Footnotes:[1] Scott, Reconstruction during the Civil War, 245 ff.[2] House Journal, 1st Session, 37th Congress, pp. 123-5.[3] Alexander H. Stephens, in The War between the States, uses this fact as a basis for the charge that Johnson was inconsistent in refusing to ratify the Sherman-Johnston Convention.[4] House Journal, 2d Session, 37th Congress, p. 33.[5] Senate Journal, 2d Session, 37th Congress, pp. 202-4.[6] House Journal, 37th Congress, 3d Session, p. 43. Introduced December 5, 1862, by C. L. Vallandigham, whose subsequent career is well known. See Cox Three Decades of Federal Legislation, pp. 80-85.[7] The italics are mine.[8] House Journal, 1st Session, 38th Congress, p. 48.[9] Ibid., pp. 65-6.[10] See Cox, Three Decades of Federal Legislation, 123.[11] House Journal, 1st Session, 38th Congress, pp. 238-9.[12] For a very able discussion of the “Efforts at Compromise, 1860-61,” see Frederic Bancroft’s article in Political Science Quarterly, vi, pp. 401-423.[13] Congressional Globe, 1st Session, 37th Congress, p. 129.[14] Ibid., 2d Session, 37th Congress, part i, p. 8.[15] Senate Journal, 3d Session, 37th Congress, p. 24.[16] See Pollard’s Lost Cause Regained, pp. 44-57, for a discussion of the growth of Southern sentiment favoring measures of peace.[17] It is improbable that he ever modified his views as to the continued existence of the States—views which were essentially those of his successor, though less dogmatically asserted. See Hurd, Theory of Our National Existence, 36 and Index; Pollard, Lost Cause Regained, 65.[18] Cooper, American Politics, pp. 141-3.[19] Blaine, Twenty Years of Congress, ii, 36.[20] Congressional Globe, 3d Session, 37th Congress, part i, p. 834.[21] House Journal, 3d Session, 37th Congress, pp. 69, 70.[22] Cooper, American Politics, bk. i, pp. 141-3. On Lincoln’s plan of Reconstruction, Cf. Gillet, Democracy in the United States, pp. 297-9; Pollard, Lost Cause Regained, 65, which claims that Lincoln could have successfully carried out his policy had he lived, but does not sustain the statement; Cox, Three Decades, etc., pp. 336-345; Wilson, Rise and Fall of the Slave Power, iii, 519-20; Scott, Reconstruction during the Civil War, 267 ff.[23] These excepted classes were: (1) Confederate civil and diplomatic officers; (2) Confederates who had left U. S. judicial positions; (3) officers above colonel in army and lieutenant in navy; (4) those who had formerly been U. S. Congressmen and had aided the rebellion; (5) those who left U. S. Army and Navy to aid the rebellion; (6) those who had treated negroes captured while in U. S. military or naval service otherwise than as prisoners of war.[24] Wilson, Rise and Fall of the Slave Power in America, iii, 531-41; Cf. Gillet, Democracy in the United States, pp. 304-7.[25] For results of this reorganization in Tennessee, see chap. iii.[26] With one exception—a Republican, Whaley, of West Virginia, voted with the negative.[27] So called from the chairmen of the House and Senate committees reporting the bill.[28] Congressional Globe, appendix, 1st Session, 38th Congress, p. 84. See also Lalor, iii, 546; Cox, Three Decades, etc., 339-341; Wilson, Rise and Fall of the Slave Power in America, iii, 520-28; Johnson’s American Orations, iii, 242-260; Scott, Reconstruction during the Civil War, 274 ff.[29] Cooper, American Politics, bk. i, p. 169.[30] Congressional Globe, part ii, 38th Congress, 1st Session, p. 1246.[31] Congressional Globe, iii, p. 2106, 1st Session, 38th Congress.[32] Cooper, American Politics, bk. i, 169-70. The President’s action caused much dissatisfaction, Davis and Wade publishing a protest which impugned Lincoln’s motives, declaring that he had committed an outrage on American legislation. See Johnson, in Lalor, iii. 5 and 6; Cox, Three Decades, etc., 341.[33] Senate Journal, 2d Session, 38th Congress, Feb. 8. Blaine (Twenty Years of Congress, ii, 46) explains that this joint resolution was intended as a rebuke to the President by the refusal of Congress to accept the proclamation of December 8, 1863, as a basis for the restoration of the States fulfilling its requirements. He then points out how Lincoln, with his usual tact, overthrows what triumph may have accrued to the leaders of the opposition by explaining that he “signed the joint resolution in deference to the view of Congress implied in its passage and presentation.” His (Lincoln’s) own opinion was that as a matter of course Congress had complete power to accept or reject electoral votes, and that the Executive had no right to interpose with a veto, whatever his own opinions might be. Blaine says that “his triumph was complete, both in the estimation of Congress and of the people.”[34] See Cox, Three Decades of Federal Legislation, 123; Johnston, in Lalor, iii, 54; Wilson (Woodrow), Division and Reunion, 261-2.[35] Senate Journal, 2d Session, 37th Congress, pp. 194-6.[36] The inconsistency in declaring a State to be extinct, and at the same time acknowledging the obligation to guarantee to it a republican form of government, is due to careless phraseology. Obviously Sumner uses the word “State,” in these resolutions, where he means state governments.[37] Congressional Globe, 1st Session, 38th Congress, part ii, p. 2041. See also his remarks on the Confiscation bill. Cox’s Three Decades of Federal Legislation, pp. 365-374, contains a chapter on the policy of Stevens.[38] See Wilson, Rise and Fall of the Slave Power in America, iii, 531-541.[39] McPherson, Reconstruction, pp. 44 f. Cf. Wilson, Rise and Fall of the Slave Power in America, iii, 592.[40] McPherson, pp. 46-7.[41] McPherson, 44 ff; Moore, Life and Speeches of Andrew Johnson, 481 ff.[42] McPherson, p. 47.[43] McPherson, pp. 47-8.[44] See Gillett, Democ. in the U. S., pp. 333-337, for a discussion of Johnson’s policy and mistakes from the Democratic standpoint.[45] Mr. Blaine in his Twenty Years of Congress, vol. ii, pp. 63-70, ascribes the apparently great modification of Johnson’s attitude towards the South to two causes: First, the personal influence of Seward; second, the flattery of Southern leaders. He assumes Johnson to have been thoroughly determined to carry out a harsh policy of reconstruction, and points out that of the six members of the Cabinet, excluding Mr. Seward, three were radical and three conservative in their views, offsetting each other in their influence upon Johnson. He then calls attention to the fact that Mr. Seward’s most conspicuous faculty was the power to convince listeners against their will through his personal conversation with them. With this remarkable faculty he believes Mr. Seward to have deliberately settled down to the task of reversing the President’s views as to reconstruction. “Equipped with these rare endowments,” he says, “it is not strange that Mr. Seward made a deep impression upon the mind of the President. In conflicts of opinion the superior mind, the subtle address, the fixed purpose, the gentle yet strong will, must in the end prevail.” Mr. Seward’s fervent pleadings, Blaine thinks, caused a marked change in Johnson’s beliefs, and inclined him to look favorably upon the glory of a merciful, lenient administration. The leaders in the South, quickly noticing the change in Johnson’s attitude, took advantage of the opportunity, and by judicious flattery completed the work which Seward had begun, and placed Johnson before the world as the ardent champion of immediate restoration. The theory impresses one with its apparent reasonableness, but as Mr. Blaine produces no evidence beyond his own authority, one is inclined to look upon it as an ingenious explanation based upon the environment of Johnson. Doubtless Seward presented his view on the situation with his accustomed ability, and probably it influenced Johnson’s view to a certain extent. The second part of the supposition can also readily be granted—that the vanity of Johnson was played upon by those whose flattery was most pleasing to one who had sprung from the ranks of those accustomed to be dictated to and spurned by these same men. Yet to ascribe the adoption of so important a policy, affecting all the fundamental principles upon which strict and loose constructionists are divided, to these influences, appears to be a superficial judgment based upon opinions formed in the heat of the struggle, when extraneous influences are always given undue prominence by the participants. The whole career of Johnson proves the logical exactness with which he followed strict construction dogma in all points excepting the doctrine of secession.[46] McPherson, Hist. of Recon., 45, 46[47] The repudiation of the Sherman-Johnston agreement of April 18th was of a negative character, and did not commit the administration to any policy. Coming, as it did, so shortly after his inauguration, it was taken by those expecting harsh measures from the President as an indication of such a policy. An examination of the circumstances, however, shows that Johnson was merely following the policy supposed to have been adopted by Lincoln, and evidenced by instructions sent to Grant on March 3 in regard to a proposed conference with Lee. Stephens’ charge (War between the States, ii, 632), that Johnson was bound to ratify the agreement as consistent with the Crittenden Resolution of 1861, is inadmissible. Generals in the field manifestly have no right to decide momentous political questions. For a copy of the Sherman-Johnston agreement, and the official dispatch giving particulars of its disapproval, see McPherson, Hist. of Recon., 121-2.[48] McPherson, p. 13-14.[49] McPherson, p. 8.[50] See Appendix; Savage, Life and Public Services of Andrew Johnson, 370-373.[51] Blaine, ii, 70-76, ascribes this amnesty proclamation to the personal influence of Mr. Seward, who favored all but the 13th excepted class (property holders above $20,000). This certainly offers a good explanation of the promptness of his action, and is not inconsistent with the theory of Johnson’s attitude as outlined above.[52] McPherson, p. 11; Blaine, ii, 77, 78.[53] Tennessee, of course, having been reorganized during Lincoln’s administration, under the direction of Military Governor Johnson, cannot be considered in connection with Johnson’s policy as President. Louisiana and Arkansas also retained their reorganized governments until the reconstruction acts took effect. See Blaine, ii, 79, 80.[54] The phraseology differed in the different States, depending upon the sensitiveness and pride of the legislature.[55] McPherson, Reconst., 7, 8.[56] McPherson, Reconst., 49.[57] Ibid., 51-2.[58] McPherson, 20.[59] Ibid., 21-2.[60] McPherson, 43; Blaine, ii, 102-3.[61] See Why the Solid South, edited by Hilary A. Herbert, for a detailed presentation of the Southern view.[62] The report of the Joint Committee on Reconstruction, June 18th (House Reports, No. 30, 1st Session, 39th Congress; McPherson, 84-93), gives a spirited summary of the action of the Southern States since the appointment of the provisional governors. See also Blaine, Twenty Years of Congress, ii, 84-107.[63] Lalor, iii, 546.[64] Senate: Republicans, 40; Democrats, 11; House: Republicans, 145; Democrats, 40. The work before Congress was well expressed by Schuyler Colfax in his speech made upon taking the Speaker’s chair. Speaking of Congress he said: “Representing, in its two branches, the States and the people, its first and highest obligation is to guarantee to every State a republican form of government. The rebellion having overthrown constitutional State governments in many States, it is yours to mature and enact legislation which, with the concurrence of the Executive, shall establish them anew on such a basis of enduring justice as will guarantee all the necessary safeguards to the people, and afford what our Magna Charta, the Declaration of Independence, proclaims is the chief object of government—protection to all men in their inalienable rights. * * * * Then we may hope to see the vacant and once abandoned seats around us gradually filling up, until this hall shall contain representatives from every State and district; their hearts devoted to the Union for which they are to legislate, jealous of its honor, proud of its glory, watchful of its rights, and hostile to its enemies.” Congressional Globe, 39th Congress, 1st Session, p. 5. See Blaine, Twenty Years of Congress, ii, 111, 112.[65] Among the Senators elected were Alexander H. Stephens, Vice-President of the Confederacy, and H. V. Johnson, a Senator in the rebel Congress, both from Georgia; from North Carolina, W. A. Graham, Senator in the rebel Congress; from South Carolina, B. F. Perry, a Confederate States judge, and J. I. Manning, volunteer aid to General Beauregard at Fort Sumter and Manassas (McPherson, 106-7). Among the Representatives chosen were: from Alabama, Cullen A. Battle, a Confederate general, and T. J. Foster, a Representative in the rebel Congress; from Georgia, Philip Cook and W. T. Wofford, generals in the Confederate army; from Mississippi, A. E. Reynolds and R. A. Pinson, rebel colonels, and J. T. Harrison, in rebel provisional Congress; from North Carolina, Josiah Turner was a rebel colonel, and a member of the rebel Congress, and T. C. Fuller a rebel Congressman; from South Carolina, J. D. Kennedy was a colonel, and Samuel McGowan a general in the rebel army, and James Farrow, a rebel Congressman.[66] By Mr. Brooks, of New York. Congressional Globe, 39th Congress, 1st Session, pp. 3, 4.[67] Congressional Globe, 1st Session, 39th Congress, p. 2; Blaine, Twenty Years of Congress, ii, 113-115.[68] Wilson, History of Reconstruction, 16 ff.[69] Congressional Globe, 39th Congress, 1st Session, pp. 24-30.[70] Senator Lane committed suicide on July 11, 1866. Mortification caused by abuse, as the result of his action, is supposed to have unbalanced him mentally. Cf., Blaine, ii, 185.[71] The resolution as adopted by the House on the 4th contained in addition: “and until such report shall have been made, and finally acted upon by Congress, no member shall be received into either House from any of the so-called Confederate States, and all papers relating to the representation of the said States shall be referred to the said committee without debate.” The Senate, however, considered such provisions to affect powers granted to each House separately, and which should not be entrusted to a joint committee. Therefore they were struck out, but on December 14 the House of Representatives passed resolutions binding itself to be governed by similar principles.[72] The other members of the committee were: on the part of the Senate, Howard of Michigan, Grimes of Iowa, Harris of New York, Williams of Oregon, and Johnson of Maryland; on the part of the House, Washburne of Illinois, Morrill of Vermont, Grider of Kentucky, Bingham of Ohio, Conkling of New York, Boutwell of Massachusetts, Blow of Missouri, and Rogers of New Jersey.[73] Blaine, Twenty Years of Congress, ii, 115.[74] Wilson, History of the Reconstruction Measures, 42-105, contains a summary of the debates on reconstruction; see also Blaine, Twenty Years of Congress, ii, 128 ff.[75] Congressional Globe, 39th Congress, 1st Session, pp. 72-5.[76] Congressional Globe, 1st Session, 39th Congress, p. 1019.[77] Congressional Globe, 1st Session, 39th Congress, p. 1309. These strong statements of the advisability of confiscation alarmed the Southern States greatly, and caused them to hate and fear Thaddeus Stevens. See Lalor, iii, 546 ff. The following extract from General Taylor’s Destruction and Reconstruction (pp. 243-4), is characteristic of the Southern estimate of the man. General Taylor had occasion to call upon Stevens while endeavoring to get permission to visit Jefferson Davis, then in confinement at Fortress Monroe. He goes on to say: “Thaddeus Stevens received me with as much civility as he was capable of. Deformed in body and temper like Caliban, this was the Lord Hategood of the fair; but he was frankness itself. He wanted no restoration of the Union under the Constitution, which he called a worthless bit of old parchment. The white people of the South ought never again to be trusted with power, for they would inevitably unite with the Northern ‘Copperheads’ and control the government. The only sound policy was to confiscate the lands and divide them among the negroes, to whom, sooner or later, suffrage must be given. Touching the matter in hand, Johnson was a fool to have captured Davis, whom it would have been wiser to assist in escaping. Nothing would be done with him, as the Executive had only pluck enough to hang poor devils, such as Wirz and Mrs. Surratt. Had the leading traitors been promptly strung up, well; but the time for that had passed. (Here, I thought, he looked lovingly at my neck, as Petit AndrÉ was wont to do at those of his merry-go-rounds.)”[78] Congressional Globe, 39th Congress, 1st Session, p. 1476.[79] Congressional Globe, 39th Congress, 1st Session, p. 1616.

[80] Ibid., p. 1617.[81] Ibid., p. 1828.[82] Congressional Globe, 39th Congress, 1st Session, p. 155.[83] Ibid., p. 150.[84] Congressional Globe, 39th Congress, 1st Session, p. 1169.[85] Ibid., p. 2256.[86] Gillet’s Democracy in the United States, pp. 309-13, discusses the Freedmen’s Bureau from the Northern Democratic standpoint.[87] The first bill creating a Freedmen’s Bureau was introduced in the House during the 37th Congress by Mr. Eliot, of Massachusetts, who during the 39th Congress was chairman of the Select Committee on Freedmen. It was not reported, but the same bill was presented in the first session of the 38th Congress, and passed the House by a vote of 69 to 67. It was returned from the Senate on June 30, 1864, amended so as to attach the Bureau to the Treasury Department. A committee of conference agreed upon a new bill creating a department of freedmen’s affairs, reporting to the President. This passed the House, but failed in the Senate. The next attempt succeeded. Congressional Globe, 2d Session, 38th Congress, p. 1307. See Cox’s Three Decades of Federal Legislation for an account of the Freedmen’s Bureau; also Wilson, Rise and Fall of the Slave Power in America, iii, 472-485; Wilson (Woodrow), Division and Reunion, 263.[88] Congressional Globe, 39th Congress, 1st Session, p. 1299. Mr. Doolittle on the 19th of December, 1865, had introduced a bill relative to the Bureau of Freedmen, but when reported from the Committee on Military Affairs, to which it had been referred, it was indefinitely postponed.

[89] This committee had been established by a resolution introduced by Mr. Eliot, of Massachusetts, on December 6, 1865. So much of the President’s message as related to freedmen, and all papers relating to the same subject, were to be referred to it. The following were appointed members of the committee: T. D. Eliot of Massachusetts, W. D. Kelley of Pennsylvania, G. S. Orth of Indiana, J. A. Bingham of Ohio, Nelson Taylor of New York, B. F. Loan of Missouri, J. B. Grinnell of Iowa, H. E. Paine of Wisconsin, and S. S. Marshall of Illinois.[90] Cox confuses this act with the act passed over the veto on July 16, declaring that it was passed over the veto on February 21. Three Decades of Federal Legislation, p. 444.[91] See Wilson (Henry), Rise and Fall of the Slave Power in America, iii, 490-97; Wilson, History of Reconstruction, 148-184; Blaine, Twenty Years of Congress, ii, 164-170; Wilson (Woodrow), Division and Reunion, 264.[92] Congressional Globe, 1st Session, 39th Congress. McPherson, History of the Reconstruction, pp. 73-4.[93] The veto messages of the Presidents of the United States, from Washington to Cleveland, inclusive, have been compiled by Ben: Perley Poore by order of the Senate.[94] Congressional Globe, 39th Congress, 1st Session, pp. 915-917; McPherson, History of Reconstruction, pp. 68-72.[95] See Wilson, Rise and Fall of the Slave Power in America, iii, 497-99; Wilson, History of the Reconstruction, 184-195; Blaine, Twenty Years of Congress, ii, 171-2.[96] The votes were: House, 104 to 33; Senate, 33 to 12. For the text of the bill, see Congressional Globe, 1st Session, 39th Congress; McPherson, History of the Reconstruction, pp. 149-50. Blaine, Twenty Years of Congress, ii, 172, states that the bill was far less popular than the measure vetoed on February 19. “It required potent persuasion, re-enforced by the severest exercise of party discipline, to prevent a serious break in both Houses against the bill.”[97] McPherson, History of the Reconstruction, 52-56.[98] House journal, 39th Congress, 1st Session, 300, 315. The resolution was carried particularly to silence the Tennessee claimants for recognition. The somewhat anomalous position of that State gave grounds for the argument that it should be classed in the same category with the other Southern States. Thus Mr. Stevens was able to get the power for the joint committee which he had originally claimed.[99] McPherson, History of the Reconstruction, pp. 58-63.[100] See Wilson, Rise and Fall of the Slave Power in America, iii, 684-692; History of Reconstruction, 117-149; Blaine, Twenty Years of Congress, ii, 172-79.[101] Congressional Globe, 1st Session, 39th Congress, pp. 39, 40.[102] Congressional Globe, 39th Congress, 1st Session; McPherson, History of the Reconstruction, pp. 75-8.[103] Congressional Globe, 39th Congress, 1st Session, pp. 1679-81; McPherson, History of Reconstruction, pp. 75-8.[104] Senate Journal, 39th Congress, 1st Session, pp. 431-2; McPherson, History of the Reconstruction, pp. 82-3; Blaine, Twenty Years of Congress, ii, 275-80.[105] McPherson, History of the Reconstruction, 81-2; Congressional Globe, 39th Congress, 1st Session, 2609.[106] McPherson, 160-164.[107] McPherson, History of the Reconstruction, pp. 164-6; Congressional Globe, 39th Congress, 1st Session.[108] Hurd, in his Theory of our National Existence, p. 42, says that this report of the Joint Committee on Reconstruction “as being the most authoritative declaration of principles supposed to have been afterwards carried out in political action, is a document which, either for good or evil, will probably be regarded as one of the most important in the history of this country.”[109] For an extended discussion of the constitutional views of the members of the committee, see Hurd’s Theory, etc., pp. 224 ff.[110] House Reports, No. 30, 39th Congress, 1st Session. McPherson, History of Reconstruction, pp. 84-93.[111] Gillet, Democracy in the United States, pp. 318-20.[112] Congressional Globe, 1st Session, 39th Congress, pp. 9, 10, 351.[113] Ibid., 141-2, 232. For general discussions and summaries of the debates on the 14th Amendment, see Wilson, Rise and Fall of the Slave Power in America, iii, 647-660; Wilson, History of Reconstruction, 218-266; Blaine, Twenty Years of Congress, ii, 193-214.[114] The vote was: yeas, 120; nays, 46.[115] Congressional Globe, 39th Congress, 1st Session, p. 2459.[116] Yeas, 128, nays, 37.[117] On May 29, Congressional Globe, 39th Congress, 1st Session, p. 2869.[118] See Pollard’s Lost Cause Regained, p. 74.[119] Senate Journal, 39th Congress, 1st Session, p. 502.[120] On the reorganization of Tennessee, see Blaine, Twenty Years of Congress, ii, 50-52, 214-17; Cox, Three Decades of Federal Legislation.[121] House Reports, No. 30, pt. 1; McPherson, History of the Reconstruction, pp. 105-6.[122] Ratified by the Senate July 11, yeas, 15, nays, 6; by the House July 12, yeas, 43, nays, 11. Tennessee was the third State to ratify the amendment, Connecticut and New Hampshire being the first two.[123] McPherson, History of the Reconstruction, pp. 151-4.[124] Blaine, Twenty Years of Congress, ii, 219-220.[125] The Congressional committee of investigation, appointed at the beginning of the 2d session, in December, submitted a detailed report of the riots. See House Reports, No. 16, 2d Session, 39th Congress. See also Blaine, Twenty Years of Congress, ii, 233-237.[126] House Reports, No. 16, 39th Congress, 2d Session, p. 26.[127] See below for an account of this canvass.[128] House Reports, No. 16, 39th Congress, 2d Session, pp. 24-27; McPherson, History of the Reconstruction, 137.[129] McPherson, History of the Reconstruction, 118, 119; Blaine, Twenty Years of Congress, ii, 220-223.[130] Among these Republicans were Thurlow Weed, Edgar Cowan, James R. Doolittle, A. W. Randall, O. H. Browning, James Dixon, Henry J. Raymond, R. S. Hale, J. A. Dix, Marshall O. Roberts and Montgomery Blair.[131] McPherson, History of the Reconstruction, 240-1.[132] Blaine, Twenty Years of Congress, ii, 222.[133] McPherson, History of the Reconstruction, 127.[134] McPherson, History of the Reconstruction, 129. This manner of indicating his disinterestedness caused great offense in some quarters. See the account below of the Pittsburg convention of soldiers and sailors of September 26.[135] See Blaine, Twenty Years of Congress, ii, 237-239.[136] McPherson, History of the Reconstruction, 130.[137] McPherson, History of the Reconstruction, 131, 132.[138] McPherson, 135. The following is a good example of the manner in which Johnson lowered himself to the level of the disorderly element, who made a bedlam out of some of the meetings he attended. The extract is from the Cleveland speech: “Who can come and place his finger on one pledge I ever violated, or one principle I ever proved false to? (A voice, ‘How about New Orleans?’ Another voice, ‘Hang Jeff Davis.’) Hang Jeff Davis, he says. (Cries of ‘No’ and ‘Down with him!’) Hang Jeff Davis, he says. (A voice, ‘Hang Thad. Stevens and Wendell Phillips.’) Hang Jeff Davis. Why don’t you hang him? (Cries of ‘Give us the opportunity.’) Have you not got the court? Have not you got the Attorney General? (A voice, ‘Who is your Chief Justice who has refused to sit upon the trial?’ Cheers.) I am not the Chief Justice. I am not the prosecuting attorney. (Cheers.) I am not the jury.

“I will tell you what I did do. I called upon your Congress that is trying to break up the government. (Cries, ‘You be d—d!’ and cheers mingled with hisses. Great confusion. ‘Don’t get mad, Andy.’) Well, I will tell you who is mad. ‘Whom the gods wish to destroy, they first make mad.’ Did your Congress order them to be tried? (‘Three cheers for Congress’),” etc.[139] Tennessee, Texas, Georgia, Missouri, Virginia, North Carolina and Alabama were represented among the signers to the call.[140] McPherson, History of the Reconstruction, 124.[141] Blaine, Twenty Years of Congress, ii, 224-228.[142] McPherson, History of the Reconstruction, 241, 242.[143] McPherson, History of the Reconstruction, 242.[144] The address was prepared by Senator Creswell, of Maryland. See Blaine, Twenty Years of Congress, ii, 223-228.[145] McPherson, History of the Reconstruction, 243; Blaine, Twenty Years of Congress, ii, 228-230.[146] Blaine, Twenty Years of Congress, ii, 230-233.[147] General John A. Logan was first chosen president, but was unable to attend.[148] McPherson, History of the Reconstruction, 242, 243.[149] McPherson, History of the Reconstruction, 140.[150] McPherson, History of the Reconstruction, 194.[151] Scott, Reconstruction during the Civil War, 290 ff.[152] House Journal, 2d Session, 39th Congress, 12-23; McPherson, History of the Reconstruction, 143-147.[153] House Journal, 2d Session, 39th Congress, 15.[154] The resolution passed the House on December 4, and the Senate on December 5. House Journal, 2d Session, 39th Congress, 30; Senate Journal, 2d Session, 39th Congress, 22.[155] Senate Journal, 2d Session, 39th Congress, 202.[156] House Journal, 2d Session, 39th Congress, 345.[157] Congressional Globe, 2d Session, 39th Congress, 1074.[158] Congressional Globe, 2d Session, 39th Congress, 1076.[159] Congressional Globe, 2d Session, 39th Congress, 1360.[160] Ibid., 1381-2.[161] Ibid., 1360.[162] Congressional Globe, 2d Session, 39th Congress, 1399.[163] McPherson, History of the Reconstruction, 192.[164] House Journal, 2d Session, 39th Congress, 563-572.[165] Act of January 22, 1867.[166] Congressional Globe, 1st Session, 40th Congress, 13.[167] The Committee on the Judiciary was instructed on March 7 to report a supplementary bill (Congressional Globe, 17), and the Wilson bill was accordingly reported by it.[168] Congressional Globe, 1st Session, 40th Congress, 302-3; 313-14.[169] Congressional Globe, appendix, 1st Session, 40th Congress, 39; McPherson, History of the Reconstruction, 192.[170] Except in Virginia, where the number was modified in proportion to the change made by the separation of West Virginia.[171] By the act of that date all persons elected or appointed to any office under the government of the United States were required to take the following oath previous to entering upon the duties of such office: “I, A. B., do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I have never voluntarily borne arms against the United States since I have been a citizen thereof; that I have voluntarily given no aid, countenance, counsel, or encouragement to persons engaged in armed hostility thereto; that I have neither sought nor accepted nor attempted to exercise the functions of any office whatever, under any authority or pretended authority in hostility to the United States; that I have not yielded a voluntary support to any pretended government, authority, power or constitution within the United States, hostile or inimical thereto. And I do further swear (or affirm) that, to the best of my knowledge and ability, I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; that I take this obligation freely, without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion, and that I will well and faithfully discharge the duties of the office on which I am about to enter, so help me God.”[172] Appendix, Congressional Globe, 1st Session, 40th Congress, 39, 40.[173] Johnson, Reconstruction, in Lalor, iii, 552; Cox, Three Decades of Federal Legislation, 378.[174] Congressional Globe, appendix, 1st Session, 39th Congress, 43-4.[175] McPherson, History of the Reconstruction, 335-6.[176] Stanbery had ruled that the willingness of an applicant to take the oath must be regarded as final evidence of his qualification to register. Thus those notoriously incapacitated from taking the oath honestly, could not be prevented from registering. This additional power virtually enabled the boards of registration to exercise their own discretion as to whom they should enroll.[177] Scott, Reconstruction during the Civil War, 317 ff.[178] Cox, Three Decades of Federal Legislation, 512-14.[179] McPherson, History of the Reconstruction, 336-7.[180] McPherson, 190.[181] Dunning, in Papers of the American Historical Association, iv, 473; Congressional Globe, 1st Session, 40th Congress, p. 565.[182] McPherson, 264.[183] Ibid., 178.[184] McPherson, 178.[185] Vetoed March 2, 1867, and repassed by both houses on the same day. For copy of the act, see McPherson, 176 ff.[186] His argument here, however, is weak, as the power of suspension would easily have covered all such cases.[187] Ex parte Hennen, January, 1839, 13 Peters, 139.[188] McPherson, 261.[189] Ibid., 262.[190] The text of the correspondence between Grant and Johnson may be found in McPherson, History of the Reconstruction, p. 282 ff.[191] McPherson, p. 283.[192] Ibid., p. 284.[193] McPherson, 265. The fact also that Grant had refused to be governed by Johnson’s instructions made the attempt still less serious.[194] See Dunning, Papers American Historical Association, 1890, p. 481.[195] McPherson, 266. The vote was 128 to 47, divided strictly on party lines.[196] For the full text of the eleven articles, see McPherson, 266 ff. For a critical discussion of the legal points involved in the trial, see Dunning, in Papers American Historical Association, iv, 483 ff.

Transcriber’s Notes:

Foonote 80 appears on page 58 of the text, but there is no corresponding marker on the page.

Punctuation has been corrected without note.

Other than the corrections noted by hover information, inconsistencies in spelling and hyphenation have been retained from the original.