RUSSIAN SUCCESSES AFTER ERZERUM

With the same surprising vigor with which the Russian armies in the Caucasus had pushed their advance toward Erzerum, they took up the pursuit of the retreating Turkish army, after this important Armenian stronghold had capitulated on February 16, 1916. With Erzerum as a center the Russian advance spread out rapidly in all directions toward the west in the general direction of Erzingan and Sivas; in the south toward Mush, Bitlis and the region around Lake Van, and in the north with the important Black Sea port of Trebizond as the objective. This meant a front of almost 300 miles without a single railroad and only a limited number of roads that really deserved that appellation. Almost all of this country is very mountainous. To push an advance in such country at the most favorable season of the year involves the solution of the most complicated military problems. The country itself offers comparatively few opportunities for keeping even a moderate-sized army sufficiently supplied with food and water for men and beasts. But considering that the Russian advance was undertaken during the winter, when extremely low temperatures prevail, and when vast quantities of snow add to all the other natural difficulties in the way of an advancing army, the Russian successes were little short of marvelous.

As early as February 23, 1916, the right wing of the Russian army had reached and occupied the town of Ispir on the river Chorok, about fifty miles northwest of Erzerum, and halfway between that city and Rizeh, a town on the south shore of the Black Sea, less than fifty miles east of Trebizond. At the same time Russian destroyers were bombarding the Black Sea coast towns. Under their protective fire fresh troops were landed a few days later at Atina on the Black Sea, about sixty miles east of Trebizond, which promptly occupied that town. From there they rapidly advanced southward toward Rizeh, forcing the Turks to evacuate their positions and capturing some prisoners as well as a few guns, together with rifles and ammunition.

The center, in the meantime, had advanced on the Erzerum-Trebizond road, and by February 25, 1916, occupied the town of Ashkala, about thirty miles from Erzerum. From all sides the Russian armies were closing in on Trebizond, and their rapid success threw the Turkish forces into consternation, for the loss of Trebizond would mean a serious threat to their further safety, having been up to then the principal point through which supplies and ammunition reached them steadily and rapidly by way of the Black Sea. No wonder then that the London "Times" correspondent in Petrograd was able to report on March 5, 1916, that all accounts agreed that the population of the Trebizond region were panic-stricken and fleeing even then in the direction of Kara-Hissar and Sivas, flight along the Black Sea route being out of question on account of the presence of Russian warships.

In the south the left wing of the Russian army was equally successful. On March 1, 1916, it occupied Mamawk, less than ten miles north of Bitlis, a success foreshadowing the fall of that important Armenian city. And, indeed, on the next day, March 2, 1916, Bitlis was occupied by the Russians. This was indeed another severe blow to the Turkish armies. Bitlis, 110 miles south of Erzerum, in Armenian Tamos, is one of the most important trade centers, and commands a number of important roads. It is only about fifty miles north of the upper Tigris, and even though it is more than 350 miles from Bagdad, its occupation by Russian forces seriously menaced the road to Bagdad, Bagdad itself, and even the rear of the Turkish army, fighting against the Anglo-Indian army in Mesopotamia. Hardly had the Turks recovered from this blow when their left wing in the north suffered another serious reverse through the loss of the Black Sea port of Rizeh. This event took place on March 8, 1916, and the capture was accomplished by the fresh Russian troops that had been landed a few days before at Atina, from which Rizeh is only twenty-two miles distant. Along the Black Sea coast the Russians were now within thirty-eight miles of Trebizond. On and on the Russians pressed, and by March 17, 1916, their advance guard was reported within twenty miles of Trebizond. However, by this time Turkish resistance along the entire Armenian front stiffened perceptibly. This undoubtedly was due to reenforcements which must have reached the Turkish line by that time. For on March 30, 1916, the official Russian statement announced that seventy officers and 400 men who had been captured along the Caucasus littoral front belonged to a Turkish regiment which had previously fought at Gallipoli. At the same time it was also announced that fighting had occurred northwest of Mush. The Turkish forces involved in this fighting must have been recent reenforcements, because Mush is sixty-five miles northwest of Bitlis, the occupation of which took place about four weeks previously, at which time the region between Erzerum and Bitlis undoubtedly had been cleared of Turkish soldiers. Their reappearance, now so close to the road between Bitlis and Erzerum, presented a serious menace both to the center and to the left wing of Grand Duke Nicholas's forces, for if the Turkish troops were in large enough force, the Russians were in danger of having their center and left wing separated. This condition, of course, meant that until this danger was removed, the closest cooperation between the various parts of the Russian army became essential, and therefore resulted in a general slowing down of the Russian advance for the time being.

In the meantime the Russian center continued its advance against Erzingan. This is an Armenian town of considerable military importance, being the headquarters of the Fourth Turkish Army Corps. On March 16, 1916, an engagement took place about sixty miles west of Erzerum, resulting in the occupation by the Russians of the town of Mama Khatun, located on the western Euphrates and on the Erzerum-Erzingan-Sivas road. According to the official Russian statement the Turks lost five cannon, some machine guns and supplies and forty-four officers and 770 men by capture. Here, too, however, the Turks began to offer a more determined resistance, and although the official Russian statement of the next day, March 17, 1916, reported a continuation of the Russian advance towards Erzingan, it also mentioned Turkish attempts at making a stand and spoke even of attempted counterattacks.

This stiffening of Turkish resistance necessitated apparently a change in the Russian plans. No longer do we hear now of quick, straight, advances from point to point. But the various objectives toward which the Russians were directing their attacks—Trebizond, Erzingan, the Tigris—are attacked either successfully or consecutively from all possible directions and points of vantage. Not until now, for instance, do we hear of further advances toward Erzingan from the north. It will be recalled that as long ago as February 23, 1916, the Russians occupied the town of Ispir, some fifty miles northwest of Erzerum on the river Chorok.

The headwaters of this river are located less than twenty-five miles northeast of Erzingan, and up its valley a new Russian offensive against Erzingan was started as soon as the new strength of the Turkish defensive along the direct route from Erzerum made itself felt.

On April 1, 1916, and again on April 12, 1916, the Turks reported that they had repulsed attacks of Russian scouting parties advancing along the upper Chorok, and even claimed an advance for their own troops. But on the next day, April 3, 1916, the Russians apparently were able to turn the tables on their opponents, claiming to have crossed the upper basin of the Chorok and to have seized strongly fortified Turkish positions located at a height of 10,000 feet above sea level, capturing thereby a company of Turks. Again on the following day, April 4, 1916, the Russians succeeded in dislodging Turkish forces from powerful mountain positions. Concurrent with these engagements, fighting took place both in the south and north. On April 2, 1916, a Turkish camp was stormed by Russian battalions near Mush to the northwest of Bitlis. Still farther south, about twenty-five miles southeast of Bitlis, the small town of Khizan had fallen into the hands of the Russians, who drove its defenders toward the south. The Russian advance to the southwest of Mush and Bitlis continued slowly but definitely throughout the next few days, with the town of Diarbekr on the right bank of the upper Tigris as its objective.

Beginning with the end of March, 1916, the Turks also launched a series of strong counterattacks along the coastal front. The first of these was undertaken during the night of March 26, 1916, but apparently was unsuccessful. It was an answer to a strong attack on the part of the Russians during the preceding day which resulted in the dislodgment of Turkish troops holding strong positions in the region of the Baltatchi Darassi River and in the occupation by the Russians of the town of Off on the Black Sea, thirty miles to the east of Trebizond. This success was due chiefly to the superiority of the Russian naval forces, which made it possible to precede their infantry attack with heavy preparatory artillery fire. By March 27, 1916, the Russians had advanced to the Oghene Dere River, another of the numerous small rivers flowing into the Black Sea between Rizeh and Trebizond. There they had occupied the heights of the left (west) bank. During the night the Turks made a series of strong counterattacks, all of which, however, were repulsed with considerable losses to the attackers. Another Turkish counterattack in the neighborhood of Trebizond was launched on April 4, 1916. Although strongly supported by gunfire from the cruiser Breslau, it was repulsed by the combined efforts of the Russian land forces and destroyers lying before Trebizond. During the next few days the Turks offered the most determined resistance to the Russian advance against Trebizond, especially along the river Kara Dere. This resistance was not broken until April 15, 1916, when the Turks were driven out of their fortified positions on the left bank of that river by the combined action of the Russian land and naval forces. The Russian army was now, after almost a fortnight's desperate fighting, within sixteen miles of its goal, Trebizond. On April 16, 1916, it again advanced, occupying Surmench on the Black Sea, and reaching later that day, after a successful pursuit of the retreating Turkish army, the village of Asseue Kalessi, only twelve miles east of Trebizond.

With this defeat the fall of Trebizond apparently was sealed. Although reports came from various sources that the Turkish General Staff was making the most desperate efforts to save the city by dispatching new reenforcements from central Anatolia, the Russian advance could not be stopped seriously any longer. Every day brought reports of new Russian successes along the entire Armenian front. On April 17, 1916, they occupied Drona, only six and a half miles east of Trebizond. Then finally, on April 18, 1916, came the announcement that Trebizond itself had been taken.

Trebizond is less important as a fortified place than as a port and harbor and as a source of supply for the Turkish army. It is in no sense a fortress like Erzerum, though the defenses of the town, recently constructed, are not to be despised. As a vital artery of communications, however, its value is apparent from the fact, first, that it is the Turks' chief port in this region, and secondly, that railway facilities, which are so inadequate throughout Asia Minor, are nonexistent along the northern coast. Hence the Turks will have to rely for the transport of troops and supplies upon railways which at the nearest point are more than 300 miles from the front at Trebizond.

Trebizond is an ancient seaport of great commercial importance, due chiefly to the fact that it controls the point where the principal trade route from Persia and central Asia to Europe, over Armenia and by way of Bayezid and Erzerum, descends to the sea. It has been the dream of Russia for centuries to put her hands forever upon this important "window on the Black Sea."

Trebizond's population is about 40,000, of whom 22,000 are Moslems and 18,000 Christians. The city first figured in history during the Fourth Crusade, when Alexius Comnenus, with an army of Iberian mercenaries, entered it and established himself as sovereign. In 1461 Trebizond was taken by Mohammed II, after it had for two centuries been the capital of an empire, having defied all attacks, principally by virtue of its isolated position, between a barrier of rugged mountains of from 7,000 to 8,000 feet and the sea.

As far as capturing important ports of the Turkish left wing was concerned, the victory of Trebizond was an empty one. For the Turks evacuated the town apparently a day or two before the Russians occupied it. The latter, therefore, had only the capture of "some 6-inch guns" to report. This quick evacuation, at any rate, was fortunate for the town and its inhabitants, for it saved them from a bombardment and the town did not suffer at all as a result of the military operations.

The campaign resulting in the fall of Trebizond did really not begin until after the fall of Erzerum on February 16, 1916. Up to that time the Russian Caucasian army had apparently been satisfied to maintain strong defensive positions along the Turkish border. But since the occupation of Erzerum a definite plan of a well-developed offensive was followed looking toward the acquisition of Turkish territory which had long been coveted by Russia.

With the fall of Trebizond Russia became the possessor, at least temporarily, of a strip of territory approximately 125 miles wide along a front of almost 250 miles length, or of an area of 31,250 square miles. In the north this valuable acquisition was bounded by that part of the south shore of the Black Sea that stretches from Batum in Russian Transcaucasia to Trebizond. In the south it practically reached the Turko-Persian frontier, while in the west it almost reached the rough line formed by the upper Euphrates and the upper Tigris. It thus comprised the larger part of Armenia. As soon as the Russians had found out that the Turks had a start of almost two days, they began an energetic pursuit. The very first day of it, April 19, 1916, brought them into contact with Turkish rear guards and resulted in the capture of a considerable number of them. The retreat of the Turks took a southwesterly direction toward Baiburt along the Trebizond-Erzerum road and toward Erzingan, to which a road branches off the Trebizond-Erzerum road. Baiburt was held by the Turks with a force strong enough to make it impossible for the Russians to cut off the Trebizond garrison. Along the coast the Russians found only comparatively weak resistance, so that they were able to land fresh forces west of Trebizond and occupy the town of Peatana, about ten miles to the west on the Black Sea.

A desperate struggle, however, developed for the possession of the Trebizond-Erzerum road. The Russians had been astride this road for some time as far as Madan Khan and Kop, both about fifty miles northwest of Erzerum and just this side of Baiburt. There the Turks put up a determined resistance and succeeded in holding up the Russian advance. Although they were not equally successful farther north, the Russians managed to advance along this road to the south of Trebizond only as far as Jeyizlik—about sixteen miles south of Trebizond—where they were forced into the mountains toward the Kara Dere River. This left still the larger part of the entire road in possession of the Turks, and especially that part from which another road branched off to Erzingan.

In the Mush and Bitlis region the Russians had made satisfactory progress in the meantime. On April 19, 1916, progress was reported to the south of Bitlis toward Sert, although the Turks fought hard to hold up this advance toward Diarbekr. This advance was the direct result of the defeat which the Russians had inflicted on a Turkish division at Bitlis as early as April 15, 1916. By April 23, 1916, the Turks had again gathered some strength and were able to report that they had repulsed Russian attacks south of Bitlis, west of Mush, east of Baiburt, and south of Trebizond. From then on, however, the Russians again advanced to the south of Bitlis as well as in the direction of Erzingan. By the beginning of May, 1916, the Russian official statements do not speak any longer of the "region south of Bitlis," but mention instead "the front toward Diarbekr." This important town is about 100 miles southwest of Bitlis, and apparently had become, after the fall of Trebizond, together with Erzingan, one of the immediate objectives of the Russian campaign.

Diarbekr is a town of 35,000 inhabitants, whose importance arises from its being the meeting point of the roads from the Mediterranean via Aleppo and Damascus from the Black Sea via Amasia-Kharput, and Erzerum and from the Persian Gulf via Bagdad. Ras-el-Ain, the present railhead of the Bagdad railway, is seventy miles south.

The stiffening of the Turkish defensive was being maintained as April, 1916, waned and May approached. The Russian campaign in the Caucasus had resolved itself now into three distinctive parts: In the north its chief objective, Trebizond, had been reached and gained. There further progress, of course, would be attempted along the shore of the Black Sea, and in a way it was easier to achieve progress here than at any other part of the Caucasian front. For first of all the nature of the ground along the coast of the Black Sea was much less difficult, and then, too, the Russian naval forces could supply valuable assistance. That progress was not made faster here by the Russians was due entirely to the fact that the advance along the two other sectors was more difficult and the Turkish resistance more desperate. And, of course, if the front of any one sector was pushed considerably ahead of the front of the other two, grave danger immediately arose that the most advanced sector would be cut off from the rest of the Russian armies by flank movements. For in a country such as Turkish Armenia, without railroads and with only a few roads, it was of course impossible to establish a continuous front line, such as was to be formed on the European battle fields both in the east and west. This explains why by May 1, 1916, the Russian front had been pushed less than twenty-five miles west of Trebizond, even though almost two weeks had elapsed since the fall of Trebizond.

In the center sector the immediate objective of the Russians was Erzingan. Beyond that they undoubtedly hoped to advance to Swas, an important Turkish base. Toward this objective two distinct lines of offensive had developed by now—one along the valley of the river Oborok and the other along the Erzerum-Erzingan road and the valley of the western Euphrates. The latter was somewhat more successful than the former, chiefly because it did not offer so many natural means of defense. But to both of these offensives the Turks now offered a most determined resistance, and the Russians, though making progress continuously, did so only very slowly.

In the southern sector conditions were very similar. Here, too, two separate offensives had developed, although they were more closely correlated than in the center. One was directed in a southwestern direction from Mush, and the other in the same direction from Bitlis. Both had as their objective Diarbekr, an important trading center on the Tigris and a future station on the unfinished part of the Bagdad railroad. Here, too, Russian progress was fairly continuous but very slow.

Some interesting details regarding the tremendous difficulties which nature put in the way of any advancing army, and which were utilized by the Turks to their fullest possibility, may be gleaned from the following extracts from letters written by Russian officers serving at the Caucasian front:

"We have traveled sixty miles in two days, and never have we been out of sight of the place from whence we started. South and north we have scouted until we have come into touch with the cavalry of the —— Corps of the vedettes which the Cossacks of the Don furnished for the —— Brigade. Sometimes it is wholly impossible to ride. The slopes of these hills are covered with huge bowlders, behind any of which half a company of the enemy might be lurking. That has been our experience, and poor K—— was shot dead while leading his squadron across a quite innocent-looking plateau from which we thought the enemy had been driven.

"As it turned out, a long line of bowlders, which he thought were too small to hide anything but a sniper, in reality marked a rough trench line which a Kurdish regiment was holding in strength, K—— was shot down, as also was his lieutenant, and half the squadron were left on the ground. Fortunately, at the foot of the road leading down to the plateau, the sergeant who led the men out of action found one of our Caucasian regiments who are used to dealing with the fezzes, and they came up at the double, and after two hours' fighting were reenforced by another two companies and carried the trench.

"Farther back we found the enemy in a stronger plateau. Almost within sight of the enemy we made tea and rested before attempting to push forward to the fight.

"An officer of the staff who does not understand the Caucasian way reproved the colonel for delaying, but he took a very philosophical view, and pointed out that it was extremely doubtful whether he even now had men enough to carry the enormous position, and that he certainly could not do so with exhausted troops. So we had the extraordinary spectacle of our men lying down flat, blowing their fires and drinking their tea and laughing and joking as though they were at a picnic, but when they had finished and had formed up they made short work of the fellows in the trench. But think of what would have happened if we had left this plateau unsearched!"

"On the Baiburt road," writes another Russian officer, "there was one small pass which had been roughly reconnoitered, and through this we were moving some of the heavy guns, not imagining that there were any Turks within ten miles, when a heavy fire was opened from a fir wood a thousand feet above us. The limbers of the guns were a long way in the rear, and there was no way of shelling this enemy from his aerie. There was nothing to do but for the battalion which was acting as escort to the guns to move up the slope under a terrific machine-gun and rifle fire and investigate the strength of the attack. The guns were left on the road, and mules and horses were taken to whatever cover could be found, and an urgent message was sent back to the effect that the convoy was held up, but the majority of the infantry had already passed the danger point. Two mountain batteries were commandeered, however, and these came into action, firing incendiary shells into the wood, which was soon blazing at several points.

"The battle which then began between the Turks who had been ejected from the wood and the gun escort lasted for the greater part of the afternoon. It was not until sunset that two of our batteries, which had been brought back from the front for the purpose, opened fire upon the Turks' position, and the ambushers were compelled to capitulate. The progress on the left was even more difficult than that which we experienced in the northern sector. The roads were indescribable. Where they mounted and crossed the intervening ridges they were almost impassable, whilst in the valleys the gun carriages sank up to their axles in liquid mud."

From still another source we hear:

"In the Van sector a Russian brigade was held up by a forest fire, started by the Turks, which made all progress impossible. For days a brigade had to sit idle until the fire had burned itself out, and even when they moved forward it was necessary to cover all the munition wagons with wet blankets, and the ashes through which the stolid Russians marched were so hot as to burn away the soles of their boots.

"A curious discovery which was made in this extraordinary march was the remains of a Turkish company which had evidently been caught in the fire they had started and had been unable to escape."

On May 1, 1916, Russian Cossacks were able to drive back Turkish troops, making a stand somewhere west of Erzerum and east of Erzingan. Other detachments of the same service of the Russian army were equally successful on May 2, 1916, in driving back toward Diarbekr resisting Turkish forces west of Mush and Bitlis, and a similar achievement was officially reported on May 3, 1916. On the same date Russian regiments made a successful night attack in the upper Chorok basin which netted some important Turkish positions, which were immediately strongly fortified. May 4, 1916, brought a counterattack on the part of Turkish forces in the Chorok sector at the town of Baiburt, which, however, was repulsed. On the same day the Russians stormed Turkish trenches along the Erzerum-Erzingan road, during which engagement most savage bayonet fighting developed, ending in success for the Russian armies. Turkish attacks west of Bitlis were likewise repulsed. On May 5, 1916, the Turks attempted to regain the trenches in the Erzingan sector lost the day before, but although their attack was supported by artillery, it was not successful.

The Russian official statement of May 7, 1916, gives some data concerning the booty which the Russians captured at Trebizond. It consisted of eight mounted coast defense guns, fourteen 6-inch guns, one field gun, more than 100 rifles, fifty-three ammunition wagons, supply trains and other war material. This, taken in connection with the fact that practically the entire Turkish garrison escaped, confirms the view expressed previously that the capture of Trebizond was of great importance to the Russians, not so much on account of what they themselves gained thereby, but on account of what the Turks lost by being deprived of their principal harbor on the Black Sea, comparatively close to the Caucasian theater of war.

The Turkish artillery attack of May 5, 1916, in the Erzingan sector was duplicated on May 7, 1916, but this time the Russians used their guns, and apparently with telling effect. For so devastating was the Russian fire directed toward the newly established Turkish trenches that the Turks had to evacuate their entire first line and retire to their second line of defensive works. Throughout the entire day on May 8, 1916, the Turks doggedly attacked the Russian positions. Losses on both sides were heavy, especially so on the Turkish side, which hurled attack after attack against the Russian positions, not desisting until nightfall. Though no positive gain was made thereby, the Russians at least were prevented from further advances. The same day, May 8, 1916, yielded another success for the Russians in the southern sector, south of Mush. There, between that town and Bitlis, stretches one of the numerous mountain ranges, with which this region abounds. On it the Turks held naturally strong positions which had been still more strengthened by means of artificial defense works. A concentrated Russian attack, prepared and supported by artillery fire, drove the Turks not only from these positions, but out of the mountain range.

On May 9, 1916, engagements took place along the entire front. In the center fighting occurred near Mount Koph, in the Chorok basin southeast of Baiburt, and the Turks made some 300 prisoners. Farther south a Turkish attack near Mama Khatun was stopped by Russian fire. In the south another Turkish attack in the neighborhood of Kirvaz, about twenty-five miles northwest of Mush, forced back a Russian detachment after capturing some fifty men. All this time the Russians were industriously building fortifications along the Black Sea coast both east and west of Trebizond. During the night of May 9, 1916, the Turks made a successful surprise attack against a Russian camp near Baschkjoej, about thirty-five miles southeast of Mama Khatun. There a Russian detachment consisting of about 500 men, of which one-half was cavalry and one-half infantry, found themselves suddenly surrounded by the bayonets of a superior Turkish force. All, except a small number who managed to escape, were cut to pieces.

As the Russians succeeded in pushing their advance westward, even if only very slowly, they became again somewhat more active in the north along the Black Sea. On May 10, 1916, they were reported advancing both south and southwest of Platana, a small seaport about twelve miles west of Trebizond. Throughout May 11, 1916, engagements of lesser importance took place at various parts of the entire front. During that night the Turks launched another strong night attack in the Erzingan sector, without, however, being able to register any marked success. The same was true of an attack made May 12, 1916, near Mama Khatun. In the south, between Mush and Bitlis, an engagement which was begun on May 10, 1916, concluded with the loss of one Turkish gun, 2,000 rifles and considerable stores of ammunition. In the Chorok sector the Turks succeeded on May 13, 1916, in driving the Russian troops out of their positions on Mount Koph and in forcing them back in an easterly direction for a distance of from four to five miles. There, however, the Russians succeeded in making a stand, though their attempt to regain their positions failed. May 14, 1916, was comparatively uneventful. Some Russian reconnoitering parties clashed with Turkish advance guards near Mama Khatun, and a small force of Kurds was repulsed west of Bitlis. On May 16, 1916, the Russians announced officially that they had occupied Mama Khatun, a small town on the western Euphrates, about fifty miles west of Erzerum and approximately the same distance from Erzingan. Throughout the balance of May, 1916, fighting along the Caucasian front was restricted almost entirely to clashes between outposts, which in some instances brought slight local successes to the Russian arms, and at other times yielded equally unimportant gains for the Turkish sides. To a certain extent this slowing down undoubtedly was due to the determined resistance on the part of the Turks. It is also quite likely that part of the Russian forces in the north had been diverted earlier in the month to the south in order to assist in the drive against Bagdad and Moone, which was pushed with increased vigor just previous to and right after the capitulation of the Anglo-Indian forces at Kut-el-Amara in Mesopotamia.[Back to Contents]