APPENDIX G

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Extract from the narrative of the interruption in the mail arrangements
in the N.-W.P. and Punjab subsequent to the Mutiny at Meerut and
Delhi on the 10th and 11th May, 1857.
By Mr. G. Paton, Postmaster-General, North-West Provinces.

On the mutiny of the native troops at Meerut and Delhi on the 10th and 11th May, 1857, the mail communication between Meerut, Delhi and Allyghur was interrupted. The eastern mails were then forwarded from Allyghur via Anoopshahur and Moradabad to Meerut and thence direct to Kurnaul or via Seharanpore to Umballa. In like manner the mails from the north-west were forwarded from Kurnaul and Umballa to Allyghur. There was delay by the arrangement, but it was the only one practicable on the route via Delhi being closed by the mutiny and rebellion there.

2. After the lapse of a week the mail was reopened between Allyghur and Meerut, but by the mutiny of the 9th Regiment N.I. on the 20th June at Allyghur all postal communication from the north, the south, the east and west of that station was stopped.

3. Exertions were made to establish communication between Cawnpore and Meerut via Futtehgurh, Bareilly and Moradabad. Mails were forwarded towards Bareilly, but none issued from or through that station. This excited much uneasiness for some time, but was explained by the mutiny of the troops there and at Shajehanpore on the 30th June. Bareilly was, like Delhi, the scene of the political intrigue, and the suppression of postal communication was there, as elsewhere, an object of the first importance with the insurgents.

4. The post offices and mail lines in Oude, generally, became disorganized about the same time as in Rohilcund, as the troops mutinied almost simultaneously in both provinces.

5. While the Grand Trunk Road between Cawnpore and Agra was open, arrangements were made to maintain communication between the Punjab and Cis-Sutledge States with Agra via Kurnaul Hansie and Jeypore, but the mutiny of the Hurrianah Battalion and a portion of the 4th Irregular Cavalry at Hansie and Hissar in the end of May entirely stopped that line.

6. An attempt was made to open communication with Agra and Meerut via Muttra and by a line midway between Khoorjah and Secunderabad, but it had to be abandoned owing to the rebel Wulleedad Khan and his followers having obtained undisputed possessions of the district of Bulundshahur.

7. But, although Bulundshahur and a large portion of Allyghur were occupied by the rebel Wulleedad Khan, a line of runners was established between Meerut and Agra via Gurhmooktesur Ghat, the left bank of the Ganges, Anoopshahur and Allyghur. Letters of light weight were managed to be conveyed with tolerable safety by that route, notwithstanding that large sums were offered for the murder of those caught in the act of conveying English correspondence.

8. On or about the 5th June the troops at Allahabad, Cawnpore, Futtehgurh, Hameerpore, Banda Jansie, Lullutpore and Saugor mutinied; and, in consequence, all the post offices and mail lines in the Doab and Bundlekund as low down as Mirzapore became disorganized. Communication between Agra, the Cis-Sutledge States and Calcutta was then fairly cut off and could not be re-established by the Grand Trunk Road so long as Delhi remained in the possession of the mutineers. The route via Multan to Bombay was, however, open and instructions were given for the mails to and from the N.-W.P., Cis-Sutledge and Punjab being forwarded via Lahore.

9. Between Agra and Bombay the mail was not interrupted till the mutiny of the Gwalior Contingent on the 17th June, and since then up to 1st February, 1858, or a period of seven months and thirteen days, the road via Gwalior and Indore to Bombay was closed or not practicable and safe for the mail.

10. So soon as it was apparent that the mail between Bombay and Agra could not be re-established via Gwalior and Indore, the establishment of runners between Agra, Jeypore, Naseerabad, Deesa and Ahmedabad was strengthened, and the mails to and from Bombay, Calcutta, Madras, etc., were very regularly conveyed by that route.

11. In the course of the month of August, Dr. Clark managed at Agra to organize an establishment of kossids, thence via Etawah to Cawnpore, and for very light letters not exceeding a ¼ tola in weight the arrangements, although occasionally interrupted, were generally successful excepting for a period of nearly eighteen days in the end of November and beginning of December, when the troops of the Gwalior Contingent crossed the Jumna and invested Cawnpore. On the defeat of the Gwalior Contingent at Cawnpore on the 7th December the kossid dak was again useful in keeping up communication between Agra and Cawnspore until the 5th January, 1858, when the mail carts were re-established after having ceased to run from the 5th June, or a period of seven months.

12. Communication with the province of Kemaon was uninterruptedly maintained by an establishment of runners posted via Sreenugger, Teeree, Mussoorie and Deyrah Dhoon.

13. Between Meerut and the Camp at Delhi runners were posted via Bagput, but they were frequently cut off, and the communication had to be kept up via Shamlie and Kurnaul or via Seharunpore and Umballa. When the runners between Meerut and the Camp at Delhi were intercepted it was frequently impossible to open direct communication even by kossids, so closely was the country infested with insurgents.

14. The mail cart establishment between the Camp at Delhi and Lahore was steadily kept up. Occasionally it was unsafe to take the carts over the twelve miles leading to and from the Camp, and there the coachman rode the horses across country or proceeded on foot and so managed to elude the insurgents.

15. The mail cart establishment was the only available means by which officers could travel to and from the Camp before Delhi, and it afforded them an easy and speedy mode of travelling.

16. Extra horses were posted at each stage between the Jhellum and Delhi to admit of express cart daks being laid when necessary for mails or passengers.

17. In the month of August it became necessary to provide means for the removal of the sick and wounded officers from the Camp in Delhi to Kurnaul or Umballa, and some of the Inland Transit Company's carriages, in addition to the palanquin carriages and vans attached to the Post Office, were hired for the purpose. All sick and wounded officers were allowed, at the recommendation of the Brigadier-General, now Sir Archdale Wilson, to travel free of expense. Many valuable lives were thus saved.

18. I consider the conduct of the native coachmen beyond all praise during the disturbances. Great temptations to desert us were held out to them by the mutineers, but not one of them proved unfaithful to Government. From the date of arrival of our troops before Delhi on the 8th June till the 20th of September, the date of the fall of Delhi, the coachmen conveyed the mails to and from the Camp with the same safety and the same regularity as before the outbreak.

19. The public mind of the Punjab and Cis-Sutledge States was at the highest pitch of excitement watching the result of the operations of our troops against the mutineers at Delhi, and any interruption of the mail would have had a fatal effect on the peace of those States. The telegraph wire connecting the Camp with the Punjab was frequently cut, and thus it may be easily understood that the regularity of the mail throughout the crisis was of the most vital importance.

20. The Commissioner of Scinde, anticipating the possibility of the communication between the Punjab and Scinde or Bombay being cut off, organized on his own responsibility a mail establishment between Bhawulpore and Jaudhpore, and again with Deesa and Hyderabad. This arrangement was useful in conveying intelligence between Agra, the Punjab and Central India, and also as an auxiliary line of communication between the Punjab and Bombay.

21. In the middle and end of July the mail cart establishment between Googairah and Mooltan became very clamorous and appeared to be inclined to strike. The vital importance of that establishment made me determine on travelling to Mooltan so as to ascertain whether the contractors had any reasonable grievance. There had been many expresses besides passenger daks, and their horses had been perhaps somewhat overworked in consequence, and accordingly I authorized an additional horse at each stage, which for the time quieted the contractors and they gave no more trouble. I was not without some suspicion that there were political influences exciting dissatisfaction amongst them. This impression was in some degree corroborated by an effort on the part of the prisoners of the jail at Googairah attempting to effect their escape. Happily, through the prompt and rigorous measures adopted by the Deputy Commissioner, Mr. Elphinstone, the Émeute amongst the prisoners was most successfully crushed and the peace of the district was not disturbed. Otherwise the mails would have there been interrupted.

22. On the 14th September insurrection broke out between Googairah and Hurruppa. Many horses of the mail cart establishment were carried off by the rebels. Several carts were burnt, and communication by the direct route between Lahore and Mooltan was for several days wholly cut off. The local authorities of the district had no warning of the outbreak till the morning of the night on which it took place. The District Officers gave me reason to hope that the insurrection would be instantly put down, but unfortunately, owing to their paucity of troops, the rebels were not overawed sufficiently to admit of the mails being conveyed by the direct road within fifteen days. In the interim, however, they were, after several days' stoppage, conveyed via Shahpore and Seeah to and from Mooltan and Lahore.

23. It is here worthy of remark that the successful assault of Delhi on the 14th September by our troops was telegraphed to Lahore, and full particulars thereof were transmitted by the mail of that date from Lahore to Mooltan, Scinde, Bombay, etc., before the outbreak between Googairah and Humppa. The receipt of the news of the successful assault of Delhi was signally opportune in Scinde, as the native troops then at Karachi, Hyderabad and Shikarpore were in a state approaching to open mutiny.

24. The route for the mail between Lahore and Mooltan via Shahpore being very circuitous and also unsafe as the country between the Sutledge and Ravee and even for some distance west of the Ravee was in open revolt, it became necessary to determine on having a more direct line of communication between Lahore, Scinde and Bombay. Accordingly a camel dak was established by the Chief Commissioner of the Punjab between Bhawulpore and Ferozepore. The head overseer of the Jullunder Division, Hurdeo Bux, was transferred for the superintendence of this dak and managed it most successfully.

25. The establishment of runners between Ferozepore, Lahore and Loodianah was at the same time strengthened in view to provide for the extra weight of the mails in transit via Bhawulpore, and thus the stations east and west of the Sutledge were rendered independent of the direct mail line between Lahore and Mooltan in respect to Scinde, Bombay, Calcutta, etc., etc.

26. The post offices and mail lines at and above Meerut and throughout the Cis-Sutledge States and Punjab have continued in uninterrupted operation excepting those situated on the line of road between Googairah and Humppa, which were for a short time the scene of insurrections in September.


                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           

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