THE RUSSIAN RECONQUEST OF THE BUKOWINA

Simultaneously with the drive in Volhynia, the extreme left wing of the Russian southern army under General Lechitsky forced the Austro-Hungarians to withdraw their whole line in the northeastern Bukowina, invaded the crownland with strong forces and advanced to within fourteen miles of the capital, Czernowitz. On the Strypa the Austrians had to fall back from their principal position north of Buczacz. In spite of the most desperate resistance and in the face of a violent flanking fire, and even curtain fire, and the explosions of whole sets of mines, General Lechitsky's troops captured the Austrian positions south of Dobronowce, fourteen miles northeast of Czernowitz. In that region alone the Russians claimed to have captured 18,000 soldiers, one general, 347 officers, and ten guns. Southeast of Zaleszcyki on the Dniester the Russians again were victorious and forced the withdrawal of the Austrian lines. Fourteen miles north of Czernowitz the Austrian troops tried to stem the tide by blowing up the railroad station of Jurkoutz. At the same time they made their first important counterattack in the Lutsk region. Making a sudden stand, after being driven over the river Styr, north of Lutsk, they turned on the Russians with the aid of German detachments rushed to them by General von Hindenburg, drove the Muscovite troops back over the Styr and took 1,508 prisoners, including eight officers. At other points, too, the Austrian resistance stiffened perceptibly, especially in the region of Torgovitsa, and on the Styr below Lutsk.

Dubno, a modern fortress, built, like Lutsk, mainly in support of Rovno, to ward off possible aggression, now supplied an excellent starting point for a Russian drive into the heart of Galicia. Proceeding on both sides of the Rovno-Dubno-Brody-Lemberg railway the Russians should be able to cover the eighty-two miles which still separates them from the Galician capital within a comparatively short time, provided that Austrian resistance in this region continues as weak as it has been up to date.

A greater danger than the capture of Lemberg was, however, presented by the Russian advance into the Bukowina. If these two Russian drives—to Lemberg and to Czernowitz—would prove successful the whole southeastern Austro-Hungarian army would find itself squeezed between two Russian armies, and its only escape would be into the difficult Carpathian Mountain passes, where the Russians, this time well equipped and greatly superior in numbers, could be expected to be more successful than in their first Carpathian campaign.

Still the Russian advance continued, although on June 11, 1916, there was a slight slowing down on account of extensive storms that prevailed along the southern part of the front.

In Galicia, in the region of the villages of Gliadki and Verobieyka, north of Tarnopol, the Austrians attacked repeatedly and furiously, but were repulsed on the morning of the 11th. Farther south, however, near the town of Bobulintze, on the Strypa, fifteen miles north of Buczacz, the Austro-Hungarians, strongly reenforced by Germans, scored a substantial success. They launched a furious counterattack, bringing the Russian assaults to a standstill and even forcing the Muscovite troops to retreat a short distance. According to the German War Office more than 1,300 Russian prisoners were taken.

Simultaneously with this partial relief in the south Field Marshal von Hindenburg began an attack at several points against the Russian right wing and part of the center. He penetrated the czar's lines at two points near Jacobstadt, halfway between Riga and Dvinsk, and at Kochany between Lake Narotch and Dvinsk. At the three other points, in the Riga zone, south of Lake Drisviaty and on the Lassjolda, his attacks broke down under the Russian fire.

Lemberg, Galicia's capital, was now threatened from three sides. Czernowitz, the capital of the Bukowina, was even in a more precarious position. It had been masked by the extreme left wing of the Russian armies and, unless some unexpected turn came to the assistance of the Austrians, its fall was sure to be only a matter of days, or possibly even of hours. All of southern Volhynia had been overrun by the Russians who were then, on the ninth day of their offensive, forty-two miles west of the point from where it had begun in that province.

Northwest of Rojitche, in northwestern Volhynia, after dislodging the Germans, General Brussilov on June 12, 1916, approached the river Stokhod. West of Lutsk he occupied Torchin and continued to press the enemy back.

On the Dniester sector and farther General Lechitsky's troops, having crossed the river after fighting, captured many fortified points and also the town of Zaleszcyky, twenty-five miles northwest of Czernowitz. The village of Jorodenka, ten miles farther, northwest of Zaleszcyky, also was captured.

On the Pruth sector, between Doyan and Niepokoloutz, the Russian troops approached the left bank of the river, near the bridgehead of Czernowitz.

The only point at which the Austrian line held was near Kolki in northern Volhynia, south of the Styr. There attempts by the Russians to cross that river failed and some 2,000 men were captured by the Austro-Hungarians. In the north Field Marshal von Hindenburg's efforts to divert the Russian activities in the south by a general offensive along the Dvina line had not developed beyond increased artillery bombardments which apparently exerted no influence on the movements of the Russian armies in Volhynia, Galicia and the Bukowina.

The only hopeful sign for the fate of the threatened Austro-Hungarian armies was the fact that the daily number of prisoners taken by the Russians gradually seemed to decrease, indicating that the Austrians found it possible by now, if not to withstand the Russian onslaught, at least to save the largest part of their armies. Even at that the Russian General Staff claimed to have captured by June 12, 1916, a total of 1,700 officers and 114,000 men. Inasmuch as it was estimated that the total Austrian forces on the southwestern front at the beginning of the operations were 670,000, of which, according to Russian claims, the losses cannot be less than 200,000, including an estimated 80,000 killed and wounded, the total losses now constituted 30 per cent of the enemy's effectives.

How the news of the continued Russian successes was received in the empire's capital and what, at that time, was expected as the immediate results of this remarkable drive, secondary only to the Austro-German drive of the summer and fall of 1915, are vividly described in the following letter, written from Petrograd on June 13, 1916, by a special correspondent of the London "Times":

"As the successive bulletins recording our unprecedented victories on the southwestern fronts come to hand, the pride and joy of the Russian people are becoming too great for adequate expression. There is an utter absence of noisy demonstrations. The whole nation realizes that the victory is the result of the combined efforts of all classes, which have given the soldiers abundant munitions, and of an admirable organization.

"The remarkable progress in training the reserves since the beginning of this year was primarily responsible for the enormous increase in the efficiency of our armies and the heightening of their morale. The strategy of our southwestern offensive has been seconded by a remarkable improvement in the railways and communications. Last, but not least, it must be noted that the Russian high command long ago recognized that the essential condition of the overthrow of the Austro-German league, so far as this front is concerned, was the completion of the work of disintegration in the Austrian armies, in which Russia has already achieved such wonderful results. At the rate at which they are at present being exterminated it would require many weeks completely to exhaust the military resources of the Dual Empire and to turn the flank of the German position in Poland.

"The consensus of military opinion is inclined to the belief that the Germans will not venture to transfer large reenforcements to the Galician front, as it would require too much time and give the Allies a distinct advantage in other theaters. But as the Germans were obviously bound to do something to save the Austrian army, they are endeavoring to create a diversion north of the Pripet in various directions. The points selected for these efforts are almost equidistant on the right flank of the Riga front, near Jacobstadt, and south of Lake Drisviaty, where the enemy's maximum activity synchronized with General Lechitsky's greatest successes on the southern front....

"On the southwestern front all eyes are now focused on General Lechitsky's rapid advance on Zaleszcyky and Czernowitz. As the official reports show, the Austrians have already blown up a bridge across the Pruth at Mahala, thus indicating that they entertain scant hope of being able to hold Czernowitz, and they may even now be evacuating the city. General Lechitsky's gallant army, which some months ago stormed the important stronghold of Uscieszko on the Dniester, has performed prodigies of valor in its advance during the last few days. The precipitous banks of the Dniester had been converted into one continuous stronghold which appeared impregnable and last December defied all our efforts to overcome the enemy's resistance. In the first few days of the offensive we took one of the principal positions between Okna and Dobronowce, southeast of Zaleszcyky. Dobronowce and the surrounding mountains, which are thickly covered with forests, were regarded by the enemy as a reliable protection against any advance on Czernowitz. The country beyond offers no such opportunities for defense.

"General Brussilov's operations on the flanks of the Austro-German army under Von Linsingen are proceeding with wonderful rapidity. All the efforts of German reenforcements to drive in a counterwedge at Kolki, Rozhishshe and Targowica, at the wings and apex of our Rovno salient, proved ineffectual. On the other hand, we have scored most important successes west of Dubno, capturing the highly important point of Demidovka, marking an advance of twenty miles to the west. Demidovka places us in command of the important forest region of Dubno, which, as its name indicates, is famous for its oak trees. These forests form a natural stronghold, of which the Ikva and the Styr may be compared to immense moats protecting it on two sides. The possession of this valuable base will enable General Brussilov to checkmate any further effort on the part of the enemy to counter our offensive at Targowica, which is situated fifteen miles to the north.

"The valiant troops of our Eighth Army, who have altogether advanced nearly thirty miles into the enemy's position in the direction of Kovel, will doubtless be in a position powerfully to assist the thrust of the troops beyond Tarnopol and join hands with them in the possible event of an advance on Lemberg."

On June 13, 1914, the progress of the Russian armies continued along the entire 250-mile front from the Pripet River to the Rumanian border. The capture of twenty officers, 6,000 men, six cannon, and ten machine guns brought the total, captured by the Russian troops, up to about 120,000 men, 1,720 officers, 130 cannon and 260 machine guns, besides immense quantities of material and munitions.

South of Kovel the Austrians, reenforced by German troops, offered the most determined resistance near the village of Zaturzi halfway between Lutsk and Vladimir-Volynski. Southwest of Dubno, in the direction of Brody and Lemberg, Kozin was stormed by the Russians, who were now only ten miles from the Galician border. To the north of Buczacz, on the right bank of the Strypa, a strong counterattack launched by the Austrians could not prevent the Russians from occupying the western heights in the region of Gaivivonka and Bobulintze, where only two days before the Austrians had been able to drive back their opponents. But the most furious battle of all raged for the possession of Czernowitz. A serious blow was struck to the Austro-Hungarian defenders when the Russians captured the town of Sniatyn, on the Pruth, about twenty miles northwest of Czernowitz, on the Czernowitz-Kolomea-Lemberg railway. This seriously threatened the brave garrison which held the capital of the Bukowina, as it put the Russians in a position where they could sweep southward and cut off the defenders of Czernowitz, if they should hold out to the last. In fact the entire Austro-Hungarian army in the Bukowina was now facing this peril.

The first massed attack against Von Hindenburg's lines since the offensive in the south began was delivered on June 13, 1916, when, after a systematic artillery preparation by the heaviest guns at the Russians' disposal, troops in dense formation launched a furious assault against the Austro-German positions north of Baranovitchy. The attack was repeated six times, but each broke down under the Teuton fire with serious losses to the attackers, who in their retreat were placed under the fire of their own artillery.

Baranovitchy is an important railway intersection of great strategical value and saw some of the fiercest fighting during the Russian retreat in the fall of 1915. It is the converging point of the Brest-Litovsk-Moscow and Vilna-Rovno railways. Sixty-one miles to the west lies Lida, one of the commanding points of the entire railway systems of western Russia.

Again, on June 14, 1916, the number of prisoners in the hands of the Russians was increased by 100 officers and 14,000 men, bringing the grand total up to over 150,000. All along the entire front the Russians pressed their advance, gaining considerable ground, without, however, achieving any success of great importance.

Closer and closer the lines were drawn about Czernowitz, though on June 16, 1916, the city was still reported as held by the Austrians. On that day furious fighting also took place south of Buczacz, where the Russians in vain attempted to cross the Dniester in order to join hands with their forces which were advancing from the north against Czernowitz with Horodenka, on the south bank of the Dniester as a base. To the west of Lutsk in the direction toward Kovel, now apparently the main objective of General Brussilov, the Austro-Hungarians had received strong German reenforcements under General von Linsingen and successfully denied to the Russians a crossing over the Stokhod and Styr Rivers.

June 17, 1916, was a banner day in the calendar of the Russian troops. It brought them once more into possession of the Bukowinian capital, Czernowitz.

Czernowitz is one of the towns whose people have suffered most severely from the fluctuating tide of war.

Its cosmopolitan population, the greater part of whom are Germans, have seen it change hands no less than five times in twenty-one months. The first sweep of the Russian offensive in September, 1914, carried beyond it, but they had to capture it again two months later, when they proceeded to drive the Austrians out of the whole of the Bukowina. By the following February, however, the Austrians, with German troops to help them, were again at its gates, and they forced the Russians to retire beyond the Pruth. For a week the battle raged about the small town of Sudagora, opposite Czernowitz, the seat of a famous dynasty of miracle-working rabbis, but the forces of the Central Powers were in overwhelming numbers, and with the loss of Kolomea—the railway junction forty-five miles to the west, which the Russians were again rapidly approaching—the whole region became untenable and the Russians retired to the frontier.

Czernowitz is a clean and pleasant town of recent date. A century ago it was an insignificant village of 5,000 people. To-day it has several fine buildings, the most conspicuous of which is the Episcopal Palace, with a magnificent reception hall. In one of the squares stands the monument erected in 1875 to commemorate the Austrian occupation of the Bukowina. The population consists for the most part of Germans, Ruthenes, Rumanians, and Poles. Among these are 21,000 Jews and there are also a number of Armenians and gypsies. With all these diverse elements, therefore, the town presents a very varied appearance, and on market days the modern streets are crowded with peasants, attired in their national dress, who mingle with people turned out in the latest fashions of Paris and Vienna.

How violently the Russians assaulted Czernowitz is vividly described in a letter from a correspondent of a German newspaper who was at Czernowitz during this attack.

"The attack began on June 11, 1916. Shells fell incessantly, mostly in the lower quarter of the town and the neighborhood of the station. They caused a terrible panic. Incendiary shells started many fires.

"Austrian artillery replied vigorously. The Russians during the night of June 12, 1916, attempted a surprise attack against the northeast corner defenses, launching a tremendous artillery fire against them and then sending storming columns forward. These were stopped, however, by the defenders, who prevented a crossing of the Pruth, inflicting severe losses upon the Russians.

"The Russian artillery attack on the morning of June 16, 1916, was terrific. It resembled a thousand volcanoes belching fire. The whole town shook. Austrian guns replied with equal intensity. The Russians advanced in sixteen waves and were mown down and defeated. Hundreds were drowned. Russian columns were continually pushed back from the Pruth beyond Sudagora."

Serious, though, this loss was to the Central Powers, they had one consolation left. Before the fall of Czernowitz the Austro-Hungarian forces were able to withdraw and only about 1,000 men fell into Russian captivity. In one respect then the Russians had not gained their point. The Austrian army in the Bukowina was still in the field.

Slowly but steadily the force of Von Hindenburg's offensive in the north increased. On the day on which Czernowitz fell attacks were delivered at many points along the 150-mile line between Dvinsk in the north and Krevo in the south. Some local successes were gained by the Germans, but generally speaking this offensive movement failed in its chief purpose, namely, to lessen the strength of the Russian attack against the Austrian lines.

A more substantial gain was made by the combined German and Austro-Hungarian forces, opposing the Russians west of Lutsk, in order to stop their advance against Kovel. There the Germans drove back the center of General Brussilov's front and captured 3,500 men, 11 officers, some cannon, and 10 machine guns.

On the day of Czernowitz's fall the official English newspaper representative with the Russian armies of General Brussilov secured a highly interesting statement from this Russian general who, by his remarkable success, had so suddenly become one of the most famous figures of the great war.

"The sweeping successes attained by my armies are not the product of chance, or of Austrian weakness, but represent the application of all the lessons which we have learned in two years of bitter warfare against the Germans. In every movement, great or small, that we have made this winter, we have been studying the best methods of handling the new problems which modern warfare presents.

"At the beginning of the war, and especially last summer, we lacked the preparations which the Germans have been making for the past fifty years. Personally I was not discouraged, for my faith in Russian troops and Russian character is an enduring one. I was convinced that, given the munitions, we should do exactly as we have done in the past two weeks.

"The main element of our success was due to the absolute coordination of all the armies involved and the carefully planned harmony with which the various branches of the service supported each other.

"On our entire front the attack began at the same hour and it was impossible for the enemy to shift his troops from one quarter to another, as our attacks were being pressed equally at all points. "The most important fighting has been in the sector between Rovno, and here we have made our greatest advances, which are striking more seriously at the strategy of the whole enemy front in the east.

"If we are able to take Kovel there is reason to believe that the whole eastern front will be obliged to fall back, as Kovel represents a railway center which has been extraordinarily useful for the intercommunications of the Germans and Austrians.

"That this menace is fully realized by the enemy is obvious from the fact that the Germans are supporting this sector with all the available troops that can be rushed up. Some are coming from the west and some from points on the eastern front to the north of us.

"In all of this fighting the Russian infantry has proved itself superb, with a morale which is superior even to that of 1914, when we were sweeping through Galicia for the first time. This is largely due to the fact that the army now represents the feeling of the whole people of Russia, who are united in their desire to carry the war to its final and successful conclusion."

To the question how he had been able to make such huge captures of prisoners the Russian general replied:

"The nature of modern trenches, which makes them with their deep tunnels and maze of communications, so difficult to destroy, renders them a menace to their own defenders once their position is taken in rear or flank, for it is impossible to escape quickly from these elaborate networks of defenses.

"Besides, we have for the first time had sufficient ammunition to enable us to use curtain fire for preventing the enemy from retiring from his positions, save through a scathing zone of shrapnel fire, which renders surrender imperative."[Back to Contents]