I. For without the strong feeling of patriotism, neither had G. Duelius, Aulus Atilius or L. Metellus freed us from the terror of Carthage; or the two Scipios extinguished with their blood the rising flame of the second punic war. Quintus Maximus would not have weakened, nor M. Marcellus have crushed the one which was springing up with still greater strength: or P. Africanus turning it from the gates of this city, have borne it amid the walls of our enemies. Yet it was not thought unbecoming in M. Cato, an unknown and a new man, by whom all of us who emulate his course are led as a bright example of industry and virtue, to enjoy the repose of Tusculum, that healthy and convenient situation. That insane man, however, as some have considered him, preferred when urged by no necessity, to contend amid those waves and tempests to extreme old age; rather than pass his days in the most agreeable manner, amid so much ease and tranquillity. Men without number I omit, each of whom were benefactors to the State, and who are not far removed from the remembrance of this generation. I forbear to commemorate them, lest any one should reproach me with neglecting to speak of himself or his immediate friends. This one truth I would mark, that nature has so strongly implanted in man the necessity of virtue, and so powerful an inclination to defend the common welfare, that this principle overcomes all the blandishments of voluptuousness and ease.

II. Yet to possess virtue, like some art, without exercising it, is insufficient. Art indeed, when not effective, is still comprehended in science. The efficacy of all virtue consists in its use. Its greatest end is the government of states, and the perfection not in words but in deeds, of those very things which are taught in the halls. For nothing is propounded by philosophers, concerning what is esteemed to be just and proper, that is not confirmed and assured by those who have legislated for states. For from whence springs piety, or from whom religion? Whence the law, either of nations, or that which is called civil? Whence justice, faith, equity? Whence modesty, continence, the dread of turpitude, the love of praise and esteem? Whence fortitude in trouble and dangers? From those who having laid a foundation for these things in early education, have strengthened some of them by the influence of manners, and sanctioned others by the influence of laws. Of Xenocrates, one of the noblest of philosophers, it is said, that when he was asked what his disciples learnt of him, he replied “to do that of their own choice, which the laws enjoined them to do,” therefore the citizen who obliges every one by the authority and fear of the law to do that, which philosophers by reasoning, with difficulty persuade a few to do, is to be preferred to those learned men who only dispute about these things. For which of their orations, however exquisite, can be compared in value to a well constituted state, to public right and to morals. Truly as great and powerful cities, as Ennius says, are as I think, to be preferred to villages and castles; so those who stand pre-eminent in those cities, in authority and counsel, are to be esteemed far before those in wisdom, who are altogether ignorant of the conduct of public affairs. And since we are chiefly urged by a desire to increase the possessions of the human race, and seek by our counsels and labours, to surround the life of man with gratification and security, and are incited by the instincts of nature to these enjoyments; let us hold the course which was always that of the best men: nor attend to those signals which speculative philosophers make from their retirement, to allure back those who are already far advanced.

III. Against these reasons so certain and so clear, it is urged by those who are opposed to us: first, the labour to be undergone in preserving the public welfare; a slight impediment to the zealous and industrious, not alone in matters of such high import, but in inferior things: whether in studies or in official stations; and to be despised even in affairs of business. To this they add the dangers to which life is exposed, and the dread of death, which brave men scorn; being wont to view it as more wretched to waste away by infirmity and old age, than to seize an occasion to devote that life to the advantage of their country, which one day must be rendered to nature. It is here however they deem themselves most successful and eloquent, when they bring forward the calamities of eminent men, and the injuries heaped upon them by their ungrateful countrymen. Here come the instances in Grecian history. Miltiades, the conqueror and subduer of the Persians, with those wounds yet streaming, which he received in front, in the height of victory: preserved from the weapons of the enemy, to waste away his life in the chains of his countrymen. And Themistocles proscribed and driven from the country he had freed, flying, not to the harbours of that Greece he had preserved, but to the barbarous shores he had harrassed. Nor indeed are instances wanting among the Athenians of levity and cruelty towards great numbers of their citizens; instances which springing up repeatedly among them, are said also to have abounded too conspicuously in our city. For either the exile of Camillus, the misfortune of Ahala, the ill will towards Nasica, or the expulsion of Lenas, or the condemnation of Opimus is remembered: or the flight of Metellus, the sad overthrow of C. Marius, the cutting off of the most eminent citizens, or the destruction of many of them, which soon after followed. Nor indeed is my name forgotten. And I judge that deeming themselves to owe both life and ease to my peril and counsel, they have a more deep and tender remembrance of me. But it is not easy to explain how they who cross the seas for the sake of observing or describing * * *

IV. * * * * At the expiration of my consulship, when in the assembly of the Roman people, I swore that the republic had been saved by my exertions, which they confirmed by universal acclamation, I was requited for the cares and vexations of every injury. Albeit my reverses had more honour than pain attached to them, and less disquietude than glory. Greater was my pleasure at receiving the approbation of good men, than my regret at observing the satisfaction of the bad. But had it happened otherwise, as I said, what complaint could I make? Nothing unforeseen could have occurred, nor more grievous than I might have expected for so many of my deeds. For I was one who could well have gathered greater fruits from ease than others, on account of the agreeable variety of the studies I had pursued from my childhood; and if any disaster had overtaken the republic, I need not have sustained a greater share of it, but have divided it equally with the rest. I hesitated not to oppose myself to those stormy tempests, and almost raging waves, for the sake of preserving my fellow citizens, and of accomplishing at my own risk the common safety of all. For our country has not produced us, or educated us under a law, that she is entitled to no support on our part, lending herself as it were to our convenience only; furnishing a secure refuge, and a tranquil and peaceful asylum to our indolence: but rather holds as pledges to her, to be employed for her benefit, the many and great faculties of our mind, genius, and reason; and only permits us to appropriate to our private purposes, that portion of them, of which she stands in no need.

V. The pretences which are urged for the enjoyment of indolence are not to be listened to. As when it is stated that the public affairs are meddled with by men worthy of no confidence, with whom it is disgraceful to associate: yet to contend against whom is a miserable and dangerous effort, especially when the multitude is excited. For which reason a prudent man ought not to take the reins, when he is not able to restrain the mad and untameable violence of the vulgar: or a generous man expose himself to the lashes of contumely in a strife with low and outrageous adversaries: or a wise man hope to withdraw from such a contest without injury. As if there could well be a more just cause for good and firm men, endowed with noble minds, to stand forth in aid of their country, than that they may not be subject to bad men; nor suffer the republic to be lacerated by them, before the desire of saving it may come too late.

VI. But who can approve of their exception, that a wise man ought not to take upon him any part of the public affairs, unless an occasion of extraordinary need should drive him to it? as if indeed a greater necessity could ever have happened to any one, than occurred to myself. How could I have been useful then, had I not been consul? and how could I have been consul, had I not pursued that course of life from my youth, which belonging to the equestrian rank, in which I was born, enabled me to attain the first honours of the state? No man therefore can assume at pleasure the ability of aiding in the public service, however urgent the danger may be, unless he stands in that relation to his country, which fits him for the occasion. And it appears to me most marvellous, that in the discourse of learned men, they who declare themselves unable to steer in a calm sea, because they have never been taught, nor have ever studied the subject, talk of taking the helm in the midst of the greatest storms. For these very men openly declare, and pride themselves greatly upon it, that they have never studied or taught the mode of establishing or protecting the public interest; which they think the exclusive province, not of learned and erudite men, but of those who are practised in these matters. What consistency is there then in promising to aid the republic in times of peril, when they are incapable of the easier task of directing it in the calmest moments? And although, in truth, the philosopher is not wont of his own accord, to consider the details of state affairs, unless called upon by the times to do it, when indeed he will not decline what duty imposes on him; nevertheless, I judge the knowledge of state affairs is least to be neglected by a wise man; that every thing may be familiar to him, for he cannot tell the moment, when it may be necessary for him to avail himself of his knowledge.

VII. These things I have somewhat enlarged upon, because the discussion proposed and undertaken by me in this work, was on government: and in order to prevent its being without effect, it was necessary in the first instance, to remove every doubt as to the duty of engaging in the public service. Nevertheless if there are any who are governed by the opinions of philosophers, let them turn their attention for a while, and listen to those who enjoy a proud pre-eminence among learned men, even when they have not borne any charge in the republic; still whom I deem from the extent of their studies, and their writings on government, to have been invested with functions appertaining to the public interest. But those seven, whom the Greeks call wise, I perceive have almost all been greatly engaged in public affairs. For there is no one thing in which human worth is more nearly allied to the power of the gods, than to found new states, or to preserve those already founded.

VIII. Concerning which matters, since it hath happened to me, to be deemed something worthy of memory in my administration of public affairs, and to possess some talent for unfolding them; not only in practice, but being versed too in the art of speaking and teaching: while of those before me, some were perfect in debate, yet unknown by their deeds; others of respectable parts for business, without the talent of oratory. Still it is not my intention here to bring forward any new system invented by myself, but to repeat a discussion, that took place at a certain period of our history, among our most illustrious and wise men, which was related to me a long time ago in my youth, by P. Rutilius Rufus, when we were at Smyrna together: in the which I think scarce any point was omitted that belongs to the consideration of these great matters.

IX. When P. Africanus, the son of Paulus, established Latin holidays in his gardens, during the consulate of Tuditanus, and Aquilius; and his most intimate friends had promised to visit him frequently at that season. On the morning of the first day, Q. Tubero, the eldest son of his sister, came. Pleased with his visit, and kindly addressing him “What! Tubero,” said he, “is it you so early? I should have thought these holidays would have given you a favourable opportunity of pursuing your literary inquiries.” “Why in truth,” replied he, “I can apply all my leisure to my books, for they are always disengaged. But to find you at leisure, is very remarkable; especially at this time so critical for the republic.” “So help me Hercules,” said Scipio, “however you find me, it is more idle in appearance than in truth.” “You must now,” said Tubero, “relax your mind a little also, for several of us have determined if it is not inconvenient to you, to spend some of our leisure with you.” “With all my heart,” replied Scipio, “provided we may acquire some information thereby on philosophical subjects.”

X. “Since you invite and encourage me to it yourself,” said Tubero, “let us first converse, Africanus, before the others come, about the meaning of this double sun which has been spoken of in the senate. For those who declare that they have seen two suns, are neither few in number, nor insignificant persons: so that it appears to be of less importance to doubt the fact, than to inquire into the cause of it.” “Would that we had with us our excellent PanÆtius,” said Scipio, “who among other objects of knowledge, was so diligent an inquirer about celestial phenomena. As to myself, Tubero—for to you I will freely declare what I think; I am not drawn in to adopt in matters of this sort, the opinions of our friend, who pronounces things which are scarcely within the reach of conjecture, to be as manifest, as if he beheld them with his eyes, or could lay his hands upon them. On which account I am accustomed to consider Socrates much wiser, who leaves the consideration of such things aside, and teaches that the phenomena about which nature may be interrogated, are either beyond the force of human reason, or irrelevant to the conduct of human affairs.” “I know not,” rejoined Tubero, “what authority there is for the fact, that Socrates rejected all discussion upon such matters, and confined himself to the moral conduct of human life. For what author is to be commended, as more ample on that head than Plato; in whose writings, in many places, it is the custom of Socrates in discussing morals, the virtues, and finally public affairs; to allude studiously to the science of numbers, to geometry, and to harmony, after the Pythagorean mode.” Scipio answered, “these things are as you say; but I dare say you have heard, Tubero, that Plato after the death of Socrates, was carried by the love of knowledge first into Egypt, afterwards into Italy and Sicily, that he might obtain an insight into the discoveries of Pythagoras. That he associated much with Archytas the Tarentine, and with TimÆus of Locram. That he acquired the commentaries of Philolaus, and perceiving that the name of Pythagoras was at that time in great reputation in those places, he dedicated his time to the disciples of Pythagoras and to their opinions. But as he had loved Socrates alone, and wished to make all things conducive to his reputation, he interwove very skilfully the subtlety and humour of the Socratic style with the mysteries of Pythagoras, and with many branches of the arts.”

As Scipio ceased to speak, he suddenly saw L. Furius approaching, and as soon as he had kindly saluted him, he took him by the hand, and placed him on his couch. And as P. Rutilius the accomplished preserver of this conversation appeared at the same time, saluting him also in the same manner, he bade him be seated near to Tubero. “What are you engaged in,” said Furius; “hath our arrival broken in upon your conversation?” “Not in the least,” replied Africanus, “for it is precisely about matters, such as Tubero has just been introducing, that thou art wont diligently to inquire into, and to investigate. And indeed our friend Rutilius was in the habit occasionally of discussing things of this kind with me, when we were under the walls of Numantia.” “What is the subject you have fallen upon?” said Philus. “These two suns,” replied he, “respecting which I am desirous of hearing your opinion.”

XII. As he spoke this, a boy announced that LÆlius was approaching, having already left his house; upon which Scipio having dressed himself, left his chamber, and had made but a few paces in the portico, when he saluted LÆlius who was approaching, and those who were with him: Spurius Mummius, to whom he was particularly attached; Fannius, and Quintus ScÆvola, sons-in-law of LÆlius, highly gifted young men of the quÆstorial age. And having welcomed them all, he made another turn on the portico, placing LÆlius in the middle; for in their friendship it was a sort of law between them, that LÆlius did homage to Scipio as to a god, on account of his glorious pre-eminence in war; while in his turn Scipio, in private life, paid to LÆlius all the reverence due to a parent, on account of his superior years. And having chatted a little together in various places, Scipio, who was very much enlivened and gratified with their arrival, was pleased to have them seated in a sunny place in a little meadow, on account of its being the winter season; which as they were about to do, M. Manilius came, a prudent and agreeable person, and very dear to them all; who being cordially saluted by Scipio and the rest, took his seat next to LÆlius.

XIII. “It does not seem to me necessary,” said Philus “that we should seek another subject of conversation on account of those who are arrived, but that we should observe more accuracy, and say something worthy of their ears.” “What subject were you upon,” said LÆlius, “and what discussion are we come to be present at?” “Scipio was inquiring of me,” replied Philus, “what my opinion was respecting the fact of two suns having been seen.”

LÆlius. “Why truly Philus, is there no longer any thing left for us to inquire about, touching our own domestic affairs, or those appertaining to the republic, that we must be exploring the things that are passing in the heavens?” “Dost thou then think,” replied he, “that it does not concern our own mansions, to know what is passing, and what is done in that vast one, not the one surrounded by our walls, but that which constitutes the universe, and which the gods have given to us for a domicile, and a common country with themselves. Especially when if we are ignorant of them, many and very high matters will be hidden from us. As to myself, the contemplation and knowledge of these things delight me, as certainly as it does you, LÆlius, and all who are eager in the pursuit of knowledge.” “I offer no impediment,” said LÆlius, especially at this holiday time; but shall we hear any thing, or are we come too late?”

Philus. “Nothing has been discussed yet, and as the subject is entire, I freely concede to you, LÆlius, the right of expressing your sentiments first.”

LÆlius. “Let us rather hear you, unless Manilius thinks, that some decree by way of compromise between these two suns may be adjusted; so that each may keep possession of its own part of the firmament.” “You love still to banter that science, LÆlius, in which I am proud to excel,” replied Manilius, “and without which no one could know his own possession from anothers. But of that by and by. Let us now listen to Philus, who I perceive has a case of greater difficulty referred to him, than ever came before me or P. Mucius.”

XIV. “I shall lay nothing new before you,” said Philus, “nor any thing discovered or thought of by myself. I remember, however, that C. Sulpicius Gallus, a very learned man as you know; when this same phenomenon was stated to have been seen, being by chance in the house of M. Marcellus, who had been in the consulate with him; ordered a sphere to be placed before him, which the ancestor of M. Marcellus had taken from the conquered Syracusans, and brought out of their wealthy and embellished city; the only thing he had possessed himself of among so great a spoil. I had heard a great deal of this sphere, on account of the fame of Archimedes, but did not admire the construction of it so much; for another which Archimedes also had made, and which the same Marcellus had placed in the temple of virtue, was more elegant and remarkable in the general opinion. But subsequently, when Gallus began very scientifically to explain the nature of the mechanism; the Sicilian appeared to me to possess more genius, than human nature would seem to be capable of. Gallus said, that the other solid and full sphere was an old invention, and was first wrought by Thales of Miletas: but afterwards was delineated over with the fixed stars in the heavens by Eudoxus, the Cnidian, a disciple of Plato. The which adorned and embellished as it was by Eudoxus, Aratus who had no knowledge of astronomy, but a certain poetical faculty, many years afterwards extolled in his verses. The mechanism of this sphere, however, on which the motions of the sun, moon, and those five stars which are called wandering and irregular, are shown; could not be illustrated on that solid sphere. But what appeared very admirable in this invention of Archimedes was, that he had discovered a method of producing the unequal and various courses, with their dissimilar velocities, by one revolution. When Gallus put this sphere in motion, the moon was made to succeed the sun by as many revolutions of the brass circle, as it actually took days to do in the heavens. From which the same setting of the sun was produced on the sphere as in the heavens: and the moon fell on the very point, where it met the shadow of the earth, when the sun from the region * * * *

XV. * * * * * for he was a man I was very much attached to, and I know that my father Paulus esteemed and placed the highest value on him. I remember when I was but a boy, being with my father, who was then consul in Macedonia; that while we were encamped, our army was struck with a religious dread, because the full and splendid moon in the serenity of the night, was suddenly eclipsed. He being then our lieutenant, the year just before that in which he was declared consul, did not hesitate the following day, to pronounce openly in the camp, that it was no prodigy. And that what had then taken place, would always occur in future at those particular periods, when the position of the sun was such, that its rays could not fall upon the moon. “But how could he,” asked Tubero, “make men half wild, comprehend such matters, or venture to speak of them before the unenlightened?”

Scipio. “Indeed he did, and with great * * * *

* * * * * there was neither a haughty ostentation, nor any thing in his speech unbecoming a grave personage; and he accomplished a point of great importance, in removing from the disturbed minds of the men, the influence of an idle and fearful superstition.

XVI. There was an occurrence similar to this during the great war, which the Athenians and Lacedemonians waged against each other with so much inveteracy. Darkness being suddenly produced by the obscuration of the sun, and a prodigious fear taking possession of the minds of the Athenians. Pericles, the first man in the city, in authority, in eloquence, and in council; taught the citizens what he had himself learnt from Anaxagoras, whose pupil he had been: that it was an unavoidable appearance at the particular period, when the moon had placed herself immediately before the orb of the sun: and although it did not take place every lunar period; it could nevertheless be occasioned only by the moon’s motion. Having convinced them by reasoning, he delivered the people from their apprehension. For it was then a strange and unknown reason to give for an eclipse, that the sun and moon were in opposition to each other, which it is said, was first observed by Thales the Milesian. At a later period, this had not escaped our Ennius, who wrote about the year 350 of the building of Rome, in the nones of June; that “the moon and night stood before the sun.” So great, however, is the advancement of knowledge in these matters, that from this day, which we find noted in the principal annals, and by Ennius; the previous occultations of the sun are fixed up to that which took place in the reign of Romulus, in the nones of the fifth month. During which darkness, Romulus, whom the laws of nature indeed would have carried to the tomb, is said to have been borne by his virtue to heaven.

XVII. Then Tubero, “Dost thou not perceive Africanus, that what appeared otherwise to thee a while ago * * * * * *

* * * * * * “Who can perceive any grandeur in human affairs, whose eyes are accustomed to survey the empire of the gods? What are temporal things in the eyes of those conversant with eternal ones? What is there glorious to the contemplation of him, who looks at the small size of the earth; first as to its whole extent, then to that part of it which men inhabit? And yet we, confined to so small a portion of it, unknown to most nations, hope our name will be diffused to its utmost limits. What are lands, and houses, and flocks, and immense masses of gold and silver to him who neither considers them desirable nor calls them so: the fruition of which appears to him trifling, the use unsatisfactory, the possession uncertain: and which are often in the hands of the most contemptible of men? How fortunate may that man be esteemed, who alone claims a share in all things, not as the privilege of a citizen, but of a philosopher: not by civil rights, but by the common law of nature, which forbids any one to be the proprietor of aught, of the proper use of which he is ignorant! Who considers our consulships and high offices, not to be sought after for the sake of personal advantage or glory; not as things to be coveted, but to be undertaken as duties. The man finally who can say that of himself which my ancestor Africanus, as Cato writes, was wont to say, “that he never was more busy than when he was doing nothing; and that he never was less alone, than when nobody was with him.”

For who can deem Dionysius to have accomplished a greater thing, when by the greatest exertion he snatched their liberties from the citizens, than Archimedes his countryman, who appearing to be occupied in nothing, produced this sphere of which we were but now conversing? Are they not more alone, who find no one in the forum or in the crowd who chooses to talk with them, than those who without any witness can converse with themselves; or as it were, be present at the councils of the most learned men, when they solace themselves with their discoveries and writings? Who in truth can imagine any one to be more rich, than the man who has no wants, beyond the simple calls of nature; or more powerful than him, who has attained the possession of al that he desires; or more blessed than him who is freed from all anxiety of mind? or what man’s fortune is better established than his, who can carry along with him, or out of a shipwreck as men are wont to say, all his possessions? What command, what office, what kingdom can be preferred to that condition of mind, which looking down upon all things human, and esteeming them to be the objects of an inferior wisdom, turns ever to the contemplation of those things that are divine and eternal: persuaded that they only deserve to be called men, who are refined by the sciences of humanity? That which has been said of Plato, or of some other sage, appears to me therefore very excellent. Who being borne by a tempest to unknown lands, and cast on a desert shore, while his companions were apprehensive on account of their ignorance of the place, is said to have perceived geometrical figures described on the sand. Which when he saw, he bade them all be of good heart, for he had seen vestiges of men. Not that he judged so from the cultivation of the fields which he beheld, but from these indications of science. For all these reasons, Tubero, learning, and learned men, and these thy studies have always been pleasing to me.

XVIII. Then said LÆlius, “I am not bold enough, Scipio, to speak of these things: nor even to thee, or Philus, or Manilius * * * * *

* * * * in his paternal house we have had a friend, worthy to be imitated by him.

“Ælius Sextus, conspicuously discreet and wise.” That he was conspicuously discreet and wise, is said by Ennius, not because he sought after what he was not able to discover, but because he answered those who made inquiries of him, in a manner to solve their difficulties and anxieties, in whose mouth when arguing against the studies of Gallus, were always these words of Achilles, in Iphigenia.

He also said, for many times and willingly I listened to him, that Zethus the author of Pacuvius, was too great an enemy to science. The Neoptolemus of Ennius pleased him more; who says that he likes to philosophize but only with a few; not willing to give himself up to it altogether. But if the studies of the Greeks delight you so much, there are others freer and more easily diffused, which we may bring to the use of life, or even to that of the republic. As for these arts, their value consists, if in any thing, in stimulating and sharpening the genius of young boys; enabling them in this manner the better to comprehend greater things.

XIX. “I do not dissent from you, LÆlius,” said Tubero, “but ask what you understand by greater things?”

LÆlius. “I will tell you in good faith, although you may somewhat despise me for it; since it is you who are asking Scipio about these celestial matters. As for myself, I think those things most worthy of our attention, which lay immediately before our eyes. How can it interest me that the grandson of L. Paulus by the mother’s side, born of such a noble and illustrious family in this republic, should seek for reasons why two suns have been seen, when he does not inquire the cause why two senates, and almost two people exist in one republic? For as you perceive the death of Tiberius Gracchus, and even before that event, the whole proceedings of his tribunate were dividing one people into two parties: those who are the detractors of Scipio also, and are envious of him, urged on at first by P. Crassus and Appius Claudius, keep up notwithstanding their death, an opposition to us in the senate, through the influence of Metellus and P. Mucius. Nor will they suffer him to come forward, who is alone equal to so dangerous a crisis, amidst the factious and dangerous associations made under the Roman name: amidst violated compacts, and the new matters daily stirring by the seditious triumvirs, to the consternation of good and respectable men. Wherefore young men, if you will listen to me, entertain no apprehensions about this double sun: for either it is nothing at all, or if it is a reality, as far as it has been observed, there is nothing injurious in it. Either we can know nothing about such matters, or even if we could know all about them, we should not be better or happier for that knowledge. But one senate and one people we may have; that is practicable. And if it is not done, we shall suffer for it. And we know it is otherwise, and that if it were effected, we should have more stability, and be happier and better.”

XX. Then Mucius. “What is it we have to learn, in your opinion, LÆlius, that we may be able to effect what you require of us?”

LÆlius. “Those sciences whose tendency is to enable us to be useful to the state; for I deem that to be the most pre-eminent gift of wisdom, as well as the noblest fruit of virtue and duty. Wherefore that these holidays may be productive of conversations in an especial manner useful to the republic, let us entreat Scipio to impart to us, what he deems to be the happiest condition of a state. Afterwards we can consider other matters, the knowledge of which I hope will bring us to the subject before us, and will unfold the causes of the present condition of things.

XXI. * * * * * not for that cause alone I wished it, but because I thought it proper that the first person in the republic should first speak on public affairs; and because I remembered that you were accustomed frequently to discuss with PanÆtius before Polybius, two Greeks extremely versed in civil affairs; and that you had proved by various reasonings the excellence of that form of government, which our ancestors had transmitted to us from so distant a period. In the which matter, you, being more competent to it, will do an agreeable thing to us all, (for I speak also for the rest,) if you will unfold to us your opinion of the commonwealth.”

XXII. “I cannot,” he began, “say that I have been in the habit of turning my mind more intensely and diligently to the consideration of any subject, than the very one which you now propose to me, LÆlius. For when I perceive that every artificer who truly excels in his vocation, is filled with anxiety, care, and zeal, lest any one should surpass him in his art. I, whose chief duty, bequeathed to me by my parents and ancestors, is the conduct and administration of the republic, must confess myself more indolent than any artisan, if I bestowed less attention on the greatest of arts, than he does on the most insignificant. But neither am I satisfied with the writings on this subject which the first and wisest among the Greeks have left to us; while I hesitate to establish my own conclusions in preference to theirs. Wherefore I intreat you, not to listen to me as one entirely ignorant of the affairs of the Greeks, nor as one who gives them the preference to our own writers, particularly in matters of this kind; but as one liberally brought up by the diligence of distinguished parents, and ardent in the love of knowledge from his youth; yet nevertheless much more formed by domestic experience, than by literary studies.”

XXIII. “I doubt,” said Philus here, “whether any one has ever excelled you in genius. We know to what studies you have always been partial, and that in your acquaintance with the great affairs of the state, you have surpassed every one: wherefore if as you say, your mind has been particularly turned to matters which have now become almost a science: I feel very much indebted to LÆlius, feeling a hope that what you will say will be more instructive, than all those things which the Greeks have written for us.” “You are creating” replied he, “much expectation from my discourse, which is a very great weight upon one, who is about to speak of matters of importance.” “However great it may be,” said Philus, “you will throw it off as you are accustomed to do; nor is there any danger that a dissertation from you on government will be deficient in any requisite.”

XXIV. “I will do what you desire, as well as I am able,” rejoined Scipio, “and will begin the discussion in conformity with the rule which I think ought to be observed in the examination of all things, if you would avoid error. That the name of the subject in discussion being agreed upon, the meaning of the name shall be defined. If this be found to be appropriate, the matter can be entered upon at once; for unless this be perfectly understood at first, we never can understand what we are disputing about. Wherefore since it is of the republic we are inquiring, let us first examine what that is we are inquiring about.” LÆlius having shown his acquiescence. “I do not intend, however,” said Africanus, “in a matter so clear and familiar, to begin with the very origin of things; the first conjunction of the sexes; then their progeny and descendants, as some of our learned men are accustomed to do: nor shall I go into continual definitions of terms—what they are—and how many varieties of them. When I address wise men, who in war and in peace, have taken a glorious part in the affairs of a great republic, I shall not expose myself in such a manner, that the very thing under discussion shall be more intelligible, than my own explanation of it. Neither do I take upon me to pursue the subject in every direction, as a master would: nor can I promise to do it so effectually, that no omission whatever shall escape me.” “It is exactly such a discourse as you promise, that I am in expectation of,” said LÆlius.

XXV. “A republic or commonwealth then,” said Scipio, “is the wealth or common interest of the people. Every assemblage of men however, gathered together without an object, is not the people, but only an assemblage of the multitude associated by common consent, for reciprocal rights, and reciprocal usefulness. The leading cause of this congregating, is not to be ascribed so much to his weakness, as to the social principle innate with man. Our species is not a solitary and wandering one, but is so created that even when enjoying the greatest affluence * * * *

XXVI. * * * * rather intuitive; for no original institution of the social state has been found, nor of the other moral virtues. These congregations therefore made for the purposes I have explained, established their first seat in some particular place for a residence. Which after being fortified by their labours and by its position, and fitted with temples and public squares, the re-union of dwellings constructed after this manner, they called a town or city. Every people therefore, formed by the assemblage of such a multitude as I have described, every city which is the settlement of a people, every commonwealth which as I have said, is the wealth of the people, must in order to be permanent, be governed by some authority. That authority however must always have a strong relation to the causes from whence the commonwealth derived its origin. It may then be delegated to one, or to some selected persons; or it may be borne by the whole multitude of the people. When therefore authority over all things, is in the control of one man, we call him king; and a commonwealth so ordered, his kingdom. When the authority is exercised by selected persons, then such a state is said to be under the government of the better class. But there is also a popular form of government, for so it is called, where all things are ruled by the people. And of any of these three modes, if the chain is in any manner kept together, which at first united men into the social pact for the sake of the common interest, I would not indeed call the mode perfect, nor say that in my opinion it was the best, but that it was to be tolerated, and that one might be preferable to another. For whether under a just and wise king, or chosen eminent citizens, or the people themselves, although this last is least to be approved of, setting aside the irregularities occasioned by the bad passions of some men, any one may see that a steady government might be preserved.

XXVII. In kingdoms however, the governed are too much deprived of common rights, and of power. Under the better class, the multitude can scarcely be partakers of liberty, as they are not admitted either to the public councils or offices: and when the government is conducted by the people, although it be justly and moderately administered, yet equality itself becomes injustice, seeing that it admits of no degrees of rank. Therefore, although Cyrus the Persian, was a most just and wise king, yet such a commonwealth, (for as I said before, it is the common property,) governed by the nod of one man, does not appear to me very desirable. And although the Massilians our clients are governed with great justice, by their chosen chief men, nevertheless in that condition of a people, there is something resembling slavery. And the Athenians at a certain period having abolished the Areopagus, conducted every thing by ordinances, and decrees of the people; yet as they had no distinctions in dignity, their state was without its ornament.

XXVIII. And this I say of these three kinds of government, not of the agitations and disturbances incidental to them, but of their tranquil and regular state. Those varieties are principally remarkable for the defects I have alluded to. Then they have other pernicious failings, for every one of these governments is travelling a dangerous road, bordering on a slippery and precipitous path. To a king so commendable, or if you choose, since I especially name him; to the amiable Cyrus; a parallel springs up in the cruel Phalaris, with all his capricious tyranny; into whose similitude the government of one man so easily slides with a downward course. To the administration of the city of the Massilians by their select chiefs, may be opposed the plot and faction of the Thirty, which took place at a certain period among the Athenians. Nor need we look farther; the very Athenian people having assumed the power over all things, and giving license to the fury of the multitude * * * * * *

XXIX. * * * * * * and this great mischief arises whether under the rule of the better class, or under a tyrannical faction, or under the regal government; and even frequently under the popular form. At the same time from the various forms of government of which I have spoken, something excellent is wont to emanate. For the changes and vicissitudes in public affairs, appear to move in a circle of revolutions; which when recognized by a wise man, as soon as he beholds them impending, if he can moderate their course in the administration of affairs, and restrain them under his control; he acts truly the part of a great citizen, and almost of a divine man. Therefore I think a fourth kind of government, moderated and mixed from those three of which I first spoke, is most to be approved.”

XXX. “I know” said LÆlius, “that such is your opinion Africanus, for I have often heard you say so. Nevertheless, unless it is troublesome to you, I should be glad to learn which you judge best of these three kinds of government. For either it will throw some light upon * * * * * *

XXXI. * * * * * * every government partakes of the nature and will of him who administers it. So that in no other state, save where the power of the people predominates, has liberty any home. Liberty the sweetest of all blessings, and which if it is not equal for all, is not liberty. For what equality can there be, I do not mean in kingdoms where slavery has no doubtful character: but in those states where all are nominally free: there indeed they give their votes, confer commands, magistracies and are solicited and intreated. But in truth they only part with that, however repugnant it may be to them, which must be conferred: things which they cannot retain, which is the reason why others seek to possess them. For they are invested with no command, have no public authority, nor are called to be judges in the tribunals: privileges which belong either to ancient families, or are purchased by money. Among a free people however, as at Rhodes or Athens, there is no citizen who * * * * *

XXXII. Some assert, that when one or more in a state becomes conspicuous by his opulence or riches, disdain and pride soon break out: and the weak and indolent yield and bend under the arrogance of riches. But if the people are able to preserve their rights, they think no condition of things could be more excellent, more free, or more happy. For in their hands would be the laws, the tribunals, war, peace, treaties, and the properties and lives of all the citizens. This sort of government they think is properly called one republic, that is the common interest of the people. Wherefore it is, that the people are wont to restore commonwealths to liberty from the domination of kings, and patricians; not that kings are believed to be necessary to a free people, or that the better class are the source of power and wealth. And they deny that these advantages should not be conceded to a free people on account of the excesses of uncivilized nations: for where the people are unanimous, and every thing tends to the public safety and liberty, nothing can be more unchangeable, nothing more firm. Unanimity in such a commonwealth is very easy, where the common effort is for the public good. But from opposing interests, where one man clashes with another, discord arises. Wherefore when the senate had possession of the government, the condition of the state was never sound. In kingdoms the disadvantages are still greater; of them Ennius said

Wherefore as the law is the bond of civil society, and equal rights form that of the law, by what power can a community of citizens be maintained, where their condition is not an equal one? If therefore it is not expedient to equalize fortunes; if the powers of mind cannot be equalized in all, certainly then an equality of rights ought to exist, among those who are citizens of the same republic. For what is a state but a community of rights? * * * * *

XXXIII. * * other governments however are deemed by them not to deserve those names, which they have chosen to arrogate to themselves. For why should I call a man who is greedy of rule, or of the sole command, and who is trampling upon an oppressed people, king, which is the title of the good Jupiter, rather than tyrant? A tyrant may be clement as well as a king may be oppressive; the matter really interesting to the people is, whether they are to serve under a gentle or a severe master: for as to being any thing but servants, that is not to be avoided. How could Lacedemon, when she was thought to excel in the science of government, possess only good and just kings, when she was obliged to take any king who was sprung from the royal blood? And the better class, who can endure them, who have arrogated to themselves in their own assemblies, a name not conceded to them by the people? For who is the man to be pronounced best, in learning, in the arts, in studies? * * * * *

XXXIV. * * * * If it was done by lot, the government would be overthrown; like a ship, at whose helm, some passenger taken at hazard was placed. A nation can entrust its affairs to whom it may choose; and if it wishes to remain free, it will choose from among the best. For certainly the security of states is found in the counsels of the best citizens; especially as nature has not only ordained that they should preserve an influence over the weak by their conspicuous virtue and courage, but also that the weak should resign themselves to the government of great minds. This most desirable state of things, they say, is prevented by the erroneous opinions of men who, through ignorance of that virtue, which belongs to but few, and is seen and appreciated only by few, deem those who are sprung from a noble race, or who are opulent and wealthy, to be the best men. Under this vulgar error, when the power, not the virtues of a few, have got possession of the government; those chiefs tenaciously preserve the title of better class; a name however to which the substance is wanting. For riches, titles, and power, devoid of wisdom, of the knowledge of self-government, and that of the government of others, exhibit nothing but insolent and disgraceful pride. Nor can the condition of any city be more deplorable, than where the richest men pass for the best. But what can be more delightful than a state virtuously governed? What more illustrious than the man, who while he governs others, is himself the slave of no bad passions? Who, while he calls upon the citizens to observe the regulations he has formed, lives up to them all himself? Nor imposes any laws upon the people, which he himself obeys not, but who presents his whole life to his fellow citizens as one unbroken law. If one man could suffice to all things, there would be no need of many; and if all men could perceive what is best, and consent to it, no one would require any chiefs to be elected. The difficulty of coming to wise determinations, has transferred the rule from one king to many persons; and the error and rashness of the people, from the multitude to a few. Thus between the obstinacy of one, and the temerity of many, the better class have possessed themselves of the middle and least turbulent of all the situations: by whom if the commonwealth is well administered, the people relieved from all care and thought, must necessarily be happy: enjoying their independence through the labours of those, whose duty it is to preserve it to them; and who ought never to permit the people to think that their interests are neglected by their rulers. As to that exact equality of rights, which is held so dear by a free people; it cannot be preserved: for the people themselves, however free and unrestrained they may be, are remarkable for their deference to many persons; and exercise a great preference as it respects men and dignities. That which is called equality also, is a most unjust thing in itself: for when the same honour is enjoyed by the high and by the low, through a whole people, that very equality must be unjust; and in those states which are governed by the better class, it can never happen. These, LÆlius, and some other reasons resembling them, are wont to be urged by those who chiefly praise that form of government.

XXXV. “But which, Scipio, among those three, do you chiefly approve of?” said LÆlius.

Scipio. “You do well to ask, which chiefly of the three, since separately I do not approve of any of them; but should prefer to every one of them, a government constituted out of all three. But if one of them for its simplicity may be admired, I should approve of the kingly form, and give it the highest praise. For the name of king calls up at once the idea of a father, consulting with his citizens as if they were his own children; and more anxious to preserve them, than to reduce them to slavery: it being a great advantage to the weak to be sustained by the exertions and by the foresight of one pre-eminent and good man. Here however the better class profess to do the same thing to more advantage, and say there is more wisdom with numbers than with one, and at the same time equal justice and faith. But the people call out with a loud voice, that they choose neither to obey one nor many; that nothing is sweeter to the beasts of the field than liberty, which is wanting to all who serve either under the better class or under a king. Thus on the score of personal attachment, kings attract us. The better class by their wisdom; and liberty on the side of the people. So that in making the comparison, it is difficult to say which is preferable.”

L. “I believe it,” said he, “but if you leave this point unfinished, the other parts of the subject can scarcely be cleared up.”

XXXVI. S. “Let us imitate therefore Aratus, who in his introduction to a discourse upon high matters, thought it best to begin with Jupiter.”

L. “Why with Jupiter? and what has this discussion to do with the verses of Aratus?”

S. “Insomuch, that the opening of our debate may be honoured with the name of him, whom all, learned and unlearned, consent with one voice, to be the one king of all the gods and men.” “What then!” said LÆlius. “What do you believe in but the things which are before your eyes?” replied he. “This opinion has been established for the conduct of life, by those who have had the direction of public affairs; that the belief might prevail, that one king ruled in heaven, who with his nod, as Homer says, could tumble down Olympus; and that he should be considered as the King and Father of all. Great is the authority for it, and many the witnesses, inasmuch as all have concurred in it. Nations too have agreed, as we find in the decrees of princes, that the regal form of government was most excellent, since they imagine the gods themselves to be under the government of one king. And if we have been told that this and similar opinions have sprung from fables and the errors of the ignorant, let us listen to those who may be considered almost the common teachers of erudite men; who as it were, saw these very things with their eyes, which we scarcely are acquainted with, when we hear of them.” “And who are they?” said LÆlius. “They,” replied he, who in their investigations of the nature of all things, have perceived a design in the universal structure of this world * * * * * *

XXXVII. * * * * * * “But if you desire it LÆlius, I can give you authorities in no wise barbarous, nor of too remote an antiquity.”

L. I should be glad to have them.

S. You are aware that it is now somewhat less than four hundred years since this city has been governed without kings.

L. That is true; rather less.

S. What then are four hundred years, for the age of a city or state; is it such a long period?

L. It can hardly be called an adult age.

S. Then there was a king in Rome four hundred years ago?

L. And a very superb one.

S. Who before him?

L. A most just one; and from that period up to Romulus, who reigned six hundred years from the present time.

S. Then he is not so very remote.

L. Not at all. The institutions of Greece were already on the wane.

S. I submit to you now, whether Romulus was the king of a barbarous people?

L. If as the Greeks say, all men were either Greeks or Barbarians; then I am afraid he must be esteemed a king of a barbarous people. But if that epithet is appropriate to a difference of manners, rather than to languages, I think the Greeks not less barbarians than the Romans.” “In relation to the matter of which we speak,” said Scipio, “it is intelligence we are looking for, rather than men. If a discreet people therefore, not of a very ancient period, have preferred the government of kings, I am availing myself of testimony which cannot be deemed savage, uncivilized, or of a barbarous antiquity.”

XXXVIII. “I perceive Scipio,” said LÆlius, “that you are sufficiently provided with testimony. But with me, as with good judges, sound argument prevails more than witnesses.” “Make use of an argument then,” replied Scipio, “which your knowledge of yourself can suggest to you.” “What knowledge,” said he.

S. Why as when by chance it happens to you to be angry with some one.

L. That occurs oftener than I could wish.

S. What! when you are in anger, do you suffer your mind to fall under the domination of that passion?

L. No, so help me Hercules. I rather imitate Archytas, the Tarentine; who on arriving at his country house, and being greatly offended at perceiving his orders had been disobeyed, “You are a miserable wretch,” said he to his farmer, “and I would have you flogged to death if I were not angry.” “Excellent,” said Scipio. “Archytas wished to calm his anger by reflection, considering that degree of it which was not under the control of reason, to be leading on to a sort of sedition of the mind. To it add avarice, ambition, the passion for glory, and for sensual pleasures; and it will appear that there exists in the minds of men, a sort of regal controlling power, to wit, reflection. For that is the best part of the mind, and where its authority prevails, there is no room for sensuality, for anger, or for rashness.

L. So it is.

S. Do you approve therefore of a mind so disposed?

L. There is nothing I admire more.

S. Then you really do not think, reflection being driven away; that voluptuousness or the angry passions, which are without end, should have the mastery in all things.

L. Indeed I can conceive of nothing more wretched, than such a state of mind; nor of a man more debased than when under such government.

S. You prefer then all parts of the mind, to be under some government, the government of reflection?

L. I certainly prefer it.

S. Why therefore do you hesitate in your opinion about public affairs; where if the administration is transferred to many, there will be no one, as I now understand it, to take the command. And it seems that if authority is not one thing, it is nothing at all.

XXXIX. “I would ask,” said LÆlius, “of what consequence it is to us, whether one or many, if justice is dispensed by the latter.” “Since I find LÆlius,” said Scipio, “that my witnesses have made no great impression on you, I shall not desist from making use of yourself as a witness to prove what I say.” “Me,” said he, “in what way?”

S. Why adverting to the directions you so earnestly gave to your family, when we were lately at Formianum; to obey only the orders of one person.

L. Oh! my farmer!

S. Well, at home, I suppose, several are entrusted with the management of your affairs?

L. No, only one.

S. What, your whole establishment! does no one but yourself manage it?

L. Just so.

S. Do not you therefore accede to the same conclusion in public affairs: that the government of a single person, if it is a just one, is the best?

L. I am brought to the conclusion, and must almost assent to it.

XL. You will be more inclined to that opinion, said Scipio, when omitting the analogies of one pilot, one physician, who if they are any way skilled in their arts, ought one to have the control of the ship; the other of the patient, in preference to many; I come to the consideration of greater matters.

L. What are they?

S. Are you not aware that the name of king became odious to this people, on account of the oppression and pride of one man, Tarquin?

L. Yes, I am aware.

S. Then you are aware of what haply in the course of this discussion, I may find occasion to speak. Tarquin being driven out, the people exulted with a marvellous sort of insolence of freedom. At one time driving innocent people into exile; at another, confiscating the property of many. Next came annual consuls. Then the fasces prostrated before the people—appeals in all cases. Then the mutiny of the plebeians—then a complete revolution in every thing, placing all things in the power of the people.

L. It is as you say. “It is true,” said Scipio—“in peace and tranquillity, some license may be permitted when there is nothing to fear, as at sea sometimes, or in a slight fever: but like him who is at sea, when suddenly the ocean puts on its terrors, or the sick man, when his complaint oppresses him, and the assistance of one is implored: so our people in time of peace, interfere in internal affairs, threaten the magistrates, refuse submission to them, denounce them and provoke them; yet in war obey them as they would a king, preferring their safety to the indulgence of their passions. Also in our more important wars, our countrymen have constantly preferred the command to be in the hands of one, without any colleague; the extent of whose power is indicated by his name. For a dictator is so called on account of every thing being dictated by him. But in our books, LÆlius, you see also that he is called master of the people.”

L. It is so. “Wisely therefore did those ancients,” said Scipio * * * *

XLI. * * * When a people is deprived of a just king, as Ennius says, after the death of one of the best of kings,

Those whom the laws enjoined them to obey, they did not call lords or masters; finally, not even kings, but guardians of the country, fathers and gods. Nor without cause, for what is added,

They thought that life, honour, and every comfort was given to them by the justice of a king. And the same inclinations would have remained with their posterity, if the character of their kings had not changed. But you perceive that kind of government was ruined by the injustice of one man.

L. I do perceive it, and I am desirous of knowing the course of these changes, not only in our own country, but in all governments.

XLII. “It will be for you,” said Scipio, “when I shall have given my opinion of that kind of government which I prefer, to give a more accurate account of the mutations in governments; although I do not think them much to be apprehended in the form I am inclined to. But a regal form of government is particularly and most certainly exposed to change. When a king begins to be unjust, that form of government perishes at once. The tyrant is, at the same time, the worst of all conditions of government, and the nearest to the best. Whom, if the better class have overturned, which for the most part happens, the commonwealth possesses that second class of the three. And this is a sort of royalty; a paternal government of the principal people, for the benefit of the rest. But if the people cast out or slay the tyrant; rejoicing in their own deed, they are more moderate, as long as they know and feel the value of being so, in their endeavour to protect the commonwealth constituted by themselves. But when the populace have bent their force against a just king, and have stripped him of his kingdom; or even, as it happens very often, have tasted the blood of the better class, and have prostrated the whole republic in their madness; think not that the vexed ocean or the wildest conflagration, can be more easily kept down, than the unbridled insolence of the multitude.

XLIII. Then is produced what in Plato is so clearly described, if I can in any manner express it in Latin, a thing difficult to be done, but I will endeavour. “It is then,” he says, “when the insatiable throats of the people, parched with the thirst of liberty, and led on by rash demagogues, have greedily drank, not temperate but too unalloyed draughts of freedom. Then the magistrates and chiefs, unless they are too lenient and indulgent, permitting them every excess of liberty; are pursued, impeached, insulted, and called oppressors, kings, and tyrants.” I think this part of his works is known to you.

L. I am well acquainted with it.

S. Then follows, “Those who pay obedience to the magistrates, are tormented by the people, are called voluntary slaves. But those magistrates who affect to be on an equality with the lowest; and other individuals who strive to abolish all distinction between citizens and magistrates, are exalted with praises, and overwhelmed with honours. And in this condition of things, it follows, of course, that there is an unrestrained license in a government of this kind; so that every private family is without any government: and this evil extends even to the beasts. At length the father fears the son—the son disregards the father: every sort of decency is extinguished, that an open license may prevail. Nothing distinguishes the citizen from the stranger. The master pays court to his scholars, that he may be flattered by them. Teachers are despised by their disciples. Young persons take upon themselves the authority of aged ones, who abase themselves to mingle in their games, lest they become odious and burdensome to them. At last slaves give themselves all sorts of liberties. Wives assume the privileges of their husbands. Nay the dogs, the horses, the asses at length are so infected with liberty, and run kicking about so, that it is absolutely necessary to get out of their way. Wherefore from this infinite license these things result, that the minds of the citizens become so scornful and impatient, that if the least power of government is exercised, they become exasperated and will not endure it; whence they come to despise every kind of law, that they may be without the least restraint whatever.”

XLIV. “You have,” said LÆlius, “precisely expressed Plato’s sentiments.”

S. Returning therefore to the subject of my discourse. “It is from this very license,” he says, “which they deem to be liberty itself, that a tyrant springs up as a sapling from a root. For as the destruction of the better class arises from their overweening power, so this excess of liberty, effects the slavery of this free people. Thus all extremes of an agreeable nature, whether in the seasons, or in the fertility of the fields, or in our natural feelings, are often converted into their opposites. Especially it occurs in public affairs, where excess of liberty degenerates into public and individual slavery. Out of such licentious freedom a tyrant arises, and the most unjust and severe bondage. For by a people so untameable, or rather so outrageous, some leader is chosen out of the multitude, in opposition to the better class, now persecuted and driven from their offices: bold and dishonest, perversely persecuting those who have frequently deserved well of their country, and gratifying the people from his own means and from those of others. To whom, that he may be freed from all apprehensions on account of his private condition, authority is given and continued to him. Surrounded too by guards, as was the case with Pisistratus at Athens, at length he becomes the tyrant of the very citizens who brought him forward. Who, if he is subdued by the good, as often happens, the state is regenerated. If by the bad, then a faction is established, another kind of tyranny. The same state of things too frequently occurs in that goodly form of government of the better class, when the vices of the chiefs have caused them to deviate from their integrity. Thus do they snatch the government of the commonwealth from each other like a ball—tyrants from kings—chiefs or the people from tyrants; and factions or tyrants from them, nor does the same mode of government ever last a long time.

XLV. These things being so, the regal form of government is in my opinion much to be preferred of those three kinds. Nevertheless one which shall be well tempered and balanced out of all those three kinds of government, is better than that; yet there should be always something royal and pre-eminent in a government, at the same time that some power should be placed in the hands of the better class, and other things reserved for the judgment and will of the multitude. Now we are struck first with the great equability of such a constitution, without which a people cannot be free long; next with its stability. The three other kinds of government easily fall into the contrary extremes: as a master grows out of a king; factions from the better class; and mobs and confusion from the people. The changes too are perpetual which are taking place. This cannot well happen in such a combined and moderately balanced government, unless by the great vices of the chief persons. For there is no cause for change, where every one is firmly placed in his proper station, and never gives way, whatever may fall down or be displaced.

XLVI. But I am afraid, LÆlius, and you too my very discreet and respected friends, if I continue long in this strain, my discourse will appear more like that of a master or teacher to you, than as a conversation with you. Wherefore I will speak of matters known to us all, and which we have all inquired into long ago. For I am convinced, and believe, and declare, that no kind of government, either in the constitution, the planning, or the practice, is to be compared with that which our fathers have left to us, and which was adopted by our ancestors. Which if you please, since you have been desirous that I should repeat things known to yourselves, I will shew not only what it is, but that it is the best. And with our own government in view, I will if I can, have a reference to it, in whatever I may say respecting the best form of government. The which if I can follow up and effect, I shall, as I think, amply fulfil the task which LÆlius has imposed on me.

XLVII. “It is your task indeed, Scipio,” said LÆlius, “most truly yours. For who in preference to yourself may speak of the institutions of our forefathers; you being sprung from such illustrious ancestors; or of the best form of government. The which if we now possess it, would hardly be so, if any one stood in a more conspicuous situation than yourself. Or who may venture to advise measures for posterity, when thou, having delivered the city from its greatest terrors, hast foreseen for the latest times?”