ENVOYS FROM AMERICA'S ALLIES

What perhaps most vividly brought home to the nation that it was now one of the belligerents of the Allied Powers was the visit of a number of special commissioners from the governments of the latter countries, following the American declaration of war. The presence of the British and French missions in particular made a deep impression, not only because of the importance and magnitude of their errand, but because of their personnel. The British mission was headed by Arthur James Balfour, a former Conservative premier, and now Foreign Secretary in the Lloyd-George cabinet. The French mission included RenÉ Viviani, a predecessor of Premier Ribot and a member of his cabinet, and Marshal Joffre, the victor of the Battle of the Marne and an idol of France. The commanding personalities of Mr. Balfour and Marshal Joffre caught the American imagination and the visits they paid to several cities during their brief stay partook of the character of state events, marked by an imposing welcome and sumptuous hospitality.

A reception no less generous was accorded the members of the other missions—the Italian, headed by the Prince of Udine, son of the Duke of Genoa and nephew of King Victor Emmanuel, and including Signor Marconi, the inventor of wireless telegraphy; the Russian, headed by Boris Bakhmetieff, the new Russian Ambassador; and the Belgian, headed by Baron Moncheur. Other missions came from Ireland, Rumania, and Japan.

The reception of these various missions formed the occasion for a number of state functions which placed the Administration in the rÔle of a national host to many distinguished guests from foreign countries with which the United States was now allied for the first time in a devastating war. The honors paid to them produced remarkable proceedings in Congress without parallel in that body's deliberations; but then the great world war had shattered precedents wherever it touched. The spectacle was witnessed of a British statesman, in the person of Mr. Balfour, addressing the House and Senate, an event which became an enduring memory. Congress also heard addresses from M. Viviani, Baron Moncheur, and the Prince of Udine. They told why their countries were in the war—a familiar story whose repetition within the halls of Congress had considerable point in that the national legislature itself had sanctioned war on Germany for the same reasons. American and Allied statesmen thus met on common ground in a common cause. The numerous conferences between the various sections of the Allied missions and American officials—beginning with that between the President and Mr. Balfour—were councils of war. They symbolized the joining of hands across the sea in a literal sense—across a sea infested with German submarines, which the envoys, incidentally, escaped both in coming and returning.

In the public ceremonials that marked their visit the leading envoys freely and repeatedly expressed their grateful recognition to the United States for unselfishly entering the war at last on the side which was fighting for civilization—a disinterested action without parallel in the history of wars, as Mr. Asquith had called it. Their gratitude might well be taken for granted; but, like the Allies' aims in the war, it bore repetition, because American aid was sorely needed, and they had, in fact, come to accept as much assistance as the United States had to give. The immediate need was money, food, ships—all the accessories of war outside the fighting zone. Funds for loans having become available, the American Treasury proceeded to distribute its largesse generously. Great Britain received $200,000,000 as the first installment of a number of loans; France and Italy received $100,000,000 each; Serbia got $3,000,000; Russia $175,000,000; France another $60,000,000; and Great Britain $300,000,000 more. Further credits to the various countries brought the amount loaned to $1,525,000,000 by the close of July, 1917, or more than half of the $3,000,000,000 sanctioned by Congress for financing the Allies.

By these transactions the United States Government displaced the banking firm of J. P. Morgan & Co., who had been acting as fiscal agent for the Allies since they began to purchase huge supplies in America on American credits.

Great Britain, as the bulwark of her allies, had many weighty matters to lay before the United States. Her mission sought an understanding regarding the conduct of the blockade, naval operations, munition supplies, military dispositions and resources, and the shipment of foodstuffs. There was no driving of bargains, since neither was a competitor of the other, and hence could have no radical difference of view on questions to the settlement of which they had been drawn in union against a common foe. The attitude of the British mission invited American cooperation, reciprocal service, and expressed gratitude for the American partnership. They had no policies to suggest to the Administration. They had much information on the conduct of the war to lay before the United States—specially blunders to be avoided; but they did not presume to teach Americans how to make war. The United States, on its part, eagerly wanted to know all that could be known, and to be guided accordingly.

A week of conferences clarified the situation. Both the British and French missions revealed with surprising frankness the status of the Allied resources and the military situation. Great Britain was especially candid in disclosing the extent of her losses by submarines. She needed ships, as many as America could build. France needed an American army at once to augment her man power. Italy wanted coal and grain. Most of all, the collapse of Russia's military organization had brought the Allies to the pass of relying on American aid as imperative if Germany was to be defeated.

The personal contact between American Government officials and the various missions, especially the British, produced a mutual confidence and sympathy not to be measured by words. Resources and needs were frankly stated. The United States disclosed what it could do and how. The way, in short, was cleared for the United States to enter the Grand Alliance on a basis making for efficient cooperation in the conduct of the war.

A gentleman's agreement was effected with neither side committed to any binding policy. The United States retained a free hand, and was not controlled, formally or informally, by any entangling undertaking as to any future course it might elect to take in its relations with Germany. But one enlightening point emerged. It was that while the United States was free to enter into any peace it chose, it would not enter into a separate peace. No action in that direction was imaginable in the circumstances without consulting the Entente Allies. This injection of peace considerations into the war situation, before the United States had really entered the lists with troops and guns, was taking time by the forelock. But it was needful to clear the air early, as one of the reasons ascribed to Germany's apparent complacence to the entrance of America as a belligerent was that she counted on the United States as a balance wheel that might restrain the Entente's war activities and hasten peace, or later operate to curtail the Entente's demands at the peace conference. On these assumptions America's participation was supposed to be not wholly unwelcome to Berlin.

American freedom of action was unlikely to confuse the war issues in the manner Germany looked for. Whatever hopes Germany built upon that freedom did not deter Secretary Lansing and Mr. Balfour from hastening to counteract misleading impressions current that America would be embarrassed in its postwar foreign policy by becoming involved in European territorial questions, from which, for more than a century, it had remained aloof.

The French mission also achieved an incontestable popular triumph, due to the presence of Marshal Joffre and to memories of French assistance in the Revolutionary War. France's heroic resistance to German invasion of her territory, specially in thwarting the advance on Paris, had also attached American sympathies to her cause. M. Viviani and Marshal Joffre did not hesitate to avail themselves of this feeling by plainly requesting the immediate dispatch of American troops to France. While this course conflicted with the early plans of the American General Staff, the latter had to recognize the immense moral effect which the flying of the Stars and Stripes would have on the Allied troops in the Franco-Belgian trenches, and the request did not go unheeded. The country realized that the French importunity for troops was born of an equally importunate need.

All the missions, except the British, were birds of passage, who departed upon fulfilling their errands of securing American aid in directions where it was most required. There was more permanency to the British mission, owing to Great Britain's rÔle of general provider to her Allies, which called for the establishment of several British organizations in New York and Washington as clearing houses. Mr. Balfour and his suite left, to be succeeded by Lord Northcliffe, chief proprietor of the London "Times," London "Daily Mail," and many other British publications, who was commissioned by Lloyd-George to continue the work Mr. Balfour had begun and to coordinate the ramifications produced by extensive scope of the Allies' calls on American industries for war equipment.

In the same direction the American Government consolidated its energies in a War Industries Board, which it created to supervise the expenditure of millions of dollars on equipping the American armies.[Back to Contents]