BUCHAREST FALLS

On December 6, 1916, the German War Office announced the entry of Teutonic troops into the Rumanian capital, and what was more important still from a military point of view, the capture of Ploechti, an important railroad junction thirty-five miles northwest of Bucharest, famous for its oil wells and therefore of great value to the Austro-Germans. As developed later, however, these wells were destroyed by the retreating Rumanians, and for some time to come, at least, rendered almost useless.

Whatever the value of Bucharest from a military point of view, there can be no doubt that its capture was a heavy blow to the Allies. With it went one-half of Rumania. The mightiest efforts of Russia had been unable to save the kingdom from the hands of the invaders. Thereby she had been forced to confess a certain degree of weakness. Nor had Sarrail in Macedonia been able to divert the activities of the Bulgarians from Dobrudja to any serious extent. This too constituted a second confession of weakness.

Indeed the activities, or lack of activities, on the part of the Allies in Macedonia, in spite of the capture of Monastir, had been even more disappointing than the inability of the Russians to save Rumania.

But the disaster to the cause of the Allies was more apparent than real. As has been demonstrated on the Russian front more than once during this war, the capture of territory alone has very little influence on the final result of a campaign. It is not enough to defeat an enemy; his forces must be destroyed, eliminated, wholly or in part, and this can only be accomplished by the capture of his forces. Though the Germans claimed that the Rumanians had lost 100,000 men to them as prisoners, an obvious exaggeration, the Rumanian fighting forces remained comparatively intact after the fall of Bucharest. The best of the Rumanian troops undoubtedly remained, for by this time they were becoming seasoned veterans.

Having taken Bucharest, the German rush noticeably subsided; it lost its force. This was in part due to the bad weather conditions which now set in and lasted a week; rain fell in the plains in torrents and made the passage of troops, and especially of artillery, very difficult, even impossible. No doubt this also hindered the retreat of the Rumanians, but the advantage was on their side.

On the 18th it was reported from Petrograd that the entire Rumanian front was being held by Russian soldiers, the Rumanians having retired to their rear beyond the Sereth River at Jassy and in Bessarabia, where they were being reorganized for future operations. After the Bucharest-Ploechti line had been lost, according to one unofficial report, the Russians had sent some strong cavalry divisions to support the Rumanian retreat. The Russians offered strong resistance in the region of Buzeu so as to permit their engineers to construct a defensive front between Rimnik Sarat and the marshes at the mouth of the Danube. On that same date Berlin announced an advance of the Teutonic forces in northern Dobrudja. It was in this latter section that the Teutons now centered their activities. The Russo-Rumanians still remained in Dobrudja, on the south side of the Danube. So long as they had a footing here they remained a potential threat to the Teutons, which might awaken into active danger at the first favorable opportunity. To be ousted from this northern tip of Dobrudja would be even more serious to the Russo-Rumanians than the loss of Wallachia. From this point they might, at some future day, initiate an offensive against Bulgaria which might become extremely dangerous. Once across the river, however, it would be difficult for them to recross, for reasons that have already been discussed: no line of fortifications, no intrenched positions they might throw up, would be so effective a defense to the Teutons as the mouth of the Danube.

In Rumania, west of the river, continuous and at times heavy fighting continued, sometimes assuming almost the proportions of pitched battles. During the last week of the month Mackensen apparently realized the hopelessness, for the present at least, of driving the enemy out of Dobrudja, and shifted some of his forces over to the west bank of the river. The Russians had retired behind the Rimnik River, a small stream which is about twenty-five miles north of the Buzeu and parallel to it. On January 1, 1917, the Germans announced that the Russians had been forced back against the bridgehead at Braila and that in the Dobrudja they had advanced beyond Matchin. On the 5th, Braila, the most important city left to the Rumanians, fell into the hands of Mackensen, and at the same time the last of the Russians retired from the northern tip of Dobrudja. This was the heaviest blow that had fallen since the capture of Bucharest, and from a military point of view was even more serious. Once driven across the broad waters of the Danube mouth, the Russians and the Rumanians could not recross in the future except in very strong force and with great losses. At the same time it was now possible for Mackensen to reduce his forces in Dobrudja to a minimum and reenforce the troops operating over in Rumania proper.

During the rest of the month the fighting continued up and down the line with unabated vigor, though without any sensational results. The Germans were now hammering at the main line of the Russian defense and could not expect any large gains. The defeat of the Rumanians had been, after all, only the driving back of a salient. But in general the fighting during the latter half of January, 1917, seemed to favor the Teutons.

On the 15th Berlin reported that the Bulgarian artillery was bombarding Galatz from across the Danube. On this date too the Russians lost Vadeni, ten miles southwest of Galatz, their last position south of the Sereth. On the other hand, Petrograd announced on this same day that on the northern Rumanian front, in a violent engagement on the Kasino River, the Rumanian troops forced the Germans back, while the German attacks northeast of Fokshani were repulsed by the Russians. By the following day these local attacks developed into a general engagement, such as had not been fought since before Bucharest had fallen. At Fundani, Berlin reported, the Russians hurled one mass attack after another—waves of humanity as they were termed—against the German lines and gained some temporary advantages. On the 17th Petrograd announced the recapture of Vadeni. After a prolonged artillery preparation the Russians rushed their infantry against the position in the town and drove the Germans out. The latter, after receiving reenforcements and assisted by an artillery drumfire, made a powerful counterattack, but did not succeed in driving the Russians back. Berlin admitted this defeat, incidentally mentioning that Turkish troops were here engaged. Berlin also admitted that "between the Kasino and Suchitza Valleys the Russians and Rumanians made another mass attack and succeeded in regaining a height recently taken from them." On the 20th, Mackensen's forces, as was stated by Berlin and admitted by Petrograd, succeeded in taking Nanesti and driving the Russians back to the Sereth.

On January 22, 1917, an Overseas News Agency dispatch stated that the number of Rumanian prisoners taken during the entire campaign to date now numbered 200,000. Describing the situation of the Rumanian army at that time, the dispatch continued:

"The rest of the Rumanian army, part of which fought well, is reorganizing in Moldavia and Bessarabia. The few Rumanian divisions which still are engaged at the front are very much reduced in numbers. According to the assertions of Rumanian prisoners, one division was composed of only 2,800 men, while another numbered but 2,400. The Rumanians suffered their heaviest losses from artillery fire. The large number of dead in proportion to the wounded is remarkable. On one square kilometer (about three-fifths of a square mile) of the battle field of Campulung 6,000 Rumanian dead were counted. Some of the Rumanian infantry regiments were composed of only four companies of 150 men each. Because of the lack of sanitary organization, an extraordinary large percentage of the wounded died in the hospitals, which, however, afforded room only for the officers, while large numbers of wounded soldiers were lodged in damp cellars, peasants' huts, and barns, where they died miserably." On January 20, 1917, the military critic of the Overseas News Agency summed up the situation as follows:

"The Russo-Rumanian efforts to delay the advance of the Teutons against the Sereth Plain are taking the form of fierce counterattacks, launched to avert the danger that their position on the Putna and the Sereth be outflanked. During the last few days especially violent attacks have been directed against the position situated on the Carpathian slopes north of the Suchitza. These developed no success and cost the enemy heavy losses in casualties and prisoners.... On the Carpathian front, in the Oituz district, the Teutonic forces have pressed forward until they are in a position whence they can take the circular valley of Ocna under their fire. As has been confirmed by the Russian headquarters report, Bogdaneshti and Ocna were shelled. Ocna is an important railroad station and a point of support for the Russian defense in the upper Trotus Valley, while Bogdaneshti bars the outlet to the great valley of the Trotus and Oituz. All the determined attempts made by the Russians and Rumanians to extend the narrow limits of their hold on the southern bank of the Sereth have been more or less unsuccessful. The German troops, however, with their capture of the village of Nanesti, tore the pillar from the wall of the Russian defense. Nanesti forms the strategical center of the bridgehead of Fundeni and covers the great iron bridge across the Sereth, which is in the immediate vicinity of Nanesti. The entire construction of the Nanesti-Fundeni bridgehead, which is a modern field fortification, illustrates its importance as a central point of support of the Sereth line. In the remaining sectors of the Sereth snowstorms and mists have interfered with military activity."

During the middle of January, 1917, the French Admiral du Fournier of the Entente fleet in Greek waters paid a visit to the Russo-Rumanian front. On his return from this tour, which was taken on the way to France, he wrote in the Paris "Matin":

"The Russian army was surprised by the rapid succession of Rumanian reverses and had to suspend Brussilov's offensive in Galicia in order to send large reenforcements to Rumania, but its position was such that it could not cover its flank in Wallachia and its rear in Dobrudja rapidly enough to stop the advance of the invaders. It was only on the Sereth that it succeeded in forming with the first corps that arrived from the army of General Sakharoff a front which was lengthened by several good Rumanian divisions. A few weeks will witness a change in the military situation. In my journey in a motor car with the troops on the march I saw nothing but magnificent soldiers, admirably equipped and in excellent form."[Back to Contents]