THE NAVY

The scope of the present volume is to review the defensive works which have been carried out in various ages for the protection of our shores against incursions of enemies: the story of our naval exploits does not primarily come within it.

The first duty of our English navy is, and always has been, offensive, as well as defensive. In times of peace we have been accustomed to regard our Navy as our first line of defence, and this is a perfectly accurate description of its functions. But it is obvious that these functions have always been different from, and in most periods independent of, what is generally understood by the term coast defences.

Yet, again and again, the coast fortresses have assisted the operations of our war-ships when resisting the enemy, and to a certain extent the two forces have always been, and possibly always will be closely connected.

Reference to the story of the Roman fleet for the defence of the shore of Britain, and also to the English navy under King Alfred, has already been made, but the beginning of the English navy may be traced to a somewhat later period. It had its origin in the Cinque Ports.

THE CINQUE PORTS

The association of certain towns on the south-east shores of England for the purpose of coast defence is of great antiquity. In the oldest Cinque Ports charter on record, granted in the sixth year of Edward I, reference is made to documents of the time of Edward the Confessor, indicating an origin before the Norman Conquest.

In early times there were, as the name implies, five ports included in this confederation, viz.: Hastings, Sandwich, Dover, Romney and Hythe. Almost immediately after the Norman Conquest, Winchelsea and Rye were added with status equal to the original towns. Thereafter the precise title of the corporation was “the five Cinque Ports and two ancient towns.” In addition to these seven head ports, there were eight corporate members, viz.: Deal, Faversham, Folkestone, Fordwich, Lydd, Pevensey, Seaford and Tenterden, and no less than twenty-four non-corporate members.

The jurisdiction of the Cinque Ports extended from Reculver on the north coast of Kent to Seaford on the south coast of Sussex. It will be noticed that at least three of the corporate members are situated at some little distance from the sea coast. Faversham, Fordwich, and in a greater degree Tenterden are inland towns, although two are placed on river-courses which afford access to the sea.

As will presently be seen, men as well as ships were contributed by the Cinque Ports for the defence of the realm, and Tenterden received its charter in 1449, in order that it might assist Rye to discharge its obligations. Hence it is that we find a corporate member situated so far from the coast.

The Cinque Ports were established primarily for the defence of the sea-board on the south-east of England, but in the course of time their purpose was extended. In these early times, when England possessed no regular navy, it was the men of the Cinque Ports who guarded our seas. They provided, in return for many privileges they received from the Crown, almost the only form of naval defence which England possessed until the reign of Henry VII. Until that period nearly all the men and ships which guarded our shores from the enemy were furnished by the Cinque Ports, and even after the time of Henry VII they rendered important assistance to the regular navy.

The men of the Cinque Ports seem to have carried on a certain amount of privateering at various times, but there have been times when their skill in seafaring and their undoubted courage have been employed in work of the utmost value in the defence of England. A celebrated occasion occurred in the year 1217, when Hubert de Burgh, having selected the best seamen of the Cinque Ports, set out with about sixteen large ships and twenty small ones to attack the approaching fleet of Louis the Dauphin of France, the numbers of which were no less than eighty large and many smaller vessels. Hubert de Burgh had grasped the important principle of naval strategy that in order to free his country from the danger of invasion, it was above all things necessary to attack and destroy the enemy’s force at sea.

Although opposed by such unequal numbers the Englishmen skilfully secured a windward position, bore down upon the enemy as they shaped their course for the English coast, threw quicklime in their eyes, poured into the enemy a volley of arrows from the long bows for which the English were famous, and scattered and destroyed the enemy’s ships, so that only about seventeen escaped; fifty-five were captured, and the rest were sunk. The credit of this signal victory in an engagement at sea which may rank as almost the first in English history, certainly the first subsequently to the time of King Alfred, belongs to the men of the Cinque Ports.

The strength of the Cinque Port forces in the fourteenth century may be gathered from the fact that at the Siege of Calais (1347), when the fleet was called out to assist in the blockade and to defend the Channel, the following ships and men were furnished by the Cinque Ports:

Among the privileges of the Cinque Ports to which reference has been made there are one or two which point unmistakably to an early origin. One is the right of open-air assembling in portmote or parliament at Shepway Cross, and afterwards at Dover, where by-laws were made for the governance of the confederation, the regulation of the Yarmouth fisheries, and to give decisions in all cases of treason, sedition, illegal coining, and concealment of treasure-trove. The ordinary business was transacted in two courts, named respectively the Court of Brotherhood, and the Court of Brotherhood and Guestling. The formal installation of a newly appointed Lord Warden took place at the Breding Stone at Dover, also in open-air assembly. It is an interesting fact that these moots or open-air assemblies were summoned by the sound of a horn.

The Lord Warden, who is the chief officer of the Cinque Ports, combining therewith the governorship of Dover Castle and maritime jurisdiction as admiral of the ports, may be regarded as representing to some extent the ancient office of Count of the Saxon Shore, although the changes of time and the paramount importance of the Royal Navy in more recent times in the work of defending our shores, have tended to rob the office of much of its former importance. At the present time the actual duties of the post are confined to presiding as chairman of the Dover Harbour Board.

The freemen or “Barons” of the Cinque Ports are often mentioned in connection with this subject, and it may be useful to put on record the following precise account of the subject, written by Mr. Charles Dawson, F.S.A.

DEFENSIVE CHAINS, ETC.

The Chain at Chatham.—When, early in the seventeenth century, Chatham had grown to considerable importance as a naval centre, a curious method of defence was devised. A long and stout iron chain was placed across the Medway at the western end of Gillingham Reach, near Upnor Castle, with the idea of effectually stopping the progress of alien ships up the river beyond this point. When the chain was originally placed here is not exactly known, but it was repaired in 1606, and soon after abandoned. In 1623 the chain was superseded by a boom made up of masts, iron, and cordage. A few years later, in 1635, either a new boom or a new chain was placed across Gillingham Reach.

The chain came into great prominence when the Dutch invaded the Thames estuary and the Medway in 1667. It was fixed up at Gillingham either on 27 April or soon afterwards. The published accounts are not quite clear or consistent. The claws for fastening and heaving it up were expected to arrive but apparently were not forthcoming on the date mentioned.

Although there had been a great chain here before it does not appear to have been stretched properly across the river. This was now attended to under the direction of the Duke of Albemarle, who went down to Chatham posthaste to complete the defensive works. The chain, consisting of links made of iron bars, six inches in circumference, was strained probably in such a way that it would not be visible above water, and it was perhaps buoyed at intervals. A small battery of guns was placed on shore at each end of the chain in order to protect it from injury by the Dutch. The Unity, a warship, was stationed to the east of the chain, whilst on the west side a Dutch prize was sunk, and several ships were on guard.

The Dutch ships, which had been observed off the English coast 26 April 1667, and off Harwich 8 June, now approached. A letter amongst the State Papers in the Record Office, dated 20 June 1667, tells us that the Dutch fleet was seen off Harwich on the 6 June, but the only result was that a few fishermen were frightened, and that some of the Dutchmen landed and drove off some cattle. On the 10th the navy came within shot of Sheerness, and after some hours took the guns. On the 11th, by degrees, twenty or twenty-two Dutch ships were brought up to the narrow part of the river Medway, where ships had been sunk. Two and a half hours fighting on the following day made the Dutch masters of the chain. One guard ship after another was fired and blown up. The chain was broken by Captain Brackel by order of Van Ghent. Fire-ships were sent to destroy the English ships. The first hung on the chain, but the weight of the second snapped it. The Dutch ships went forward carrying destruction with them. The batteries on the banks of the river and the guns from. Upnor Castle were now brought into action, with the result that the enemy soon retired, leaving two ships stranded.

The exploits of the Dutch in the Thames and the Medway caused considerable alarm in London. Pepys, on hearing of the failure of the chain of Chatham, writes of it as a very serious piece of news, “which,” he says, “struck me to the heart.”

Another and rather more precise account of the occurrence is as follows: On 12 June the Dutch sent up towards Gillingham a division consisting of four men-of-war, three armed yachts, and two fire-ships. Several of the ships charging at the same time, broke the chain, entered the waters beyond and set fire to the Mathias. The Dutch next dealt with the batteries at either end of the chain, and by means of their guns quickly silenced them. Great damage was done to the shipping in the Medway, many vessels being burnt and destroyed.

It seems probable that at least one purpose of the chain was to hinder the progress of fire-ships which the enemy set in motion against our shipping.

In order to defend the government works nearer London, batteries mounting sixty pieces of ordnance were erected at Woolwich, whilst the defensive works at Gravesend and Dover were strengthened.

About the middle of the following September workmen were employed in clearing away the moorings of the chain at Gillingham Reach.

Chains at Portsmouth, Great Yarmouth, etc.—The chain of Chatham furnishes a curious example of coast defence, wholly ineffective against powerful shipping; but it was not a novelty. Portsmouth Harbour had been at an earlier period provided with a similar form of defence. Edward VI, on the occasion of a visit to Southsea Castle, determined to strengthen Portsmouth against invasion by the enemy. He therefore directed the building of two massive towers at the entrance to the harbour. To these an immense iron chain was fixed in such a way that it could be raised and tightened or lowered at pleasure when the approach of the enemy made this desirable. The fortifications of Portsmouth were strengthened during the reign of Elizabeth (see p. 145).

Great Yarmouth.—In addition to a boom and two timber jetties at the entrance to the haven, Yarmouth possessed a chain for the protection of its shipping.

Hull possessed a chain, and an actual picture of it is preserved in one of the Cotton MSS.

Cowes also was defended by a chain.

Fowey.—For the protection of this town Edward IV erected two towers to carry a chain which was suspended, doubtless under the level of the water, across the haven, or mouth of the River Fowey. Subsequently the people of Fowey incurred the royal disapproval when they attacked the French during a truce, and accordingly Edward IV had the chain removed and sent to Dartmouth. It does not seem quite clear whether this chain, when removed to Dartmouth, was used for the protection of shipping, but there certainly was a chain bridge at this place in which, conceivably, the old chain may have been utilized.

There is reason to think that chains for the protection of important centres of shipping were more common than might be supposed from the few definite particulars of them which have survived. As an effective defence against the approach of the war-ships of an enemy, however, it would perhaps be impossible to find a more feeble type of protection.

Booms.—As we have already observed in dealing with chains, the necessity must have been felt of supporting such very heavy barriers, even under water and by means of buoys. The boom, although introduced quite early, must have been an improvement upon the simple iron chain, because it contained, to some extent, its own means of support. This contrivance, a chain of linked up massive timbers reinforced with iron, and armed with iron spikes was employed, as early as the time of Queen Elizabeth at Great Yarmouth, and subsequently at many other ports. Like the chain it, of course, provided an obstruction to navigation, especially at the mouths of rivers and harbours; but its massive iron spikes, calculated to pierce and damage shipping, gave it a distinct advantage over the chain.

Fire-ships.—These were ships filled with combustibles and explosives sent to drift among the shipping of the enemy. In the action off Gravelines, fire-ships were used with considerable moral effect against the remains of the Spanish Armada, and they materially assisted in breaking up the sea-power of the Spaniards. Seven vessels were charged with combustibles and primed with gunpowder. As they neared the Spanish ships their appearance created panic. The Spaniards, in order to avoid the danger of fire, cut their ships adrift, and serious damage was caused by the collisions which ensued.

In 1667, again, fire-ships were employed in the daring raid made by the Dutch in the Thames and Medway. This time they were used by the Dutch near the chain at Gillingham Reach.

Catamarans.—Another method of firing an enemy’s shipping was by means of a kind of raft charged with combustibles. The idea of the Catamaran, as regards both its name and construction, was borrowed from the coasts of India and Ceylon where a raft made of three long timbers lashed together, the middle timber being the longest, is used for fishing purpose. As adapted for destroying shipping the Catamaran may be described as a kind of floating mine. Catamarans were much favoured by Mr. Pitt, and in 1804 they were employed by the English against the French fleet, but they proved unsuccessful.

THE COASTGUARD

The coastguard force is of great antiquity, although it is not known at what period it was instituted. In 1403-4 (5 Henry IV, c. 3) it was enacted by statute

There is every reason to believe that there was a properly organized coastguard force at a much earlier period, although precise information on the subject is not available. Certain manuscripts relating to the defence of the coast of Norfolk, however, indicate the existence of a coastguard in that county as, early as the thirteenth century.[26]

In more recent times the duties of the coastguards included the suppression of smuggling and the aiding of shipwrecked vessels. Another purpose was to serve as a reserve to the navy: but in earlier times the prevention and suppression of smuggling was the main work of the coastguards. Early in the nineteenth century a coast blockade was established on the coasts of Kent and Sussex, and detachments of men and boats were stationed at the Martello Towers on the sea-coast.

It is time, perhaps, to bring these pages on the coast defences of England to a conclusion, and to review very briefly the chief features of the subject. There are one or two points which stand out with peculiar prominence.

Firstly we are struck by the origin, development, deterioration, and final degradation in the methods of coast defence. In the middle and later periods of the Roman occupation of Britain the fortresses for coast defence were built in massive masonry. In the earliest examples reliance was placed alone in mass and weight, and no attempt was made to protect the wall by enfilading. In the works built later on this defect was made good. Protecting bastions gave opportunity of attacking the invaders in flank, and so protecting the wall. In the Norman period, again, and particularly in its earlier part massive keeps of great strength and height were erected for the dual purpose of resisting the enemy by passive force, and of keeping a good look-out over the surrounding country or sea, by means of which movements of the enemy could be discovered.

In the periods which followed, notably from the reign of Henry II to that of Richard II, the art of building castles was constantly being improved and developed. Defensive works were adapted to the new forms and methods of offence.

From that time downward to the first few years of the nineteenth century there is every indication of decadence. The defences became more and more feeble. The “chain,” as a serious bar to the progress of unwelcome shipping, reached its most absurd and ridiculous stage during the time of the Dutch invasion of the Medway in 1667, when the “Chain of Chatham” was snapped without the slightest difficulty by the Dutch ships.

As a matter of fact, as we have seen, the coast blockhouses erected by Henry VIII have never taken any important part in the defence of our coasts. This is mainly due, not to their inefficiency, but to the absence of opportunity. The same is true of the Martello towers erected along our south-eastern coast when invasion from France, under Napoleon I, was anticipated.

History is full of accounts of attempted invasions of England. Up to the period of the Norman Conquest, wellnigh every attempt to land on our shores was eventually, although not always immediately, successful. But from the Norman Conquest downward England has always been strong enough to protect herself from enemies who have attempted to make a permanent settlement. This is due to the fact that whilst we have not neglected our coast defences, we have not relied on castles, forts, and other forms of land defence. We have maintained a powerful fleet of war vessels as our first line of defence. Experience has made it abundantly clear that coast defence without the aid of a powerful navy would be inadequate to protect our shores. Our navy is, and always must be, the first and most important of our defences, and its special business is not to act as a simple coastguard force, but to seek out the enemy’s naval force where-ever it may be, and destroy it.