THE ATTACK AGAINST THE HINDENBURG LINE

Canadian Headquarters were moved from Hautecloque to Noyelle Vion on August 23, 1918, and at noon General Currie assumed command of the front then held by the Seventeenth (British) Corps, extending from Neuville-Vitasse to Gavrelle in the Arras-Lens sector. The First and Fourth Canadian Divisions returned to the corps from the Amiens front on August 25 and 28, 1918, respectively. The corps thus was again with the First Army.

The general military situation at this time on the Amiens-Arras front is described by General Currie in his official report of these operations as follows:

"In sympathy with the severe reverses suffered on the Marne, and consequent upon the actions now fully developed in the Somme salient, signs were not wanting that the enemy was preparing to evacuate the salient of the Lys. This evacuation began under pressure of the First Army on August 25, 1918. "All these attacks and their results, direct or indirect, enabled the Allies to recover the ground they had lost in the course of the German offensive operations.

"The recapture of that ground was, however, of secondary importance as compared to the moral results of these successive victories.

"The German armies had been impressed in the course of these operations by the superiority of our generalship and of our organization, and by the great determination of our troops and subordinate commanders.

"The Hindenburg system, however, was intact, and the enemy Higher Command hoped and believed that behind this powerfully organized area the German armies might be collected and reorganized.

"Fighting the most determined rear-guard action in the Somme salient, they expected that our armies would be tired and depleted by the time they reached the forward area of the Hindenburg system.

"The Battle of Cambrai, now about to be begun, shattered their hopes. By breaking through the Drocourt-Queant line, itself but a part of the Hindenburg system, the Canadian Corps carried the operations forward to ground that had been in the hands of the Germans since 1914.

"This advance constituted a direct threat on the rear of the German armies north and south of Cambrai.

"Dominated at all times, paralyzed by the swift and bold strokes on vital points of their line and by the relentless pressure applied everywhere, the German Higher Command was unable to take adequate steps to localize and stop our advance. After the Drocourt-Queant line was broken, the retreat of the enemy became more accelerated, and our attacks met everywhere with less organized and determined resistance.

"The moral effect of the most bitter and relentless fighting which led to the capture of Cambrai was tremendous. The Germans had at last learned and understood that they were beaten."

The Canadian Corps, on the right of the First Army, was to attack eastward astride the Arras-Cambrai road, and by forcing its way through the Drocourt-Queant line south of the Scarpe to break the hinge of the Hindenburg system and prevent the possibility of the enemy rallying behind this powerfully organized defended area.

The ground to be attacked lent itself peculiarly to defense, being composed of a succession of ridges, rivers, and canals, which formed natural lines of defense of very great strength. These natural positions, often mutually supporting, had been abundantly fortified. Their organization was the last work in military engineering, and represented years of intensive and systematic labor. Barbed-wire entanglements were formidable, machine-gun positions innumerable, and large tunnels had been provided for the protection of the garrison.

The four main system of defense consisted of the following lines: The old German front system east of Monchy-le-Preux, the Fresnes-Rouvroy line, the Drocourt-Queant line, and the Canal du Nord line. These, with their subsidiary switches and strong points, as well as the less organized, but by no means weak intermediate lines of trenches, made the series of positions to be attacked without doubt one of the strongest defensively on the western front.

Broad glacis, studded with machine-gun nests, defended the immediate approaches to these lines, and this necessitated in each case heavy fighting to gain a suitable jumping-off line before assaulting the main position.

In addition to these systems, and as a preliminary to the attack on the old German system east of Monchy-le-Preux, it was necessary to capture the very well organized British defenses which had been lost in the fighting of March, 1918.

These defenses were intact to a depth of about 5,500 yards, and were dominated by the heights of Monchy-le-Preux, from which the Germans were enjoying superior observation.

Throughout these operations there could not be any element of surprise, other than that afforded by the selection of the actual hour of the assaults. The positions to be attacked formed the pivot of the movements of the German army to the south, and the security of the armies to the north depended also on these positions being retained. There was consequently little doubt that the enemy was alert, and had made every disposition to repulse the expected attacks. Therefore, the plans necessitated provision for very hard and continuous fighting, the main stress being laid on the continuity of the operations.

On August 26, 1918, at 3.00 a. m., the attack was launched under the usual artillery and machine-gun barrages. It made good progress, the village of Monchy-le-Preux being entered early in the day, after a very brilliant encircling attack carried out by the Eighth Infantry Brigade (Brigadier General D. C. Draper). The trenches immediately to the east of Monchy-le-Preux were found to be heavily held, and were not cleared until about 11 a. m. by the Seventh Canadian Infantry Brigade (Brigadier General H. Dyer).

Guemappe was captured by 4 p. m. and Wancourt Tower and the top of Heninel Ridge were in Canadian hands at 10.40 p. m. The defenders of the latter feature fought hard but eventually succumbed to a determined attack delivered by the Sixth Canadian Infantry Brigade (Brigadier General A. H. Bell), under cover of an extemporized barrage fired by the Second Canadian Divisional Artillery (Brigadier General H. A. Panet). During the night this brigade captured, in addition, Egret Trench, thus securing a good jumping-off place for the operations of the following day.

The attack was renewed at 4.55 a. m. on August 27, 1918, by the Second and Third Canadian Divisions, in the face of increased opposition, under a uniformly good initial barrage.

The Second Canadian Division pushed doggedly forward through the old German trench system, where very stiff hand-to-hand fighting took place, and crossed the Sensee River, after capturing the villages of ChÉrisy and Vis-en-Artois.

The Third Canadian Division encountered very heavy opposition, but succeeded in capturing Bois-du-Vert, Bois-du-Sart, and reaching the western outskirts of Haucourt, Remy, Boiry-Notre-Dame, and Pelves.

The enemy throughout the day pushed a large number of reenforcements forward, bringing up machine-gun units in motor lorries in the face of our accurate field and heavy artillery fire. Hostile field batteries in the open, firing over open sights, showed remarkable tenacity, several remaining in action until the personnel had been destroyed by our machine-gun fire.

At 9.00 a. m. on August 28, 1918, the Third Canadian Division resumed the attack, followed at 12.30 by the Second Canadian Division. The objective for the day was the capture of the Fresnes-Rouvroy line, the possession of which was vital to the success of further operations.

On the left, the Third Canadian Division had pushed forward, captured the Fresnes-Rouvroy line from the Sensee River to north of Boiry-Notre-Dame, and had secured that village, Jigsaw Wood, and entered Pelves. They had, however, been unable to clear the village of Haucourt.

On the front of the Second Canadian Division the fighting was most severe. The wire in front of the Fresnes-Rouvroy line was found to be almost intact, and although at some points the Fifth Canadian Infantry Brigade (Brigadier General T. L. Tremblay) had succeeded in penetrating the line, the first objective could not be secured, except one short length on the extreme right. Subjected to heavy machine-gun fire from both flanks as well as frontally, the attacking troops had suffered heavy casualties, which they had borne with the utmost fortitude.

At nightfall the general line of the Second Canadian Division was little in advance of the line held the night before, although a few small parties of stubborn men were still as far forward as the wire of the Fresnes-Rouvroy line.

Enemy reenforcements were seen dribbling forward all day long.

The Second and Third Canadian Divisions were now exhausted, and during the night of August 28-29, 1918, they were relieved by the First Canadian Division on the right, the Fourth (British) Division on the left, and Brutinel's Brigade (formerly the Canadian Independent Force) on the extreme left flank.

The heavy artillery from now on concentrated on the cutting of the broad belts of wire in front of the Drocourt-Queant line, and the engineers prepared the bridging material required for the crossings of the Sensee River and the Canal du Nord.

During the day (August 29, 1918) the Canadian line had been considerably improved by minor operations.

On August 30, 1918, the First Canadian Division attacked the Vis-en-Artois Switch, Upton Wood, and the Fresnes-Rouvroy line south of the Vis-en-Artois Switch. The attack, a daring maneuver, organized and carried out by the First Canadian Infantry Brigade (Brigadier General W. A. Griesbach), under cover of very ingenious barrages arranged by the C. R. A., First Canadian Division (Brigadier General H. C. Thacker), was eminently successful, all objectives being captured and the entire garrison either killed or taken prisoner. Heavy counterattacks by fresh troops were repulsed during the afternoon and following night.

On August 31, 1918, the remainder of the Fresnes-Rouvroy line south of the Arras-Cambrai road, including Ocean Work, was captured by the Second Canadian Infantry Brigade (Brigadier General F. O. W. Loomis).

In the meantime, the Fourth (British) Division had doggedly pushed ahead, crossing the valley of the Sensee River and capturing the villages of Haucourt, Remy, and Eterpigny. This advance was over very difficult, thickly wooded country, and the fighting was very heavy, particularly in the vicinity of St.-Servin's Farm, which, after changing hands several times, remained in possession of the enemy until September 2, 1918.

On the night of August 31-September 1 the Fourth Canadian Division came into the line on a one-brigade front between the First Canadian Division and Fourth (British) Division.

The important strong point known as the Crow's Nest was captured by the Third Canadian Infantry Brigade on September 1, 1918.

During the afternoon and evening of September 1, 1918, the enemy delivered violent counterattacks, directed against the junction of the First and Fourth Canadian Divisions. Two fresh divisions and two divisions already in the line were identified in the course of this heavy fighting. The Canadian troops were forced back slightly twice, but the ground was each time regained and finally held. The hand-to-hand fighting for the possession of the crest of the spur at this point really continued until zero hour the next day, the troops attacking the Drocourt-Queant line, as they moved forward, taking over the fight from the troops then holding the line.

At 5.00 a. m. September 2, 1918, the major operation against the Drocourt-Queant line was launched. Preceded by a dense barrage, and assisted by tanks, the infantry pushed forward rapidly, and the Drocourt-Queant line (the first objective) and its support line (the second objective), including the village of Dury, were captured according to program. With the capture of the second objective the field artillery barrage was shot out, and the attack farther east had to be carried forward without its assistance. The enemy's resistance, free of the demoralizing effect of the barrage, stiffened considerably, the open country being swept continually by intense machine-gun fire. In addition, the tanks soon became casualties from enemy guns firing point-blank, and the advance on the left and center was held up.

Brutinel's Brigade, reenforced by a regiment of cavalry (Tenth Royal Hussars) and armored cars, endeavored to pass through to capture the Marquion Bridge on the Canal du Nord. Wire, trenches, and sunken roads, however, confined the movements of the force to the Arras-Cambrai road; and this was rendered impassable by enemy machine-gun fire and by batteries firing over open sights.

On the right, however, the First Canadian Division pushed forward despite very heavy machine-gun and direct artillery fire, and captured the villages of Cagnicourt and Villers-lez-Cagnicourt, the Bois de Bouche and Bois de Loison to the east of Cagnicourt.

Further progress made by the First Canadian Division in the afternoon resulted in the capture of the heavily wired Buissy Switch line as far south as the outskirts of Buissy; this largely outflanked the enemy still holding out in front of the Fourth Canadian Division, and compelled their retirement during the night behind the Canal du Nord. By now the number of unwounded prisoners captured exceeded 5,000, and Canadian infantry had penetrated the enemy's defenses to a depth exceeding 6,000 yards.

In the night of September 3-4, 1918, the Second and Third Canadian Divisions relieved the First and Fourth Canadian Divisions respectively, and the Fourth (British) Division was relieved by the First (British) Division, which had come under the Canadian Corps on September 1, 1918, and had been concentrated after that date in the Monchy-le-Preux, Vis-en-Artois, Guemappe area.

The next objective on the Canadian front was now the Canal du Nord. This position, however, was so strongly held and the natural difficulties of the terrain involved were so great that it was decided to make further preparations before attempting this operation which, from its very nature, would have to form part of a larger scheme.

The Canadians now held positions which were defensively very strong. The line, therefore, was held very thinly in order to gain an opportunity to rest and refit the divisions. Until September 27, 1918, no changes developed on the Canadian front. Night patrolling and sniping, of course, were kept up. There was also continuous night firing by artillery and machine guns, while the heavy artillery (Brigadier General R. H. Massie) carried out daily wire cutting, counterbattery shoots, and gas concentrations.