OUTLINES OF A CRITICAL THEORY OF ETHICS. By John Dewey. Ann Arbor:
Register Publishing Company. 1891.

The title of this very thoughtful book expresses well the author's method of comparing opposite one-sided views with the aim of discovering a more adequate theory. In carrying out this aim not only is an analysis given of the main elements of the theory of ethics, but the main methods and problems of contemporary ethics are considered also. Professor Dewey rejects both Hedonism and Kantism. He rejects Hedonism because pleasure fails as a standard of ethics, and he rejects Kantism because it is a barren abstraction. Kant's "ought" does not root in and does not flower from the "is." Professor Dewey says:

"Hedonism finds the end of conduct, or the desirable, wholly determined by the various particular desires which a man happens to have; Kantianism holds that to discover the end of conduct, we must wholly exclude the desires. Hedonism holds that the rightness of conduct is determined wholly by its consequences; Kantianism holds that the consequences have nothing to do with the rightness of an act, but that it is decided wholly by the motive of the act. From this contrast we may anticipate both our criticism of the Kantian theory and our conception of the true end of action. The fundamental error of Hedonism and Kantianism is the same—the supposition that desires are for pleasure only. Let it be recognised that desires are for objects conceived as satisfying or developing the self, and that pleasure is incidental to this fulfilment of capacities of self, and we have the means of escaping the one-sidedness of Kantianism as well as of Hedonism. We can see that the end is neither the procuring of particular pleasures through the various desires, nor action from the mere idea of abstract law in general, but that it is the satisfaction of desires according to law" (pp. 82-83)

The author acknowledges his indebtedness to the writings of the late Professor Green and others for the "backbone" of his theory, which he states to be "the conception of the will as the expression of ideas, and of social ideas; the notion of an objective ethical world realised in institutions which afford moral ideals, theatre and impetus to the individual; the notion of the moral life as growth in freedom, as the individual finds and conforms to the law of his social placing." Among the specific forms which the author calls particular attention to, as giving "a flesh and blood of its own" to that backbone, are the idea of desire as the ideal activity in contrast with actual possession; the analysis of individuality into function including capacity and environment, and the statement of an ethical postulate.

This postulate may be regarded as summing up the ethical theory as presented by Professor Dewey. It is thus expressed: In the realisation of individuality there is found also the needed realization of some community of persons of which the individual is a member; and, conversely, the agent who duly satisfies the community in which he shares, by that same conduct satisfies himself. We have here postulated a community of persons, and a good which realised by the will of one is made public. In "this unity of individuals as respects the end of action, this existence of a practical common good," we have what is called "the moral order of the world." This view would seem to satisfy the requirements of both Individualism and Socialism, but is it consistent with the law of progress elsewhere insisted on by the author? He affirms, as against the Hedonism of Spencer, that moral ideals are always developing. Progress is itself the ideal, since "permanence of specific ideals means moral death." But this progress must originate with the individual, who by the formation of the new ideal ceases to be in perfect accord with the community, and will continue to be in disaccord with it until the community has accepted his ideal. A perfect realisation of individuality in the community would be the "fixed millennium" which the author properly objects to, and to escape which it is necessary, that the equilibration towards which the individual, as well as the social, organism is ever tending shall never be actually attained. Its attainment would mean stagnation and death.

We have not space to say more of Professor Dewey's book than that it is a very thoughtful work, most so in its critical parts, and will form an excellent help for the student of ethics.

O.

AN INTRODUCTION TO SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY. By John S. Mackenzie. New
York: Macmillan & Co. Chicago: A. C. McClurg & Co. 1890.

We have here, in an enlarged form, the substance of the Shaw Lectures delivered by the author, at the University of Edinburg, in January, 1889. The work is professedly, not a systematic treatise on the subject dealt with, but only a slight contribution to the discussion of it; and it is said to be "not so much a book as an indication of the lines on which a book might be written." The force of these apparently deprecatory remarks depends entirely on the result attained. If an introductory study is based on true principles it may be of more general value than an elaborate work, because it will probably present the conclusions of the latter in a simpler and less technical form. This presupposes, however, a knowledge of previous inquiry, and, therefore, the use of the term "Introduction" is somewhat of a misnomer. Mr. Mackenzie remarks, indeed, that his inquiry may be thought to belong to the end rather than to the beginning of philosophic study.

The leading idea of Mr. Mackenzie's work is embodied in the sentence just quoted. The value of social life depends on the ultimate end to be attained, and the author sets himself to discover what is the true aim of society. The existence of a society of human beings cannot be accounted for without the conception of purpose, for to whatever element of accident may be due the bringing of those human beings into relation to each other, "the particular direction in which their relations become developed is obviously due to certain aims by which they are guided." The inquiry into the principles which determine the nature of those aims, and as to the ideal to which such principles lead, is what constitutes Social Philosophy. This falls within the third of Hegel's chief divisions of philosophic study, the Philosophy of Spirit, which is concerned with objects in so far as they are themselves creations of thought; and the objects of Social Philosophy may be described as the relations of men to each other, their relations to the material world, and the development of individual character in so far as that is affected by these relations. Before treating of the aim which constitutes the social ideal, our author states the conditions of the social problem, those of difficulty on the one hand, and of hope on the other, and he finds that the general state of society for a number of generations back has been one of "tumultuous progress." There is a great improvement in the condition of nearly all classes of people and "a very great brightening of our general outlook." But life has become in many directions more chaotic and uncertain. What is now wanted is "some principle which will enable us to bring about a more perfect connection between the parts of our society, to form new links and ties, so that men may no longer be subject to the directions of iron laws over which they have no control. We have to overcome individualism, on the one hand, and the power of material conditions, on the other." To do this will be the chief step towards the realisation of the social ideal, which is dependent on the nature of society and on the nature of men.

The recognition of the fact that everything deepest in nature, and especially in human nature is a product of growth has, says Mr. Mackenzie, "passed over into popular thought, and become a part of our intellectual atmosphere." Nature is thus regarded as organic, by which our author means "a systematic unity, in which neither the parts exist independently of the whole nor the whole independently of its parts." This view is distinguished from that of Monadism, which regards the world as a collection of mutually independent parts, and of Monism, according to which Mr. Mackenzie declares the world is a single system, in which the nature of every part is predetermined by the whole. According to the organic view the world is a real unity, though it is a unity which expresses itself through difference. It goes without saying that there is no Monism of Mr. Mackenzie's description. No Monist would ever deny that the unity of the world expresses itself through difference.

Whether or not our author is right in rejecting what he describes as the monistic view of nature, does not really affect the conclusion as to the nature of Society. This he declares to be organic, and it is shown that society possesses the three conditions which belong essentially to the nature of an organic system; that is, the relations of the parts which form the whole are intrinsic, changes in it take place by an internal adaptation or growth, and its end forms an element in its own nature. This conclusion would, indeed, seem to be required by the fact that society consists of a number of individuals who are themselves organic units. At the same time it might be objected that, although many of the lower animals dwell together in societies, these can hardly be regarded as organic. This consideration gives rise to the thought that the organic nature of human society depends on the conditions by which man is differentiated from other animals. In treating of this point, Mr. Mackenzie shows that there are several stages in the development of the "self," and he concludes that although an animal is conscious of a self, yet that it is not conscious of "the unity of its individual life, the connected system of its experiences as a whole, in which each single experience has a definite place," being that which constitutes the highest development of self, and which is the distinguishing self-consciousness of humanity.

This faculty of self-consciousness might be reduced to simpler elements, but it is that by which, as Mr. Mackenzie shows, we are enabled to understand the organic nature of human society. The recognition of the fact that the universe is a systematic whole constitutes an ideal, which, although consciously aimed at by few, gives a progressive character to the general mind. Man is the only creature that has an ideal, because he has been able to catch a glimpse of a kind of consciousness of that which he has not attained, but which he is bound to strive to attain. He begins with vague impressions and animal impulses, "and his whole life is a struggle towards clearness—clearness in the conceptions which he applies to things in knowledge, clearness in the conception of ends of which he makes use in conduct." The struggle between the immediate experience of what is present in sense and "the 'still small voice' of the ideal, which bids us have regard for the Universal," would be fruitless, however, if the individual were alone. Society is necessary for the proper development of the more ideal elements in human nature, as it provides the rational environment required for a rational being. This leads to a consideration of the ultimate end of society. In the course of the discussion of this question the author deals with the different views entertained as to the principles by which we are guided in conduct and by which human progress is determined. He points out that what we seek is some definitely ascertainable end, which we recognise as good, and which is the happiness or well-being of persons. He rejects, however, the Utilitarian theory, showing that pleasure cannot be the end of conduct, and concludes that, if "we have any rational end at all, it must consist in some kind of realisation of our nature as a whole"; of knowledge, and will, and feeling, taken together. The true end is in fact self-realisation, and this includes society, for we cannot suppose that the ideal should be realised within our lives. It is conceivable only "by our being able to see the world as a system of intelligent beings who are mutually worlds for each other." The true nature of man's end is thus necessarily a social one, and it includes everything that belongs to the highest good. It embraces the realisation of Reason, Order, and Beauty in the world; the realisation of Life; the perfection of Knowledge and Wisdom, of Will and of Feeling.

We have given so full a summary of Mr. Mackenzie's argument that we can add only a mere outline of what he considers "the form of social union in which, under given conditions, the progress will be most rapid and most secure towards that good which we must regard as the ultimate end." The social ideal is said to depend on three chief elements of well-being, Individual Culture, Subjugation of Nature, and Social Organisation; which give rise to the one-sided ideals of Liberty, Equality, and Aristocracy, not of birth but of talent. The Organic ideal, which is that of Fraternity, is the true one, and it consists in constant progress. This progress includes the three elements of human well-being, personal development being the most important, as education reacts on social life generally, by bringing new ideals of life as well as a new sense of duty. In leaving Mr. Mackenzie's excellent work, we may say that it deals in a clear and logical manner with the important questions considered, and that it fully justifies the author's remark that "Social Philosophy is a subject which at present will repay a careful study."

O.

TWELVE LECTURES ON THE STRUCTURE OF THE CENTRAL NERVOUS SYSTEM. By Ludwig Edinger. Philadelphia and London: F. A. Davis, Publisher, 1890.

Dr. Edinger, of Frankfort-on-the-Main, Germany, is one of the very best authorities on the anatomy of the nervous system and the brain. His twelve lectures contain a statement of our present knowledge of the subject, to which the author has added considerably in several not unimportant details. No one who is a student of the human brain can do without Edinger's book, and we are glad that so soon after its appearance in German it has been translated by competent men into English.

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HYPNOTISM. By Albert Moll. New York: Scribner & Welford. 1890.
Chicago: A. C. McClurg & Company.

The present book is a translation from the second edition of the German original. It reviews in 410 pages the main facts of Hypnotism. The author begins with the history of Hypnotism (Chap. i); he then explains the different hypnotic methods and stages of hypnotism (Chap. ii). The symptoms of hypnotism (Chap. iii) are contrasted and compared with cognate states (Chap. iv). Information is given concerning several theories of hypnotism (Chap. v); all of them, however, are meagrely sketched and the author does not arrive at a conclusion himself. Simulation and its influences are briefly treated (Chap. vi). The medical and legal aspects of hypnotism (Chap. vii and viii) are good expositions of the matter, presented in lucid terms and impartially. The last chapter, on Animal Magnetism, treats of a series of questions which, as the author rightly remarks, refer to "phenomena which are often mentioned in connection with hypnotism, although the connection is rather historical than essential." In Mr. Moll's view they "are the consequences of erroneously interpreted observations." The topics here discussed are (1) animal magnetism, (2) telepathy, (3) supernormal acts of somnambulism, (4) the experiments with the magnet, and (5) the effects of the mere approach of drugs.

The author does not present new views of his subject, but he is considerate in his statements, as well as scientific and clear. He is not blind to the dangers of hypnotism, yet upon the whole he looks upon it favorably, saying that "hypnotism and suggestion will outlive many remedies whose praises fill the columns of medical journals at present."

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DER HYPNOTISMUS: SEINE PSYCHO-PHYSIOLOGISCHE, MEDICINISCHE,
STRAFRECHTLICHE BEDEUTUNG UND SEINE HANDHABUNG. By Dr. August
Forel. Zweite umgearbeitete und vermehrte Auflage. Stuttgart:
Verlag von Ferdinand Enke. 1891.

Prof. August Forel's pamphlet on hypnotism was, even in its first edition, one of the best publications of its kind. The second edition which now lies before us is enlarged and improved. The author has not changed his views; he retains his old definitions, explaining hypnosis as a state of abnormally increased suggestibility; but at the same time he has added some chapters which present his position much more accurately than he has ever done before. He rejects most positively the fluidum theories; he opposes the views of Dr. Luys whose experiments Dr. Forel repeated with his most sensitive somnambulists and obtained negative results.

The position which Professor Forel takes is unequivocal Monism. He says in his preface:

"A psychological introduction seemed to me indispensable, for it is a daily discovery with me, how much the monistic foundation of the doctrine of suggestion is misunderstood. Normal dream-life, the theory of suggestion, and the relation of the latter to medicine and to mental disorders generally, demanded substantial complements, and the addition of a few new instances of therapeutic suggestion seemed to me advantageous."

In agreement with this proposition he says in the first chapter of his pamphlet:

"Hypnotism throws much light on the phenomenon we call consciousness, and in a manner that substantially agrees with the monistic world-conception. To understand hypnotism in other relations, we must know what we have to understand by consciousness and its relation to nervous activity….

"With dualists, who regard the soul as one thing and the body together with all matter and all the forces of nature thereto appurtenant as a totally different thing, the doctrine of the psychical faculties follows of itself: herein the consciousness, the will, the mind, and the rest must be regarded as separate departments of the soul….

"The monistic conception of the world aims to reduce all cosmic phenomena to a single unity, and regards matter, force, and consciousness ultimately as only forms of appearance of a same primitive potency. Especially, however, it denies, that the soul is anything else than forces of nature….

"Considered from the monistic point of view, consciousness by itself is nothing; as Ribot ('The Diseases of Memory') correctly remarks with Huxley and others, 'Consciousness is merely the accompaniment of certain nervous processes; it is as incompetent to influence the latter as the shadow is the steps of the wayfarer it follows.' It follows, however, immediately from this, that the notions of consciousness and subject, or subjectivism, are identical and undefinable. Consciousness is merely the subjective form of appearance of nervous activity….

"Consequently, our human consciousness denotes only a summarised, synthetical, subjective illumination Of the more powerful portion of our cerebral activity….

"A very important phenomenon of consciousness takes place, further, in the reviviscence of previous combinations of cerebral activity, that is in the play of memory-images. We have here to deal with the connection in time of the activity of the brain, that is with the relative illumination of this activity by consciousness. Especially on this field does hypnotism throw valuable light. The whole process of memory is in itself completely independent of consciousness and exhibits very interesting laws, for which I refer the reader to Ribot (l. c.). We discover the laws of the memory in ourselves for the greater part through the illumination by consciousness of the activity of the brain. But it is not proper to oppose a conscious memory to the organic or unconscious memory. There is but one memory, which consists a) in the weakened preservation of the vibrations of every cerebral action (nervous activity in general), b) in the powers of reviviscence, or, better, power of re-invigoration of these actions, and often, c) in the re-cognition, that is in the identification, of the re-invigorated activity with the original one (localisation in time)….

"We all possess a second consciousness, the consciousness of dreams or sleep, which, qualitatively, does not differ in essential respects from the consciousness of the waking state….

"We may not, accordingly, place conscious and unconscious activity in opposition to each other."

Dr. Forel discusses in other chapters of his pamphlet the relation of nervous activity and nervous substance to the states of consciousness (Chap. ii). He explains suggestion, compares sleep with hypnosis, treats the symptoms of hypnosis, resistance of hypnotised persons, auto-suggestions, the "suggestion À ÉchÉance," retroactive hallucinations or suggested memory falsifications, the import and nature of suggestions (Chap. iv). He then proceeds to investigate diseased states of mind with reference to hypnotism, and maintains that insane people are least suggestible (Chap. v). He gives some valuable hints for suggestive or psycho-therapeutic treatment to hypnotisers (Chap. vii), and presents cases of successful cures (Chap. viii). The legal aspect is treated in Chap. x, the hypnotisation of animals in Chap. xi. An interesting and indeed candid chapter is Forel's views on quackery (Chap. ix); acknowledging the fact that at best one sixth only of patients are cured by physicians, our author hopes that the full recognition of the suggestion theory in therapeutics will contribute not a little to the advancement of medical science and also to the moral attitude of the profession.

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DER MODERNE MENSCH. Versuche Über LebensfÜhrung. By B. Carneri. Bonn:
Emil Strauss. 1891.

During a long and laborious life Mr. Carneri has been an indefatigable champion of the monistic world-conception. With a keen eye he recognised years ago the importance Of physiological investigations for psychology, and he saw at once the moral import of the evolution theory even at a time when most of its defenders denounced it as the immoral law of nature. Carneri thus became the preacher of a new ethics; he taught the morality of science and helped us out of the pessimism that naturally followed a time when the old foundations had been overthrown and the new ones had not as yet been built. The author is now at a very advanced age and the present book contains his maturest and dearest ideas. He is a man whose burden of life has been heavier than that the average man has to bear. Physical weakness, since birth, long periods of illness accompanied with almost incessant pain, later on periods of recovery and transient happiness followed. He married and had children. But new visitations came. He buried his wife, and also a little son at the premature age of ten years.

These are some facts of the author's life not mentioned in any one of his books; they are only hinted at in a line of the preface of the present book, quoted below. But his readers should know these facts, because they bring the author so much nearer to us. We learn to understand him better and shall the more appreciate his genuine courage in working out a noble conception of life and sound rules of moral conduct.

The present book contains a number of articles on various subjects, and the author has as he says in the preface "put into them his whole heart." It differs from former publications of his. The latter are as a rule scientific and objective, they are investigations into the laws of life and of ethics. The present book is subjective; it shows the aim and the path of the author's conduct of life. Carneri adds: "And that I, visited with ills above the average measure, have found life beautiful, and being in my seventieth year now, find it beautiful still, speaks in favor of this path. It speaks also for a happy individuality, but I hope that this will not detract from the truth that the present book is not mere imagination but is taken from the thrilling pulse of life."

Carneri is fully convinced that morality will find a better foundation in the unitary nature of man than in the old conception Of his double nature and in this sense he discusses the following topics, Gratitude, Labor, Egotism, Justice, Versatility, Passion, the Ideal, the Inevitable, the God-idea, Truthfulness, Morality, Love, Family, Imagination, Continence, Honor, God-everywhere, Death, Tolerance, Character, Art, and Humor. The whole tenor of the book is very sympathetic and we might describe the author as one of the high priests of the coming Religion of Science.

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UEBER DIE GRUNDLAGEN DER ERKENNTNIS IN DEN EXACTEN WISSENSCHAFTEN. By Paul du Bois-Reymond. Nach einer hinterlassenen Handschrift. Mit einem Bildnis des Verfassers. TÜbingen: H. Laupp'sche Buchhandlung. 1890.

This little book of the late Prof. Paul du Bois-Reymond has been prepared for print by Dr. Guido Hauck with the assistance of the author's brother from a posthumous manuscript. The pamphlet contains in popular form the final rÉsumÉ of a thinker's life-work; complementing and completing his investigations, and maturing mainly his favorite ideas which he had presented to his students in a course of lectures on gravitation during the winter '87-88 at the Technical High School of Berlin, where he was Professor of Mathematics.

Prof. Paul du Bois-Reymond is not only as powerful and at the same time as subtle a thinker as his more famous brother Emil du Bois-Reymond, but he also agrees with the latter's philosophical attitude. Both are agnostics and both represent an unusually profound and scientifically elaborate agnosticism. They have become agnostics because they have arrived at results which, to their mind, present an insolvable problem. Prof. Paul du Bois-Reymond does not despair of a final solution of the problem of life, which according to Emil du Bois-Reymond decidedly belongs to "the seven world-riddles," but he considers gravitation as incomprehensible. The purpose of all our attempts to explain phenomena is to limit the incomprehensible to the smallest space possible and to reduce it to the simplest expression (p. 13). Comprehension, according to Paul du Bois-Reymond, can be attained by three methods, (1) the empirical, (2) the mechanical, and (3) the meta-mechanical. The empirical is inductive, the mechanical is deductive, and the meta-mechanical attacks those problems which are at the bottom of all our fundamental conceptions. The meta-mechanical tendency of science is not satisfied with the results of the empirical and mechanical investigations; it attempts to conquer all the difficulties or at least to arrive at the limits of human comprehension. "Its province is to comprehend matter, how matter can have effect on other matter, how actio in distans can produce pressure or motion; it tries to understand the great concepts of time and space and whatever profound problems may now or during the further progress of science be proposed."

Having explained these preliminary views concerning the methods of comprehension, the author discusses the following topics: Is the Space-filling Substance Continuous or Atomistic? (Chap. iii).—Actio in Distans (Fernkraft) (Chap. iv).—Several Syntheses (Chap. v).—The Idealistic and the Empiristic World Conception (Chap. vi).—Atomism and Actio in Distans with Reference to the Absolute (Chap. vii).—Concerning World-Conceptions (Chap. viii). In the first of these chapters (viz. in Chap. iii. of the book) the author presents the difficulties which beset the theory of a continuous substance. At first sight it appears most plausible to conceive of that which fills space as something constant and uninterrupted, but continuity of substance, our author declares, excludes a possible change of volume; compressibility and expansibility, properties which we predicate of any kind of substance, stand in a patent contradiction to a continuous filling of space. Substance therefore cannot be continuous, it must consist of a material which can be shifted, which is compressible, can be mixed, is liable to chemical changes, and allows imponderabilia to pass freely through; it is porous, or in other words it is permeated by space free from substance. Prof. Paul du Bois-Reymond conceives of substance as dust-like, viz. it consists of spatially distinct corpuscles, and he thinks that there must be supposed to be different kinds of dust. These dust-particles are in his synthesis the vehicles of any actio in distans, their properties are energy and inertia. Actio in distans, we are informed in the next chapter, cannot be explained by constructing a world-synthesis either out of absolutely rigid elements or out of absolutely elastic elements. Since we cannot derive a construction of actio in distans from mechanical concepts, we are led to the conclusion that we have reached here the limit of cognition. Indeed, the incomprehensible in all forces is and remains the actio in distans. All the hypotheses which try to explain the problem, will only defer it by introducing some medium which is to be the vehicle of the actio in distans, and the simplest method is after all to consider the atom as this vehicle. "The far-effective atom, conceived as a centre of activity, endowed with inertia, freely movable, is the simplest mechanism that can be used as the basis of our synthesis, and we call it briefly the far-effective (fernwirkende) atom" (p. 52).

It seems to us that Professor du Bois-Reymond has disposed of the idea of a continuous substance too easily, and that he is at the same time too easily satisfied with the shortcomings of his atomistic theory of a dust-like substance. We grant most willingly that the idea of an actio in distans is inconceivable, for an action can be effective only where it takes place, it can have no effect in other and more distant places. But action is never confined to a limited point: it always stretches over a field of some size. Suppose an action a takes place along the line b c, can we speak of b as being effective in c; or is it not rather a, i. e. the whole process, which takes place in b and in c. The sun's mass exercises an effect upon the earth; and yet they are about 80,000,000 miles distant. But let us use an instance which can become a more direct object of our observation. We have a pair of scales and put a weight on one of them. At once, simultaneously with the sinking of the weighted scale, the other scale rises. Is this not just as much an actio in distans as any other instance of gravity? In fact our astronomers compare the gravitating celestial bodies quite frequently to the action of a balance. It may be objected to this comparison that we see the beam of the scales, while there is no beam between the sun and the earth. If there is no beam, there must be a connection of some kind. If the earth and the sun are two disconnected bodies, we see no possibility for an explanation that the effects of the sun's mass are felt upon the earth. Is not after all the hypothesis of a continuous world-substance the easiest explanation of gravity? It seems to me that it is the only possible way of explaining what is commonly and perhaps awkwardly called actio in distans. The atomistic philosophers are bound to have the world a composition of innumerable particles of dust; they wish to construct the universe mechanically and this view of things appears for certain purposes very well adapted. Yet they cannot construct the world of isolated world-dust particles, they must have some glue or cement to fasten their atoms into a single whole that sticks together. Professor Du Bois-Reymond is consistent enough to see the impossibility of this construction. The cement of which the mortar of atomism consists is the inconceivable, unthinkable idea of an actio in distans.

Let us try to look at things from the other side. Our world-conception consists of the sum of all the divers things we are acquainted with; but daily experience teaches, that the world is not a composition of things or of atoms, the world is one inseparable whole, and the least change in one part affects the whole universe. Some one said, if I raise my finger the entire cosmos is shaken; and this we know is true, although the vibrations are too insignificant to be noticed by our dull senses. We speak of the earth and we speak of the sun, but in reality there is neither an isolated sun on the one side nor an isolated earth on the other, there is a whole and continuous world, one part of it is called sun and another part is called earth. Every action of every part of the world has its effects on all the other parts, and there is no action taking place in the world which in this sense is not an actio in distans. If we call the part played by the sun alone his action, then there is certainly actio in distans, and actio in distans would be the basis of the existence of the world as a cosmic whole. Yet we should remember that the sun does not perform any action alone for itself. The actions that take place in reality are relations among the inseparable parts of the universe. The sphere of every action extends, closely considered, over the whole world.

This view of things is not a construction of the world, it has not been invented for making a philosophical synthesis, it is a description of the world as we know it by experience. The description is imperfect and it presents many difficulties which will have to be formulated in problems. But we are confident that this descriptive method is the only procedure that promises success and will produce results in the future.

Attempts to reconstruct a world-system from its analysed elements have been made and, although we have not as yet reached a general consensus, we must consider these attempts as being at least in part successful. Suppose we call the simplest and most original state of substance ether and consider matter as ether-whirls of a certain kind. The ether must have a peculiar aggregate state of its own which in some respect is like a fluid, for its parts are continuous as well as interchangeable. An ether whirl, or an atom, being a condensation of ether, would naturally produce a tension which stands in some proportion to the condensed mass.

Let an india-rubber plate in a frame such as the designers use for altering the size of a picture represent the normal relation among the different parts of pure ether. Now put the finger-tips of both hands upon the india-rubber and contract them so as to condense in both places the india-rubber inside your finger-tips. Would not the tension between both condensations be increased? and suppose the two condensed spots were swimming freely in the india-rubber, they would in that case attract each other in a similar way as masses of matter gravitate toward each other.

This comparison is of course rude, but it may serve here as an illustration of how we can conceive of actio in distans without committing ourselves to the assumption that an action has its effects in a place where it does not operate. We should not venture to speak of the absolute rigidity or absolute elasticity of the world-substance until the phenomena which urge us to form our views about ether have been better classified and understood.

In the chapter on "Several Syntheses" the author discusses problems without coming to any conclusion. The synthesis of organised life may lead us to something which is quite as incomprehensible as actio in distans and cannot be reduced to it (p. 70). The riddles grow before our eyes, "above the fog of that which lies near us rises the imposing problem of the soul and towering above all other things appears the awful question of the consciousness of the ego." Prof. Du Bois-Reymond does not attempt any solution and proposes no reconciliation between the empirical and idealistic world-conceptions (which are contrasted in Chapter vi). This lack of arriving at a definite solution leads our author into mysticism, in which he indulges in the last chapters to a greater extent than we are inclined to allow a man of science. He speaks of a treble world in which we are shut up as if in a treble cage, (1) the world of immediate apprehensions, (2) the world of conceptions, and (3) the world of reality. The third world is "extra-phenomenal," it is the physical beyond our ego included. But "we are lacking the organ of reality" (p. 120) and "in the physical beyond nothing is impossible" (p. 122). It is strange that Prof. Du Bois-Reymond mentions Professor Kirchhoff's famous preface to his mechanics, in which he replaces the word "explain" by "describe" (p. 13). He also mentions Professor Helmholtz's term that phenomena (i. e. sensations) are symbols or signs of reality, Zeichen der Wirklichkeit (p. 121). But he overlooks entirely that the world-conception derived from these ideas can be developed in a positive world-conception that can satisfactorily reconcile idealism with empiricism. As soon as we know that cognition means description, we can dispense with meta-mechanics and need not join in the disheartening cry of the agnostic ignorabimus. The inscrutableness of reality, says our author, is almost a matter of course. Happily we forget it constantly, for the idea is one of the dreariest and the most weird (trostlosest and unheimlichst).

The whole result is negative, for we can predicate of reality nothing save that it is contained in a space and that there is motion taking place in it. But of what kind this space and the time depending on the motion are, and in what relation they stand to our conceptions of time and space we can say nothing.

This is sad, but, adds Prof. Du Bois-Reymond, "world-pain is of no avail and yet, the world is not so bad after all" (p. 124).

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TUISKO-LAND DER ARISCHEN STAEMME UND GOETTER-URHEIMAT. ErlÄuterungen
zum Sagenschatze der Veden, Edda, Ilias, und Odyssee. By Dr. Ernst
Krause. Mit 76 Abbildungen im Text und einer Karte. Glogau: Carl
Flemming. 1891.

Dr. Ernst Krause, better known by the nom de plume of "Carus Sterne," has of late made a special study of comparative mythology, and many interesting articles of his have appeared in different German periodicals, analysing and collating the myths of the Aryan nations and investigating their material as to their probable origin. Dr. Krause distinguishes between two kinds of myths, (1) those which might and actually do originate in any place, and (2) those which could originate only in a certain and limited locality. The former are most interesting to the psychologist. We can expect that they will afford us an important clue to the development of the human soul. The latter, however, are valuable material to the historian and ethnologist, and from their rich mines Dr. Krause quarries his main arguments to prove the European origin of the Aryas. The course and the effects of the sun vary so greatly in the south and in the north that it would have been strange if the solar myths also did not vary. Now it is natural that such a myth as that of Baldur's death, for instance, could only originate in a northern climate, and if we find the same legend told with slight modifications in the south, we must assume that it has been transplanted there. The attempt has often been made to explain the similarities between the Edda on the one hand and the Greek or Hindoo legends on the other by the influence of the latter on the former; yet we find that this theory is no longer tenable and we must grant, if not to the Edda itself, certainly to the substance of the Edda traditions a far greater antiquity than we ever could have anticipated. Let us compare, for instance, the Baldur myth with the account of Herodotus in "Klio" (Chaps. 34-45), and let us bear in mind that here we have not to deal with history, but with legends, for Plutarch already observes, the ancient historians had noticed that Solon died soon after Kroesos's accession to the throne (563 B. C.); accordingly it was little probable that he saw the Lydian King while at the height of his power. The striking similarity of the two versions can be seen in eight points:

1. King Odin has two sons, of 1. King Kroesos has two sons of whom the one is a model of whom the one excels by his perfection, beloved by God and virtues all his companions, men, while the other appears to while the other appears to be be excluded from the succession unable to succeed his father by the fact of his being blind. on the throne. He is deaf.

2. The Ases have evil dreams, 2. Kroesos dreams that a indicating that some danger is pointed iron will kill his threatening to Baldur. favorite son Atys.

3. Frigga takes an oath from 3. Kroesos removes all iron all created things not to arms within reach of his son. injure her son.

4. Baldur is married young, the 4. Atys is married young, his name of his wife being Nanna. mother's name is Nana.

5. The Ases make a sport of 5. Atys goes a hunting, because
shooting at Baldur because no in this sport he need not fear
missile can hurt him. the tooth of the boar.

6. Baldur's own brother kills 6. A friend (who was a fratricide
him without intention. by accident) kills Atys
unintentionally.

7. Loki is accused of being 7. Not he who threw the fatal
guilty of the murder. missile is accused, but the God
who predicted Atys's fate in
the dream.

8. The innocent murderer is 8. The innocent murderer slain. commits suicide.

We must consider it as an additional proof of the theory that the southern version has been taken from northern sources when we find incidental features which have sense only so long as they appear connected with their original surroundings. The Ilias also contains a modified version of the Baldur myth in the account of Patroclus's death. Patroclus is the kind hero, obliging and friendly to all who knew him, the brightest and purest figure of the whole poem. He falls by the intrigues of a God. When Patroclus's body is burned the same thing happens as with Baldur. Achilles lights the funeral pyre but it will not burn, and as in the Edda a giant-woman is called in, so in the Iliad, Iris is sent for in order to call Boreas and Zephyr who by the promise of considerable sacrifices are induced to make the fire burn. There is no reason here why the fire should not burn, but in the Edda there is a very obvious reason, for all the elements had promised by oath not to harm Baldur's body. The flames were not allowed to burn him, the logs on which the funeral ship should roll into the waves were not allowed to carry him down, and the waves were not allowed to receive him.

Great interest attaches also to the similarities between the Baldur myth and Christianity, and not long ago a Danish theologian has attempted to show that the sagas of the Edda were imported into the North by Christian monks, the world-tree Yggdrasil was said to be the biblical tree of life, the same from which the wood of Christ's cross had been taken, Loki was identified with Lucifer, the blind HÖder with Longinus, the Roman captain who thrust the lance into the side of Christ, etc. It is a strange coincidence that Longinus was blind, according to the Gospel of Nicodemus, which may have been written in the eighth century. Longinus, it is told, acquired sight through the blood of Jesus, thus interpreting the passage "they shall look at him whom they pierced" in the sense as if Longinus had not been able to look at Jesus before.

A Jewish libel against Christianity, Toledoth Jeshu, (reprinted in Eisenmenger's "Entdecktes Judenthum") contains a very striking similarity with the Baldur myth. It is told:

"When the wise had ordered Jesus, after he had been stoned, to be hanged to the wood and the wood would not bear him but broke, his disciples saw it and they wept and said: 'Lo the justice of our Lord Jesus; no wood will bear him.' The disciples did not know that he had extorted an oath from all the wood while he had still the name (viz., the mystical and miracle-working name of God) in his power, for he knew his fate that he would be condemned to be hanged…. But when Judas saw that no wood would bear him, he said to the wise: Consider the shrewdness of his mind. He has taken oaths from all wood that it should not bear him, but in my garden grows an enormous cabbage-stock. I shall go and bring it; perhaps it will bear him. The wise said: Do as you say. Then Judas went and brought the cabbage-stock, and they hanged Jesus on it."

This account being older than 1278, it was supposed to have contributed to form the Baldur myth of the Edda, but MÜllenhoff refuted all the attempts to attribute a recent origin to the Edda. The mistle does not grow in Iceland, accordingly the main parts of the Baldur myth in which the mistle plays so prominent a part must have existed before the Icelanders left their Scandinavian homes.

Dr. Krause's investigations strongly tend to corroborate the new view of placing the home of the Aryas in Europe.

By Aryas in the old sense of the name were understood those families of nations which spoke the Aryan languages, viz., the Hindoo, the Persians, the Greeks, the Romans, the Slaves, the Germans, and the Celts, and some few smaller ones. These Aryas were formerly considered as kin in blood and their home was sought somewhere in Asia. Of late, however, many considerations tend to prove that these Aryan nations were by no means one family; they are the product of a mixture of several races among which one has forced its language upon the others. If we call this race the Aryans proper we find that they are represented most purely in the Teutonic nations, the Saxons, Low Germans, and Scandinavians. These Aryans are a tall, blond, and dolichocephalic race. They appear as the conquerors of India, the masters of Persia, the Dorian immigrators of Greece, showing everywhere the same attributes. It is natural that they were swallowed up again by the dark brachycephalic races whom they had conquered, because the latter were better adapted to the southern climate than their masters.

There are three long-headed races: (1) the blond long-heads or Aryas, (2) the dark South European long-heads, and (3) the dark and woolly-haired long-heads of Africa or the Negroes. There are also several broad-headed races, among them the Ugro-Finnians, Turanians, South European broad-heads are represented as the Savoyards. The original Aryans (by A. de Quatrefages called the Cannstadt race) were extremely long-headed, the proportion sinking below 75 : 100. This race, so called after the discovery of graves in Cannstadt, shows a strong similarity with, and must be considered as, an evolution from the Neanderthal type. The eyebrows of the male Neanderthal type skulls protrude (slightly reminding us of the Gorilla) making the smallness of the forehead still more noticeable. The hind part of the head is well developed. The bones are extremely strong, the skull is thick, and the proportion of length to breadth averages in both, the Neanderthal and Cannstadt types, 71·3. This race inhabited the banks of the Rhine and Seine and has been called the Germanic type by HÖlder, the Saxon type by Englishmen, Cymrians by Broca, while Dr. Krause calls them Aryans. The South European long-heads with dark hair are called by A. de Quatrefages the Cro-Magnon type, named after a place in the VÉsÈre valley where as its first specimen a tall old man had been discovered. The Cro-Magnon type varies greatly from the Cannstadt type; the forehead is broad and high, and the cranium is also well formed. The proportion of breadth to length is also dolichocephalic, it averages 73·76. The orbits are broad but closely set, and the size of the lower parts of the face from the middle downward is strongly lessened in proportion to the higher parts, ending in a pointed and protruding chin. This race lived in Greece, Southern Italy, France, and Spain, and is found also in England, where its descendants even to-day can be traced in some of the Silurian inhabitants of South Wales and Ireland. Tacitus says that the Silurians have come from Spain, and even to-day the people of Berkshire resemble greatly, as Boyd-Dawkins says, the Basques of the Western Pyrenees, near BagnÈres de Bogorre. Their stature is sometimes small but not always, they are sometimes tall, their gait is light, their nose narrow and long, sometimes approaching Jewish features, their skin dark, their hair coarse, black, and usually curled.

Long after the appearance of these long-heads arrived several varieties of broad-heads, among them Mongoloid, Ugro-Finnish, and Turanian types. Dr. Krause arrives at the following rÉsumÉ, that the Cannstadt skull represents the Germanic or better the Aryan type. "This race lived in Middle Europe in the oldest times to which prehistoric investigation descends and has not immigrated from Asia since the great ice-era. This conclusion has been adopted by the most prominent anthropologists, in France by Hamy, Topinard, Quatrefages, in England by Beddoe, Flower, Thurnam, in Germany by Ecker, Lindenschmit, HÖlder, Virchow, and others."

Dr. Krause adds: "Virchow however takes in this question of the characteristic features of the Aryan race a strange and isolated position, in so far as he believes that from the beginning there had been and are still broad-heads as well as long-heads among the Germanic races." With respect to the conflict between Virchow and Dr. Krause, we should prefer to call the old and original races by new names, as Quatrefages did; we should speak of them as the Cannstadt type, the Cro-Magnon type, etc. When we speak of Aryans, or Saxons, or Germanic nations, we should know that they are no longer the pure Cannstadt type, but a mixture, and this mixture has not even to-day become sufficiently fixed to produce one uniform race. There are certain features predominant in certain nations, and certainly the blond long-heads are purest in the Teutonic nations; nevertheless, it is not an uncommon occurrence that in one and the same family both types are distinctly represented. Johannes Ranke on the strength of this fact has no faith in the constancy of the skull and does not regard it as a fit method of settling any race problem.

The Aryans, i. e. the tall, blond broad-heads of the Cannstadt type are distinguished by strength and by power of will. They were hunters, fishermen, sea-faring people, and warriors. They loved the sea, they loved rivers and lakes. They appear repeatedly in history as conquerors. The arts and industries, however, the use of metals, the invention of pottery, do not seem to have originated among them.

It seems to us that Dr. Krause exhibits an excusable partiality for the blond tall Aryas in comparison with the dark South-European long-heads as well as the broad-heads. The Aryans were chiefly the rulers, except in Palestine, where the tall blond Amorites had been conquered by Semites. It appears that the conquest of a country by the Aryas for instance in India, in Persia, in Greece, gave a start to civilisation, as the Ostro-Goths restored peace and reawakened the arts in Italy. But at the same time we notice that the Aryas were most likely more savage than their broad-headed fellowmen. The present Teutonic population represents so little the pure type of the old tall long-heads that Professor Virchow refuses to recognise long-headedness as a race symptom at all. We find long-heads and broad-heads in the same family. Both long-headed parents may have broad-headed children and vice versa. This need not prove the correctness of Professor Virchow's position, but it may very well prove that the present nations, the Teutonic race not excluded, are the product of a mixture. As the most important feature of Aryan character Dr. Krause considers their religion, and we are inclined to accept Dr. Krause's opinion as thoroughly sound. The Aryan religion, he says, is the cult of light in opposition to the southern cult of darkness. The original Semites worshipped the earth, the moon, the night; the Aryan, worshipped the sun, the sky, the day, the former bowed before womanhood and sentimentality; the latter represented manhood and will-power. (The Jews are not pure Semites, they show a constant proportion in the north of a little over 14/100 and in the south of a little over 13/100 of tall, blond long-heads. These blond Jews, are according to Virchow, the Amorites with which the Israelites mixed after the conquest of Palestine. The religion of the Jews also shows very strong Aryan influences especially since their contact with the Persians.)

The Aryan religions as a rule begin the world with male motherless Gods; while the Semitic religions begin with female mother-gods without fathers. There is the giant Ymir or in Alfadur, here the goddess Kybele, Isis, Rhea, or Demeter. This difference is founded on a social difference which again depends upon climatic conditions. In the south we find in the beginning a state of matriarchy. There was no great difficulty in bringing up large families and the assistance of the father was not needed. In consequence thereof the father was and remained a stranger, an occasional visitor. There were no lasting family ties between himself and the mother of his children, the sexual relations remained free, and the right of heredity recognised the mother only. How different was it in the north! Without their father a family had to perish. The severe struggle for life created the family and eventually the monogamic family, it made the men strong, active, liberty-loving. There was undoubtedly much rudeness among the northern nations; they were savages in many respects, but wherever they appeared as conquerors they introduced their religion of light, activity, and submission to moral laws. The conquered tribes contributed undoubtedly many most valuable qualities to the mixture from which the future races arose, qualities which the Aryans would perhaps never have been able to evolve out of themselves alone. Nevertheless the Aryans gave character to the nations, impressed upon them their speech, their thought, their world-conception and their morality.

Dr. Krause's treatment of comparative mythology with reference to the physical and geographical conditions under which myths originate, is very suggestive, and we wish he had also taken into consideration the parallelism of the northern Sun-myths with Christianity. Dr. Krause mentions that the idea of immortality is an Aryan thought, he might have added that the idea of a dying God who will again rise from the dead can only have originated in the home of the Baldur myth.

Dr. Krause's work contains in 624 pages an almost inexhaustible store of investigations. It is one of the most interesting books we have ever seen. We mention here only the chapters on the Megalithian Monuments, on Orion, on the northern animals of Apollo, on little Red Ridinghood, on the Wagon in the Skies and Tom Thumb, on Helen and her northern representatives, and on the history of the Odyssee. The book would be more valuable to the reader if it possessed an index.

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DIE MATHEMATIK DIE FACKELTRAEGERIN EINER NEUEN ZEIT. By C. Dillmann.
Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer, 1889.

The importance of this little book does not lie so much in the theories as in the practical aims of the author. Oberstudienrath Dillmann is a reformer in the system of higher education; he is not a mere theorist, but a man of experience who has now been for years the principal of a school like that which he advocates. Mr. Dillmann's idea is very simple and obviously correct. He claims that the old so-called classical method, where the teaching of dead languages is made the basis of education, no longer meets the needs of our time; that there is however another discipline, which for its universality and its fundamental importance in every branch of knowledge should be made the corner-stone of education, and that is mathematics. So he proposes to have our boys educated in mathematical high schools.

We may insert here some information concerning Mr. Dillmann, which is not found in his book but will throw light upon his plans and theories. Mr. Dillmann is the son of a schoolmaster. He inherited from his father the aspiration of acquiring a higher education and having passed through the gymnasium he went to the university to study theology. The study of theology is the only one in which a poor youth finds support and material help from his fellowmen. Having passed his examinations he was engaged for about seven years as a vicar in the service of the church. He felt however the need of completing his education in mathematics and the natural sciences. He went again to the university (this time to the polytechnic school at Stuttgart) and devoted himself with great zeal to his favorite studies. Having passed his examinations in these branches he was appointed professor of mathematics at the Stuttgart gymnasium. While here engaged in preparing his pupils for the university, he became more and more convinced that the whole plan of teaching then followed was inadequate. Our youth receive much information about trifles which are useless to them in after life, while the main things are treated with indifference. He wrote a book "The demands of the Realistic Sciences on Education," which excited general interest and called the attention of Kultus-minister von Golther to his ideas. Herr von Golther founded a new kind of a high school which besides giving good philological instruction, Latin included, was to be devoted mainly to a thorough mathematical education; and Professor Dillmann was appointed president of the school, which first bore the name of "mathematical gymnasium." The authorities soon considered it best to change the name into Real-gymnasium. The school was started in 1867 as a mere trial and in 1871, when its success appeared to be assured, it became a permanent institution. For 15 years it counts an average of from 800 to 900 pupils.

In spite of the confidence of the public, the new school had and has still its hard times. The views now prevalent among the German authorities are less favorable to great reformatory ideas than ever. The restrictions put upon the Real-gymnasia have also hit Mr. Dillmann's school, although his institution is different in plan from the other Real-gymnasia, the latter being, as a rule, schools in which the scholastic severity of the gymnasia is neglected without replacing it by other systematic studies.

The present book has been written to explain and justify Mr. Dillmann's methods, and we cannot but say that we heartily sympathise with his aspirations. At the same time we express here the sincere hope that another Dillmann might rise on American soil and institute a real mathematical high school which will give a more solid foundation for the education of scientists than our present educational systems can give. We do not mean that the philological and historical studies should be neglected in such a mathematical school. We trust that they can be taught with less waste of energy than has been done in the past. There is perhaps no need of preaching against Greek and Latin in our American schools, because philology, it appears, is the most neglected study on this side of the Atlantic and the ignorance in classics often of highly educated scholars is sometimes astounding and would be shocking to pedants of European philology. But I have not as yet been able to discover that this ignorance concerning a few grammatical rules of two dead languages has wrought great harm. At the same time I have noticed that European savants in spite of their enormous philological scholarship are sometimes grossly ignorant of the spirit that lived in the so-called classic nations. They have translated Homer, have analysed the Ionic and Aeolian and Dorian forms of Homeric speech, but they have rarely read Homer and imbibed the beauties of Greek poetry. Philological scholarship is dry and hard work, but the study of historical evolution, to be nourished with the spirit of the past and to see it develop into the spirit of modern times is rather recreation than drudgery. We can keep the latter without plaguing our boys so much as before with the former.

The present book contains as introduction an "open word" by the author to his Excellency the Prussian Secretary of Education, Dr. von Gossler, pointing out the error of his policy not to admit the pupils of Real-gymnasia to the universities. The bulk of the book is devoted to an explanation of the importance of mathematics in all the sciences. Mr. Dillmann declares it is a mistake to believe that the objective world is unknowable. Kant has torn the world in two halves and by making space and time purely subjective, he created a gap between the subject and the object, between mind and nature, a gap which, if Kant's assumption be true, cannot be bridged. Kant's division of the world however is wrong. Does not every thinking subject with his feelings and concepts lie in the sphere of objectivity of other subjects? Time and space are not purely subjective and the science of time and space is destined to reconcile the conflicting parties, it will restore peace and harmony again between mind and nature. Our world of conception is in immediate contact and interconnection with the world of reality. All intellectual activity is motion of our organ of thought. Sensations are produced by motions of the objective world and these sensations are gradually transformed into concepts. Words are the embodiment of concepts. The phenomena of the outer world reappear in the symbolism of language, and thus our intellectual activity can lead to a faithful representation of nature. The world is cognisable, truth can be born in us and we need not lose the self-confidence in our own abilities.

These theoretical explanations are of great interest, and we need scarcely add that Mr. Dillmann's plan would still retain its value, if they were proved to contain inaccuracies or errors. We look upon it as the author's philosophical confession of faith, the main idea of which is indubitably correct while many of its details are without great consequence. We would express the main idea of Mr. Dillmann's book in the following way: Formal thought is the basis of all knowledge and a correct comprehension of the main formal sciences especially of mathematics is the primary condition of a scientific education.

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GEISTESSTOERUNGEN IN DER SCHULE. Ein Vortrag nebst 13 Krankenbildern.
By Christian Ufer. Wiesbaden: J. F. Bergmann. 1891.

The subject-matter of this pamphlet was read as a lecture on November 9th, 1890, before the Verein fÜr wissenschaftliche PÄdagogik at Weissenfels. The author's aim is, to bring home to parents and teachers the important idea, that the treatment of psychical disturbances must be based on our best knowledge of psychology, and especially of physiological psychology. A deeper insight into pathological conditions, says Krafft-Ebing, will remove many mistakes and tyrannies in our education. Teachers as a rule have to deal with healthy children, but diseased conditions are sufficiently frequent to demand of our teachers that they should learn how to treat them. The cases with which the author illustrates his doctrines show that one of the most common causes of psychic diseases in children must be sought in the nervous disposition of their parents, their unequal treatment and also their over-anxious ambition which produces excitement in the child's mind without helping him to overcome the rather heavy demands of German school-life.

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THE SOUL OF MAN. An Investigation of the Facts of Physiological and
Experimental Psychology. By Dr. Paul Carus. Chicago: The Open
Court Publishing Co. 1891.

The Editor of The Monist has collected and collated in this book the results of the work done in the field of psychology and its auxiliary sciences. The author's philosophical standpoint is characterised in the first chapter where he contrasts feeling and motion. Feeling is defined as the subjective aspect of certain processes which, viewed objectively, appear as motions, and it is described as a state of awareness. Feeling originates from the simpler elements of subjectivity and becomes naturally representative, i. e. it acquires meaning. Mind is an organised totality of meaning-endowed feelings. The author reconciles from his standpoint idealism with realism. He shows that "the fulfilment of mind is truth…. Mind expands in the measure that it contains and reflects truth" (p. 46). The question of telepathy is touched, yet telepathy has here a different meaning from mystic thought-transference without any means of communication. Every sensation is a "far feeling" in the literal sense of the word, for "we do not feel our sense-organs but in and through our sense organs objects outside of us are felt. In and through our eyes most distant stars are seen…. What is the soul but a telepathic machine?" (p. 44) In the chapters following are described the characteristic features of organised life and its rise from non-organised life. The physiological part of the book treats of the soul-life of plants, then of animals, and gives by the aid of profuse illustrations an account of the evolution of nervous systems up to man. The chapter on the seat of consciousness proposes a new theory which will be of interest to physiologists as well as psychologists.

The recapitulation of the present state of experimental psychology presents the most telling facts of hypnotism, compares them with their correspondent normal states of soul-life, and explains them from the standpoint of the author. The conclusion of the book is devoted to the ethical and religious application of this conception of psychology. The practical importance of the new truths in the psychological field is vigorously maintained, but at the same time it is shown that the old conceptions psychological as well as religious are by no means worthless. They contain great truths and cannot be discarded offhand. In this sense are discussed among others the problems of Freewill and Responsibility, of Immortality and of the God-idea.