SINKING OF THE ARABIC—ANOTHER CRISIS—GERMANY'S DEFENSE AND CONCESSIONS.

The Lusitania issue, after the dispatch to Germany of the third American note of July 21, 1915, was withdrawn from the publicity in which the exchange of diplomatic communications had been made. Note writing having fulfilled its mission in stating the case, an interlude followed devoted to private conversations between the American Ambassador at Berlin and the German Foreign Office and between the German Ambassador at Washington and the State Department. Apparently a way out of the impasse was seen in conferences in the privacy of the chancelleries rather than by negotiations conducted in the light of day on the theory that absorbed public observation and criticism of every stage in the exchanges was not helpful to a settlement. But time did not show that this resort to secrecy smoothed the path of Germany meeting the American demands.

In fact, the ruthless course of the submarine warfare, which the sinking of the Lusitania only momentarily checked, relegated that specific issue to the background, or at least made it only one of a series of indictments by the United States of the entire submarine policy pursued by the Teutonic Powers.

Thirty days after the American Government had warned Germany that any further contravention of American neutral rights at sea would be regarded as an act "deliberately unfriendly," the White Star Atlantic liner, the Arabic, with twenty-nine Americans among her company, was sunk without warning off the south of Ireland by a German submarine. Germany had not responded to the reiterated demands made in the third American note on the Lusitania and the question was impetuously asked in the press: Was the sinking of the Arabic Germany's answer? This view of Germany's second blow at transatlantic liners, made at a time when the Lusitania crisis had only seemingly abated because withdrawn from the public gaze, found its best expression from a pro-German quarter. The "New Yorker Staats-Zeitung" deplored the absence of a reply from the German Government to the third Lusitania note as "most unfortunate," because the subsequent destruction of the Arabic could therefore be held to be a "direct challenge," particularly as reports showed that the liner had been torpedoed without warning and the rescuing of the passengers had been left to "blind chance."

The Arabic was bound from Liverpool to New York, so that the motive for sinking her could not be that advanced by Germany for destroying the Lusitania—that the vessel was carrying war munitions to her enemies. The fact that she was headed for the United States inspired some incensed commentators to make the direct charge that the German submarine commander deliberately aimed at the lives of Americans on board. As elsewhere described, the Arabic was sunk on August 19, 1915, without being first warned by the attacking submarine. Abundant testimony from survivors satisfied the Administration as to this circumstance, in addition to disproving the belief originating from German sources that the liner was being convoyed by a warship, whose presence would deprive her of any right to protection from attack. The Administration was also assured that the liner, contrary to Germany's allegation, did not attempt to ram the submarine or escape from it. Two Americans were among the passengers lost; but this was not the sole issue.

The days immediately following were charged with dangerous undercurrents. The President was silent. Had he not said all there was to be said in the Lusitania notes? But there was no doubt that the press correctly divined what was passing through his mind, and the press said that, short of a satisfactory explanation from Germany, made in a proper spirit, accompanied by a disavowal of the deed, a break in diplomatic relations was inevitable. But the onus was on Germany to speak before the Administration took action, which could not take the form of another protest. The situation had grown beyond the stage of protests. They had already been made. If Germany could not show extenuating circumstances that palliated the sinking of the Arabic, the President must act on his Lusitania warning, or remain silent—must go forward or recede.

This ominous condition of American sentiment was not lost on Germany. It was true the Berlin press affected an apathetic tone in referring to the Arabic, saw nothing calling for perturbation, and, in casting doubt on the accounts of the liner's destruction, hinted that a mine was responsible. But the German Government, wisely informed by Count von Bernstorff on the state of American feeling, knew better than to belittle the situation. Pending the receipt of any report from the submarine commander who sank the Arabic, it charged Ambassador von Bernstorff to ask the American Government to defer judgment.

"The German Government," Count von Bernstorff pleaded, "trusts that the American Government will not take a definite stand after hearing the reports of only one side, which in the opinion of the Imperial Government cannot correspond with the facts, but that a chance be given Germany to be heard equally. Although the Imperial Government does not doubt the good faith of the witnesses whose statements are reported by the newspapers in Europe, it should be borne in mind that these statements are naturally made under excitement, which might easily produce wrong impressions. If Americans should actually have lost their lives, this would naturally be contrary to our intentions. The German Government would deeply regret the fact and beg to tender sincerest sympathies to the American Government."

This statement, made five days after the Arabic's destruction, was viewed as the first ray of hope in the crisis. A disavowal of unfriendly intent was seen in the regrets expressed for the loss of American lives. There was a disposition to credit Germany with cherishing a desire to avert a rupture with the United States and to go to considerable lengths in that endeavor. This impression eased the Washington atmosphere, which had been weighed by the President's determination not to depart from the stand he took in the third Lusitania note, and also by Germany's apparent indifference to its warning, as shown by her pursuit of submarine warfare seemingly regardless of consequences.

What the "facts" were in the sinking of the Arabic to which, according to the German statement, the reports to hand could not correspond, exercised official Washington. As the German Government had not so far heard from the submarine commander of its own acknowledgment, it could not itself be aware of this version of how the Arabic sank. Why Germany was so confident that the reports the Administration accepted were inaccurate was explained on the surmise that she had revised her orders to submarine commanders governing the conduct of their operations. For some time before the sinking of the Arabic the German submarine commanders had been conforming closely to the rules of search and seizure demanded by the United States. The sudden divergence from this procedure in the sinking of the Arabic, according to the accepted reports, implied that the submarine commander had contravened instructions, or could plead justification. Germany was indisposed to believe that the submarine commander had disobeyed orders. But if he had done so, the German Government would give "full satisfaction" to the United States. This assurance came from the Imperial German Chancellor, Dr. von Bethmann-Hollweg, the day after Ambassador von Bernstorff had revealed Germany's conciliatory spirit.

The United States consented to withhold judgment until Germany had presented her side of the case. Meantime Count von Bernstorff urged upon his Government the imperative necessity of making more substantial concessions to the United States on the submarine issue. Another catastrophe such as the sinking of the Lusitania or Arabic, he warned Berlin, would aggravate the situation beyond his control. That Germany recognized the danger was shown by a further declaration from her Imperial Chancellor on August 26, 1915, wherein he endeavored to placate American feeling by declaring that the sinking of the Arabic, if caused by a German submarine, was not a "deliberately unfriendly act," but, if the accepted version of the disaster proved to be true, was "the arbitrary deed of the submarine commander, not only not sanctioned but decidedly condemned by the German Government," and that the latter, being "most anxious to maintain amicable relations with the United States, would express its deep regret and make full reparation." This conditional promise was made in the continued absence of any report from the implicated submarine commander, whose silence became mysterious. The British added to the perplexity by making the unqualified statement that the submarine which sank the Arabic had herself been sunk by a British patrol boat.

While the United States waited significantly for Germany to make the amende honorable, an internal conflict was proceeding in Berlin over the submarine policy. The Arabic crisis had been transferred to Germany by the stand the Chancellor, Dr. von Bethmann-Hollweg, and the Foreign Minister, Herr von Jagow, made for modifying the ruthless conditions under which the German admiralty had pursued the submarine warfare. Grand Admiral von Tirpitz and the extremists opposed any relaxation permitting passenger ships to be warned before being torpedoed or safeguarding the lives of passengers. The chancellor desired to place Germany on record as an observer of international law, and the kaiser faced the task of determining which side should prevail.

Admiral von Tirpitz was generally regarded as the originator of the policy of sinking merchant shipping without heeding the recognized laws of visit and search. "What would America say if Germany declares war on all enemy merchant ships?" he had asked before Germany initiated the submarine methods which caused the destruction of the Lusitania and the Arabic and numerous other craft. His view of the Lusitania issue, as freely expressed in an interview, was that the maintenance of friendly relations with the United States was of far less importance than the continuance of the submarine blockade of British ports, and that the entrance of the United States into the war among Germany's enemies was preferable to acceding to the American demands.

Since the Lusitania disaster the imperial chancellor had been the target of sustained attacks from the Von Tirpitz group, who charged that he was not radical enough and inclined to abandon the extreme aims of German policy. The agitation attained such serious proportions that the National Liberal party issued a statement denying knowledge of any lack of confidence in the Government. Dr. von Bethmann-Hollweg's difficult position in trying to save Germany from international outlawry, however, was not sensibly weakened. Events temporarily showed that the kaiser concurred more in his view than that of the hotspurs. There was a momentary cessation of submarine activity. The chancellor's policy, the keynote of which was: "Keep at peace with the United States," gained the upper hand, and Admiral von Tirpitz grudgingly bowed to the chancellor's contentions, on the condition that his acquiescence must be deemed unofficial; but he held out against any formal disavowal by Germany of the sinking of the Arabic. This attitude was comprehensible, for a disavowal meant a repudiation of his submarine policy. Thus the surrender of the extremists did not go very far; it merely helped to relax the friction between the kaiser's councilors.

The outcome of this agreement was a note (September 1, 1915) from Count von Bernstorff to Secretary Lansing announcing that his instructions concerning Germany's answer to the last American note on the Lusitania contained this passage:

"Liners will not be sunk by our submarines without warning and without safety of the lives of noncombatants, provided the liners do not try to escape or offer resistance."

The German Ambassador added that this policy had been decided on before the Arabic was sunk. Secretary Lansing, commenting upon this abatement of Germany's sea war methods, said: "It appears to be a recognition of the fundamental principles for which we have contended." A settlement of the Lusitania case, however, was deferred until that of the Arabic had been satisfactorily disposed of. The atmosphere was clearer. But Germany was still silent regarding the report of the submarine commander, on whose version of the Arabic's destruction hinged the question whether Germany would disavow his act. The report that the submarine had been sunk revived in London, but the British admiralty maintained an impenetrable silence regarding its truth or falsehood. The circumstantial story was that the submarine later sighted a cattle boat, and was engaged in shelling it when a British patrol boat appeared and, opening fire, sank the submarine with its crew except two or three survivors. Hence London concluded that in the disappearance of the submarine lay Germany's reason for her readiness to climb down to the United States on the Arabic controversy.

On September 7, 1915, nineteen days after the Arabic was sunk, Germany appeared to disprove this story of furnishing a report to the American Government giving the submarine commander's account of the sinking. This delay was in contrast to the promptitude with which the German Government had officially announced the sinking of the Lusitania. The British openly charged that Germany could not have heard from the submarine commander, for the sufficient reason, they iterated, that he was drowned with his craft, and that the German Government, waiting in vain for him to report, had resorted to "manufacturing" a report to conform with its preconceived theories of the Arabic's destruction. This, however, remained an unsolved press controversy in face of the British admiralty's silence. The American Government gave no indication that it took cognizance of the charge, or that the British admiralty had privately enlightened it as to whether it had any real basis. Hence Germany's report officially stood unquestioned.

The defense of Germany was that before sighting the Arabic the submarine commander had stopped the British steamer Dunsley and was about to sink her by gunfire, after the crew had left the vessel, when the Arabic appeared, headed directly toward the submarine. From the Arabic's movements the commander became convinced that the liner intended to attack and ram his submarine; whereupon, to forestall such an attack, he ordered the submarine to dive, and fired a torpedo at the Arabic. After doing so he had convinced himself that the people on board were being rescued in fifteen boats.

"According to his instructions," the German report continued, "the commander was not allowed to attack the Arabic without warning and without saving the passengers' lives unless the ship attempted to escape or offered resistance. He was forced, however, to conclude from the attendant circumstances that the Arabic planned a violent attack on the submarine.

"The German Government most deeply regrets that lives were lost through the action of the commander. It particularly expresses this regret to the Government of the United States on account of the death of American citizens.

"The German Government is unable, however, to acknowledge any obligation to grant indemnity in the matter, even if the commander should have been mistaken as to the aggressive intentions of the Arabic.

"If it should prove to be the case that it is impossible for the German and American Governments to reach a harmonious opinion on this point, the German Government would be prepared to submit the difference of opinion, as being a question of international law, to The Hague Tribunal for arbitration, pursuant to Article 38 of The Hague Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes.

"In so doing it assumes that, as a matter of course, the arbitral decision shall not be admitted to have the importance of a general decision on the permissibility or the converse under international law of German submarine warfare."

Here Germany affirmed that submarine commanders were forbidden to attack liners without warning and safeguarding passengers' lives, but that commanders could justifiably disregard this precaution if they deemed that a vessel's movements, designedly or otherwise, jeopardized the safety of the attacking submarine. On this reasoning a submarine commander could excuse a wanton act on the plea of self-defense, which Germany appeared eager to accept, whether the need of self-defense was actual or fancied. The Washington Government declined to consent to clothing a submarine commander with the discretionary power of determining whether a vessel should be sunk on sight because of movements he considered suspicious. The German Government would absolve him from blame and repudiate any obligation to grant indemnity, even if the commander was mistaken in attributing aggressive intentions in a vessel's movements. Germany's precept, as laid down by Count von Bernstorff in his note of September 1, 1915, and Germany's practice, as illustrated by the foregoing defense for the sinking of the Arabic, were thus widely divergent.

The situation receded to the Lusitania stage. Ambassador von Bernstorff's assurances as to warning and safety to passengers were negatived by the new condition that submarine commanders could disregard instructions, whether right or wrong, in doing so. The Administration accepted as convincing the abundant evidence before it that the Arabic made no attempt to ram the submarine. According to this testimony, no one on board the Arabic even saw the submarine; only the torpedo was seen coming from the direction of the sinking Dunsley, behind which, it was supposed, the submarine had been screened when the Arabic came in view, whereupon it submerged. Moreover, the Arabic was struck astern from a direction which showed that the submarine was at right angles to her. If the Arabic had been heading toward the submarine with the intention of ramming it, the torpedo should have struck her at the bow. But the Arabic testimony was that the submarine was invisible.

Germany's explanation was so unsatisfactory, so discredited by the overwhelming evidence of the Arabic survivors, as well as being qualified by an indirect recognition of the possibility that the submarine commander might have erred, that the question of severing diplomatic relations again became imminent. A resort to arbitration, as proposed by Germany, with the nullifying condition that any decision of a Hague tribunal was not to affect Germany's conduct of submarine warfare, was not deemed worthy of serious consideration. The question now was whether, after the pledge given by Count von Bernstorff, the German Government intended to allow submarine commanders a broad discretion in deciding the circumstances under which passenger ships may be torpedoed. The ambassador was informed of the Administration's conviction that the torpedoing of the Arabic could not have been a mistake, justified or unjustified. Germany's unreadiness to disavow responsibility for the act of the submarine commander as "arbitrary" and "unsanctioned," to quote the German Chancellor, showed that she accepted her submarine commander's purported report, not the Arabic testimony. In this impasse the Administration was credited with being almost ready to break off relations with Germany, but deferred doing so until the German Government had studied the evidence on which the American Government had decided that the submarine commander was solely to blame.

In the negotiations which followed, the Arabic issue went the way of the unsettled Lusitania case by its withdrawal from being threshed out in public. The exchange of notes was abandoned for pourparlers, which were resorted to as seeming to afford a more supple means of arriving at a settlement. Germany was afforded an opportunity of privately establishing her good faith—which was in serious question—by reconciling her acts on the seas with her pledge not to attack passenger vessels without warning. No official disclosure was made to enlighten a forgetful public as to the extent to which she had done so in the negotiations which occupied the American and German Governments throughout September, 1915. But a communication from Count von Bernstorff to Secretary Lansing, which passed October 2, 1915, was permitted to be revealed acknowledging that the submarine commander was mistaken in believing that the Arabic intended to ram his vessel, and disavowing the act. The Von Bernstorff note contained this passage: "The order issued by His Majesty the Emperor to the commanders of the German submarines, of which I notified you on a similar occasion, has been so stringent that the recurrence of incidents similar to the Arabic case is considered out of the question."

The United States had thus brought Germany to an admission that the sinking of the liner was unjustified. This important point gained, the issue was removed from the acute stage at which it had dangerously lingered, and only left undetermined the question of indemnity to be paid by Germany to the Arabic victims.

It cleared the diplomatic decks sufficiently to enable the deferred negotiations on the Lusitania dispute to be resumed; but these had made little headway when both the Lusitania and Arabic issues were overshadowed by the sinking of the Ancona.[Back to Contents]