Henry’s preparations were begun, as many believe, very soon after his accession to the throne, and were not discontinued during negotiations which can scarcely have been intended to succeed. His situation was, on the whole, favourable for his undertaking. He had no reason to dread a hostile diversion by way of Scotland. The Scottish king had been for many years a prisoner in England, and though the chronic disturbances of the Border did not cease, he was an effectual pledge for the good behaviour of his subjects, who, if they wished to indulge their hereditary enmity to England, had to take service with the French king. The Welsh insurrection had long ceased to be dangerous, but it had not been yet suppressed, and it might become troublesome again when the royal forces were employed elsewhere. Henry did not forget this contingency. From previous amnesties offered to the rebels the name of the ringleader, Owen Glendower, had been omitted. Henry now included him in his proposition. He commissioned his “faithful counsellor, Gilbert Talbot, to treat with Owen Glendower of Wales,” and promised to receive the said Owen and “others our rebels of Wales” to his favour Henry had no accumulated wealth to fall back upon when he set himself to the task of providing for the many necessities of the campaign which he meditated. On the contrary, he had found on his accession the public treasury empty and even embarrassed with debt. But his subjects were heartily with him in his purpose, and they came forward with liberal subsidies. The first Parliament of his reign had continued to him the grant of a tax on stoneware, of tonnage and poundage which they had made to his father, and that which met in November 1414 had, as we have seen, been not less generous. Henry, on his part, was raising money in every possible way. We find, for instance, a bond given to Paul Milan, a merchant from Lucca, for a loan of two hundred marks, and a debt of £478 18s. 8d. for cloth of Henry, it is clear, spared no expense in making his army as numerous and effective as possible. In that wonderful collection of public documents known as Rymer’s Foedera we find the contracts into which he entered for the payment and maintenance of this force. It will be interesting to give Dr. Lingard’s careful summary of their contents.
These arrangements strike us as being as liberal as they are business like. Henry, it is clear, would not run the risk of failure by starving his great expedition, or by neglecting to enlist on his side the interests of his troops. In another important matter, little regarded or wholly disregarded before his time, he showed his remarkable capacity for military command. This was the medical service of the army. Generals, of course, had often taken their physicians with them into the field. We have, for instance, the diaries, with notes of symptoms and treatment, of the physicians who attended Alexander the Great. But now, for the first time, at least in English history, we find a commander-in-chief We do not hear of Nicholas Colnet being furnished with any assistance. Anything like hospital treatment of disease was probably impossible in a campaign of those days; and a staff of physicians could hardly have had any proper facilities for using whatever knowledge they may have possessed. On the other hand, Thomas Morstede, the surgeon, was accompanied by a considerable establishment. When a wound had been received, life could often be saved, or efficiency preserved, by immediate surgical treatment. The surgeon-general, as we may call him, was accordingly directed to take with him twelve of his own craft. Each of the twelve was to receive the daily pay of an archer; and in addition to the daily twelve pence, a quarterly allowance of a hundred marks was assigned to each of the two chief medical officers. Nearly a month later Morstede presented a petition to the King praying for a sum of money for the purchase of such things as were necessary for his office, and also that all persons engaged in the surgical service of the army should be directed to act under his instructions, and should receive such wages as he should appoint. A third request was for a transport-service, modestly limited to a chariot and two waggons, Morstede Sixpence a day could not have been a very attractive remuneration. Accordingly we are not surprised to find Morstede afterwards applying to the King for power to press, “as well within as without franchise birth, persons of his craft such as he should choose to accompany him.” In the following year, that it may not be necessary to return to the subject, the King issued a writ to Morstede and William Breowardine, his colleague, to this effect:
The army, raised and equipped with such care and forethought, numbered, it is said, six thousand men-at-arms and twenty-four thousand archers. Cannons as effective as the manufacturing skill of that day could produce, and other engines of war had been procured. So effective and so well prepared an army had never before been collected in England for service abroad. A splendid relic of the expedition remains to this day in the Record Office. On July 20th a roll was prepared in which should be written the names of all who were to set forth with the King. It is still to be seen, a The army was on the point of embarking, Henry himself having come to Southampton to superintend the operation, when everything was delayed by the discovery of a conspiracy which had for its object nothing less than a change of dynasty. Its ringleader was Richard Plantagenet, Earl of Cambridge, second son of Edmund of Langley, Duke of York. He had received his title from Henry, but he seems to have conceived the hope of advancing his fortunes more effectively by supporting the elder branch of the Plantagenets. “He intended,” says the record of his trial, “to kill the usurper Henry of Lancaster, and to set the Earl of March upon the throne.” He had married Anne, the Earl’s sister, and in the event of the Earl dying without issue, as actually happened nine years later, his own son Richard would be heir to the throne.8 This conspiracy, therefore, was a premature attempt to assert the claims which were afterwards advanced for the house of York, whose head at this time was the conspirator’s elder brother. The Earl had also, it is said, what may be called a second string to his bow in a person supposed to be Richard the Second, escaped from the Tower. This pretender, Thomas of Trumpyngton, was then in Scotland. With the Earl of Cambridge were associated Sir Thomas Grey of Heton, in Northumberland, who was probably the intermediary of the King’s enemies on both sides of the Scotch border, and Lord Scrope of Mersham, nephew of the Archbishop The plan of the conspiracy was to conduct the Earl of March to the Welsh border and then proclaim him king. Henry Percy, who had not yet returned from Scotland, and some Scotch lords were to create a diversion in the north. The King acted with his accustomed vigour. The conspirators were at once put upon their trial and found guilty. They were too dangerous to be spared. It would be impossible to carry on the war with vigour if the enemies of the dynasty were to be allowed to plot against it at home. But Henry, though he was stern, was not cruel. The guilty persons were executed, but without the indignities that usually accompanied the punishment of treason. The friendly relation between the Earl of March and the King was not disturbed by this rash attempt. The story that the Earl encouraged the conspirators and then betrayed them, may be safely disregarded. |