The four speeches against Catilina were delivered during the latter part of the year b.c. 63, when Cicero was Consul.

L. Sergius Catilina, the author of the conspiracy against which they were directed, was descended from one of the oldest patrician families of Rome, though for many years no one of his house had held any public office. He was a man of ambitious and energetic disposition, distinguished among his contemporaries for great powers both of mind and body, which enabled him to exercise a remarkable degree of influence over others[1]. At the same time he was notorious for the dissoluteness and extravagance of his life, which were excessive even in an age when such characteristics were common; he was, moreover, suspected of grave crimes, such as the murder of his wife and son. But as these charges rest to a great extent upon the authority of his opponent Cicero, it is possible that they have been exaggerated.

He was born probably about b.c. 108, though the exact date is unknown. His first appearance in public life was during the dictatorship of Sulla (b.c. 82-79). When the latter issued his proscription list, Catilina was among those who took an active part in carrying out the work of bloodshed and confiscation. This, however, was from personal motives, and not from any sympathy with the Senatorial party which had triumphed under Sulla; for he subsequently attached himself entirely to the popular side.

In b.c. 68 he filled the office of Praetor in Rome; the following year he governed the province of Africa as Propraetor. Immediately on his return home he became a candidate for the Consulship for the year 65[2]. He was obliged, however, to withdraw, as an indictment for extortion in his province was brought against him, and Roman law did not allow a citizen against whom a legal suit was pending to be a candidate for any magistracy. It so happened that the Consuls elect for 65, Autronius Paetus and Cornelius Sulla, were convicted of bribery. Their election consequently became void, and L. Aurelius Cotta and L. Manlius Torquatus were declared Consuls in their stead. Enraged at his disappointment, Autronius entered into communication with Catilina, and the two, in conjunction with Cn. Piso and others, formed a plot, sometimes known as the 'First Catilinarian conspiracy.' The intention was, it is said, to murder Cotta and Torquatus on the day of their entering upon office (January 1, 65). Catilina and Autronius were then to proclaim themselves Consuls, while they were to be supported by an army which Piso was to raise on their behalf in Spain. The execution of this plot was postponed, however, until February 5, when it failed, as we are told, through Catilina's impatience in giving the signal too soon, before the armed bands on which he relied had collected in sufficient number. It is to this conspiracy that Cicero alludes in Cat. 1. §15. It was asserted that both Caesar and Crassus were concerned in it, but the facts are surrounded by a great deal of mystery. Whatever the design was, it came to nothing, and the Senate did not take steps against anyone in consequence.

During this year (65) Catilina was acquitted on the charge of extortion. The trial had, however, been postponed long enough to prevent him from standing for the Consulship for the year 64.

He was obliged, therefore, to postpone his candidature till the next year, when he had among his competitors M. Tullius Cicero and C. Antonius Hybrida, of whom the latter was believed to be partly in sympathy with him. He was known to entertain revolutionary designs of the most sweeping character, which he hoped as Consul to carry out. Prominent among these was a declaration of novae tabulae[3], or general cancelling of debts, and a wholesale confiscation of property. Many of the Roman aristocracy were hopelessly in debt, and he thus collected round him a numerous body of adherents, partly composed of those to whom his designs seemed to promise relief from their embarrassments, partly also of wild and turbulent spirits to whom any prospect of revolution was welcome. Alarmed at these schemes, the Optimates[4] threw their influence upon the side of Cicero, overcoming their natural jealousy of a novus homo, that is, one whose ancestors had never held any curule office. He was also strongly supported by the Equites[5], who, as the wealthiest class in Rome, were naturally most opposed to any general attack upon property. Accordingly, he was elected by a large majority. Antonius was returned as his colleague by a small majority over Catilina.

Defeated in his immediate object, Catilina began to entertain the idea of carrying out his designs by force. The time was eminently favourable for an armed insurrection against the government. Seventeen years before, Sulla had rewarded the soldiers of his victorious army by establishing them in colonies in various parts of Italy, and assigning them allotments of land. Unsuited for an agricultural life, these men had for the most part mismanaged their farms and exhausted their resources. Accordingly they were restless and discontented, and desired nothing so much as a return of the civil wars, with fresh chances of plunder. From among these and other discontented spirits, Catilina began secretly to recruit and organize an army, selecting as his leader one Manlius, who had served with distinction under Sulla as centurion. At the same time he opened secret negotiations with the schools of gladiators in different parts of Italy. Thus prepared, he again stood for the Consulship for the year 62; his intention being to bring about a general rising if he should be once more defeated.

The situation of the government was dangerous in the extreme, for there was no regular army in Italy, and the only general of distinction, Cn. Pompeius, was absent in the East, where after bringing the third Mithridatic war to a close (65) he was occupied in settling the affairs of Syria, and could not be expected to return for some time.

Cicero, however, was kept accurately informed of the progress of the conspiracy. One of its members, Q. Curius, had talked of the plot to his mistress Fulvia. She had not kept the secret; and Cicero, employing her as his agent, had induced Curius by large promises to reveal to him all the details. The consular elections were this year postponed somewhat beyond their usual time. On the day before they should have been held, Cicero induced the Senate to resolve that they should on the next day, instead of holding the election, take into consideration the state of public affairs. He thereupon revealed to them what he knew of the conspiracy, and invited Catilina to clear himself of the charges against him. The latter replied in threatening language; but, notwithstanding his violence, the Senate took no decisive resolution[6]. Shortly afterwards the elections were held; Cicero appearing with a cuirass under his toga, and surrounded by a guard of his friends, to testify to the designs upon his life[7]. Catilina was again defeated, and D. Junius Silanus and L. Licinius Murena elected as Consuls for 62.

Thus once more foiled, Catilina resolved to proceed to active measures. Alarmed at the news that an army was actually collecting in Etruria, and roused by further disclosures from Cicero[8], the Senate, on October 21, passed what was known as the 'Ultimum Decretum;' 'videant consules ne quid detrimenti respublica capiat.' This, the usual formula in cases of emergency, declared the State to be in danger, and called on the Consuls as the executive magistrates to take measures for its safety. Whether it actually conferred any additional powers upon them, is not certain[9]. At the same time they placed the gladiatorial schools under strict surveillance, established patrols in the city, and offered large rewards for information. The praetors, Q. Pompeius Rufus and Q. Metellus Celer, were sent to Capua and Picenum respectively to raise what troops they could. Cicero had already detached his colleague Antonius from the conspiracy, and induced him to support the cause of order, by ceding to him the lucrative province of Macedonia[10].

On October 27 Manlius set up his standard at Faesulae in Etruria. Catilina proposed to go thither himself shortly; he was anxious however to conceal his designs as long as possible, and having been indicted for inciting to riot (de vi) by L. Paullus, he had offered to place himself in free custody[11] under the charge of some citizen of reputation in order to disarm suspicion.

On the night of November 6, he assembled his partisans in the house of M. Porcius Laeca. There he disclosed his plans, and declared it to be essential to success that Cicero should be removed before his own departure. Two of his adherents, C. Cornelius and L. Vargunteius, undertook the duty of visiting Cicero's house in the early morning, under pretence of giving the customary salutation, and there murdering him.

The attempt was actually made, though probably not until the morning of November 8[12]. But Cicero, who was informed of the plot through the agency previously described, refused his visitors admittance. He immediately summoned the Senate to meet, for the sake of safety, in the temple of Jupiter Stator on the Palatine. The equites thronged the hill in large numbers, to secure the safety of the Consul, and to protest against the designs of the conspirators. Catilina did not scruple to attend, whereupon Cicero rose, and delivered the speech known as the First Catilinarian Oration. He revealed to the Senate all the particulars of the plot, including the attempt upon his own life, denounced Catilina as a public enemy, and called upon him to leave the city. His adversary attempted a few words of exculpation, but the feeling roused by the Consul's address was too strong, and finding himself assailed on all sides by reproaches, he left the Senate abruptly, declaring that his enemies were driving him to ruin, but that if he was to fall he would involve others in his overthrow. The same evening he left the city for Etruria, travelling by the Via Aurelia, which was the coast road, in order to create the impression that he was going into exile at Massilia. He left in the city a large number of adherents, the chief of whom was Cornelius Lentulus Sura, with directions to prosecute the plans previously agreed upon. Cicero on the following day assembled the people in the Forum, and in the Second Catilinarian Oration recounted to them what had taken place in the Senate, explaining and justifying his own action.

In a few days the news arrived that Catilina had joined the camp of Manlius at Faesulae. Upon this the Senate declared them both public enemies. At the same time they issued a proclamation promising immunity to those of their adherents who should lay down their arms before a fixed date. Meanwhile the Consul Antonius was directed to take such military measures as might be necessary against the insurgents, Cicero being retained for the protection of the city.

The proclamation did not have any effect in reducing the number of Catilina's forces, nor did the rewards previously offered lead to any disclosures. Cicero had hoped that the effect of his speeches would be to drive all the conspirators into open rebellion, as they would thus be more easily dealt with. In this he was disappointed, for though the chief had left the city, his agents had remained in Rome, and Cicero could not venture to proceed against them without direct evidence. It was not long, however, before their carelessness put into his hands the proofs he desired.

The Allobroges, a tribe of Transalpine Gaul, had sent delegates to petition the Senate for relief from certain exactions to which they were subjected. Knowing that these men, from their desperate condition, were likely to favour a revolution, Lentulus opened negotiations with them, with a view to securing the aid of their countrymen for the conspirators. They took counsel however of their 'patronus' Q. Fabius Sanga, and by his advice revealed the whole affair to Cicero. Acting under his directions they pretended to enter heartily into the schemes of Lentulus, and obtained from him letters written and sealed by himself and his friends, addressed to their nation, stating and confirming by oath the rewards they were to receive for their assistance. A letter was also given them for Catilina, whose camp they were to visit on their way home. With these letters they set out from Rome on the night of December 2, accompanied by T. Volturcius, the agent of Lentulus. Cicero, as previously agreed upon, posted two Praetors with an armed force at the Mulvian Bridge, on the Via Flaminia, a few miles to the north of Rome. They there arrested the whole party, and carried them, with the compromising papers, to the Consul. He at once summoned the chief conspirators to his presence. One, Caeparius, made his escape, though he was eventually recaptured; but Lentulus, Cethegus, Statilius, and Gabinius came unsuspectingly, and were at once conveyed by Cicero to the presence of the Senate, which he had convoked at the Temple of Concord. There Volturcius, under promise of impunity, made a full disclosure, and the conspirators were further confronted with the evidence of the Allobroges, and their own letters, the authenticity of which they were compelled to acknowledge. Lentulus, who was Praetor at the time, was obliged to abdicate his office, and he and his companions were placed in free custody under the charge of several prominent citizens. Rewards were voted to the informers, and a 'supplicatio' or thanksgiving for the averted danger decreed in honour of Cicero, who after leaving the Senate addressed to the people assembled in the Forum the Third Catilinarian Oration, giving a full account of what had just taken place.

Two days later (December 5) the Senate was once more convened, and Cicero as Consul put to them the formal question, 'what was their advice with respect to the conspirators actually in custody?'

The Consul elect, D. Silanus, who was first asked for his vote, proposed that they should be put to death. The other consulars supported him. When it came to the turn of Caesar, who was praetor elect, he proposed as an alternative that their property should be confiscated, and that they should be imprisoned for life in some of the provincial towns of Italy. These two proposals were before the Senate when Cicero intervened with the Fourth Catilinarian Oration. It does not pronounce a formal sententia, for the Consul, as president, would not himself vote, but places the alternative proposals before the house for their consideration; indicating, however, a preference for that of Silanus. But Caesar's speech had made a great impression, and Silanus announced that he would agree to a motion for a postponement of the decision, which had been suggested as a compromise. The matter was eventually decided by a speech of M. Cato, who was tribune elect. He attacked the conspirators with great vigour, and proposed that they should be summarily put to death more maiorum. His words produced such an effect that his proposal was carried forthwith. Lentulus, Cethegus, Statilius, Gabinius and Caeparius were at once conducted to the Tullianum, the prison underneath the slopes of the Capitol, and there strangled[13].

This summary proceeding effectually checked the plans of Catilina. From this moment he received no fresh reinforcements, and his original adherents began to leave him. The retreat of his army into Gaul was blocked by the Praetor Metellus Celer, while M. Petreius, acting as the legate of Antonius, advanced against him from the south. Early in the following year (62) the opposing forces met at Pistoria in Etruria, where Catilina and his followers, after fighting with desperate courage, were defeated and slain to a man.

NOTE A.

The above sketch follows in the main the traditional account of the Catilinarian conspiracy, which has been generally accepted by later historians. It is fair to add that some writers have adopted a different view, which may be thus briefly stated. They believe that historians have been mistaken in regarding Catilina as the leader of a mere band of desperadoes; that his so-called 'conspiracy' was really an act of revolt against the authority of the Senate on the part of the whole democratic party, of which he was the recognized leader (a similar movement, in fact, to those which had been organized by Gaius Gracchus in 123 b.c., by Saturninus in 100 b.c., by M. Lepidus in 78 b.c., and others); that he was driven to use force by the opposition of the Optimates to his schemes, and that Cicero, as the spokesman of the latter, purposely misrepresented him as the leader of an anarchist conspiracy, whose sole object was confiscation and plunder.

The received account is derived almost entirely from two sources; the speeches and writings of Cicero; and the 'History of the Catilinarian Conspiracy' by Sallust, written probably about 44 b.c. The former is undoubtedly a prejudiced witness, and statements resting on his authority alone must be received with caution. Sallust, however, was a partisan of Caesar, and a member of the democratic party. He had consequently no motive to represent the character of Catilina as worse than it really was, especially as his patron Caesar was commonly supposed to have been implicated in the first conspiracy (66 b.c.)[14], if not the second also. He certainly hints that the worst charges against Catilina, which he repeats, rested on very doubtful authority; but as to the main features of the conspiracy, he confirms Cicero on every point; and this is a strong argument in favour of the received account. The question is too large to be fully discussed within the limits of this book; those who wish to see the contrary view maintained with great spirit and ability should read the very interesting article in 'Catiline, Clodius and Tiberius,' by Professor E. S. Beesly[15].

NOTE B.

On the Legality of the Execution.

On account of his action in this matter, Cicero was afterwards attacked by Clodius, who, as tribune in 58 b.c., carried a law enacting that 'any one who had put Roman citizens to death without trial should be forbidden fire and water.' As Clodius was supported by Caesar and Pompeius, Cicero did not make any resistance, but retired temporarily into exile.

Had his action been really illegal or not? The Valerian, Porcian, and Sempronian laws certainly enacted that no citizen should be put to death except by vote of the people, after a formal trial before them. Cicero justifies his apparent violation of these laws on two grounds—

(1) That the conspirators, having become hostes by their own act, and having been recognised as such by resolution of the Senate, had ipso facto forfeited the rights of citizens (1. §28; 4. §10).

As regards this, we may remark that, though the conduct of the conspirators might justify the adoption of active measures against them, it could not legally be held to deprive them, when arrested, of the benefit of trial. For the question, whether they had acted as hostes or not, would be exactly the point which the law-court would have to decide. The argument is, in fact, from the legal point of view, a petitio principii.

(2) That the 'ultimum decretum' of the Senate (see Introduction, page 11) invested the Consul with dictatorial powers, including the right of summary execution. (1. §4 habemus senatus consultum, etc.)

In support of this he recalls the fact that C. Gracchus (121) and Saturninus (100) had been killed by the Consuls Opimius and Marius respectively, acting under a similar decree. It is certain that a party in the Senate claimed the right of thus arming the Consul with exceptional powers in cases of emergency, and Sallust (Cat. 29) distinctly says that they possessed it. On the other hand, the right had never been admitted by the popular leaders, who had, as a protest, brought Opimius to trial for the murder of C. Gracchus, though they had not secured a conviction. They had, moreover, during this year (63) accused of murder one C. Rabirius, who had been concerned in the death of Saturninus thirty-seven years before. The trial was avowedly instituted for the purpose of contesting the right of the Senate to invest the Consul with dictatorial powers. Cicero, who defended Rabirius, claimed that the 'ultimum decretum' acquitted his client of all liability. But it seems probable that he would have been condemned, had not his supporters found means to prevent the trial from coming to a decision.

It is on this point that the question of legality or illegality really turns, and as the Romans were not themselves agreed upon it, we can scarcely pronounce a decision. If the Consul did possess dictatorial powers in virtue of the 'ultimum decretum,' then the execution was legal; if (as seems, perhaps, the more reasonable view) he did not, then it was illegal. In any case, it is clear that the Senate, as such, could not order the execution of any citizen. They could only arm the Consul, and though he was at liberty to consult them on this, as on any matter of importance, the responsibility of the particular measures taken rested with him alone.

Unconstitutional actions may, however, sometimes be justified on the ground of the necessities of the case; and Cicero might fairly plead that the executions had proved efficacious in checking the spread of the conspiracy, (a result which the measures previously taken had entirely failed to secure,) and that it was very doubtful whether, if the prisoners had been kept for trial, a general rising could have been avoided.

The position of Caesar is somewhat hard to understand. As a popular leader, he must have held the view that neither the Consul nor the Senate had the right of dealing summarily with the accused; yet by proposing the alternative punishment of imprisonment he seems to admit their jurisdiction. Possibly he took this course as the best means of saving their lives for the moment, but if so it is not clear why he should have added the provision that their property should be confiscated.

The first and fourth speeches are orationes pro senatu habitae, the second and third are contiones ad populum.