SUMMARY OF POLITICAL HISTORY

From the preceding narration of the political histories of Europe's nations during the last half century there stand out very clearly two facts. All the bigger countries and even one or two of the smaller ones displayed a strong desire for expansion and the gratification of this desire resulted in a crude form of international cooperation between various groups of nations, crude because each separate nation at all times was guided primarily by its own interests and demanded cooperation on the part of some other nation or nations much more readily than it was willing to grant cooperation to its ally or allies.

The motive of this desire for expansion, it is true, was in all cases chiefly an economic need. But the very fact that the various efforts at expansion, at least in their early stages, found almost always popular approval, shows that there usually was a secondary motive, a desire for aggrandizement. For it is very rare, indeed, that public opinion possesses sufficient foresight to either appreciate or be guided by economic necessities, while undertakings which can be made to appeal to the sentiments of jealousy, of nationalism, and of rivalry, readily find public support. The second of these—nationalism—especially was reawakened and in many an instance grew into chauvinism, endangering frequently the peace of the world. This, in a way, was very remarkable; for hand in hand with the increase of nationalism went an increase of internationalism to a degree that never before had been achieved in the history of the world. Indeed, for a considerable period it looked as if the world nations were rapidly approaching that happy state when war would be unnecessary because a peaceful method of adjusting international difficulties had been found and had been universally adopted. Whether the Great War of 1914 has destroyed all that was accomplished in the years preceding to make peace lasting, or whether it was only one of the obstacles in the path of this revolutionary undertaking, remains to be seen.

The international cooperation of which we have just spoken was, of course, nothing new. For treaties have been signed and alliances have been concluded between nations ever since they have been developed far enough to be capable of definite, deliberate political efforts. But never before have treaties and alliances been so plentiful or gone so far, and only rarely have they resulted in such a definite alignment of the European nations into two groups. The inception of this policy the world owes to the great modern German statesman, Bismarck. It was through his efforts that the Triple Alliance was created soon after the Franco-Prussian War and after the foundation of the new German Empire which chose as its companions Austria-Hungary and Italy. That Bismarck built well then is clearly shown by the wonderful progress that Germany especially has been able to make since the Triple Alliance was founded and insured European peace for a long period of years. But that either he did not build well enough for all exigencies or else that his successors were not as capable as he, is shown equally clearly by the fact that at the most crucial moment in Germany's modern history one member of the Triple Alliance, Italy, deserted. The second group of European nations, in a way, was the logical result of the first, for the latter, as it were, left high and dry on the sea of international cooperation the three powerful countries of England, France, and Russia. At the time of the formation of the Triple Alliance France, of course, was disabled through its defeat by Germany to such an extent that alliances were, at least temporarily, out of the question. Its wonderfully quick recovery soon changed that, however, and resulted in very definite efforts on the part of French statesmen to form a defensive alliance which would insure France from any aggressiveness on the part of the Triple Alliance. This finally brought about the Franco-Russian Alliance. That Russia was available then was due to the fact that Germany's old intimacy with its eastern neighbor had received a serious setback when it chose Austria as its ally. For, though Austria and Russia had once been friends and for a short time even allies, conditions had changed and in modern times the interests of the two countries had become so conflicting that an alliance was entirely out of the question.

After France and Russia had gotten together it was not long before England found it necessary to choose between these two international groups. That in spite of its close racial relation to the Germanic countries it preferred the Gallo-Slavic combination, was due to a number of reasons. In the first place it was found easier to adjust whatever conflicts there were between England on the one side and France and Russia on the other than those in existence between England and Germany. In the second place English modern culture was clearly more interested in and more influenced by French than by German achievements. And last, but not least, an alliance between Germany and England became impossible, because in such an alliance neither country would have gracefully yielded the leadership to the other, whereas in an Anglo-Franco-Russian concert all England had to do was to signify its willingness to join and the leadership was England's without question or contest. It was England, then, which gave up its international isolation later than any of the others. But it did not lose thereby; for just as its Franco-Russian alliance assured to it cooperation against the Triple Alliance, if such cooperation was needed, it secured to itself protection for its immense Far Eastern interests by an alliance with the new world power of the Far East, Japan.

The outbreak of the war of 1914, then, saw these two great groups of nations: The Triple Alliance of Germany, Austria-Hungary and Italy, and the Quadruple Entente of England, France, Russia and Japan. To foretell the result of the gigantic struggle in international relations is obviously impossible. Its end may bring a revival of internationalism on a greater scale than ever before, it may result in a new and severe separatism, it may cause a rearrangement of the present alliances or it may simply mean a return to the status quo of August, 1914.[Back to Contents]