Lord Randolph Churchill :: CHAPTER XII THE TWENTY-SIXTH OF JANUARY

CHAPTER XII THE TWENTY-SIXTH OF JANUARY

‘When it was said that the noble lord, the member for Paddington, had not declared a policy, he pointed, and he was justified in pointing, not to a sentence, nor even to a phrase, but to a date, and he said, "Our policy is the 26th of January."’—Speech of Mr. Gladstone, Second Reading Government of Ireland Bill, May 10, 1886.

ACCORDING to Mr. Morley, the month that followed the General Election was passed by Mr. Gladstone ‘in depth of meditation.’ The questions which he revolved were vast and grave. Important and even vital factors in their decision were hid from him. He saw that the Liberal party was ripe for schism. He faced the united demand of Nationalist Ireland. He knew that the balance of power was held by Mr. Parnell. But he could not know whether the Government would meet Parliament or not; whether they wanted to be dismissed or not; whether they would seek to gain Whig and Liberal support, or would try to preserve the combination which had placed them in power; nor what, in the last alternative, was the Irish policy Ministers would be prepared to offer or parties disposed to accept. Yet time was short and the country waited tip-toe on his deliberations.

The suspense was not prolonged. The results of the elections could not be estimated till after November 30 and were not determined until another week had passed. But on December 17, after ten days of whisperings and rumour, a public announcement of his Home Rule scheme, apparently authentic in character and circumstantial in detail, appeared simultaneously in Liberal and Conservative papers. Mr. Gladstone was prompt to repudiate, as a mere ‘speculation’ upon his opinions, this premature and unfortunate disclosure. But the next day he was writing to Lord Hartington, who had asked for explanations, a frank and full account of his ‘opinions and ideas,’ which shows how closely newspaper assertion corresponded with the workings of his mind. The process by which his conversion was effected, has been at length laid bare. His internal loathing of the Coercive measures he had been forced to impose during the past five years; his suspicion and entire misconception of the cold-blooded manoevres by which his Government had been overturned; his hope of repairing, remoulding and consolidating the great party instrument which he had directed so long; the desire of an ‘old Parliamentary hand’ to win the game; the dream of a sun-lit Ireland, loyal because it was free, prosperous and privileged because it was loyal—the crowning glory of an old man’s life—all find their place in that immense decision. And then the whole mass of resolve, ponderously advancing, drawing into its movement all that learning and fancy could supply, gathering in its progress the growing momentum of enthusiasm, wrenching and razing all barriers from its path, was finally precipitated like an avalanche upon a startled world! All has been set forth. What communications Mr. Gladstone made to his colleagues; how he addressed himself to Lord Granville, to Lord Spencer, to Lord Hartington, to Mr. Chamberlain; and how he was variously met, have now become matters of published fact. An authoritative analysis of the workings of his mind has been published and may be checked or extended by a score of conversations, letters and chance remarks, all carefully recorded. Judgment may be formed of the part he played, upon evidence perhaps more full and accurate than attaches to any similar transaction. But a veil of mystery and even suspicion still hangs over the inner councils of Lord Salisbury’s Government. What were the leaders of the Conservative party thinking about during these anxious weeks? What plans did they resolve, what difficulties did they face within the secrecy of the Cabinet? Their final decision was declared on January 26. But what alternatives were they weighing meanwhile in conclave or consultation? How far were they prepared to go in satisfaction of Irish demands? What purpose lay behind Lord Randolph Churchill’s silence at Sheffield or lurked in Lord Carnarvon’s ‘empty house’? Upon these much-disputed matters it may now be possible to cast some light.

Lord Randolph’s view of the policy which the Conservative party should pursue in Irish matters is described with the utmost candour in a letter which he had written to a friend of mark before the result of the General Election was known:—

Private.

2 Connaught Place, W.: October 14, 1885.

I have no objection to Sexton and Healy knowing the deliberate intention of the Government on the subject of Irish Education; but it would not do for the letter or the communication to be made public, for the effect of publicity on Lancashire might be unfortunate and might cripple the good intentions of Her Majesty’s Government.

...It is the Bishops entirely to whom I look in the future to turn, to mitigate or to postpone the Home Rule onslaught. Let us only be enabled to occupy a year with the Education Question. By that time, I am certain, Parnell’s party will have become seriously disintegrated. Personal jealousies, Government influences, Davitt and Fenian intrigues will all be at work on the devoted band of eighty: and the Bishops, who in their hearts hate Parnell and don’t care a scrap for Home Rule, having safely acquired control of Irish education, will, according to my calculation, complete the rout.

That is my policy, and I know that it is sound and good, and the only possible Tory policy. It hinges on acquiring the confidence and friendship of the Bishops; but if you go in for their mortal foes the Jesuits on the one hand, and their mortal foes the anti-clerical Nationalists on the other, for the purpose of humiliating and beating back Archbishop Walsh and his colleagues, this policy will be shattered.... My own opinion is that if you approach the Archbishop through proper channels, if you deal in friendly remonstrances and in attractive assurances, ... the tremendous force of the Catholic Church will gradually and insensibly come over to the side of the Tory party.

Lord Randolph furthermore openly avowed and defended his Irish policy during these months—in its general scope—on March 4, 1886, in the House of Commons after the election and after the accession to power of Mr. Gladstone’s Home Rule Government. ‘I am not going to deny,’ he said, ‘that at one time I had an idea that the Tory party might co-operate with the Irish party. I have often worked with Irish members. I hope to be able to do so again. I have never concealed in the last Parliament that I thought it possible that on many Irish subjects the Tory party might co-operate with the Irish National party.... It always appeared to me that the Tory party were well qualified to deal with many questions of Irish interest in a manner agreeable to the Irish people and not in the least dangerous to the general welfare of the British Empire. I particularly allude to the question of education and to the question of the land. Judging by past history, I imagined that the cry of Repeal might be raised as strongly as ever and that Irish members might say again: "Live or die, sink or swim, we go for Repeal." Still, I imagined that might merely turn out to be a sentiment for keeping together a powerful political party; and that, if Repeal were shown to be absolutely against the will of the Imperial Parliament, the policy of Repeal would be dropped.’ Whatever may be thought of the merits of such a policy, there is nothing disingenuous or obscure either in its private handling or its public declaration.

Lord Randolph’s Irish opinions were not altered by the verdict of the constituencies. His natural delight at the Tory victories in the boroughs led him to form a more sanguine estimate of the mood of the counties than the event sustained. But even his highest anticipations did not place the number of Conservative members at more than 300; and his mind turned at once towards a Whig coalition:—

Lord Randolph Churchill to Lord Salisbury.

2 Connaught Place, W.: November 29, 1885.

Dear Lord Salisbury,— ...If we have any luck this week we ought to number 300 in the House.

I saw Sir Erskine May yesterday—very grumpy. He said the first trial of strength would be a vote of want of confidence. I said that did not follow; that the first trial of strength in a new Parliament often took place on the election of a Speaker. He said: ‘What, oppose Mr. Peel!’ I intimated that, though we were very fond of Peel, he had no prescriptive possession of the Chair, and that his election would require something in the nature of a quid pro quo. I also gave him to understand that we have quarrelled with the Irish, and, having put these and various other false ideas into his head, left him in a state of exasperated perplexity.

I hope you may be a little in town next week, for the future seems to require the most careful consideration before any policy is submitted to the collective luminosity of the Cabinet. I think you ought to negotiate with the other side, giving Hartington India, Goschen Home Office and Rosebery Scotch Office. You will never get Whig support as long as I am in the Government, and Whig support you must have. I should like to contribute effectively to your getting it, for my curiosity as to the internal and mysterious mechanism of Government is completely satiated. Very indifferent health makes me look forward irresistibly to idleness regained. If you wanted another bait for the Whigs, ——’s elevation to the Lords might supply it, for I hear on the very best authority that chaos and the —— Office are at present indistinguishable. I believe that by some process of this kind you could institute a Government which would keep the Parnellites and Radicals at bay for years; and, after all, that is what must be arrived at.

Yours most sincerely,
Randolph S. Churchill.

Lord Salisbury’s answer reads strangely in the light of after-events:—

November 30, 1885.

My dear Randolph,—I am afraid your patriotic offer of giving place to Goschen for the sake of making a coalition will be of little avail. They hate me as much as they hate you—and if retirements are required for the sake of repose and Whig combinations I shall claim to retire with you in both respects.

The time for a coalition has not come yet—nor will, so long as the G.O.M. is to the fore. But I don’t expect we shall be long in office this time. I must try and see you some time this week about our future measures. Are you staying in town? I have not yet had time to read your Burma papers, but will send them you back, with any comments that occur to me, when I have.

Yours very truly,
Salisbury.

Lord Randolph, however, held tenaciously to the idea of a coalition. The fact that the accession of Lord Hartington to the leadership of the House would block his own path effectively and that the acceptance of office by important Whig Ministers must diminish his personal influence, does not seem to have affected this self-seeking and unscrupulous man; and about December 4 or 5 he sent the Prime Minister a formal and elaborate account of his views, which is for many reasons worthy of attention:—

MEMORANDUM.[46]

Assume that the supporters of the Government will number 300.

Under ordinary circumstances Government would probably resign at once, there being a clear majority of seventy against them. The 370 opponents of the Government are so singularly disunited that there is no reason to suppose the Government need be placed in a minority, and there is every reason to suppose that no other Government could command so large a following as the present Government.

Constitution of the 370 Opponents.

It is almost certain that there are in this number some twenty-five members who without doing any violence to their political principles would habitually support the Government. It may be reckoned that 200 will follow the lead of Lord Hartington as long as he remains leader of the Liberal Opposition. The party more immediately under the control of Messrs. Chamberlain, Dilke, Morley and Labouchere may be estimated at sixty-five votes. There remain eighty Nationalists under the leadership of Mr. Parnell.

It is certain that no Vote of Censure or of Want of Confidence will be moved at the assembling of Parliament because—

1. Neither Mr. Gladstone, nor Lord Hartington, nor Mr. Chamberlain could form a Government.

2. Without the support of the eighty Nationalists a Vote, of Censure or otherwise, would be heavily defeated.

3. The support of the Nationalists would demand a heavier price than any large portion of the Liberal party would be prepared to pay.

On what occasion can a trial of party strength arise?

1. On the election of Speaker.

2. On the question of Parliamentary Oath.

Speakership.

The Irish are hostile to Mr. Peel.

The Whigs equally strong in his favour. The Government can displace Mr. Peel with the help of the Irish. The Whigs will be bitterly alienated. On the other hand, the Government can support Mr. Peel and carry his election. The Irish will find their revenge in voting for Mr. Bradlaugh. The triumph of Mr. Bradlaugh would be a shaking blow to the Tory Government and party. The alienation of the Whigs by the defeat of Mr. Peel would certainly in the course of a few weeks or months destroy the Government.

Which course to choose?

Seeing that the Irish support can never be other than momentary, seeing that by no possibility can [that] support be clothed with any elements of stability, seeing that the alienation of the Whigs from the Government must lead to great evils, seeing that Whig support, if attained, is honourable, stable, and natural, in my own mind I pronounce for the re-election of Mr. Peel and for running the risk of the triumph for Mr. Bradlaugh.

We have proceeded thus far.

The Whigs will not be displeased by the election of Mr. Peel. The Whigs will not be indignant at the seating of Mr. Bradlaugh. Is it possible to convert this negative frame of mind of non-hostility into one of positive co-operation?

Three methods suggest themselves.

1. The offer of places in the Government.

2. The production of a large, genuine and liberal programme.

3. After such a programme has been produced and proceeded with satisfactorily, the renewal of the offer of places in the Government.

I think that all these three methods should be honestly tried in their order. The first must be done with liberality. The leading members of the Whig party who should be offered places in the Government are Lord Hartington (with the lead of the House of Commons), Mr. Goschen, Lord Rosebery and Sir Henry James.

I do not imagine that these offers would be now accepted. Nevertheless the fact that they have been honestly made may before long be a powerful weapon in the hands of Lord Salisbury, either as influencing his own party or the public. The making of these offers in a generous spirit cannot possibly do harm.

II. THE PROGRAMME.

On foreign questions there does not at present appear to be any difference of opinion, nor on colonial questions. Attention may be concentrated on domestic questions. I suggest that the programme should include:—

1. Parliamentary Procedure	—Executive.
2. Departmental Reform
3. Indian Inquiries. (H. of C. Committee)
4. Education Inquiries. (Royal Commission)
5. Local Government	—Legislative.
6. Land Laws
7. University (Ireland) Education
8. Codification of Criminal Law

Parliamentary Procedure.

The following measures might be informally submitted to the leaders of parties in the House of Commons:—

A. The Resort to Autumn Sessions.—The session at present is too long and too short—too long for a consecutive session; too short for the decent and efficient transaction of executive, financial and legislative business.

If this is granted, the following reform suggests itself:—

That Parliament should meet not later than the first week in February, and, with the usual Easter and Whitsuntide holidays, should continue in session not later than the first week in August. That an adjournment should then take place to a period not later than the second week in October, and that the annual session should formally be brought to an end by prorogation not later than the first week in December.

B. The Alteration of Hours of Business.—That the House should meet four days in the week at 1 P.M., adjourn from 7 P.M., and rise at midnight.

C. ClÔture.—That, in addition to existing regulations, it shall be within the right of the Minister to demand a division on the subject under discussion a quarter of an hour before the adjournment of or rising of the House.

D. Questions.—That the Speaker should appoint a Committee of three, not being Privy Councillors, who shall decide what questions can be answered in the House, and which in the votes; and that no question shall be put without notice, other than explanatory questions, except by the leave of the House on the demand of 100 members.

E. Adjournment, Motion for.—That the existing rule be altered, substituting the number 100 members for the present number 40.

F. That Grand Committees deal with the report stage of any Bill referred, as well as with Committee stage; and that all Bills be referred to Grand Committees after second reading.

G. That the bulk of private business relating to local development and local enterprise be transferred to local boards whose proceedings must be sanctioned by provisional orders.

Departmental Reform.—That Committees of the House of Commons be appointed to examine and report upon the constitution, staff, work performed, comparative cost of all public departments, with a view to the effecting of economies and the rearrangement of salaries, promotions and retirements.

Indian Inquiry.—This has been agreed upon.

Elementary Education Inquiry.—This requires no further notice.

Legislative.

Local Government.—Two essentials: (1) purely popular election by ratepayers; (2) large and liberal measure of executive and local legislative powers. Workhouse management need not be touched, nor education arrangements. But all Quarter Sessions business, all sanitary matters, registration of votes, survey of land and registration of titles should be among the duties of the local boards. Also powers might be given, as in Ireland, to local boards to advance money on security of rates for purchasers of small holdings and allotments.

Land Laws, Reform of.

1. Abolition of primogeniture in cases of intestacy.

2. Compulsory registration of title.

3. Enfranchisement of future leaseholds.

4. Enfranchisement of copyholders.

5. Enfranchisement of lands held in mortmain.

University (Ireland) Education.

This should take the form of—

1. The transference of Cork College to a Catholic board of management.

2. The endowment of the Catholic University College in Dublin.

3. The establishment of a Catholic College in Armagh.

4. The transference of the Belfast College to a Presbyterian board of management.

Codification of and Reform of Criminal Law.

This can never be attained if it is left to the action of Parliament entirely. The procedure suggested is:—

1. The proposing and carrying of certain general resolutions through both Houses.

2. The appointment by statute of jurisconsults with full power under aforesaid resolutions to codify; and

3. That the code as drawn shall, after lying on the table of either House for six months, become the criminal code of the United Kingdom.

This, as above, is my second method for attracting Parliamentary support from the ranks of the nominal Opposition. Should this programme, or one more or less closely analogous to it, be introduced, generously received by the bulk of the Whigs and honestly supported, a further offer of places in the Government might with advantage be made.

‘The success of foregoing,’ concluded Lord Randolph, ‘turns upon Ireland. I assume two facts:

‘1. That Coercion is impossible now.

‘2. That anything in the nature of an Irish Parliament is impossible always.

‘Similarity of treatment between England and Ireland in respect of Local Government:

‘Liberality of grants from Treasury towards Irish objects:

‘Concession to the Roman Catholic hierarchy on education questions:

‘These are the main lines of a policy towards Ireland which will secure a great amount of Parliamentary and public concurrence and will, if vigorously and boldly followed, bring about inevitably the disintegration of Mr. Parnell’s party. The great size of this party is its chief danger. Its members are open to various influences—jealousy of each other and of Parnell; want of funds; Ministerial influences, priestly influences; and last, but not least, the capricious, unstable and to some extent treacherous character of the Irish nature. If that party is boldly dealt with at the outset it will soon dissolve. I do not consider that the cry for an Irish Parliament now need be more dangerous than was the cry for Repeal in the days of O’Connell. As that latter danger altogether disappeared, so may this present danger if the Government is strong in Parliament, undivided in council and unwavering in action.

‘I wish to express my firm conviction and belief that if the general spirit of this Memorandum could be acted up to, the Queen’s Government might well be carried on with dignity and efficiency, and the Parliament will have every reasonable chance of running a normal course and of being the means of benefit to the people.’

Lord Salisbury did not answer until the 9th:—

Private.

Foreign Office: December 9, 1885.

My dear Randolph,—Lord Melbourne used to say that if you only would let a letter alone, it would answer itself. Your very interesting memorandum is not quite in that condition: but some important parts of it have been answered by events. After Hartington’s speech of Saturday, there can be no longer any question of offering office just yet to the Moderate Liberals; and, therefore, no question of your or my resigning to facilitate that operation. He evidently said what he did to prevent his friends from suspecting him of any intention, under any circumstances, to join us. His resolves are not eternal, but he has effectually debarred himself from any such course until some little time has passed or something new has happened. Then, again, I don’t think the Irish will expect us to upset the Speaker; but, if they did, I quite agree with you in thinking that it would be poor policy to do so.

But we shall have to make a Queen’s Speech—at least, I can hardly imagine the Cabinet resolving on an immediate resignation. It would be deliberately excusing the other side from the necessity of showing their hand.

In making this Queen’s Speech I entirely agree that our leaning must be to the Moderate Liberals, and that we can have nothing to do with any advances towards the Home Rulers. The latter course would be contrary to our convictions and our pledges, and would be quite fatal to the cohesion of our party.

But in leaning towards the Moderate Liberals we should take note of the fact that the moment for bargaining with them has not yet come. Whenever it does come, two results will follow: (1) Our own people will recognise the political necessity of admitting a somewhat stronger ingredient of Liberal policy into our measures, and (2) the Moderate Liberals will require some such concession as a condition of their joining us and as a proof to their own friends that they have not been guilty of any apostasy in so doing. That being so, the extra tinge of Liberalism in our policy will be part of the bargain when it comes, and must not be given away before that time comes. If we are too free with our cash now, we shall have no money to go to market with when the market is open.

In this view I should offer one or two suggestions in revisal of your programme. The abolition of primogeniture is in itself of no importance except on strategic grounds—it is not worth the trouble of resistance. But it is a bit of a flag. The concession would be distasteful to a certain number of our people now, and it might be acceptable as a wedding-present to the Moderate Liberals whenever the Conservative party leads them to the altar. I would not proffer it, therefore, now; though, if carried against us, I should make no serious fight over it.

The proposition of Leasehold Enfranchisement in the future requires more thrashing out. I doubt whether it would effect your object, which is that more occupiers should be owners of the houses they inhabit. I quite agree in the object. I should be more disposed to follow the Irish precedent and give local authorities the power of advancing (on the security of the tenement) some large fraction of its value at low interest, limiting the advance to cases where the occupier was owner of the whole lease—and, of course, confining it to voluntary purchase. This for existing leaseholds. For future buildings the most effective plan would be to allow exemption from the rates and house tax for five years in all cases where the occupier was also the owner. (3) With respect to Local Government, I admit that a general ratepaying franchise may be difficult to avoid; and, on the whole, I think the Local Government Bill should be mentioned in the Queen’s Speech. But I should mention in the same sentence, and as part of the same subject, a London Local Government Bill, which might be drawn in a very popular manner. The multiplication of municipalities—say eight or nine—would please the local leaders, who hope to figure in them and become Mayors. I should introduce this before the big Local Government Bill. If we are turned out, we shall be able to fight the question better for not having shown our hand.

I should be disposed—subject to counsel—to introduce a Church Reform Bill giving an easy method for getting rid of criminous clergy, and perhaps also of incompetent clergy; but that craves wary walking. Then a Bill for making the sale of all corporate land easy; a Bill to enable marriages to take place in Dissenting chapels without the presence of the Registrar; and, perhaps, a Bill for dealing with the Scotch marriage law, but that is doubtful. With respect to the other articles of your programme—such as Parliamentary Procedure, Criminal Code, and Roman Catholic Education—I need say nothing, because I generally agree with you. I have inflicted on you an abominably long letter, but I thought it better to put my thoughts before you....

Lord Randolph replied:—

India Office: December 9, 1885.

Dear Lord Salisbury,—It will be a great pleasure to me to wait upon you to-morrow afternoon at three o’clock at the Foreign Office.

It is very kind of you writing to me at such length; but as this will require no answer, other than what you may give in conversation to-morrow, I venture a few additional observations.

As to offer of places to Whigs.

I can imagine a crisis supervening, to deal with which might require heroic measures and a great appeal to your followers in both Houses of Parliament for confidence and support. Under such circumstances the fact of the offer having been made and sulkily or arrogantly refused would be of great moral value to you. A proper recognition of two leading features of the situation seems to me almost to compel you to make an attempt now at such a negotiation, even though you may be certain that it will fail:—

1. The fact that your Government is in a minority in the House of Commons.

2. The division in the Opposition, so glaringly and so recently shown by Mr. Chamberlain’s speech at Leicester and Lord Hartington’s in Derbyshire.

I submit with great deference that, your task being to carry on the Queen’s Government, it is incumbent upon you to take advantage of every apparent circumstance which may be made to contribute to the efficiency and solidity of the Government; nor ought you, under such grave conditions as now exist, to shrink unduly from any reasonable sacrifice of friends or colleagues which might enable you honourably to attain the end in view. Having put your hand to the plough under the uninviting conditions of June last, it is hardly possible to look back, or to act as if the responsibility for Government was not upon you.

It is very pleasant to me to learn that my suggestions with regard to Parliamentary Procedure, R.C. University Ireland, Education, and criminal law reform and codification meet with your general concurrence; and that being so, I allow myself to risk a few arguments which seem to me to militate somewhat against the views expressed in your letter on the question of the programme generally, and in particular the questions of Local Government and Land Law reform.

If I apprehended your meaning rightly, you would make your programme rather rigidly orthodox Tory, with a view of expanding it into Whig heresy when the time for a fusion should seem to have arrived. Now I hold very strongly that in that case the moment for a fusion will never arrive. If the Newport programme is not at once presented to Parliament in a large and generous measure, the Whigs will be justified in their contention that it did not signify real progressive legislation—that they were right and discriminating when they mocked at it. That has been Lord Hartington’s cry all along, which he reiterated with emphasis last Saturday. The difference between the Newport programme and the concrete portions of the Midlothian address was not easy to be distinguished, and I doubt its existence. That being so, if you produce the former, without timidity, skimping, paring, or scraping, and if the Whigs turn you out, obviously their motive is office, and office only. The country will not be deceived or edified by such purely party manoeuvres. And as by your administrative record, so with your legislative programme, you will have laid up for yourself treasure in the constituencies, you will have cast bread upon the waters which you will find after many days.

This is indubitably the lesson of 1835.

I do urge as strongly as I may that you should decide in your mind how far you can go in legislation—not under Whig pressure, not with a view solely of gaining Whigs, but solely with a view of what appears to be best for the country without infringement of any great Tory principle; and that, having so decided, you should offer the result to Parliament without delay, without stint, without qualification, and with all confidence. It is, I am convinced, by ‘showing your hand,’ by showing how many good trumps you have in it, that you will gain support—if not immediate, at any rate in the near future. It is by hiding your hand—by giving cause for the belief, or ground for the accusation, that it is a poor hand and that you have no trumps, that you will lose support now and make it most difficult to gain later. The boroughs have gone for you so strongly because they believe in the fulness and genuineness of the Newport programme. Our task should be to keep the boroughs, as well as to win the counties; this can only be done by an active progressive—I risk the word, a democratic—policy, a casting-off and a burning of those old, worn-out aristocratic and class garments from which the Derby-Dizzy lot, with their following of county families, could never, or never cared to, extricate themselves.

This being so, in my mind, I find the suggested postponement of rural Local Government a course open to the deepest suspicion; the preference given to London government an error in tactics of the largest kind. No one in the country, or in London either, cares a damn about a London municipality, nor would many municipalities attract them. But county government, involving as it does a redistribution and relief of burdens, to which every man of our party is deeply pledged, is without doubt anxiously expected by the constituencies, and will not brook delay. So I would say about land law reform. I am very sure that the feeling of the boroughs is in favour of extensive changes in our land system, on the ground that the labour in the towns is depreciated by agricultural migration, and that this latter is the effect of an antiquated land system. This, rightly or wrongly, is the notion in the manufacturing minds, and failure on our part to come up to their legitimate and reasonable expectations would produce incalculable disappointment and mortification.

If you decide that the large constructive measures which the times seem to demand are beyond the capacity of the Tory party, or the scope of their political principles, though I should regret the decision I would accept it without demur. But in that case I would press upon you the advisability of prompt resignation, on the ground that the country had for the time decided that the function of the Tory party would be more usefully displayed in Opposition, in efforts purely critical, in attempts to amend Liberal legislation and moderate Liberal zeal. If you show your hand at all, show it fully and show a good one; but if you have no hand good enough for the game or the stakes, place the cards face downwards on the table, decline to play, and leave the Downing Street table. I cannot think there is any safe via media between these two courses.

Lastly, I will not conceal my repugnance to dealing with Church reform. Surely the Russell-Gurney-Disraeli Church legislation is a warning. The time of Parliament will be wasted in furious ecclesiastical differences, and votes will be lost on every side by the party responsible for the effort. The Public Worship Regulation Act was one of my first House of Commons experiences, and I cannot forget it. The Nonconformists, so powerful, will offer every opposition; and nothing will be gained except loss of time, of temper, and of strength. If those ornamental but, on the whole, rather useless and expensive Lords Spiritual care to justify their privileges by attempts at legislation, smile on them, beam on them, give them every encouragement for bringing the Lords Temporal into a devout and heavenly frame of mind. Some good may possibly issue from such a source, if such should be the will of Providence. But Church reform which is the product of a Cabinet checked and controlled by party Whips and guided by House of Commons lobbies is surely in its nature a monstrosity, possibly a profanity, certainly a farce.

Please pardon me this long letter. I feel that my constant and lengthy epistolary communications to you may lead you to look forward to resignation of office as an immense relief, but I find my excuse in your kindness hitherto, and am

Yours most sincerely,
Randolph S. Churchill.

Ireland swiftly overclouded all other projects and puzzles which Ministers might consider. It was late in July that Lord Carnarvon had met Parnell. Four anxious months had passed and the Viceroy had now arrived at definite conclusions. He saw with alarm that the National League was strengthening and expanding every day. The fall in prices had affected the payment of rents. Serious social and economic discontents stimulated the increasing political excitement. Boycottings were flagrant, pitiless and widespread. Alike by his convictions and his public pledges he felt himself debarred from asking for special legislation. Another policy forced itself upon him with crushing weight. He declared that unless the Cabinet could move in the direction of Home Rule he could not continue their servant. It became a question for the Cabinet whether the retirement of Lord Carnarvon on the grounds stated would be so heavy a blow to the Government and so injurious to their main political position that, if he persisted, it would be better for the Government to resign in a body, ostensibly as a consequence of the election. Lord Salisbury desired his principal colleagues to express their opinion upon Lord Carnarvon’s views and intentions.

Lord Randolph Churchill to Lord Salisbury.

December 10, 1885.

Dear Lord S.,—I return you Lord Carnarvon’s memorandum, which was carefully considered by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Mr. Smith, and myself.

We came to the conclusion that if the Lord-Lieutenant insists on the choice being made between the adoption of his policy and resignation, the latter course becomes compulsory on us. If we go out merely on the ground of our Parliamentary position, we remain for the purposes of opposition to Home Rule, as a party, totus teres atque rotundus; but if that blessed man sets the signal for concession flying, our party will go to pieces, as it did on the Irish Land Act. The only hope for the country is to keep this present Tory party well together; and unfortunately Lord Carnarvon has it once more in his power, as on two former occasions, to disintegrate, demoralise, and shatter.

However, I wish to say for myself—and I feel pretty certain it will be the view of Sir M. Hicks-Beach and Mr. Smith—that, whatever course you may finally decide upon, I will gladly see it through to the best of my ability, no matter what may be the result.

Yours most sincerely,
R. S. C.

But Lord Salisbury preferred to face the consequences of the Carnarvon resignation, whatever they might be. ‘The fact,’ he wrote (December 11), ‘that Gladstone is mad to take office, will force him into some line of conduct which will be discreditable to him, and disastrous, if we do not prematurely gratify his hunger. The Carnarvon incident is vexatious. I hope he will be induced to stay with us till Parliament meets. But even if he does not, I doubt if his retirement will produce any very serious confusion. He will nominally retire on the ground of health or some private reason. The truth may ooze out. But we shall not mend matters by all retiring with him. The true reason will equally ooze out; and we shall have proclaimed our own impotence very loudly.’

The Irish situation oppressed all minds and from every quarter doubt and foreboding streamed in upon the Conservative leaders. Was it possible in face of Mr. Parnell and his United Ireland, in face of Mr. Gladstone and his ponderous meditations, in face of Lord Carnarvon and his open sympathies, to remain utterly unyielding? Would it not be well to make terms while time remained? Could not a joint conference of parties arrive at some compromise in regard to Irish government? And if not, how could the land be ruled? Everywhere during this month of December the sands were shifting underneath men’s feet. Few were firm. Lord Randolph Churchill was a rock.

Lord Randolph Churchill to Lord Chief Justice
Morris.

Very Confidential.

December 7, 1885.

My dear Chief Justice,—I am very grateful to you for your letter, which I have sent on to Lord Salisbury for his consideration.

In a memorandum on the situation which I submitted to the Prime Minister a week ago, I laid down as an axiom that with regard to any policy towards Ireland in the nature of, or containing an Irish Parliament, the attitude of the Tory Party could only be an absolutely ‘non possumus’ one. You suggest a Committee of leading men on both sides to inquire, and you base the suggestion on the proceedings which took place with regard to the Reform Bill.

Two objections seem to me to arise.

1. With regard to Irish Government the Ministers cannot yet with honour or even decency shift the responsibility from off their shoulders on to Parliament. In so great a matter surely Ministers must take the lead and state their policy or abdicate.

2. The precedent of the proceedings on the Reform Bill does not yet, it seems to me, apply at all closely. Those proceedings were taken to extricate Government, Opposition, and Parliament generally from a deadlock and to avert a great constitutional crisis. In this matter of Irish Government neither deadlock nor crisis has yet arisen. In the event of their arising, the co-operation of parties may well be resorted to, but this machinery would, I think, be spoilt by premature recourse to it.

This may happen: Mr. Gladstone may persuade his colleagues and party to a policy which Parnell might think too good to refuse absolutely. The policy might be embodied in an amendment to the Address and carried against the Government by a large majority. What should be the course of Government under such circumstances?

To resign or to dissolve?

I should be strongly in favour of the latter if Royal sanction could be obtained. If the Government resign, Gladstone succeeds in forming an Administration and carrying a Bill through the Commons by great majorities. Then will crop up again the eternal question of resistance of the House of Lords to the will of the people, and an appeal to the people on that ground will cause the essential question of Repeal or no Repeal to be obscured or perhaps altogether lost sight of. By dissolution, a clear issue is presented to English and Scotch constituencies, and the House of Lords is kept out of the battle.

Then there is no reason, it is true, why the agricultural labourers, revolving many things in their anxious minds, should not gladly agree to Repeal in order to obtain three acres and a cow, and therefore no great change in the state of parties might result, and the Tories would be definitely and decisively beaten on a distinct issue. Well, what then? We should have fought our battle as well as it could be fought, and the Repeal of the Union would be the work of the people, the responsibility resting absolutely upon them and not upon us.

This is my own way of looking at the situation, and why I adhere to the policy, which you think will be ‘brushed aside,’ of changes in County Government, &c. That policy may fail, but at any rate it is a Conservative policy; the surrender to Home Rule, no matter how you disguise it, is the reverse of conservative as you will be the first to admit. The Disraeli epoch of constant metamorphoses of principles and party has passed away.

Radical work must be done by Radical artists; thus less mischief will arise.

Yours sincerely,
Randolph S. Churchill.

‘I cannot say,’ wrote Lord Salisbury, to whom this correspondence had been referred (December 6), ‘how heartily I agree in the tone of your letter to Morris.’

The whole political situation was considered at a Cabinet Council on the 16th. Decision was taken to go on with the Government, to meet Parliament and await results. The outlines of the Queen’s Speech were considered. Lord Randolph was most anxious to assign a foremost place to the reform of Parliamentary Procedure, as described in his memorandum. The Cabinet, having listened to long speeches on Irish matters, were tired and disposed to be irritable. The subject was one with which they were very familiar and on which many of them had already committed themselves. One Minister whom Lord Randolph thought he had conciliated the day before, pronounced absolutely against it. Lord Salisbury practised what he called ‘the decorous reserve proper to one who had been so long out of the House of Commons.’ The whole question was abruptly postponed. This defeat filled Lord Randolph with mortification. He loved his own plans ardently. He cared too much for the objects at stake to be skilful in personal diplomacy. He could fight; he could lead; he could drive; but a stolid junta of Cabinet Ministers—‘holy men,’ as he called them, vexed his soul. He was grievously disappointed at what he took to be the summary dismissal of a most important subject. He wrote in deep despondency to the Prime Minister. Lord Salisbury consoled him in a letter almost affectionate in character. All would come right if he drafted his proposals and chose a better opportunity of taking the sense of the Cabinet upon them.

Lord Randolph Churchill to Lord Salisbury.

India Office: December 17, 1885.

Dear Lord Salisbury,—I am very grateful for your kind letter, and intensely relieved to learn that you consider the question of giving to Procedure a prominent place in our programme as still quite open. I shall do as you tell me, and place on paper elaborated proposals for the more efficient and speedy transaction of ‘business.’ You are, I know, quite right in blaming me for having been precipitate on Tuesday. I cannot help it, and shall never be able to attain to that beatific state of chronic deliberation which is the peculiarity of * * *, * * * & Co., and also of the Turk.

This I add—that Procedure reform does not necessarily entail rapid legislation. ‘Business’ includes Estimates, Budget, and Supply. It is the transaction of this that I am more especially anxious to promote. Further, assuming that owing to some miraculous exercise of superhuman control H.M. Government remained in office, I would suggest that there might be very considerable tactical advantages from not plunging immediately into legislation, and from gaining time by setting the House of Commons to work on a difficult question in the consideration and settlement of which no issue of party or of confidence need arise.

Yours most sincerely,
Randolph S. Churchill.

The Cabinet did not meet again until the New Year, but Christmas was not a season of unbroken peace and good-will to Her Majesty’s Ministers. Not one, however experienced and imaginative, could penetrate the obscurity of the future or calculate the crisis to which events were hurrying. The election had left them in a large minority. The Government of Ireland was rapidly passing into the hands of the National League. The Viceroy had resigned. Mr. Gladstone was revolving vast and unfathomable schemes. Parliament was to meet for regular business upon January 21. Meanwhile the days were disturbed by every kind of rumour and alarm. Lord Randolph Churchill, who always cultivated the acquaintance of clever men irrespective of their political opinion, had friends in every camp and possessed many special channels of information. All he could gather he wrote to his chief:—

Lord Randolph Churchill to Lord Salisbury.

India Office: December 22, 1885.

... Now I have a great deal to tell you.

Labouchere came to see me this morning. He asked me our intentions. I gave him the following information. I can rely upon him: (1) That there would be no motion for adjournment after the 12th, but that business would be immediately proceeded with after three or four days’ swearing. On this he said that, if we liked to go out on a motion for adjournment, he thought the other side might accommodate us. I told him that such an ineffably silly idea had never entered our heads. Then he told me that he had been asked whether he could ascertain if a certain statement as to a Tory Home Rule measure which appeared recently in the Dublin Daily Express was Ashbourne’s measure, and if the Tories meant to say ‘Aye’ or ‘No’ to Home Rule; to which I replied that it had never crossed the mind of any member of the Government to dream even of departing from an absolute unqualified ‘No,’ and that all statements as to Ashbourne’s plan were merely the folly of the Daily News. Then I was very much upset, for he proceeded to tell me that on Sunday week last Lord Carnarvon had met Justin McCarthy, and had confided to him that he was in favour of Home Rule in some shape, but that his colleagues and his party were not ready, and asked whether Justin McCarthy’s party would agree to an inquiry, which he thought there was a chance of the Government agreeing to, and which would educate his colleagues and his party if granted and carried through. I was consternated, but replied that such a statement was an obvious lie; but, between ourselves, I fear it is not—perhaps not even an exaggeration or a misrepresentation. Justin McCarthy is on the staff of the Daily News. Labouchere is one of the proprietors, and I cannot imagine any motive for his inventing such a statement. If it is true, Lord Carnarvon has played the devil. Then I told Labouchere that if the G.O.M. announced any Home Rule project, or indicated any such project, and by so doing placed the Government in a minority, resignation was not the only course; that there was another alternative which might even be announced in debate, and the announcement of which might complete the squandering of the Liberal party, and that his friend at Hawarden had better not omit altogether that card from his calculations as to his opponents’ hands. Lastly, I communicated to him that, even if the Government went out and Gladstone introduced a Home Rule Bill, I should not hesitate, if other circumstances were favourable, to agitate Ulster even to resistance beyond constitutional limits; that Lancashire would follow Ulster, and would lead England; and that he was at liberty to communicate this fact to the G.O.M.[48]

Meanwhile Mr. Gladstone, although embarrassed and forestalled by the disclosures in the newspapers, was deep in his Irish schemes. A chance conversation which he had had with Mr. Balfour in the middle of December had encouraged Mr. Gladstone to make a proposal to Lord Salisbury. He wrote (December 20) of the ‘stir in men’s minds’ and of the urgency of the question, how it would be ‘a public calamity if this great subject should fall into the lines of party conflict.’ Only the Government could deal with such a question, and on public grounds he specially desired that the existing Government would deal with it. If Lord Salisbury and his friends would bring forward ‘a proposal for settling the whole question of the future government of Ireland,’ he would desire to treat it in the same spirit as he had shown in respect to Afghanistan and the Balkan Peninsula.

We are assured that Mr. Gladstone laid great stress upon this proffer of support. He had told the Queen two years before that the Irish question could only be settled by a conjunction of parties. He seems to have imagined that such a proposal would be regarded us a fair and magnanimous undertaking, and would receive, as some may think it deserved, the unprejudiced deliberation of the Cabinet. He had received full information—denied to Lord Randolph Churchill—of Lord Carnarvon’s interview with Parnell. He believed in all sincerity that the Conservative Government were seriously considering, even if they were not already committed to, a policy of Home Rule in some form or other. He remembered the conferences on the Reform Bill, and the support which he had lately given to the new ministry. Neither he nor his friends seem fully to have appreciated the fear and aversion with which his opponents regarded him. His letter was treated with contempt. No other word will suffice. ‘A public calamity,’ forsooth! ‘If this great question should fall into line of party conflict!’ ‘His hypocrisy,’ wrote a Minister to whom this letter had been shown, ‘makes me sick.’ In the Tory Cabinet there was but one opinion about him. He was ‘mad to take office’; and if his hunger were not ‘prematurely gratified,’ he would be forced into some line of conduct which would be ‘discreditable to him and disastrous.’

Mr. Gladstone wrote again on the 23rd, pressing for a definite answer. ‘Time,’ he said, ‘was precious.’ Lord Salisbury suavely replied through Mr. Balfour, in a letter which has since been made public, that a communication of the views of the Government would at this stage be at variance with usage. As Parliament would meet for business before the usual time, it was better ‘to avoid a departure from ordinary practice which might be misunderstood.’ There, of course, the matter ended; and thus idly drifted away what was perhaps the best hope of the settlement of Ireland which that generation was to see. Mr. Gladstone tarried no longer. On December 26[49] he drafted a memorandum for submission to the various noblemen and gentlemen with whom he proposed to act, setting forth with all possible precision his immediate intentions. If the Government were ready to deal with Ireland in a manner that would satisfy him and satisfy the Irish Nationalists, he would support them. If not, he would turn them out at the earliest convenient opportunity; and if in consequence entrusted with the duty of forming a Government, he would make the acceptance of a plan of ‘duly guarded Home Rule’ an indispensable condition.

Ministers meanwhile preserved an impenetrable silence. No one knew in what spirit, with what intention or with what allies they would meet Parliament. The Queen’s Speech still engaged the attention of the Cabinet. Lord Randolph Churchill was indebted to a friend for a happy suggestion, which he did not delay to forward to Lord Salisbury:—

Lord Randolph Churchill to Lord Salisbury.

India Office: January 14, 1886.

Mr. Buckle has just been to see me, full of an idea of his own which struck me as good, and which I persuaded him not to spoil by bringing it out in to-morrow’s Times.

1886
Æt. 36

He wishes the Queen’s Speech of 1833 to be imitated, when, after the agitation of O’Connell, the Government declared in the Speech their intention of maintaining the Union. I send you the paragraph and also the paragraphs from the Speech of 1834, which seem still more to the purpose. Mr. Buckle very forcibly argues that some declaration of such a kind will force on the question at once, and prevent Gladstonian shuffling being resorted to successfully. The Irish would be obliged to meet such a challenge, and all parties would have to declare themselves....

The paragraph which was finally adopted was modelled on the lines of the Speech of 1834:—

The King’s Speech, Feb. 4, 1834.

But I have seen, with feelings
of deep regret and just indignation,
the continuance of attempts to excite
the people of that country to
demand a repeal of the Legislative
Union.

This bond of our national
strength and safety I have already
declared my fixed and unalterable
resolution, under the blessing of
Divine Providence, to maintain
inviolate by all the means in my
power.

In support of this determination
I cannot doubt the zealous
and effectual co-operation of my
Parliament and my people.

The Queen’s Speech, Jan. 21, 1886.

I have seen with deep sorrow
the renewal, since I last addressed
you, of the attempt to excite the
people of Ireland to hostility
against the Legislative Union
between that country and Great
Britain. I am absolutely opposed
to any disturbance of that fundamental
law, and in resisting it I am
convinced that I shall be heartily
supported by my Parliament and
my people.

But the Tory leader was meditating a more decided challenge. He proposed to meet Parliament with a declaration of a Coercion policy which should disperse all doubts as to the relations of his Government with the Parnellites and should throw upon the Opposition the odium of defeating a Government upon a measure affecting law and order. He may have been led to this decision partly by a desire that the armies should face each other squarely in the coming battle. Partly, no doubt, he was persuaded thereto by the growing clamour and pressure of those sections of his own party who are always powerful to urge repressive measures. Sulky murmurs at the Carlton; loud complainings in the Times; trumpeted advent of Loyalist and Orange deputations claiming the protection of the Crown—all the storm-signals were flying. But there was a considerable case upon the merits. When Lord Randolph Churchill had visited Ireland in October he found the Viceroy anxious and alarmed by the growing power of the National League, and that organisation was now greatly extended. Throughout those parts of Ireland where the National League was supreme, liberty and law were gravely endangered. There was not, indeed, that kind of treasonable organisation which had existed in 1865 and 1867; nor was there such an amount of capital crime as culminated in the Phoenix Park murders; but a sullen, widespread, and well-organised spirit of resistance to the laws of property had taken possession of the Irish people and grew worse week by week. ‘There were in Ireland, and there are in Ireland now,’ said Lord Randolph at Paddington (February 13, 1886), ‘two governments—there is the Government of the Queen and the government of the National League—and the Government of the Queen is not the stronger government of the two in many parts of Ireland.’

Lord Salisbury first mentions the subject on January 13. ‘I am very perturbed,’ he writes, ‘about the state of Ireland.’ Three days later he met the Cabinet with definite proposals. Lord Ashbourne had prepared a Coercion Bill, and the Prime Minister had drafted a paragraph for the Queen’s Speech announcing its immediate introduction. The Cabinet was startled. Lord Randolph Churchill and Sir Michael Hicks-Beach had not prepared themselves for such a departure, grave as they knew the situation in Ireland to be. They were not satisfied that a case for special legislation was disclosed, still less that it could be sustained in the House of Commons. Both remembered their speeches of the previous summer. Neither responded sympathetically to the militant and autocratic temper of the mass of the party. The council was long and stormy and Ministers separated without having come to any decision. Meanwhile the resignation of Lord Carnarvon was publicly announced.

The decision of Lord Salisbury’s Administration to introduce a Coercion Bill in January 1886 has been the subject of much hostile criticism. It has been censured as a resort to extra-constitutional measures, not for the sake of public safety, but as a party manoeuvre. It has been denounced as the callous and unscrupulous reversal of a policy of conciliation so soon as the Irish vote had been cast at the election. There is a degree of justice and truth in these harsh accusations, but it is only a degree; and if the Ministers concerned require a defence, that defence is best supplied by their own secret letters during these days of perplexity and stress.

Lord Randolph Churchill to Lord Salisbury.

Carlton Club: January 16, 1886.

Dear Lord Salisbury,—I cannot resist writing to you on Ireland while the proceedings of to-day’s Cabinet are fresh in my mind. As far as I could ascertain, the exact difference of opinion between the view which you hold and the view which I ventured to express amounts (in the measure of time) to a month at the outside. You would announce and produce a Bill at once. It appears to me that at present there is no sufficient Parliamentary case for a Bill, estimated by the weight of facts adduced; and that the Bill which you may decide upon now, upon your incomplete grounds, may and will in all probability be utterly insufficient to meet the facts which you will have to deal with in abundance in a period of time which may be calculated by weeks and even days.

What I would like to know, if I am not asking too much, is this—What influence or information not yet disclosed is compelling you to lay such a heavy burden on your sadly inefficient colleagues in the House of Commons? I assume as indubitable that you consider, and almost entirely guide your action by, the state of parties in the House of Commons—that is involved in the decision come to in December to carry on the Government—yet I am certain that you know that none of us could sustain a case for Coercion. Yet you press it on us—for we could have come to an agreement to-day on Lord Cranbrook’s suggestion, only that evidently it was not acceptable or good in your eyes.

I wish I knew what you really wanted, and how you wished it to be worked out. I have never thought of anything except the success, or at least the credit, of your Government; and, knowing how much depends on the House of Commons, I am at the present moment only occupied in imagining how the action which you seem to favour could be effectively sustained from a House of Commons point of view. I do not think you will accuse me of arrogance or conceit if I avow my belief that, unless you show me the way very clearly, that action must fail disastrously. I do not want it to fail so. I know how very great and high your position is, what a really fine party you have behind you, how great their confidence in you is (on these points I do not believe I am capable of making an error), and I am most anxious that that great instrument on which depends not merely the item of Ireland, but also the interests of the entire Empire and home community, should not be damaged or blunted by weak and inefficient House of Commons action such as the immediate demand for Coercion will in practice involve.

One word as regards the Government of Ireland. You think the situation so serious that it demands a Coercion Bill. That necessitates a strong Irish Government. That Government you have not got. I think there are three men in the Government who would answer to the requirements of the position—Lord Cranbrook, Mr. Smith, and (please don’t be shocked) myself. Of the three I greatly prefer Mr. Smith. But, assuming that you have decided it is your duty to carry on the Government until you are turned out, I implore you not to think of [the arrangement Lord Salisbury had suggested]. No extra laws could make that good or stable. I hope you won’t be vexed with me for writing so freely. I am only anxious to find myself on Monday loyally and strenuously supporting whatever you may think best to be done; but I admit I have not been able hitherto to refrain from shrinking to take part in an enterprise desperate in its nature, involving certain and immediate Parliamentary death, and which, if determined on, will only leave you without one or two of your most faithful supporters in the House of Commons. Not that they will refuse to obey what you order, but that the order itself will be their ruin.

Yours most sincerely,
Randolph S. Churchill.

Lord Salisbury to Lord Randolph Churchill.

Confidential.

Foreign Office: January 16, 1886.

My dear Randolph,—I cannot say how much touched I am by the great kindness and loyalty of your letter. I cannot help feeling how little I deserve it. I will tell you at once what my dominant feeling is. It is that we should be a united Cabinet—if possible with a united party. I have been throughout ready to postpone my individual opinion to this primary consideration. We have no right to the luxury of divided councils in a crisis such as this. It is evident that the great majority of the Cabinet—and, I believe, the great majority of the party—wish earnestly for a policy which will show that we do not shrink from the duty of government, and that we mean to stand by the Loyalists. The disaster I am afraid of is that we should be driven from office on some motion insisting on the necessity of a vigorous step, and our position in Opposition would then be very feeble and we should be much discredited.

I really feel very strongly and deeply all the kindness you have shown to me, and the great and most successful efforts you have made to sustain the Government. I should differ from you and Beach with the most extreme reluctance. But do not let us take any line which will brand us in the eyes of our countrymen—or will enable our opponents to do so—as the timid party, who let things float because they dared not act. The time is coming on us when people will long for government: do not let us get a character of shrinking from responsibility.

The question of the personnel of the [Irish] Government must be considered, but the Speech presses for settlement in the first instance. I should have thought that the notorious growth of this ‘second government’ throughout Ireland, overshadowing the law and the Queen’s authority and securing its power by organised terror, would have sustained a case for such a Bill as Gibson produced. If you remain of the opposite opinion, let us consider whether some such phrase as the enclosed could unite us.[50] It is merely a suggestion. I confess I have a heavy heart in the whole matter. I have serious doubts whether I am doing my duty. But my train is going. Perhaps I may write again from Hatfield.

Ever yours very truly,
Salisbury.

Lord Randolph now surrendered his view altogether. Never before or afterwards did the two men stand in such cordial relationship. A comradeship in anxiety had drawn these contrasted natures, each so vehement and earnest after its own fashion, very close together:—

Lord Randolph Churchill to Lord Salisbury.

India Office: January 16, 1886.

Dear Lord Salisbury,—I am very grateful for your letter, which enables me to enter more fully into the position from which you view things than I have been able hitherto to do. I greatly like the paragraph suggested, and believe firmly that it meets with wisdom, tact, and courage the necessities and the possibilities of the situation. But, after all, you are the head of the Government, and have had a very long experience of public affairs; and if you think it absolutely incumbent to go further—well, then, further we must go. A collapse of the Government at the present moment would be a catastrophe too hideous to contemplate.

I have said all that occurs to me at much too great length and with far too much reiteration. Kismet.

Yours most sincerely,
Randolph S. Churchill.

There is a passage in the speech of Sir R. Peel on the Address in ‘33, where the constitutional position required before a Coercion demand is very clearly and weightily laid down.

He wrote to Beach accordingly. The Chancellor of the Exchequer was more unyielding and his letter shows the variety of strong characters arrayed against Mr. Gladstone:—

Sir Michael Hicks-Beach to Lord Randolph Churchill.

January 17, 1886.

My dear Churchill,—Of course I should readily accept the sentence Salisbury suggests. But though his letter touches and influences me, it does not persuade me to anything more; and I am sorry your reply goes so far. I do not in the least believe that, with such Irish paragraphs as we are all ready to accept, any motion insisting on the necessity of a vigorous step would be ever proposed, much less carried, against us. I do not think in such a matter we ought to be governed by the ignorant wish of ‘the great majority of the party’ or be forced to action we do not approve for fear of being branded as the ‘timid party.’ If these are Salisbury’s reasons for Coercion, my opinion remains the same.

But his last sentences require explanation. If by ‘serious doubts whether I am doing my duty’ he means that he is himself persuaded that the moment has come when the government of Ireland cannot be carried on without it, and that he ought not therefore to agree to delay, that is another matter. I would yield my opinion, strong as it is, to his convictions, but only to his convictions. And in that case he must have a man to govern Ireland.

Yours sincerely,
M. E. Hicks-Beach.

Monday’s Cabinet was united upon the Queen’s Speech. Lord Salisbury decided to entrust the Irish Office to Mr. Smith. Lord Randolph Churchill, who had acquired much influence with him, was chosen to press it upon him. The task was thankless and unpromising; the occasion momentous; but the post of difficulty and peril was also the post of honour. Gravely and reluctantly Smith accepted, and Lord Cranbrook became Minister of War in his stead. ‘I saw Mr. Smith this morning,’ wrote Lord Randolph to the Prime Minister (January 20), ‘and used every argument to persuade him to take in hand the government of Ireland. The appointment should be settled to-day and announced to-morrow morning without fail. If there is any weakness in our attitude on Coercion (which I do not at all admit) it will be more than contradicted by the appointment of Mr. Smith. This of itself will do much to restore confidence. Please do not, if possible, allow any delay. On second thoughts,’ added Lord Randolph mischievously, ‘would Lord Iddesleigh like to go as Lord-Lieutenant?’

The appointment of the new Irish Secretary was announced on the morning of the 21st, and that same day formal business, including election of Speaker, having been previously completed, Parliament was opened in state and the Session began.

The Government prolonged a precarious existence for five days. Both parties were in a turmoil. On the one side Whigs and Moderate Liberals endeavoured, without success, to extract from Mr. Gladstone definite declarations upon Ireland. In the Tory camp the demand for a Coercion Bill was loud and insistent. Although the party as a whole had been beaten in the elections, the bulk of its members came fresh from remarkable victories in the big towns. Their temper was aggressive. They welcomed the declaration of the Chancellor of the Exchequer that Mr. Smith would go to Ireland at once to consider what special measures were necessary.

We are told that Mr. Gladstone did not resolve to overturn the Ministry until they definitely declared for Coercion on January 26. That act, he considered, imposed the responsibility of government upon him. But Lord Randolph Churchill’s correspondence shows that he had information as early as January 13 that some independent member would move an amendment to the Address regretting that no announcement was made of provision for the wants of the agricultural population. Whether this would fail, or would gain the support of a united Opposition, could not be ascertained till the House met. A few hours of Westminster were, however, sufficient to convince the Tory leaders that the temper of the majority was adverse to them, that virtual and effective agreement existed between Mr. Gladstone and Parnell, and that Whig and Moderate Liberal support would almost certainly be insufficient to sustain them. They had decided on Coercion; they resolved, if possible, to place the details of their policy and the case in support of it before the country. The adroit and experienced Parliamentarians on the Treasury Bench used all their wits to obtain the necessary delay. The Chancellor of the Exchequer had given notice on the 21st that immediately on the conclusion of the debate on the Address he would move resolutions for the Reform of Procedure and that these would be pressed to the exclusion of other matters, ‘subject to the intervention of any specially important or urgent business.’ On the following day Lord Randolph Churchill suggested that the general debate on the Address should be brought to a conclusion and that the reforms in Parliamentary Procedure, the consideration of which Mr. Gladstone had declared in his election address ought to take precedence of legislation, might be decided before the amendments to the Address were considered. The changes which Ministers proposed were in themselves sufficiently startling to have absorbed the House in calmer times; and Lord Randolph no doubt calculated upon this. But Mr. Gladstone found no difficulty in persuading his party that Procedure reform might safely be a little delayed. Lord Randolph’s proposal was ignored and the debate continued.

On the 23rd Mr. Smith started for Dublin, which he reached on the morning of the 24th. The imminent defeat of the Ministry had now become certain. An amendment relating to Burma was moved on the 25th. Mr. Gladstone, though recommending that no decision should be taken upon it, as other more convenient opportunities of discussing Indian matters would occur, indulged in acid criticism of the Burmese policy. ‘Shall I answer him now?’ asked Lord Randolph, taking up the red box in which the India Office papers reposed, ‘or shall I wait for the Indian Budget?’ ‘Now or never,’ answered the Leader of the House; and Lord Randolph thereupon, using the precise information of a great department with the skill of a practised debater, made a vigorous rejoinder. Upon the spur of the moment he managed to cite a number of instances from the record of the late Government where they had themselves been drawn into warlike operations, with, as Lord Randolph contended, far less justification than was presented in Burma. Mr. Gladstone was much provoked by such comparisons. He could not speak again himself, and as the Secretary for India proceeded he was observed repeatedly turning to those about him and behind him, explaining how this did not apply; how that was wholly unfounded: how this, again, was a travesty; and so forth. The Conservatives were delighted at Lord Randolph’s prowess. The attack was repelled. On the next amendment the Liberal Front Bench abstained, and the Government survived by twenty-eight. But this was the end.

Faced by approaching destruction, the Government cared only to rally their friends, to make one last bid for Whig support, and to declare plainly the issue on which they were to be dismissed. The Cabinet which met on the morning of the 26th desired the immediate introduction of a Coercion Bill. But Mr. Smith was not inclined to be hustled. He could not realise the rapid developments which had taken place in his absence. Harassed by telegrams, he appealed to Lord Randolph. The friendship between them was steadily ripening. Of all the characters with which this story deals, scarcely one improves so much upon acquaintance as this valiant and honest man. He was the true type of what Disraeli calls ‘an English worthy.’ Here is his letter:—

Mr. Smith to Lord Randolph Churchill.

Private.

Chief Secretary’s Office, Dublin Castle: January 25, 1886, 6 P.M.

My dear Churchill,—I have had a telegram from Salisbury which affords evidence of pressure for what is termed ‘prompt action,’ and I have replied by letter. Another telegram has just come in from Beach, which cannot be deciphered before post leaves.

There is only one opinion here—that the League must be suppressed and large powers obtained to protect life, property and public order, unless the Government is prepared to treat for terms of capitulation with the Parnellites. But the Land Question is at the bottom of the trouble, and gives all the force to the agitation. As at present advised, I should be unwilling to ask for large repressive powers unless I had authority to promise a large land scheme.

But these telegrams indicate restlessness in my colleagues. So big a question cannot be decided offhand. It is more than peace or war with a foreign Power. We are at a crisis in the relations of the Imperial Government with Ireland. I may very possibly fail to do any good, but I will not be hurried into a positive decision on such momentous issues by the party or the papers; and if my colleagues think the three or four days I propose to take too long, I will return to London with pleasure. Let me hear from you either by telegraph or post.

Yours sincerely,
W. H. Smith.

The correspondence was continued by cypher telegrams:—

Lord R. Churchill to Mr. Smith.

January 26.

Greatly obliged by your letter.

Absolutely necessary for Government to state to-night their intentions with regard to Ireland—viz. suppression of National League followed by Land Bill. This is the only method of averting defeat on Jesse Collings. Notice should be given to-day of introduction of repressive Bill on Thursday, coupled with revival of rules of urgency. Telegraph to me your views. I would earnestly press your return to London.

Mr. Smith to Lord R. Churchill.

I think proposed action looks precipitate. There is no excessive urgency here, and great care is required in framing and describing measure. I should prefer, if possible, to provide against the intimidation of League than denounce it by name. I cross to-night.

Lord Randolph replied from the House of Commons at six o’clock the same day:—

Your telegram received half-hour after Cabinet separated. Beach has just announced introduction of Bill by you on Thursday for suppression of National League and other dangerous associations, for the prevention of intimidation and for the protection of life, property and order in Ireland.[51] Of course, great sensation.

It is not improbable, however, that we shall be defeated to-night, in which case we shall resign. I showed your wire to Lord Salisbury. We both agreed you would not wish unanimous decision of Cabinet modified.

Mr. Smith arrived in London with the daylight, to read upon the early placards that the Government was out.

The famous Jesse Collings Amendment produced an interesting debate; but as the members listened to the opposing views of Mr. Chaplin and Mr. Joseph Arch, of Mr. Goschen and Mr. Bradlaugh, of Mr. Gladstone and Lord Hartington, they knew that behind the relevant arguments of the speakers, behind all the talk of peasant-proprietors, allotments, vegetables, and cows, stood a far greater issue. ‘If the result of this division,’ said the Chancellor of the Exchequer, ‘should be unfavourable to Her Majesty’s Government we shall accept that decision without regret. We assumed office reluctantly, and we shall leave it willingly as soon as we are assured that we do not possess the support of the House. But the success of this motion will have another and graver effect.... It will not only be a defeat of Her Majesty’s Government, but it will be a defeat of the policy ... which they believe it to be their duty to pursue with respect to Ireland.’

The Government were beaten on the division by seventy-nine votes, notwithstanding that sixteen Liberals, including Lord Hartington, Mr. Goschen and Sir Henry James, voted with them and fifty-six others stayed away. The next day Lord Salisbury’s Cabinet resigned.

Thus, after a brief but exciting reign, fell the ‘Ministry of Caretakers.’ They had confronted enormous difficulties with small resources. They existed at the caprice of their enemies. They had office, but not power. Yet they faced their task and their opponents with courage and skill. Their Administration was defended by powerful oratory; it was sustained—except in its dying moments—by sedate and efficient Executive action. In a few short months the Conservative party were freed from the reproach of irresponsibility and their capacity for government was recognised by the country. The peace of Europe was preserved amid grave embarrassments and under their guidance the nation emerged safely and honourably from the Russian crisis. They legislated with unexpected good fortune. They inaugurated a new policy, never since abandoned, of Land Purchase in Ireland. They restored and greatly strengthened the defences of India. They laid the foundations of Australian Federation, and by a successful, inexpensive and almost bloodless military expedition added a vast and fertile province to the dominions of the Crown.

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