By LIEUTENANT COLONEL JOHN A. COOPER
Late Commander of the 198th Battalion, Canadian Buffs

When the dark cloud broke on August 4, 1914, Canada was not wholly unprepared. While not a militaristic people, Canadians had always recognized that it was the duty of every able-bodied citizen to be prepared to defend his country in case of need. That principle had underlain the military policy of the nineteenth century both before and after Confederation. Every citizen of fighting age was theoretically a soldier, more or less prepared to take his share in national defense.

To this was added, in later years, a feeling that some day Canadians might be called upon to take a part in the defense of the British Empire should it become engaged in a supreme struggle. This feeling developed during the South African War when Canada took over the last garrison duties from the Imperial forces as well as the naval stations at Halifax and Esquimalt. The obligation of contributing men to Imperial defense was admitted and discussed at the various Imperial Conferences between 1900 and 1914. Assisted by British experts, certain military and naval preparations had been made with the intention of meeting any national emergency and any imperial necessity which might arise.

While these grave obligations may have rested lightly on the majority of the people engaged in agriculture, commerce, and railway building, the country was not mentally unprepared for the great call of August, 1914. This explains in part why the recruiting of her early battalions and the prompt dispatch of her first contingent of 33,000 men was so enthusiastically accomplished. Division followed division until in about fifteen months Canada had a fighting army corps in France. This accomplishment surprised herself not more than it surprised the Allies and the enemy. Canada's enlistment during the five years of activity totaled one-thirteenth of her population. Over four hundred thousand men, out of a population of about eight millions, actually crossed the ocean. Four divisions fought as such in France. Railway troops worked with every British Army, and forestry battalions did almost all the work of that nature required to supply the needs of both French and British forces on the western front. The casualties among Canadian troops were quite equal to those sustained by the more numerous armies of the United States, because of the greater duration of Canadian service.

Such success as the Canadians had in fighting was due largely to inheritance and environment. Many of those who fought were of British birth or were English, Scotch, Irish, or Welsh once or twice removed. The military instincts of the British and French races had been preserved to a remarkable degree in the Dominion. Added to this was the energy, adaptability, and initiative developed in a people living in small communities scattered through the vast open spaces of a country almost equal in area to the whole of Europe. The pluck of the pioneer, the tenacity of the settler, the self-reliance of the rider of the plains, the initiative of the woodsman, the skill of the shantyman and the prospector—all these combined to give the Canadian army a quality second to none among those engaged in the Great World War.

Remarkable also was the development of officer ability. The Canadian army, after the first two years, was officered entirely by Canadians. The business man, with his experience in organization and executive, became a military administrator in a wonderfully short space of time. The corps commander had never been in any military school except the Canadian militia. Of the seven or eight men who served as divisional commanders, not more than three could qualify as professional soldiers before the war. Of the brigadiers and battalion commanders probably 90 per cent had never attended a military school for more than a month. Canada's army was a citizen army, commanded and administered by men without business training. Such professional soldiers as Canada had before the war became administrators rather than leaders in battle. The war developed so much that was new in tactics and technique that the militia officer had almost an equal chance with the so-called military expert.

If the individual soldier ranked high in initiative and valor, he also must be credited with a loyalty to discipline and to his national traditions. He quickly acquired steadiness and obedience to his officers. He respected himself and his superiors. While never servile nor obsequious, he rendered such service as made the fighting units effective because of their cohesion and compactness. That was remarkably exhibited in the first great engagement in which Canadians took part, the Second Battle of Ypres. It was equally in evidence at Amiens, Arras, Cambrai, and Mons during the final period of the war. The Canadian never forgot he was a Canadian. He had such a sublime faith in himself and in his army as a whole, that his ambition was only fully realized when he was asked to do more than was usually asked of a soldier in this titanic struggle. He never despised the enemy, but he never lost the feeling that he was physically and mentally the enemy's superior. Excepting, perhaps, the Guards Division, the Fifty-first Division, and the Australians, the Canadian army yielded the palm to no portion of the British fighting forces.

Finally, Canadian success in the field of war was but a reflection of the determination of those who remained at home and who with wonderful fortitude, self-sacrifice, and determination backed the army to the limit. There were few tears and less mawkishness when the battalions moved out from their home towns on the long trail. The sentiment of the time was stern because of the prevailing spirit of duty and responsibility. But no nation has paid more honor to those who served nor has done more toward reestablishing the warrior in citizen life than have the Canadian people. If the pay of the soldier was good and the allowance to his dependents adequate, the effort and money expended on his reestablishment have been most generous. In raising Red Cross gratuities and other patriotic funds, the motto of Canadians was "Give till it hurts." In the production of food and of war material, the nation accomplished the seemingly impossible. In subscriptions to the national loans, patriotism reached heights undreamed of by bankers and financial experts. Nearly seventy million shells, made and exported by a country that never before made an explosive instrument of this kind; the purchase of over two thousand million dollars worth of Dominion Government bonds by a people who had never bought a million of such in their history—these are the tangible results by which one may measure the depth of Canadian loyalty and determination.

When the war broke out, the Hon. (afterward Sir) Sam Hughes was Minister of Militia and Defense. He possessed militia experience extending over many years and had seen active service in South Africa. The possibility of war in Europe in which the Empire troops would be engaged had long been in his mind, and he had studied in advance the possibilities of such a situation. Consequently when the first contingent was authorized he proceeded to discharge both the civil duties of Minister of Militia and the military duties of Chief of Staff. He it was who recruited, organized, administered, and commanded this first Canadian army. He was the driving power which brought success in the speedy dispatch of the first contingent and the raising and the training of subsequent divisions.

This very success in the end brought a change. General Hughes centralized too much power in himself to please all those with whom he was associated. The purchasing of supplies for the army was taken from his department and put in charge of a purchasing board. A Shell Committee was formed at his suggestion and this later grew into the Imperial Munitions Board. The administration of the troops in England was gradually organized and eventually placed under General (afterward Sir Richard) Turner at Argyll House, London. The control of the army in the field passed as a matter of course to the British authorities, who were responsible for food, clothing, transport, and administration from the moment the troops crossed the Channel. Sir Sam Hughes resigned his post as Minister of Militia in the autumn of 1916. He was succeeded by Sir Edward Kemp, who later went to England as Minister of the Overseas Forces of Canada. His place in Canada was taken by General The Hon. S. C. Mewburn, who remained Minister for some time after the war closed.

In the field the first commanding officer of the little Canadian army was General Alderson, an English officer of experience. He was in charge when the First Division made its unique reputation at the Second Battle of Ypres. Later on General Byng, a younger English officer, was selected to command the corps, which he did with complete success. In process of time a Canadian was selected in the person of General (afterward Sir) Arthur W. Currie. He took over in 1917 and commanded with general satisfaction for the remainder of the war. On his return to Canada he was made Inspector General, the highest purely military office in the Canadian army next to that of the Governor General who is Commander in Chief.

After the Fifth Division was filled up, the unsystematic practice of sending reenforcements overseas by battalions and batteries was discontinued. In January, 1917, a new method of furnishing drafts was outlined. This necessitated the reorganizing of the whole army on a territorial basis. There was created in each military district in Canada a home battalion, with corresponding battalions in England and in France. The scheme was as follows:

M. D. No. 1—Western Ontario Regiment (one depot battalion in Canada, two reserve battalions in England, and 1st, 18th, 160th, 161st, and 2d Pioneers in the field).

M. D. No. 2—1st Central Ontario Regiment (3d, 4th, 5th, 15th, 20th, 75th, 123d, 124th, 134th, 198th, and 208th Bus.).—2d Central Ontario Regiment (4th C. M. R., 54th, 58th, 102d, 116th, 119th, 125th, and 164th).

M. D. No. 3—Eastern Ontario Regiment (P. P. C. L. I., 2d, 21st, 38th, 156th).

M. D. No. 4—1st Quebec Regiment (5th C. M. R., 13th, 14th, 24th, 42d, 87th).

M. D. No. 5—2d Quebec Regiment (22d and 159th). M. D. No. 6—Nova Scotia Regiment (R. C. R., 25th, 85th, 185th).

M. D. No. 7—New Brunswick Regiment (26th, 100th).

M. D. No. 10—Manitoba Regiment (8th, 16th, 27th, 43d, 52d, 78th, and 107th Regt).

M. D. No. 11—British Columbia Regiment (2d C. M. R., 7th, 29th, 47th, and 72d).

M. D. No. 12—Saskatchewan Regiment (3d C. M. R., 5th, 28th. and 46th).

M. D. No. 13—Alberta Regiment (10th, 31st, 49th, and 50th).

The idea behind this scheme was to effect a closer connection between the military patriotism and pride of the home distinct with the battalions serving overseas. The hope was distinctly expressed that "the Canadian militia should inherit the honors and distinctions won in battle by the Canadian Expeditionary Force."

There is no question that this measure was founded in wisdom and that it worked tolerably well. It was not always possible to maintain it exactly, since the smaller provinces had too many battalions for their resources in men. Consequently Ontario, which produced most men proportionately, was called upon to reenforce units credited to other provinces. For example, the 2d C. M. R. ceased to be a British Columbian unit early in 1918, although its commanding officer was a British Columbian who continued to give British Columbia officers the preference. This, however, was quite on a par with the selection of generals in France; for, when the war closed, Ontario which contributed half the men in the ranks, did not have a single brigadier or divisional commander on active duty.

It is also interesting to note that the hope of the originators of the scheme with regard to the old militia inheriting the "Honors and distinctions" of the C. E. F. has been negatived by the action of the militia authorities of 1919 in disbanding all militia units which existed previous to the war. This action seems to have been based on a mistaken conception of the important part played by the Canadian militia from 1860 to 1914.

Early in 1918 came one of the greatest discussions of policy that ever engaged the Canadian army leaders. The British had decided to reduce their brigades from four battalions to three to conform to the German changes and for other good and sufficient reasons. The Canadians were requested to conform to the new organization, and the chiefs of Argyll House decided that this should be done by creating two corps of three divisions each instead of one corps of four divisions. Thus, instead of five divisions with 12 battalions of infantry each, there would be six divisions of 9 battalions each, and the number of infantry battalions would be reduced from 60 to 54. This was to be accomplished by breaking up four battalions of the Fifth Division, the infantry of which was still in Witley Camp, England, and turning the other two into pioneer battalions for the Fifth and Sixth Divisions.

The scheme was so far planned and executed that the two battalions of the Fifth, chosen to be pioneers, had already commenced their training as such, and the four battalions to be eliminated had already been decided upon. Argyll House had even chosen, unofficially, the new staffs required.

The proposal was negatived eventually by the influence of the corps commander. Quite naturally, he did not take kindly to the reduction of his corps from four to three divisions. His four divisional commanders did not relish having their commands reduced from twelve battalions of infantry to nine. A protest was lodged with Sir Edward Kemp, who had recently arrived in England as Minister of Militia Overseas. After consultation with Ottawa, Sir Edward Kemp decided that General Currie was right and the request of the British authorities was refused. The logical consequence of that refusal was the break-up of the infantry of the Fifth Division, since four divisions were sufficient for the one corps which it was decided to maintain. Its artillery and engineers were already in France, and its machine-gun companies also passed over intact. The artillery retained its identity until the end of the war.

After the break-up of the Fifth Division, and because reenforcements for some months had exceeded casualties, the corps commander found himself with an abundance of troops. He therefore decided to enlarge his establishment, increasing the number of men in each infantry battalion, to change his pioneer battalions into engineer brigades with greatly increased strength, and to create machine-gun battalions instead of machine-gun companies. Even these changes left him with surplus men, and so came the creation of The Hughes Brigade (4,234), The McPhail Brigade (4,776), and Brutinel's Brigade, afterward known as the "Independent Force." The latter was composed largely of motor machine-gun units, cyclists, and cavalry, and was used as emergency corps troops. There was also an engineer motor-transport company, a tramway company, a field-survey company, several searchlight companies and various other corps accessories.

Here is seen one of the difficulties of coordinating the military forces of the Empire, a problem which tried the patience of the higher command. The overseas troops were magnificent in their fighting qualities, but the overseas officers were not always as sympathetic with the higher military control as might have been expected. The overseas business man makes a good soldier and a good general, but in either case he is prone to exhibit those elemental qualities which make him a trenchant and resourceful warrior.

Another of the outstanding problems which faced the Canadian army was the question of the supply of officers. Canada had an oversupply of officers from the start, and the army never quite recovered from the malady. This surplus was continually seeking to be absorbed while the officers in the field were quite as assiduous in trying to keep it from fulfilling its desires. Most officers who went over with the First and Second Divisions had friends of equal civilian rank with themselves in their commands and they desired to see these men rewarded with commissions earned in the field. As all four divisions were controlled largely by those who arrived in France in 1915, the surplus officer in the Canadian camps in England was usually forced to return home without fighting; to seek imperial service as town major—the lowliest employment in the army; or to serve as supernumerary without recognition. When the infantry of the Fifth Division was broken up, the surplus officer question became even more acute. As an example of the injustice which necessarily resulted, it may be cited that one former commanding officer from the Fifth Division was killed when acting as platoon commander in a battalion in the Second Division.

Another unfortunate result of the surplus officer was the creation of new posts for those who had to be absorbed. Many young officers were given unnecessary jobs in brigade, divisional and corps staffs who but made extra work for those who had already enough to do. In other words, the heads of the staff were overburdened with a multiplicity of juniors. The Canadian corps had, it is said, nearly as many staff officers as any other two corps in France. The primary causes, it must be remembered, were the free creation of officers in Canada and the lack of coordination between those in control of this function in the field and at home.

After the United States came into the war a British Canadian Recruiting Commission was established in that country to enable Britishers of military age to join either the British or Canadian armies. This was done with the approval and consent of the United States Congress. Twenty-seven recruiting depots and three divisional headquarters were established and by the end of the war 60,000 volunteers had been dealt with, of whom 42,000 were accepted. Of these about 30,000 went to the Canadian army.

The official report (Memo. No. 5) regarding the later phases of this work says: "Effective stimulus was given to the recruiting operations of the Mission by the announcement and conclusion of negotiations for satisfactory conventions between the United States and Great Britain and Canada, providing for mutual compulsory military service, whereby those of military age were compelled within a limited period to elect between military service in their country of residence or of origin."

When the war was concluded and the work of disbanding and repatriating the army was begun, there was again some conflict of opinion between the authorities at home and those in the field. The plan proposed by the officials in Canada provided for sending home the men in the order of enlistment. The corps authorities opposed this and asked that the units be sent home intact, disregarding the date of enlistment. Either scheme had its difficulties, but as usual the corps authorities had their way. The Third Division units came home first, followed by those of the First, Second, Fourth, and details. The various units returned to their territorial headquarters in Canada practically intact.

Thus ended Canada's greatest war achievement—a chapter full of conflicting theories and methods, redolent of minor errors and clash of ambitions, but on the whole creditable and glorious. Above everything else the patriotism, courage, gallantry, and self-sacrifice of all classes of people in the greatest of the British dominions overseas shines conspicuously and brilliantly.

The deeds of the Canadian army in this World War will vitalize the pages of the nation's history in all the years-to-be. The monuments in France and Canada, the sacred colors in cathedrals and public buildings, the bronze tablets which will be erected everywhere, will gather up and preserve the memories of those who died that others might live. Meantime those who served know that in all that was done they but followed the simple path of duty.