HOLDING THE VIMY SECTOR

During the last year of the war in France and Belgium there were about 160,000 Canadians at the front, including an army corps of four infantry divisions of 80,000 men under command of Sir Arthur Currie; a cavalry brigade, 3,000 strong, under General Seely, and, after the middle of the year, Brigadier General R. W. Paterson, D. S. O.; numerous and effectively organized lines of communication units, railway, forestry, engineer, medical, ambulance, sanitary, veterinary, dental, salvage, and other services. The divisional commanders of the infantry were as follows: Major General Sir A. C. Macdonell, K. C. B., C. M. G., D. S. O., First Division; Major General Sir H. E. Burstall, K. C. B., C. M. G., Second Division; Major General F. O. Loomis, C. B., C. M. G., D. S. O., Third Division; Major General Sir David Watson, K. C. B., C. M. G., Fourth Division. Headquarters officials included Brigadier General R. J. L. Hayter, C. M. G., D. S. O.; Brigadier General G. J. Farmer, and Major General W. B. Lindsay, C. M. G., D. S. O.; the artillery commander was Major General E. W. B. Morrison, C. B., C. M. G., D. S. O., and his five divisional corps commanders were Brigadier Generals H. C. Thacker, C. M. G., D. S. O.; H. A. Panet, C. B., C. M. G., D. S. O.; J. S. Stewart, C. M. G., D. S. O.; W. B. M. King, C. M. G., D. S. O.; W. O. H. Dodds, C. M. G.; the Machine-Gun Corps was commanded by Brigadier General R. Brutinel, C. M. G., D. S. O., and the Canadian representative at General Headquarters was Brigadier General J. F. L. Embury, C. M. G., D. S. O.; the Railway Troops were led by Brigadier General J. W. Stewart, C. B., C. M. G., and the Army Medical Services by Brigadier General A. T. Ross, C. B., C. M. G.; the Siberian Expeditionary Force was commanded by Major General J. H. Elmsley, C. B., C. M. G., and Brigadier General H. C. Bickford, C. M. G. The Infantry Brigade commanders in France and Flanders were as follows: Brigadier General W. A. Griesbach, C. M. G., D. S. O.; Brigadier General G. S. Tuxford, C. B., C. M. G.; Brigadier General George F. McCuaig, C. M. G., D. S. O.; Brigadier General T. L. Tremblay, C. M. G., D. S. O.; Brigadier General Alex. Ross, C. M. G., D. S. O.; Brigadier General J. A. Clark, D. S. O.; Brigadier General D. C. Draper, C. M. G., D. S. O.; Brigadier General D. M. Ormond, C. M. G., D. S. O.; Brigadier General J. M. Ross, C. M. G., D. S. O.; Brigadier General Victor W. Odlum, C. B., C. M. G., D. S. O.; Brigadier General J. H. MacBrien, C. B., C. M. G., D. S. O.

After the Battle of Passchendaele the Canadian Corps was assigned to a part of the front where it had won immortal glory early in 1917—the Vimy sector. From January 1 to March 21, 1918, the corps held a front of some 13,000 yards from Hill 70 to Acheville, slightly east of a line drawn between Loos and Vimy.

This front was divided into five sections: Hill 70, St.-Emile, Lens, Avion, and Mericourt. The corps now settled down to the routine of trench warfare. Lieutenant General Sir A. W. Currie, of course, was in command. His dispositions provided that three of the divisions held the line while one was resting and training in reserve. Each of the divisions had approximately one month out of the line. This arrangement allowed the divisions to absorb more quickly the fresh drafts and to train rapidly the new officers and N. C. O's.

The Canadians were no strangers to this sector. Having wrested it from the enemy in April, 1917, in the Battle of Vimy and subsequent actions, they had held it practically ever since, except for the short interval late in 1917 when they fought the Battle of Passchendaele. It had been considerably improved by comprehensive defenses and complete systems of trench railways, roads, and water supply were in operation.

The great importance of this particular sector arose from the fact that behind Vimy Ridge lay the northern collieries of France and certain tactical features which covered the British lateral communication. "Here," as the British Commander in Chief said in one of his reports, "little or no ground could be given up."

A comparatively shallow advance beyond the Vimy Ridge would have stopped the operation of the collieries, paralyzing the production of war material in France, as well as inflicting very severe hardships on the already sorely tried population. In conjunction with the shortage of shipping, which practically forbade an increase in the importation of coal from England, the loss of the northern collieries might have definitely crippled France. On the other hand, a deep penetration at that point, by bringing the Amiens-Bethune railway and main road under fire, would have placed the British army in a critical position, by threatening to cut it in two and by depriving it of vital lateral communication.

The tactical and strategical results to be gained by a moderate success at that point were so far-reaching in effect that, notwithstanding the natural difficulties confronting an attack on that sector, it was fully expected that the German offensive would be directed against this the central part of the British front.

With the prospect of a German offensive now confronting the Canadians, it was decided that the defenses should be revised, to take advantage of the lessons recently learned and to embody the latest methods. Moreover, instructions had been issued by the First Army defining the policy of defense to be adopted and the methods to be followed.

The completion of the revised corps defenses and the execution of the new army program resulted in the organization of a very deep defended area, consisting of successive defensive systems, roughly parallel to the general line of the front and linked together by switch lines sited to protect both flanks. As planned, the main framework of the defense in depth was based upon machine-gun positions, protected by belts of wire entanglements so placed, in relation to the field of fire of the machine guns, that they were enfiladed over their entire length. The whole area was compartmented in such a way that the loss of ground at any one point could be localized, and would not cause a forced retirement from adjoining areas.

Machine-gun emplacements of the Champagne type were constructed, and dugout accommodation for the machine-gun detachments was provided in the deep tunnels of these emplacements.

This framework was completed as rapidly as possible by trenches and by defended localities organized for all-round defense.

A great many dugouts were made to accommodate the garrisons of these localities, and for dressing stations and battle headquarters. Advantage was taken of the possibility of utilizing the subways tunneled in 1916-17 for the attack on Vimy Ridge, and in addition steps were taken to create an obstacle on the southern flank of Vimy Ridge by the construction of dams to enable the valley of the Scarpe to be flooded as required. Trial inundations were made to insure the smooth working of these arrangements.

A great deal of care was given to the distribution of the artillery in relation to the policy of defense. Three systems of battery positions were built so as to distribute the guns in depth and sited so as to cover the ground to the northeast, east, and south, in case the flanks of the corps should be turned. These batteries were protected with barbed-wire entanglements and machine-gun positions against a sudden penetration of the enemy, and they were designed to become the natural rallying points of infantry in this eventuality.

Successive lines of retirement were also prepared, battery positions were selected, organized, and marked, cross-country tracks were opened up, and observation posts, echeloned in depth, were located and wired in.

On Vimy Ridge alone seventy-two new battery positions were built and stacked with ammunition; these positions could be used either for the distribution of the corps artillery in depth, or as positions which reenforcing artillery could immediately take up in the event of a heavy attack.

The weather being much finer during the months of January, February, and March, 1918, than is generally the case, very good progress was made, and the following defensive works were completed in rear of the main front-line defensive system:

• 250 miles of trench;
• 300 miles of barbed-wire entanglements;
• 200 tunneled machine-gun emplacements.

In addition to the above, existing trench systems, dugouts, gun positions, and machine-gun emplacements were strengthened and repaired. Each trench system was plentifully marked with signboards and many open machine-gun positions were sited and marked.

Machine-gun positions, defended localities, and certain portions of trenches were stored with several days' supply of ammunition, food, and water for the use of the garrisons.

The front held remained comparatively quiet during January, 1918, and, except for minor patrolling encounters and occasional shoots, nothing beyond the usual activity ever prevailing on a front held by this corps occurred.

In the months of February and March, 1918, little or no work was being done by the enemy on his actual defenses, but roads and disused trench railways were being repaired. In the rear areas his ammunition and engineer supply dumps were increasing in number and in size, while fresh battery positions were appearing almost daily. Furthermore, hostile aircraft and anti-aircraft guns were very active in preventing reconnoissance by British aeroplanes.

Early in March, 1918, it was considered that the enemy's front was ready for offensive operations. No concentration of troops had been observed, but the numerous towns and villages in close proximity to the front provided extensive accommodation and made it possible for him to conceal such concentrations. Conditions so favorable to the Germans required relentless vigilance on the part of the Corps Intelligence Organization, as the Canadians were dependent on the efficiency of this branch of the service for timely warning against surprise attacks.

In addition to the preparation above mentioned the enemy assumed early in February, 1918, a very aggressive attitude, raiding the Canadian lines very frequently, using for the purpose specially trained storm troops. His destructive shoots and intense gas shelling were also of frequent occurrence. To quell this activity, numerous counter-raids, retaliation shoots, and gas projections were carried out, and especially in the Lens sector soon had the desired effect.

Prisoners captured in Canadian raids stated that all their divisions had been brought up to strength and were undergoing hard training in the tactics of semiopen warfare. They stated, or left it to be understood, that the forthcoming German attacks were based on a very deep initial penetration and the rapid exploitation of success. No indications were given as to the points at which attacks would be launched, but they stated that every one of their sectors was prepared and practically ready. It was also definitely established that the enemy reserve divisions were kept near railways, ready to be moved quickly to the parts of the front selected for the coming drive.