TRADE CONDITIONS IN ILLINOIS, 1765-1775.

The peltry trade had been one of the elements which had accentuated, throughout the eighteenth century, the difficulties between France and England in the Ohio and Mississippi valleys. It was the chief support of the French government in Canada and now that the English were in undisputed possession of the great peltry districts it became apparent that the management of the trade deserved most serious consideration. It was becoming of increasing importance to the manufacturing monopoly of the mother country, and therefore, in the minds of English statesmen, deserved far more attention than did the few thousand French colonists scattered throughout the West. The desire to increase this branch of commerce dictated in a large measure those clauses in the Proclamation of 1763 which forbade the formation of settlements or the purchase of lands within the Indian reservation, but at the same time declared that the trade with the Indians should be free and open to all English subjects alike. Again, the plan proposed in 1764 related solely to the management of the Indians and to the regulation of the trade with a view to making the English monopoly of intrinsic value to the empire. Even towards the close of the period under consideration there is little or no change of policy so far as official utterances are concerned. In 1772 in a report to the crown, the Lords of Trade made the following declaration: "The great object of colonization upon the continent of North America has been to improve and extend the commerce and manufactures of this kingdom. It does appear to us that the extension of the fur trade depends entirely upon the Indians being undisturbed in the possession of their hunting grounds, and that all colonization does in its nature and must in its consequence operate to the prejudice of that branch of commerce. Let the savages enjoy their deserts in quiet. Were they driven from their forests the peltry trade would decrease." [108]

Under the French regime the western Indians and their trade had been managed with greater success than had the tribes living under English influence. The success of France was due largely to her policy of centralization combined of course with the genial character of the French fur trader and the influence of the missionary. The English, on the contrary, had managed their relations with the Indians through the agency of the different colonies, without a semblance of union or co-operation: each colony competed for the lion's share of the trade, a policy which resulted disastrously to the peace of the empire.

In 1755 the English government under the influence of Halifax, president of the Board of Trade, took over the political control of the Indians, and superintendents were appointed by the crown to reside among the different nations. [109] A little later in 1761 the purchase of Indian lands was taken out of the hands of the colonies and placed under the control of the home government. [110] No further change is to be noted until after the issue of the war was known, when the whole question was taken under consideration. The most important step yet taken respecting the Indian and his concomitant, the fur trade, appeared in the Proclamation of 1763, issued in October following the treaty of cession. Some of its provisions for the West have already been noted. In addition to reserving for the present the unorganized territory between the Alleghany mountains and the Mississippi River for the use of the Indians, the government guaranteed the Indians in the possession of those lands by announcing in the Proclamation that no Governor or Commander-in-chief would be allowed to make land grants within their territory, and further all land purchases and the formation of settlements by private individuals without royal consent were prohibited. Trade within this reservation was made, however, free to all who should obtain a license from the Governor or Commander-in-chief of the colony in which they resided. [111]

The policy was now for the central government to take the Indian trade under its management; and in the course of the year following the issuance of the Proclamation an elaborate plan was outlined by Hillsborough [112] comprehending the political and commercial relations with all the Indian territory.

According to the proposed scheme [113] British North America was to be divided, for the purpose of Indian management, into two districts, a northern and a southern, each under the control of a general superintendent or agent appointed by the crown: the Ohio River being designated as the approximate line of division. In the northern district, with which we are here concerned, the regulation of such Indian affairs as treaties, land purchases, questions of peace and war, and trade relations were to be given into the hands of the superintendent who was to be entirely free from outside interference: without his consent no civil or military officer could interfere with the trade or other affairs of any of the Indian tribes. Three deputies were to be appointed to assist the superintendent and at each post a commissary, an interpreter, and a smith were to reside, acting under the immediate direction of the superintendent and responsible only to him for their conduct. For the administration of justice between traders and Indians and between traders themselves, the commissary at each post was to be empowered to act as justice of the peace in all civil and criminal cases. In civil cases involving sums not exceeding ten pounds an appeal might be taken to the superintendent. The Indian trade was to be under the direct supervision of the general superintendent. Traders who desired to go among the Indians to ply their trade could do so by obtaining a license from the province from which they came. The region into which the trader intended to go was to be clearly defined in the license and each had to give bond for the observance of the laws regulating the trade. The superintendent, together with the commissary at the post and a representative of the Indians were to fix the value of all goods and traders were forbidden to charge more than the price fixed; for the still better regulation of the trade, it was to be centered about the regularly fortified and garrisoned forts. Regulations for the sale of land were also proposed; outside the limits of the colonies no individual or company could legally purchase land from the Indians unless at a general meeting of the tribe presided over by the superintendent.

The plan thus outlined by the ministry was never legally carried into effect, although the superintendents used the outline as a guide in their dealings with the Indians. The original intention had been to levy a tax on the Indian trade to defray the expense of putting the scheme into operation, but it was found that the budget was already too greatly burdened; and the Stamp Act disturbance which soon followed illustrated the possible inexpediency of imposing such a duty. [114]

The foregoing considerations serve to indicate the importance the ministry attached to the Indian trade in general. But what of the trade in the Illinois country? This region had been one of the great centers of the Indian trade under the French regime; and, in addition, the French inhabitants had been one of the main supports of New Orleans since its foundation early in the century. The commercial connection between the Illinois villages and New Orleans had never been broken, and at the time of the occupation of Illinois in 1765 French fur traders and merchants still plied their traffic up and down the Mississippi River. Now that the title to this trade center passed to England it was expected that the volume of trade would be turned eastward from its southerly route. The necessity for this was patent if any solid benefits were to accrue to the empire from the cession. [115]

The home and colonial authorities early saw the importance of the redirection of the trade. They hoped and expected that a trade would be opened with the Indians in and about the Illinois country immediately after the active occupation by the English troops. [116] A large number of individual traders were early aware of this and representatives of some of the large trading corporations of the East were also preparing to take advantage of the early opening of the trade. In 1765 Fort Pitt became the great rendezvous for this element, and when the army reached Fort Chartres in October, 1765, it was followed as soon as the season of the year would permit, by the traders with their cargoes to exchange for the Indians' furs. Among the more important figures was George Morgan, [117] a member of the firm of Baynton, Wharton, and Morgan of Philadelphia, [118] and the firm's personal representative at the Illinois, where he first appeared early in 1766, [119] remaining there the greater part of the next five years. [120] Other representatives of this company left Fort Pitt in March of the same year with a large cargo of goods, which reached Fort Chartres during the summer. [121] Firms such as Franks and Company of Philadelphia and London and Bently and Company of Manchac also traded extensively in the Illinois during the following years: all the larger British companies becoming rivals for that portion of the Indian trade which the English were able to command.

Other and perhaps greater sources of profit to the English merchants lay in the privilege of furnishing the garrison with provisions [122] and the Indian department with goods for Indian presents. [123] Although the houses of Baynton, Wharton, and Morgan, and Franks and Company were usually competitors for the former privileges, the latter company generally had the monopoly. [124] On the other hand, Baynton, Wharton, and Morgan derived their greatest profits from the sale of enormous quantities of goods to the government through the Indian department for distribution among the Indians accustomed to assemble at the Illinois. [125] But whether all these houses received profits commensurate with the risks undertaken is problematical. [126] In the Indian trade, in which all the merchants were interested, they not only had to compete with each other and with independent English traders, but with the French and Spanish who had not ceased to ply their trade among their old friends the Indians. This continuance of foreign traders in British territory was probably the most serious problem in the trade situation. Not only did it affect English traders but the interests of the empire itself were seriously threatened by the presence within its limits of unlicensed foreign traders.

It is therefore evident that the close of hostilities between France and England in 1763 and the formal transfer of Canada and the West to Great Britain by no means closed the intense rivalry between the fur trading elements of the two nations for predominance in the western trade: it rather accentuated it. As has already been suggested, France, until cession of the West, had naturally possessed the sphere of influence among the savages of the Mississippi Valley and Canada, and consequently the monopoly of the fur trade accrued to her subjects. In the upper Ohio river region and among the tribes bordering on or living within the limits of the English colonies, the British, during the first half of the eighteenth century, were either strong rivals of the French or were completely dominant. And it was generally expected that after the cession of the West the British would inherit the influence of the French among the Indians and succeed to the monopoly of the fur trade just as Great Britain had succeeded to the sovereignty of the territory itself. But the Conspiracy of Pontiac, due in large part to the machinations of the French traders, postponed for a considerable period the entry of the British traders, during which time the French became more strongly entrenched than ever in the affections of the savages.

The character of the French fur traders has already been noted. Their methods had from the beginning been different from those pursued by their neighbors and rivals: they lived among the Indians, affected their manners, treated them kindly and respectfully, and supplied all their wants, while the missionary, the connecting link between the two races, was ever present. This association of religion was one of the causes of the success of the French in gaining such a permanent foothold in the affections of the Indians, but was entirely absent in the British relation with that race. The English traders were in general unscrupulous [127] in their dealings with the savages and deficient of that tact which enabled Frenchmen to overcome the natural prejudice of the Indian and acquire an interest with him which would be difficult to sever. In that section of the Indian country where the influence of Great Britain was such that her traders could go among the Indians, there was always considerable dissatisfaction on account of the methods employed by the large number of independent and irresponsible traders. Many carried large quantities of rum, some dealing in nothing else. [128] English traders frequently attended public meetings of Indians, gave them liquor during the time for business and defrauded them of their furs. [129] This abuse was one of the great causes of complaint against British traders. [130] Indeed, wherever they participated in the trade, its condition was deplorable. Many of the independent traders had little or no credit so that the legitimate merchants suffered as well as the Indians. [131] They adopted various expedients to draw trade from each other, one of which was to sell articles below first cost, thus ruining a large number of traders. [132] Fabrications dangerous to the public were frequently created to explain the price and condition of goods. [133] But probably more injurious still to imperial interests, was the fact that whole cargoes of goods were sometimes sold by English firms to French traders thus enabling the latter to engross a great part of the trade, [134] depriving the empire of the benefit of the revenue accruing from the importation of furs into England. This practice was probably followed to a greater degree in the farther West, where the French continued to have a monopoly in the trade.

It had been expected that the Illinois villages would be the center of trade for the English side of the upper Mississippi Valley just as it had been one of the centers during the French regime. [135] But, except for the few tribes of Illinois Indians in the immediate vicinity, very few savages found their way to these posts for trading purposes. English traders, on the other hand, did not trust themselves far beyond this narrow circle. [136] But their French and Spanish rivals from Louisiana, many of whom formally lived in the Illinois, carried on a trade in all directions, both by land and by water. [137] They ascended the Ohio, Wabash, and Illinois rivers [138] and crossed the Mississippi River above the Illinois River, plying their traffic among the tribes in the region of the Wisconsin and Fox rivers. [139] This was probably the most productive area in the Mississippi Valley in the supply of fur bearing animals. The Mississippi River from its junction with the Illinois northward was also considered especially good for the peltry business: the otter, beaver, wolf, cervine, and marten were to be found in abundance. [140] But the British traders dared not venture into that quarter. The loss of this trade, however, can scarcely be attributed to their misconduct, for the French had never allowed it to pass from their own hands. The latter continued to intrigue with the Indians throughout the greater part of this period just as they had prior to 1765. As we have seen they pointed out to the savages how they would suffer from the policy of economy practiced by the British government. [141] Thus by giving presents and circulating stories and misrepresentations the French subjects of Spain attempted to checkmate every move of the English. [142] The Indians were constantly reminded of the bad designs on the part of the English, and were encouraged with unauthorized promises of aid in case they took up the hatchet in defense of their hunting grounds. [143]

This state of affairs continued throughout the greater part of the period, although it was probably modified to some extent after 1770, for in that year O'Reilly, the Spanish governor of Louisiana, issued an order to all the commandants in that colony to prohibit the inhabitants crossing the river in the pursuit of trade and whenever any excesses were committed satisfaction was to be given the English commandant according to the laws of nations. [144]

During the first years of the British occupation there was considerable friction in the contact between the two alien peoples in the Illinois villages. In spite of the fact that the French who remained became subjects of Great Britain there was for several years sharp competition between the English and French residents in the vicinity of the villages. [145] The latter were on terms of friendship with the savages and could go into any part of the country without difficulty and those Indians who came to Fort Chartres to trade generally preferred to deal with their trusted friends. The French often carried the packs of furs thus obtained across the river to St. Louis or transported them directly to the New Orleans market. Although the British merchants were occasionally to pool their interests with French residents, such cases were exceptional prior to 1770. In that year, however, General Gage informed the home government that "the competition between his Majestys' old and new Subjects is greatly abated & must by degrees subside, for if carried to extremes it would be very prejudicial to both." [146]

We have seen in the foregoing study how the British traders were handicapped in the prosecution of the trade by their French rivals. Naturally the large quantities of furs and skins obtained by such contraband traders as well as by the French residents of Illinois were taken directly to New Orleans and there embarked for the ports of France and Spain. These foreign interlopers, however, only followed the course they had long been accustomed to take. On the other hand it was expected by the government that the traders who carried English manufactured goods down the Ohio River would return by the same route with their cargoes of peltry for the purpose of transporting them to England. In this the aim of the ministry miscarried. English traders and merchants followed the line of least resistance: the route down the Mississippi to New Orleans was easier and quicker than up the Ohio and across the country to the sea-coast. [147] Moreover, the New Orleans market was attractive, for peltries sold at a higher price there than in the British market. [148] The tendency of the English traders and merchants to follow this course was discovered soon after the occupation. [149] In a communication to Secretary Shelburne in 1766 Gage informed the government that "it is reported that the Traders in West Florida carry most of their Skins to New Orleans, where they sell them at as good a price as is given in London. As I had before some Intelligence of this, the Officer commanding at Fort Pitt had Orders to watch the Traders from Pensilvania (sic) who went down the Ohio in the Spring to Fort Chartres; & to report the quantity of Peltry they should bring up the Ohio in the Autumn. He has just acquainted me that the traders do not return to his Post, that they are gone down the Mississippi with all their Furrs and Skinns under the pretense of embarking them at New Orleans for England." [150] A few weeks later he wrote again in a similar strain: "That Trade will go with the stream is a maxim found to be true from all Accounts that have been received of the Indian Trade carried on in that vast Tract of Country which lies in the Back of the British Colonies; and that the peltry acquired there is carried to the Sea either by the River St. Lawrence or River Mississippi." [151] Gage seemed to believe that the part which went down the St. Lawrence would be transported to England; but that the peltry passing through New Orleans would never enter a British port. [152] "Nothing but prospect of a superior profit or force will turn the Channel of Trade contrary to the above maxim." [153]

It seems impossible to figure exactly what the loss to imperial interests was under these conditions. [154] Furs and skins, however being among the enumerated commodities [155] some loss certainly accrued to British shipping and to the government through loss of the duty, as well as to English manufacturers. While practically no peltries reached the Atlantic ports from the Illinois region, enormous quantities were carried to New Orleans. The few who have left any estimate of the amount of peltries exported to New Orleans agree in general that from 500 to 1000 packs were shipped annually from Illinois. According to the usual estimate 500 packs were worth in New Orleans about 3500 pounds sterling. [156] At New Orleans, where the western trade finally centered, it was estimated that peltries worth between 75,000 and 100,000 pounds sterling were sent annually to foreign ports. [157]

It became apparent to those in a position to understand the situation that those solid advantages which the Government had expected would accrue in return for the expense of maintaining establishments in the West would not be forthcoming, unless some effective though expensive measures be taken. The rivalry of the French who monopolized the larger part of the trade and who naturally followed their old road to New Orleans, and the action of the English traders in turning the channel of their trade down the stream effectually deprived the empire of any benefits. Conditions grew no better as the years went by. In 1767 we find General Gage complaining that "as for the Trade of the Ilinois, and in general of the Mississippi, we may dispose of some manufactures there, but whilst Skins and Furrs bear a high price at New Orleans, no Peltry gained by our manufactures, will ever reach Great Britain, and if our Traders do not return with the Produce of their Trade to the Northern Provinces, by way of the Ohio or Lakes, it will not answer to England to be at much expence about the Mississippi." [158] Not only were the officials in America, who were in close touch with western affairs, convinced of the impossibility of obtaining any immediate commercial benefits from the country, but one of the leading members of the ministry, Lord Hillsborough, Secretary for the colonies, took a similar view, in an argument against the planting of western colonies. "This Commerce cannot (I apprehend) be useful to Great Britain otherwise than as it furnishes a material for her Manufactures, but it will on the contrary be prejudicial to her in proportion as other Countries obtain that material from us without its coming here first; & whilst New Orleans is the only Post for Exportation of what goes down the Mississippi, no one will believe that that town will not be the market for Peltry or that those restrictions, which are intended to secure the exportation of that Commodity directly to G. Britain, can have any effect under such circumstances." [159] Though there seems to have been a unanimity of opinion respecting the commercial inutility of the Illinois and surrounding country under existing conditions, there were those, however, who believed that with the adoption of certain measures the western country could be made of intrinsic commercial value. Whether any adequate steps could have been taken to turn the channel of trade eastward and to exclude foreign traders is uncertain.

The original intention of the British government had been to use Fort Chartres to guard the rivers in order to prevent contraband trading; [160] but its inefficiency was soon apparent. [161] Although well constructed, its location was not strategic; it commanded nothing but an island in the river. [162] An indication to the Indians of British dominion [163] and a place of deposit for English merchants was about the sum total of its efficiency. [164] In order to make the Illinois country effective as a bulwark against foreign aggression and to keep the trade in English hands, thus insuring material advantages to the empire, it seemed imperative to many who were familiar with the situation to adopt measures looking toward the closure of those natural entrances into the country, the mouths of the Illinois and Ohio rivers. [165] Almost all the correspondence of the time relating to Illinois, contains references to the practicability of erecting forts at the junctions of the Illinois and Ohio rivers with the Mississippi; in most cases this was insisted upon as the only measure to be adopted to make the country of value. [166] All were further in agreement that until such plan was carried out no benefits would arise from the possession of that territory. Suggestion were also offered relative to the erection of a fort on the Mississippi River above its junction with the Illinois for the protection of that section of the country. [167] Perhaps the most novel suggestion emanated from General Gage, who declared that in order to gain all the advantages expected it would be necessary to amalgamate all the little French villages lying between the Illinois and Ohio rivers into one settlement, which would also be the centre of the military establishment; detachments could then be sent out to guard the rivers and prevent British merchants from descending the stream to New Orleans and also watch for foreign interlopers. [168]

But these suggestions one and all failed to receive recognition from the government. One of the main reasons for this non-action may well be summed up in a statement of Hillsborough's, who appears by 1770 to have become somewhat pessimistic regarding the prospect of any immediate advantages from the western trade. He declared in that year that "Forts & Military Establishments at the Mouths of the Ohio & Illinois Rivers, admitting that they would be effectual to the attainment of the objects in view, would yet, I fear, be attended with an expence to this Kingdom greatly disproportionate to the advantage proposed to be gained.——" [169]

The failure of the government to manage successfully the western trade previous to 1770 was not the only reason the ministry hesitated to do any thing further. Any measure would have meant the expenditure of large sums of money with no absolute certainty of an adequate return. The problem of the western trade confronted the ministry at a most unfortunate time. Questions of graver import were arising and demanding immediate attention. Instead of seeking new schemes upon which to lavish money, every opportunity was seized upon to curtail expenses. The government failed to put into full operation the plan of 1764 because of the added financial burden it would entail and in 1768 the management of the Indian Trade was transferred from the crown to the colonies to further reduce the budget. The western question had become subordinated to that of the empire. Furs were important to the manufacturing monopoly of Great Britain, but at this time of rising discontent and dissatisfaction in the colonies any new projects entailing further expense were out of the question.