Card laws are intended to effect two objects: 1. To preserve the harmony and determine the ordering of the table. Such, for example, are the laws in the previous code, which regulate scoring, cutting, shuffling, &c. and the miscellaneous rules included under the head of Etiquette. 2. To prevent any player from obtaining an unfair advantage. The word "unfair" must be taken in a restricted sense. It does not mean intentional unfairness. This is not to be dealt with by laws, but by exclusion from the card table. In deciding cases of card law, the offender should be credited with bon fides. It follows from this, that offences should not be judged by the intention of the player, but by the amount of injury which his irregularity may inflict on the opponents. In a perfect code, there should be a penalty for all errors or irregularities, by which the player committing them, or his side, might profit; and on the other hand there should be no penalty for errors by which he who commits them, cannot possibly gain an advantage. Penalties should be proportioned as closely as possible to the gain which might ensue to the offender. For instance: if the third hand has not played and However carefully a code is drawn up, it will not unfrequently happen in practice, that cases occur which are but imperfectly provided for. Such cases should be referred for decision to some arbitrator. The arbitrator will find himself materially assisted by keeping well before him the two great objects with which the laws have been framed. The following general rules will also be found useful in guiding him to just decisions: Where two or more players are in fault, it should be considered with whom the first fault lies, and how far it induced or invited the subsequent error of the adversary. Questions of fact should be settled before the case is referred, either by a majority of the players, or, if When the facts are agreed to they should be written down, and the written statement submitted to the judge, who should return a written answer. Should it so happen that a case is referred, wherein the players are divided in opinion as to the facts, the arbitrator will do well to decline to give a decision. The disputants, however, may be reminded that the player whom it is proposed to punish is entitled to the benefit of reasonable doubt. Questions of interpretation of law should be decided liberally, in accordance with the spirit rather than the letter of the law. On the other hand, the arbitrator should bear in mind the great inconvenience of a lax interpretation of card laws, and, having made up his mind as to the intention of the law, should decide all cases with the utmost strictness. The following cases, with decisions, selected from a large number which have been brought under the author's notice as having occurred in actual play, are given in exemplification of the foregoing remarks. CASE I.The play of the hand shows that AB (partners) hold no honour. The hand is therefore abandoned and the adversaries (YZ) score the game. It is then discovered that Y has only twelve cards, and one of Decision—YZ are entitled to score four by honours. Y is not obliged to play with his cards in his hand. Besides, the game having been abandoned, Law 59 comes into operation. The penalty for playing with twelve cards is laid down in Law 46. Y is liable for any revoke he may have made. CASE II.AB claim "the game" and score it. After the trump card of the following deal is turned up, YZ object that AB have not claimed honours (vide Laws 6 and 7). Decision—The honours were claimed within the meaning of the law. The objection to the score, if made really in ignorance of how it accrued, should have been taken at once. YZ should not wait the completion of the deal, so as to entrap AB on a mere technicality. Note. This is a good instance of interpretation in accordance with the spirit of the law. Laws should never be so construed as to inflict a wholly unnecessary wrong, as would happen in this case were the law insisted on literally. The intention of Law 7 is to require AB to draw attention to the claim; and this is sufficiently done by the claim of "the game." CASE III.Y throws down his hand and claims "the game." B (Y's adversary) thinking that Y is referring only to the tricks, says, "You are not game." Y then marks four. After the trump card of the following deal is turned up, A remarks, "if Y had scored his honours, he would have been game." Y then claims the game, on the ground that he made the claim in time, and only withdrew it in consequence of B's contradiction. Is Y entitled to score the game? Decision—No. Y's claim of "the game" is irregular. He is bound to state in what way he wins it (vide Law 6). There is no evidence that Y was referring to his honours when he claimed the game, but rather the contrary, as he afterwards withdrew his claim and said nothing about honours. Note. This is an example of two players being in fault. It seems hard on Y that he should suffer through B's mistake; but it must be borne in mind that the confusion was introduced by Y's own irregularity, and that the omission to score honours was due to his subsequent forgetfulness. Compare with Case II. CASE IV.At the conclusion of the deal the trump card comes to the hand on the dealer's left. The dealer requests the players to count their cards. The player to the Decision—It is a misdeal. The fault is entirely with the dealer. If he deals so carelessly that there is any doubt as to the ownership of the hands, he must apportion them, and having once done so, he must not shift the hands about, so as to make a hand with twelve cards in it fall to himself. CASE V.Y throws down his cards, remarking, "We have lost the game." On this, A and B (Y's adversaries) throw down their cards. Z retains his hand. AB plead that they were misled by Y and that therefore they are not liable to Law 58. Decision—A's, Y's, and B's hands are exposed, and must be left on the table to be called, each player's by the adversary. Z is not bound to abandon the game because his partner chooses to do so. Consequently, Y's remark does not bind Z. A and B ought to keep up their cards, until they have ascertained that both adversaries have abandoned the game. Note. The written law is sufficient to decide this case (vide Law 58); but inasmuch as the irregularity in question is a fertile source of disputes, the case has been deemed worthy of insertion. CASE VI.When it comes to the last trick of a hand, it appears that the player who has to lead has no card. What is to be done? Decision—(a) If either of the other players remains with two cards, it is a misdeal (vide Law 44, paragraph iv). (b) If the other players have their right number of cards, the missing card should be searched for (vide Law 70) and when found assigned to the leader, who is liable to Law 46. (c) If the missing card cannot be found, the tricks may be searched to find what card is wanting, and the absent card assumed to have belonged to the player who had but twelve cards. Note. It may seem that decision c is severe on a player playing bon fide with an imperfect pack. But each player should protect himself, by counting his hand before he plays. His playing to the first trick signifies his acceptance of the hand. If he accepts an imperfect one he must take the consequences. CASE VII.Towards the end of a hand a spade is led. The third hand, when it comes to his turn to play, lays down the ace of trumps (hearts) and says "There's the game." He then throws his hand on the table. The hand contains several spades. Is it a revoke? Decision—It is a question of fact. If the card was exposed in order to save time, it is not a revoke. But CASE VIII.The adversary cuts the pack to the dealer, but without his consent, i.e., without the dealer's presenting it to be cut. Is it too late to claim a revoke in the previous hand? (vide Law 78). Decision—It is too late for the player who cut or for his partner to claim a revoke, but not too late for the adversaries. CASE IX.A player revokes, and on discovering the revoke before the hand is played out, says in explanation, "I never saw the card; it was hidden behind my king of diamonds"—the king of diamonds being still in his hand. Decision—The king of diamonds is constructively an exposed card, and the adversaries may require that it be laid on the table to be called. CASE X.Y leads out of turn. B (Y's adversary) says to his partner, "Shall we call a suit or not?" B's partner gives no answer. Is the asking the question a consultation within the meaning of Law 84, although no answer is made to it? Decision—Yes. It is the very question Law 84 is framed to prevent. B by the question shows that he is in doubt as to the policy of calling a suit, and thus affords information he has no right to give. Further than this, a reply by word of mouth is not necessary to constitute a consultation. Silence is an answer. The knowledge that a partner is indifferent may convey information that B has no right to extract. Note. The usual formula is "Will you exact the penalty, or shall I?" This question does not bring the player under the operation of Law 84. CASE XI.A leads and the other three players follow suit. A plays another card (it not being his lead) and proceeds to gather the five cards into one trick. On being told of it, A explains that his attention has been diverted, and that he thought he had not played to the trick. The adversaries claim to be entitled to the penalties for leading out of turn, on the ground that the penalty should depend, not on the actual intention of the player, but on his possible intention. Decision—A has not led out of turn; he has merely exposed a card. The abstract principle pleaded by the adversaries is quite sound, but it does not apply to this case. A's word must be taken as correctly representing the fact that he played a second time to one trick. |