Russian rear, might be expected to arrive and make the position of the Russians impossible.

Immediately after the ships had passed out of sight of land, the whole fleet changed its course to the N.-N.-West—and by mid-day following that on which the fleet had left the Bosphorus the greater portion of it was in the bay which extends from Kaliakra Cape towards Varna.

The landing had already been begun before our Correspondent arrived—but he was fortunate enough to be allowed to join Colonel French’s Hussars, who were landed soon after it was ascertained that the debarkation of the troops would meet with no immediate resistance. This regiment was pushed southwards, supported by a body of mounted infantry under Colonel Hutton, the second day after the arrival of the troops, and as soon as possible a couple of Horse Artillery guns, which were accompanied by Colonel Marshall, with a small cavalry escort were sent after them in support. The orders for the cavalry were to ascertain the condition of affairs at Varna; if possible to capture a few prisoners, and, taking advantage of the friendliness of the inhabitants, to endeavour to obtain reports of the movements of the enemy.