In the march of generations two distinct periods are observable: the one of ardent and vigorous activity, when quiet and lukewarmness are vexatious and annoying; the other of fatigue and exhaustion; and, when this reaction has taken place, it is necessary there should be at the head of affairs, wise and moderate ministers, perhaps even men who are themselves weary of too active and busy a life. The great European monarchies enjoy an incontestable advantage over freer but more stormy governments, in the perpetuity of their system and the lengthened career of their statesmen. Look at Austria and Russia during the last thirty-three years; they have been under the unvarying direction of two ministers, who have alone had the direction of affairs,—Prince Metternich and Count Nesselrode; and only the death of Prince Hardenberg has deprived Prussia of his services. This perpetuity of statesmen is attended with many advantages: it creates a constant succession of precedents in the cabinet; it permits the conception of a long series of measures, and allows one idea to be followed and worked out with perseverance. A young man is selected immediately he has finished his studies, and placed in the second or third rank among the attachÉs of an embassy; he next becomes a minister plenipotentiary; and, if he rises and distinguishes himself, he obtains a post in the chancellerie; and when, owing to the confidence of his sovereign, or the force of circumstances, he has once been placed in a superior rank, he remains there to the end of his life. And what is the result?—a most serious attention to all transactions, and a most profound knowledge of business: the political situation, which was originally the great object of his ambition, now becomes the subject of his careful study, and, indeed, his whole existence is bound up in it.

England, always intelligent and clear-sighted, has striven to apply a remedy to the instability of men, by the stability of parties. In that country there are two schools opposed to each other, the Whigs and the Tories; and men from their earliest childhood are destined to belong to one, or other of these vast divisions. The universities of Oxford and Cambridge receive into their bosom this twofold generation of students, who apply themselves to the study of the peculiar ideas which divide these shades of parliamentary opinion, and proceed without hesitation on the path they have chosen for themselves; and, on quitting the university, they support in parliament the opinions in which they have been educated, or which they have adopted. Suppose a young man to be a Tory, if the Tories are in power he obtains an appointment as one of the under-secretaries of state, and only resigns it when his party go out of office; should he be a Whig, and the Whigs are at the head of affairs, the same thing takes place: every thing is fixed, and proceeds according to rule in the government; by that means alone it is known whence people come, and they are equally well acquainted with the course they are likely to take.

In bringing together the names of Metternich, Nesselrode, and Hardenberg, I do not pretend to draw an absolute parallel between them; on the contrary, there exists a strong and well-defined difference. Metternich and Hardenberg always expressed their own ideas, and were the representatives of a system, which they followed with the utmost perseverance, and applied through all the changeful course of events that occurred in the two great kingdoms committed to their care. They were statesmen who had taken office with fixed principles, and their whole life was employed in their developement. For instance, the self-imposed object of Prince Hardenberg's foreign policy, was the increase of the national influence of Prussia against Napoleon; and of his internal government, the reconstruction of the States and of the Prussian citizen classes. Prince Metternich, in the foreign relations of the cabinet of Vienna, especially strove to establish his system of armed mediation, and moral influence produced by means of vast military establishments; while, to speak the truth, Count Nesselrode has been nothing more than the upright and intelligent executor of the will of his sovereign: he was the reflected image of Alexander, the faithful hand which undertook the execution of his wishes, even of those where his personal feelings were most concerned. The position of Nesselrode with regard to the Emperors Alexander and Nicholas, might be compared to that of the ministres secrÉtaires d'État under Napoleon; the influence he exercises results from his long experience, and from the circumstance of his every-day life being passed in the midst of politics, which are thus interwoven with all his habits; and this in itself confers a great degree of power.

Charles Albert, count Nesselrode, was born at Lisbon in 1770, of a noble family of German extraction. His father was minister plenipotentiary in Portugal under Catherine II., and some traditions exist concerning the cause of this species of exile; there are, however, always some of these rather sneering, and random legends, current in the corps diplomatique, as if for the purpose of unbending the brow of official gravity.

Count Nesselrode was still very young at the termination of the reign of Catherine,—that extraordinary woman, whose character forms so curious a study, because it perfectly represents the state of civilisation in Russia; whose political ideas were so masculine, and by whom the system of Peter the Great had been constantly followed up and advanced. She appeared to effect an alteration in the influence of the cabinet of St. Petersburg, which had hitherto been purely oriental, and to render it more German and central; being the first step towards the predominance in Southern Europe, which was afterwards the ambition of her grandson Alexander. Peter the Great had pointed to Constantinople; but Catherine considered Warsaw the most favourable point, as a position which might enable the Russian power, at a later period, to assume in the south the importance which her literary correspondence, and political despatches were already preparing. It was solely with this view that she encouraged the spirit of the eighteenth century, and caressed D'Alembert and Diderot, journalists who were devoted to her interests. When Voltaire, with his expression of flattering vanity, wrote to Catherine that light came from the north, he foretold the consummate ability of the Czarina, which prompted her to make herself talked of at any price; "because," as she cleverly observed, "by dint of exalting the Russian name, it will at last be made some account of in France and in England; we shall no longer be reckoned among the barbarians; we shall be talked of at Versailles, in London, and at Madrid; and this, in politics, is indispensable, if we are desirous of obtaining any ascendancy."

The leading principle of the cabinet of St. Petersburg for the last hundred years, has been the agglomeration of Poland, and the expulsion of the Turks, whom they are desirous of driving back as far as the Black Sea. Poland has fallen; nor was it in the power of any government to prevent the ruin of that fated country. A strong antipathy, a deep, unmeasured hatred, exists between the Poles and Russians; they are two races ready to fall upon each other; two giants, armed at all points, constantly contending during six centuries. The most unpopular of all proceedings at Moscow, at Kalouga, at Novogorod, and in the old castles of the ancient nobility, was the erection of Poland into an independent kingdom, organised by Alexander,[47] which occasioned murmurs of dissatisfaction on every side. The other object of Russia, the fall of Turkey, will also take place sooner or later; it cannot be prevented, and, if the government will not undertake it, the people will do it themselves. Saint Sophia is required to crown the patriarchate of the Greek Church. Of this Europe is well aware; she delays the explosion until the proper time has arrived, and determines the various shares beforehand: but to prevent it altogether is beyond her power. And some day we shall hear that the Russians, with the cross as their banner, have marched to the succour of their brethren, and that another empire of Constantine has arisen on the Bosphorus. It is so written in the book of fate!

I am not aware that the Russian cabinet has ever been made the subject of consideration in France, in the point of view of its great diplomatic ability. The principal source of its predominance has been sought in the strength communicated by its armies, and in its absolute organisation; but they have been mistaken: the truth is, that there is nothing more persevering, or more deeply reflecting, than the Russian cabinet; it goes on slowly, without attracting attention by noise or tumult. During the last century, the Russian population has increased by eleven millions of souls, who occupy more than five hundred leagues square of territory, if we include Georgia and the part of Tartary united to the government of the Crimea; and, independent of these actual conquests, Russia has acquired an undoubted protectorate over Moldavia and Wallachia, and such a degree of influence in Persia, that no other country would now think of disputing it with her: finally, every one is aware of the position she has obtained at Constantinople, and also of the efforts made by the whole of Europe to prevent her from actually accomplishing the vast projects formed by Peter the Great. In order to arrive at this result, nothing has been neglected by Russia; neither political protestations, nor appeals to religious feeling, have been spared. Knowing exactly where to stop, she never ventures too far in an idea; she waits patiently till the opportunity is ripe; and, should her system have too much awakened attention, she does not overstep certain limits, but makes a momentary concession, and then resumes her projects with admirable consistency. As soon as the proper season has arrived, and that the obstacles she at first encountered are overcome, then Russia progresses straight to the accomplishment of her wishes.

Catherine, struck with a fatal apoplexy, had descended to the tomb, and the sceptre passed to the Grand Duke Paul, who had been condemned to the most profound obscurity, until the moment when he was summoned from his solitude to the government of forty millions of people. The gloomy singularity of his character has been exaggerated; he has been represented as a capricious prince, who would pass suddenly from acts of savage tyranny to kindness and tender intimacy; but we must remember that Paul came of the blood of Peter the Great, and being incessantly surrounded by conspiracies, which threatened both his crown and his life, he often formed resolutions which flew at once from unreserve to anger, from confidence to sudden fury. Characters generally spring from situations, and are what events have made us. Paul had to defend his life, which had been endangered by many attempts against it; we must not, therefore, be too hasty in our judgment of this prince, but, in order to form a fair opinion, we must descend to the depths of the national character, and view the general situation of her politics.

Europe had received a vehement impulse from the French revolution. The Grand Duke, who was himself threatened by the spirit of revolt, must have viewed with but little satisfaction this popular explosion at the other extremity of Europe; but the distance of Russia, her financial embarrassments, and the accomplishment of the partition of Poland, did not permit her to take part in the first coalition against the French revolution: the Russians did not join the hostile party until the second Italian war, during the campaign of Suwarof. I will not repeat the well-known military story; the divisions in the cabinets of Vienna and St. Petersburg put a stop to the second coalition: but the Russian regiments had seen Italy; they had touched the soil of Switzerland; for the first time their breasts had been warmed by the mild rays of the southern sun; and, like the invaders of the third and fourth centuries, they recollected during the long wintry nights of their icy clime, that there were large towns and fair cities in the south of Europe, that those fertile lands produced delicious fruits, while the smiling plains were crowned with abundant harvests: these recollections lay deep in the mind of many a Russian veteran in the years 1813 and 1814, and from this time forth the cabinet of St. Petersburg took a part in the interests of southern Europe.

The diplomatic career of Count Nesselrode began at the time of the embassy of Count Marcoff at Paris, under the Consulate—that wonderful period when every thing, government, institutions, and political and social ideas, appeared to have been renewed with the vigour of youth. The forcible administration of the First Consul easily opened the way to negotiations with Russia, for whenever a regular power has been established in France, Europe has never attempted to overturn it. Count Nesselrode being attached to the embassy in Paris, had the opportunity of witnessing the magnificent developement of the power and genius of Buonaparte, then First Consul. Who would have foretold that fifteen years later, he, as the Chancellor of Alexander, would preside over the acts relative to the downfall of the Emperor, and sanction the decrees of the senate of 1814 for the restoration of the House of Bourbon?

Paris, at this early period of the Consulate, was an abode full of pleasure and enjoyment. The treaty of Amiens had just been concluded, peace had been obtained through victory, and people were desirous of amusement and repose; they were emerging from the system of the Directory, the spirit of good society again raised its head, and its rules and customs were eagerly sought for, in order to restore it from its ruins. There was a little court at the Tuileries around JosÉphine; all the ceremonies and etiquette of former times were collected with avidity; ambassadors alone had liveries, and their splendid equipages shone with double lustre among the half-republican assemblage, where there was a long string of hackney-coaches with their numbers concealed. Napoleon still reserved all his magnificence for his military festivals; his grand reviews on the Place du Carrousel, where in the midst of clouds of dust the squadrons of guides, and the grenadiers of the consular guard defiled, as we see them depicted in the pictures of Isabey.

The luxurious splendour of the embassies cast over every thing belonging to the legation, an aristocratic gloss which turned the heads of this generation; and this may explain the success in female society enjoyed by various members of the corps diplomatique at this period, and the close and tender intimacies which were afterwards so useful to Prince Metternich in his diplomatic surveillances. Young Nesselrode, like all Russians, spoke French with the greatest fluency, and without the decided accent, which all Prince Metternich's talents are unable to correct. He had his share of the dissipation of the new court, where some young women, as if astonished at their own position, forgot themselves, and forgot also that they had the gravest and most serious head in the world as their chief. I can hardly say wherefore, but nothing has given me a more contemptible idea of society in the time of the Consulate, than the perusal of some memoirs that have been written in apology for it; beside the wonders achieved by one man, how mean and wretched appear the tricks and narrow intrigues of those around him!

The Russian legation was at that time obliged to concern itself, with one of the most important questions of maritime rights, and of the law of nations. The treaty of Amiens, which never could have been any thing more than a truce between France and England, was broken by both parties at once; and it is an invidious question to inquire which of these two governments, was guilty of the first infringement of the treaty: the peace fell to the ground because it was only a momentary repose for two cabinets unable to live in peace with each other, on account of their gigantic ambition. As soon as war was declared between France and England, Napoleon was naturally desirous of carrying on hostilities in a vigorous manner, and for that purpose he endeavoured to secure the co-operation of some of the continental powers. Paul, who was as ardent in his admiration as in his hatred, had conceived a high esteem for the First Consul, and Buonaparte, taking advantage of this feeling, requested him again to put in force, for the benefit of the neutral powers, the principle of the liberty of the sea; a principle completely opposed to the ideas and interests of England, for the British government never would admit that the flag should protect the merchandise. A squadron appeared in the Sound, to act simultaneously against Denmark, Sweden, and Russia, who had adhered to the principle of armed neutrality. The legation at Paris, under the direction of Count Marcoff, based the treaty on the rights of the neutral nations, being the developement of a grand maritime idea renewed by Louis XVI.

A change, however, soon took place, for, as if stricken by a thunderbolt, Paul fell a victim to a conspiracy. The mysterious horrors of that awful night have been recorded in history. The mild and romantic Alexander was placed on the throne of his father, who appeared almost immediately inclined to proceed to warlike measures against France and Napoleon; and accordingly the influence exercised by England over the cabinet of St. Petersburg was very considerable. The Russian legation quitted Paris, and as it had lately exhibited great activity in obtaining information that was not favourable to the ideas of Napoleon, Count Marcoff was on the point of being arrested, and there was a good deal of hesitation whether he should receive his passports. These acts of violence were a habit of Napoleon, for even the barrier opposed by the law of nations to his will was displeasing to him, and he was always on the eve of breaking through it.

The part played since this period by Count Nesselrode, and the importance of the negotiations between Russia and France, render it necessary to explain the organisation of the highest class of the corps diplomatique, as it exists in the Russian empire. The Emperor being the supreme head of the army, of the government, and of the church, all the authorities depend upon him, and consequently he reserves to himself the entire direction of what is called the Chancellerie. This chancellerie appoints agents, who, under the title of ministers or ambassadors, represent officially their sovereign at foreign courts; it also exercises much activity and vigilance, and keeps a watch upon the ambassadors, who are often compelled to collect the most minute information—a proceeding not at all in keeping with their elevated rank, for the shades are almost imperceptible between what is allowable, and what is forbidden in diplomatic affairs; and, as I have before stated, this ambiguous situation often induced the Emperor Napoleon to be almost violent in his measures against the Russian ambassadors, when he found they obtained statements of the military establishments, and secret conventions, so as to become masters of the most carefully guarded secrets of the cabinet.

Independent of these people, who are officially accredited, the Czar despatches aides-de-camp, without any positive commission except that of travelling, or perhaps being the bearers of some complimentary message; and these officers examine into every thing and send reports, not only regarding the government and the population they are deputed to inspect, but even concerning the Russian agents. To recall an example: under the Emperor Napoleon, in 1811, the aide-de-camp Czernitcheff made two or three journeys to Paris, ostensibly to compliment the Emperor, and to carry him autograph letters from the Czar; and then he returned to Russia with a statement of all the military strength of the country, which had been given him by an employÉ in the war-office—information that was of the greatest possible service to Russia in the defence of 1812. In addition to all this, when the Czar takes the field a great number of general officers unite diplomatic missions and services, to their military titles; as, for instance, Count Pozzo di Borgo, as we have before observed, attended at the same time to the strategic operations, and to the arrangements in the cabinets, which might secure their developement. When England, who was the first to follow this plan, granted subsidies to a power, she always sent a commissioner with each army to follow the campaign.

Count Nesselrode was early attached as a councillor to the private chancellerie of the Czar, who soon discovered him to possess a faithful disposition, great and solid erudition, a serious understanding, and a spirit of ready obedience that would willingly support his sovereign will. Count Nesselrode took especial pains to please Alexander, whose mind was too full of his own ideas to bear any impulse that was not given by himself. At the time of his departure for the interview at Erfurt, it was evident that three ideas in particular possessed the minds of the members of the cabinet of St. Petersburg. The one, entirely Russian, observed with feelings of grief and humiliation, the alliance between Alexander and the head of the French government; a strong dislike was felt by the old Muscovites to the greatness of the new empire; the noble Sclavonian detested the proud and arrogant parvenus. They did not wish for an open rupture with France, but the engagements entered into by the treaty of Erfurt, the intimacy between the two crowns, which had been formed by the fascinations of Napoleon—all this, I say, was a source of great displeasure to the old aristocracy, to the successors of those Boyards who claimed the feudal government of the Russian provinces.

The second school of this diplomacy was in some degree Greek and Oriental. Napoleon had been desirous of satisfying some of the projects of Russia by the treaty of Erfurt; and as he was then dividing the world with Alexander, he conceded to him the full and entire realisation of the plans of Catherine, agreeing that Constantinople should be his in a few years, Ispahan and Persia in the course of time; they even spoke of the independence of Greece, and consequently of the possibility of an insurrection among the Hellenic and Syrian population. Napoleon had long revolved these projects in his mind; in fact, had not the general of the army of Egypt already had an idea of appealing to the Christian profession, as a means of rousing the Copts and Syrians against their Ottoman masters? Some maxims of liberty were to be attached to the Greek school of diplomacy, and they were brought forward some years afterwards at the congress of Vienna by Count Capo d'Istria.

The third diplomatic school, which was to a certain degree founded by Count Nesselrode, consisted in taking a middle course between the two former systems. The young Count had never been devoted to the plans proposed at Erfurt, and he did not for a moment allow himself to be carried away by the gigantic projects then determined upon in a moment of enthusiasm; he did not identify himself either with the Greek or the German school, nor even entirely with the Muscovite, in its repugnance for Napoleon. What Alexander particularly remarked was, the perfect obedience of his minister to all his wishes, though he sometimes strove to infuse a little moderation into his decisions, when their tendency was too abrupt or positive to be advisable in political affairs. Nesselrode always executed the orders of his sovereign, but in so doing he tempered the expressions of enthusiastic mysticism which often characterised the politics of the Czar; he did not attempt to give an impulse, but he endeavoured to prevent the will of his master from going too far.

The commencement of Count Nesselrode's favour dates especially from the French expedition to Russia. The movement, still more national than military, which repulsed this gigantic undertaking, naturally took its source from the old Muscovite families, and in the savage energy against which the Czars, ever since the days of Peter the Great, have struggled in vain; and Alexander, whose education and principles rendered him particularly averse to this return of barbarism, felt the need of a confidential friend, in whose bosom he might confide his fears of the results to be apprehended from this Muscovite tendency, which went beyond his own ideas and wishes. Count Nesselrode became one of these confidential servants, and as early as 1812, although he did not fill the official situation of conseiller d'État, he took the principal part in the prodigious diplomatic movement then in progress; he concluded and signed the treaty of the subsidies with England, and the secret alliance of the two great powers against Napoleon, which completed his political fortune.

The intimacy between Count Nesselrode and Prince Metternich began in the course of the negotiations at the congress of Prague. As I have before observed, it is impossible to institute a comparison between these diplomatists; Prince Metternich being the creator of a system, while Nesselrode was merely employed in executing, or perhaps in moderating an idea, which was not always his own. Count Nesselrode was not the official plenipotentiary at the congress of Prague, the full powers being entrusted to M. d'Anstett, a man of considerable ability, but hardly likely to be very favourably inclined to a peaceable system, for he was a French ÉmigrÉ; however, the impulse and the direction of the whole business emanated entirely from Alexander, and consequently from Count Nesselrode, the most faithful and devoted of his representatives. It was then, as we cannot but feel, of the greatest importance, to induce Austria to join the coalition of the Allies against Napoleon, for upon it depended the success of the campaign of Germany; but Metternich was far from being decided in favour of this step, and he wished to oblige them to purchase the co-operation of Austria at a very high price: the negotiations, however, were conducted with great ability by Count Nesselrode, and at the conclusion of the congress of Prague the alliance of Austria was well secured to the coalition. The Russian minister arranged in the name of his sovereign all the articles of this treaty, which calmed the fears of Austria, by assigning to her an advantageous frontier in Germany and Italy.

A new element had just manifested itself in the Russian diplomacy, General Pozzo di Borgo having arrived at head-quarters, after accomplishing his mission to Bernadotte, crown-prince of Sweden. Count Pozzo was the friend of the disaffected generals of the Empire; and his constant thought, and the master-passion of his soul, was his desire to bring about the ruin of his ancient rival, whom he considered as the oppressor of Europe. It was necessary for Count Nesselrode, if not exactly to contend with this influence over the mind of Alexander, at least not entirety to concur in it; for he, like Metternich, for a short time considered it might be possible to treat with Napoleon, and to impose such a degree of restraint upon his military power, as to prevent him from injuring the German independence, or the security of the interests and relations of the States. On this head Nesselrode perfectly agreed in the opinions of Alexander, who, during the campaign of 1813, was as far from desiring the downfall of Napoleon, as from wishing to interfere with the form of government in France; there was then quite enough to do in Germany, the Rhine had not yet been passed, and the question concerning the deposition of the French Emperor did not occur until 1814. Count Nesselrode having been present at the interview at Abo, between the Czar and Bernadotte, it was impossible he should be ignorant that questions had been raised concerning certain possible events, among which the chance of another form of government being established in France was spoken of. Those who have some knowledge of the state of the case, are well aware that nothing could be more vague and undecided than all that was settled in this interview, if we except the close alliance between Russia and Sweden, and certain decisions concerning their territorial claims. The Emperor Alexander conversed with Bernadotte about the plan of the campaign, and the state of the public mind in France, as well as concerning all the possibilities and chances that might be the consequence of the war; and Bernadotte in his turn naturally spoke of his grievances, and of the injuries which, as a Republican general, he had been exposed to from Napoleon, and for which he retained a strong dislike to him: but there was no talk of any change, and they entered into no positive agreement to overturn the sovereign who then reigned in France.

During the campaign of 1814, there was as much activity in the negotiations as even in the military operations; and when the Allies had once passed the Rhine it was considered necessary diplomacy should follow all the phases of the war, so as to be ready to reply to the proposals that might be made by the Emperor of the French, and also to resolve all the difficulties they might encounter. The arrival of Lord Castlereagh on the Continent greatly facilitated the transactions regarding the subsidies and the equipment of the troops; and the treaty of Chaumont was signed by Count Nesselrode, as well as by the plenipotentiaries of the other allied powers. The ascendancy acquired by England just then was so great, that she may almost be said to have alone given the impulse and direction to all the acts of the cabinet; it must, however, be acknowledged, that as she furnished the sinews of war, it was very natural she should fix positively the use to which they were to be applied. Count Nesselrode arranged with Lord Castlereagh the method of issuing the pay of the troops, and the diplomatic result of the campaign.

The sad events of the war brought the Allies to Paris; and the moment was decisive for that portion of the senate which, under the direction of Talleyrand, D'Alberg, and Jaucourt, wished for the fall of Napoleon. A provisional government was established, after the occupation of the capital. There could be no hesitation in the choice of alliances, for the support of Alexander was indispensably necessary to accomplish the ruin of the imperial system, whose hour was come! For this purpose, however, it was essential to obtain the concurrence of Nesselrode, the minister who had signed all the diplomatic acts concluded in the last three years; and even had they considered him as a mere secretary (Alexander being accustomed to act very much for himself), they would naturally have been desirous of engaging him in the interests of the provisional government.

As soon as Alexander entered the French territory, the disaffected placed themselves in communication with his cabinet. I have already mentioned the mission of M. de Vitrolles, who, with a view to the restoration, had informed the Czar of the state of the public mind; and Count Nesselrode had hardly arrived in Paris before he was surrounded and assailed by a thousand conflicting intrigues and negotiations of all sorts, for the purpose of inducing his cabinet to decide in favour of the Bourbons. It was the general bent of the period, as the revolutionary principle had been that of a former era. The first steps taken by the Russian minister were full of caution; he wanted to feel his way and judge of the public feeling, and it was also necessary to induce Prince Schwartzenberg, who commanded the active army, to make an open demonstration in favour of the Bourbons; yet, at the same time, they were not quite certain what was the ultimate decision of Austria, and, more especially, of Prince Metternich. All the papers written about this time by Count Nesselrode bear evidence of this complicated situation; he, however, spoke in plain terms in an official letter addressed to M. Pasquier, that he might set at liberty some people arrested on account of the good cause, and this good cause was the restoration of Louis XVIII.

It was evident from this expression of opinions favourable to legitimate sovereignty, that the decision had been made before it was officially announced. Never, perhaps, at any time had more activity been displayed than at this period; Nesselrode must remember it as the most brilliant and busy part of his life. His salon never was empty; at one time Caulaincourt, with full powers from the Emperor, solicited peace; at another, the marshals of the empire stipulated for the rights of the army, and a special treaty for Napoleon; then, again, Talleyrand, D'Alberg, and De Jaucourt, came to press the Russian minister to put an end to all uncertainty by pronouncing the downfall of Buonaparte; and, finally, the royalists devoted to the Bourbons, such as SosthÈnes de la Rochefoucauld, and De Vitrolles, endeavoured to obtain the triumph of the ancient dynasty.

After these various negotiations, the declaration of the Emperor Alexander, announcing to France that they would not treat with Napoleon, was agreed to in the cabinet. This remarkable declaration was drawn up by Pozzo di Borgo; it was printed by means of a hand-press at the hÔtel of Prince Talleyrand, in the Rue St. Florentin, and thousands of copies were thrown from the balconies. It was a great party stroke for the house of Bourbon, for from that time its cause was secure. It has been reported that the resolution of Count Nesselrode was decided by immense diplomatic presents; but one should generally regard with distrust the various stories that are current after political events have been accomplished: there is less corruption than people imagine in public business. At the same time it is very probable that some gratitude would be manifested after so important an act; secret presents almost invariably accompany the signature of stipulations in all diplomatic transactions—it is an old custom, and, no doubt, the value of these presents was increased in consequence of the immense importance of the service rendered; but this is all that historical impartiality can say on the subject.

This season of 1814 was very brilliant for Count Nesselrode; there was nothing at Paris but fÊtes and flowers. The moderation of Russia had swayed all the resolutions and softened the conditions of victory, and the Emperor Alexander enjoyed a great reputation as the symbol of peace and the expression of magnanimity in the midst of triumph. England and Austria were quite cast into the shade, nobody was spoken of but Alexander, and this celebrity was reflected upon Count Nesselrode in so great a degree as to occasion a feeling of jealousy in Metternich, who had hardly any thing to do with the transactions at Paris in 1814. The Austrian minister awaited his turn at the congress of Vienna. The first occupation of our capital was the apogÉe of the moral omnipotence of Russia in the affairs of southern Europe.

Here it is necessary I should mention all the difficulties of Nesselrode's situation. Nothing could be more changeable and more prone to sudden impressions than the mind of Alexander, who passed from one enthusiastic fancy to another with inconceivable rapidity; when he had taken up one idea it was difficult to put it out of his head; and if you followed in the same track, some time afterwards he would meet with some other fancy, which he adopted with equal warmth. We may, therefore, imagine how difficult was the part of a secretary of state desirous of giving some consistency to these projects, of classing them in a certain order, and of producing any result from them all. From the close of 1813, Alexander had been deeply imbued with the mysticism of Madame KrÜdner, and he mingled with his manifestoes on the principles of Europe, and his theories of peace and war, a species of ascetic worship and enthusiastic superstition very difficult to translate or apply to the real business of life, and of which the ultimate object was not always understood by powers like England and Austria.

At the congress of Vienna they had to treat of serious affairs, and it was necessary to give a positive meaning to the vague conceptions of Alexander, and translate theories into treaties. Poland was occupied by a Russian army, and the diplomatists of the old Muscovite school, in hopes this occupation would become permanent, pressed the annexation of Poland to Russia, without a constitution or any free state privileges. Alexander, who was desirous of wearing the crown of Poland, was entirely opposed to these demands, and wanted to collect the ruins of that kingdom into one system of political organisation; and Count Nesselrode faithfully executed this idea of his sovereign at the congress of Vienna. The question of Poland was his sole anxiety, as the integrality of Saxony and the restoration of the House of Bourbon at Naples was the exclusive thought of Prince Talleyrand.

At the congress of Vienna Nesselrode formed an intimacy with Prince Hardenberg. Russia had supported the pretensions of Prussia, the States had been bound to each other by means of political and family arrangements, and, for the future, Prussia was destined to act as the advanced guard of Russia, in her projects of influence over the south of Europe. Russia was too busy with her own affairs to observe the sort of underhand alliance forming between England, France, and Austria, against Alexander's design of instituting a kingdom in Poland, dependent on a viceroyalty of the czars. Nesselrode had to contend at once with Metternich and Hardenberg, who were both afraid of seeing the portion of Poland that had accrued to them at the time of the first partition escape from their grasp; Austria fearing for Gallicia, and Prussia for the districts beyond the Vistula. The other opposition the Russian minister had to overcome was, as I have before observed, that of the old Muscovite families, who murmured at seeing the organisation of Poland with an independent constitution and a degree of national liberty. Great difficulty existed in this quarter, although Nesselrode had not entered as warmly into this project as his sovereign had done, but had taken a middle course, in order to avoid a misfortune with which he had at one time appeared threatened.

But all these divers interests were confounded by the astounding news of Napoleon's landing in the Gulf of Juan. The Emperor Alexander, whose mind was more than ever impressed with the mystic and liberal ideas of the German school, did not hesitate a moment in lending his powerful aid to the coalition. Madame KrÜdner had persuaded him that the white angel, Peace, was to overcome the black angel, which presided over battles, and that the part of mediator and preserver of the human race was intended for him. The immense armies of Russia, therefore, marched against the black angel (Buonaparte). I will not enter into the military details of the Waterloo campaign; suffice it to remind the reader that the Russians, who had afforded such decisive support during the invasion of 1813 and 1814, upon this occasion only arrived with the third division after the struggle was over, which explains the reason why the influence of England and Prussia was paramount in France during the transactions of 1815.

I have elsewhere given an account of these negotiations;[48] the Emperor Alexander constituted himself the protector of the French interests, being led to do so as much by the natural generosity of his disposition as by a certain degree of national rivalry, which already began to appear between Russia and England. Nesselrode's influence over the mind of the Emperor was quite as powerful as that of Pozzo di Borgo, and we must acknowledge that they rendered us the most essential service, by preserving us from a partition of our territory, and a pecuniary indemnity beyond the power of France to discharge. Still the treaty of Paris stands in evidence, that we were obliged to submit to very painful sacrifices and heavy humiliations.

Just at this time the influence of Nesselrode was endangered by a rival in Alexander's favour; I allude to Count Capo d'Istria.

Capo d'Istria was born in the Ionian islands, in the midst of the Greek population, which have so often been encouraged by Russia to strive for their liberty, ever since the time of Catherine II. He was the friend of Ipsilanti and of all the ardent generation who fought for the independence of their country. At a very early age he had been employed in secret and mysterious negotiations. However the cabinet of St. Petersburg might be situated with regard to the Porte—let the relations of the two countries be what they might, Russia, for the last century, had never ceased to favour secretly the efforts of Greece to shake off the Ottoman yoke. Alas! had she not had frequent cause for self-reproach on this subject? More than once she had instigated the Greeks to revolt, and then, when all their efforts had proved ineffectual, she had not dared to defend them openly in the face of Europe; for she was closely watched by England and Austria, who denounced to the Divan the slightest action of the unfortunate Hellenists—even the groans of an oppressed people were not allowed to pass in silence. When, therefore, Capo d'Istria was admitted to the confidence of the Emperor, the cause of the Greeks enjoyed the advantage of a constant advocate, and a warm, faithful representative. His credit dated from the negotiations in Switzerland in 1815, whose result was a new act of mediation under the threefold influence of Austria, Russia, and Prussia. Capo d'Istria was afterwards appointed to divide with Nesselrode the ministry for foreign affairs.

It was, as I have before observed, a complete rivalry, for Count Nesselrode had entirely adopted the ideas of the European school. Since the year 1812, he had followed the political system opposed to the military principle of the French revolution, now pursued in concert by all the cabinets of Europe, whose ruling desire, from the year 1816, had been the repression of the liberal movement engendered by the resistance of the people to the conquests of Napoleon. Nesselrode perfectly agreed with Metternich on this point, and the Emperor Alexander's partiality for the liberal and Hellenic school of Capo d'Istria was a source of sorrow and vexation to them both. The difficulties they had to encounter were of a complicated nature, for religious feelings were mingled with political ideas—there was strong sympathy between the two churches of Moscow and Athens, and the patriarchs were in constant communion with each other. It was impossible openly to attack Alexander on this point; all that Nesselrode could do in opposition to Capo d'Istria, was to spread the alarm in every direction concerning the fearful progress made by the spirit of insurrection.

As early as the close of 1815, the Emperor Alexander had conceived the project of the Holy Alliance—an idea resulting from the mystic and religious fancies of Madame KrÜdner, but involving at bottom very positive resistance to the spirit of revolt; for the Holy Alliance was nothing more than a contract of mutual support, a sort of bond entered into by all the crowned heads against the revolutionary movement in Europe. Metternich and Nesselrode were certainly not the men for ideal transactions—there had been too much reality and matter of fact in their lives; still they saw the cabinets adopt these measures with satisfaction, as they both entertained hopes of bringing over the Emperor to their way of thinking; and, indeed, the general course of events at that time appeared to favour the common idea of Metternich and Nesselrode, for the secret societies in Germany had been greatly developed, and kept Prussia and Austria in a state of perpetual anxiety. They sent repeated despatches to St. Petersburg, and Nesselrode secretly supported the ideas of the alarmed cabinets. Thus the liberal plans advocated by Capo d'Istria met with secret opposition, and more than once the Emperor Alexander remained undecided among the various tendencies which disputed among themselves his mind, his power, and his affections.

Events, however, were progressing in a manner likely to weaken the credit of Capo d'Istria, and augment that of Nesselrode. The Polish senate had been the especial creation of Alexander, it was the work of his own hands; and this senate, by an ill-advised resistance, had just deeply offended the will of the sovereign—a circumstance which might have been considered as a legal act, in a long-established government, was construed into an armed and criminal revolt; and the Czar suddenly issued harsh and firm resolutions regarding Poland. The strong repressive measures advocated by Nesselrode and Metternich thus regained their place among the ideas of the European system; from the same cause the influence of Capo d'Istria visibly lost ground with the Emperor, and with his influence declined the idea of a Christian insurrection in Greece.

Capo d'Istria, as I before observed, was favourably disposed towards his countrymen the Greeks, who, by a spontaneous movement, had shaken off the yoke of the Porte; and he urged Alexander immediately to interfere, by causing a Russian army to appear on the Pruth and an imperial fleet in the Mediterranean. The revolt of the Greeks was observed with great anxiety by Metternich; the house of Austria, being considered as the protectress of the Divan, made every possible effort to avoid a conflict calculated to injure the Ottoman influence, which was necessary to the balance of power in Europe: consequently, it was the object of Austria to persuade Alexander that the real spirit evinced by Greece was that of revolution, where Capo d'Istria saw nothing but a religious question; and in this opinion Nesselrode perfectly concurred. He considered that the actual state of Europe would not admit of the emancipation of a people, for rebellion was every where forming against the crowned heads, and Greece was merely employed as a pretext.

The moment was well chosen to infuse these alarms into the mind of the Emperor, the bent of the German universities having just manifested itself by the assassination of Kotzebue; PiÉmont had taken up arms, Naples was in a state of insurrection, and Spain had proclaimed the Cortes. Metternich, in concert with Nesselrode, then returned to the idea of congresses, those great fusions of the sovereignties, according to the course that had been settled by the Holy Alliance.

The diplomatic school had rather a predilection for this assembling of Europe—those meetings in which all the statesmen of the various countries met on friendly terms to discuss the affairs of the Continent. The same passion for congresses was to be observed in Talleyrand, Metternich, Hardenberg, and Nesselrode; it was a habit they had formed, a desire of appearing and playing an important part on the diplomatic stage. The Emperor Alexander was also fond of these great rÉunions because he was consulted as an arbiter, the princes of Europe trusting both to his experience and to his magnanimity.

Nesselrode accompanied the Emperor to Troppau and Laybach; those who studied the character and deportment of both observed that their minds appeared to be undecided: there was a kind of uncertain hesitation between the liberal ideas they had lately entertained and the strongly repressive tendency advocated by Austria. Metternich made use of all his talents and influence to convince the Emperor of the dangers by which all the European sovereignties were threatened, if they did not decide upon one of those great military demonstrations which, by their overwhelming force, at once made an end of rebellion; when, just at the most critical moment, intelligence was brought to the Russian minister of a mutiny that had taken place in one of the regiments of guards at St. Petersburg. This news quickly determined the Emperor's opinion; Nesselrode received orders to enter with the utmost vigour into the plans proposed by Austria, and the downfall of Capo d'Istria appeared impending.

One thing must be particularly observed in this struggle between liberal principles and those of absolute dominion; and that is, that Capo d'Istria had always been the faithful interpreter of an idea of independence for Greece, consequently, when liberal opinions were in the ascendant, he was not likely to continue in favour. The great misfortune of the Greeks at this moment, and what retarded their emancipation, was the circumstance of their insurrection taking place at the same time as the revolt in PiÉmont and the proclamation of the constitution of the Cortes; rendering it difficult always to discriminate exactly between an unruly military movement which terrified the regular governments, and the noble spectacle of Greece, with a spirit worthy of her forefathers, raising the holy symbol of her religion on her banners, stained and torn in many a former heroic struggle. Capo d'Istria's affection for Greece led to the loss of the Emperor's favour; and he, the protector of the Hellenists, was stabbed to the heart by a Greek,[49] affording a melancholy proof of the ingratitude of revolutions.

Then took place the intimate fusion of the Russian and Austrian system of politics, occasioning the absolute triumph of Metternich; and this situation was continued at the congress of Verona under Nesselrode, from that time forth sole minister of Russia, and chief of the chancellerie under Alexander. At the congress of Verona he held the pen, and all the resolutions regarding Spain were taken in concert; the diplomatic notes were drawn up by the two ministers together; Metternich wrote to the Austrian minister at Madrid, while Nesselrode, recalling the Russian ambassador, fulminated a sentence of proscription against the Cortes. It was no longer the liberal and generous Alexander they had to deal with, but an imperious prince, who, through his ministers, laid down the law in a sovereign and dogmatic manner. When M. de VillÈle craftily objected for a short time to engage in an expensive and hazardous campaign, Nesselrode, without the slightest hesitation, wrote to him, in the name of the Emperor, that Russia was determined to venture every thing in order to repress the spirit of revolt in the Peninsula. The impulse was so powerful it was no longer possible to resist it.

The close of Alexander's life was greatly harassed by these feelings; the sacred cause of the Greeks weighed upon his mind as a subject of remorse, and the sorrow it occasioned him was imprinted on his countenance, which now bore the appearance of ill health. Yet what was to be done? The panic of impending revolutions had seized upon his mind, and delivered him over to a thousand terrors, for his dread of the spirit of the secret societies was extreme. Liberalism filled him with alarm, he viewed it as a spectre threatening him with the seditions that might arise in his empire, and he did not comprehend that the most effectual means of employing the national effervescence of the Russians would have been to march them against Turkey for the deliverance of Greece. The causes of the unexpected death of Alexander have formed the subject of much inquiry; perhaps this acute sorrow was not entirely unconnected with it: he was a man of a deeply religious mind, with a mild disposition and a tender and impressionable heart; thus he felt deeply for the sufferings of Greece. Every stroke of a yataghan which caused the head of a woman or child to roll in the dust, among the ruins of Athens or LacedÆmon, made his heart bleed.

Soon after Alexander had been gathered to his fathers, a commotion, at once political and military, took place in Russia. In southern Europe people are not sufficiently acquainted with the character of the noble family of the Czar: there was a degree of enthusiasm in the filial affection entertained by the Emperor Alexander for his aged mother, and the deepest respect existed in the hearts of Constantine and Nicholas for their elder brother Alexander. His death took them all by surprise, and upon his tomb burst forth the military movement prepared by the secret societies, and by a generation of young officers, dreaming of the old Sclavonian independence.

Was the accession of the Emperor Nicholas likely to make any alteration in Nesselrode's position? One powerful reason which operated against any diminution of the minister's influence was the respectful admiration of Nicholas for the policy and the opinions of his deceased brother, and being also inexperienced in business, he considered it indispensable to surround himself with the men who had been acquainted with the politics of Russia ever since the great epoch of 1814. These men of traditions are essential to governments; they preserve the history of all the precedents in the cabinets; they know what has been the conduct of Europe during a long series of years, what are the springs by which she has been actuated, and the acts she has been called upon to concert; comprising information of the most essential utility for the comprehension of treaties and the conduct of negotiations: besides this, it was impossible to deny that Nesselrode was possessed of very great ability in unravelling events, and had always shewn an enlightened, though passive obedience, to the wishes of his sovereign. The Emperor Nicholas, then, being desirous of continuing the policy of his brother, to whom could he better address himself than to the man who had had the direction of affairs during the last fifteen years? Nesselrode also enjoyed the esteem of the Empress-Mother; and what power that remarkable woman had exercised over political affairs! She alone always manifested a sovereign contempt for Napoleon—she alone swayed the mind of her son Alexander, even after Erfurt; and, according to the patriarchal fashion, all her children appeared, to a certain degree, to do homage to her for the crown, as if they owed the supreme power to her from whom they had derived their existence.

Nevertheless, Nesselrode soon found it necessary to modify his opinions. Ideas had advanced since the death of Alexander, and it was impossible to restrain the Russian spirit, which had decided in the most energetic manner in favour of Greece; it therefore required military food, and a war was indispensable. The influence of Metternich over the cabinet of St. Petersburg daily lost ground from this moment, and Nesselrode began to draw off from Germany, and become more essentially Russian in his principles and ideas; he also began to take a decided turn in favour of the Greeks. Nor in this conduct ought he to be reproached with inconstancy, for the times and circumstances were no longer the same, the monarchical principle having triumphed every where, in PiÉmont as well as at Madrid and at Naples, while Poland appeared entirely subject to her viceroy Constantine. Under these circumstances it was less difficult to discern the holy and heroic principle of the Greek revolution, and to rekindle the ardent hope of an independence, acquired by means of so many pious sacrifices. From this new tendency of affairs, Nesselrode found himself the antagonist of Metternich, with whom he had hitherto been agreed; but the Russian interest now prevailed over the Austrian spirit.

The friendship between France and Russia dates from the year 1815, and was increased at the congress of Aix-la-Chapelle, under the influence of the Duc de Richelieu; but at that period, as we learn from the despatches of Count Nesselrode, France was too much overwhelmed by the fatal consequences of the two invasions to take an active part in affairs, or afford a support that would make her alliance worth seeking by the various cabinets of Europe: but from the year 1819 France exhibited such a developement of vital powers and military energy, that Russia hastened to include her in her diplomatic means. The inclinations of the French cabinet turned in this direction, under the Duc de Richelieu and M. Dessolles; and they continued thus until the more English administrations of Polignac, of Montmorency, and of VillÈle. The ministry of M. de la Ferronays again was favourable to the Russian alliance; and the ties that now bound France to Russia were not merely those of gratitude for the services rendered at the restoration, but the well-grounded conviction that the Russian alliance could on no occasion injure our interests, but might, on the contrary, on many occasions augment our diplomatic influence and our territorial boundaries. The collection of the despatches of Nesselrode and Pozzo di Borgo during this interval, and all the diplomatic papers that exist in the Foreign Office, attest the good-will of the cabinet of St. Petersburg, and the offers made secretly by it to obtain the alliance and concurrence of France on the Eastern question.

Another cause which made this friendship so greatly desired, was the rivalry that had already become apparent between Russia and England. The system of the alliances in 1815 had overturned all the ancient diplomatic ideas, and all private jealousies had given way before the common object of Europe,—the destruction of Napoleon's power. But one great fault then committed by England was her inordinate augmentation of the power of Russia, thus, to a certain degree, creating her future omnipotence; for it was with the money and subsidies of England that the cabinet of St. Petersburg acquired the means of influencing for ever the southern interests. Nesselrode, who had been engaged in the greater part of the transactions of 1815, was obliged to detach himself from the traditions of the alliance of 1812, and great ability is required in order to make these transitions without abruptness; supple minds possess their influence as well as those of a more decided character, and ruin follows close upon the attempt to resist too much. Nesselrode is essentially the man of transitions; he has never assumed an inflexible attitude in a system or an idea, but has constituted himself the translator of times and interests: from which cause, as I have before observed, it sometimes occurred that his opinions as chancelier d'État to the Emperor Nicholas were opposed to those he professed when he held the same situation under Alexander. The ideas of these two princes were not alike, neither were they placed in the same situations; yet Nesselrode served them both with the same fidelity and the same intelligence. It is a talent in public affairs to know how to make one's self the interpreter of another person; there are but a few of those very superior minds who, being deeply impressed with their own conceptions, obtain a dominion over times and characters, and even they frequently fall. But many very distinguished ministers never are able to attain that point of elevation, and, not daring to make themselves types, they are content with being impressions. They agree with all periods, all situations, and all difficulties.

From the accession of the Emperor Nicholas to the revolution of 1830, the Russian policy was in some measure absorbed by the war with the Porte. All the ancient theory of the Holy Alliance was abandoned for less undecided interests, and less fear was entertained concerning revolutions at the time the most complete revolution took place. Whatever judgment may be formed of the event of 1830, it must suddenly have awakened a new train of emotions in the Russian chancellerie; for the popular principle which had caused this violent irruption had demonstrated as much energy, as did formerly the military power of Napoleon, against whom all Europe had risen in arms. The old education of Nesselrode was here destined again to be of service to him; for the first consequence of the revolt was, though not exactly to revive the treaties of the Holy Alliance, an old parchment which had fallen to pieces, at least to pave the way for a treaty of mutual guarantee. All private dissensions were naturally compelled to give way, that people might hasten to provide against the most pressing danger; Metternich appeared entirely to resume his former ideas, as if he were returning to the projects of 1815, and the diplomatic school abandoned many serious plans for the chances of a crusade against democratic principles. We are inclined to think Nesselrode did not dislike this reminiscence of the principles of political repression, being those which he most perfectly understood, and which he had particularly dwelt upon during his early years of study and labour: but age had now supervened; in 1830 Nesselrode was no longer young, and it is not at the second period of existence people are able to encounter the great perturbations which shake the world to its centre. In recapitulating the causes of the maintenance of peace, people have not sufficiently considered the dread of change that possessed those wearied existences. Truly, it was not without reason that the Greeks placed in the hands of the aged the decision concerning peace or war. Let us suppose Metternich with the impetuosity of youth, and Nesselrode fifteen years younger, who can tell what might have occurred? Perhaps a violent war might have broken out, and with it all the chances of disorder.

The insurrection in Poland, however, gave plenty of occupation to Russia, and the ideas of the Emperor Nicholas on the subject of repression harmonised perfectly with those of his minister. What the Russian people desired was the union of Poland to Russia; and the amalgamation, which had so long been the constant subject of Nesselrode's thoughts, was, at last, on the point of being finally accomplished. He never fully entered into the prejudices of the old Muscovites on this point, but he, nevertheless, was of opinion that this divided nation, this double and simultaneous government, injured the political and administrative unity of Russia.

The divers administrations which constitute the vast Russian empire, and which all tend to one common centre, under the hand of the Emperor, are, as a whole, very remarkable. Ever since the constituent assembly established an unity of administration in France, our system of government has no longer cause to dread that, in a homogeneous whole, one province or one district will be opposed to another; their strength has been blended in a manner very convenient to those in power. But it is far otherwise in Russia: the cabinet of St. Petersburg has to command thousands of different races—Tartars, Mahometans, Poles, and Cossacks; each of these people has its laws, its customs, its power, and its recollections, and it is necessary to maintain this individuality without detracting from the unity of the system. There is neither one general rule observed in the mode of levying the taxes, nor even, in a great measure, is there any undeviating rule for the military conscription. Some pay tribute, others are subject to contributions of arms and horses; in some places the recruits are furnished by the nobles, in others they are obtained by means of levÉes en masse; some people are still subject to feudal government under the Czar, and others, again, depend on the regular and immediate authority of the princes. In France the administrative clockwork is so simple that nothing but a will and a hand for business are required to set it in motion; nothing can be easier than the situation of a prefect, or even of a minister for the home department; interests, rights, and customs, are all sacrificed to the strength of the government.

All these circumstances lead to the necessity in Russia of a more careful and more finished education for a statesman; for a young man who is preparing for a diplomatic situation at St. Petersburg, must not only be acquainted with French and German, but must also understand modern Greek and some of the Oriental languages. Nesselrode, in spite of his long experience, has been obliged to submit to the general rule; and a considerable portion of his life has been devoted to the study of living languages. His mind has become a repertory of treaties, he is a living catalogue of all the transactions of his time. The offices over which he presides are the most extensive, the most multiplied, and the most minute that can be imagined; there is a division for the relations with Persia, another for those with China, and with the little Mahometan princes, independent of those for the secret correspondence with the chiefs of the various tribes lately conquered by Russia. Nesselrode presides over all these affairs of the chancellerie with an activity nothing can slacken: his extreme facility in the despatch of business, and his laborious existence in the midst of the European relations, have naturally confirmed his credit with the Czar; who is also accustomed to act very much for himself, and only requires a minister as a sort of memorandum-book he can consult when he pleases, and as a faithful arm to execute his will. During the last five years the system of diplomatic aides-de-camp has been revived in full force, for the Emperor likes those semi-military appointments, which give a constantly armed attitude to Russia; in fact, it is one of the active sources of his moral influence.

Nesselrode, it is true, is only the enlightened hand which writes the will of the Emperor; he is valued as a man of good counsel, which means, that he listens a great deal, and that he can discover the secret thoughts of the person that consults him, without himself having any of those determined plans which clash with the will of the sovereign.

The junior diplomatic school of Russia regard Nesselrode as a living archive, something in the way M. d'Hauterive was considered in France; and it is of great importance that a person who is called to direct the affairs of his country in the present times should be well acquainted with its former history—it also adds greatly to the elevation of his position. The temperate system, adopted by men weary of agitation, is a great benefit when opposed to the fiery spirits who wish to proceed with impetuosity in public affairs. The proud and generous disposition of the Emperor renders it necessary he should have at his side a man who will not execute his orders till the following day, because time is thus afforded for reflection, and an order issued to-day might very possibly be revoked after the lapse of a night; on these occasions there is a great advantage in a man of a temperate mind.

Nesselrode has, in every respect, the most agreeable salon in St. Petersburg, and the one where the most conversation goes on. He takes pleasure in collecting people who hold the most various opinions, in such a manner as to form a neutral ground, on which every body may meet; and when a man has reached a venerable age, full of years and of honours, what more can be desired? our tent must be pitched somewhere. When for forty years, people have been engaged in the most gigantic events, like the aged men in Homer, they offer hospitality to the young, when they recount to them all they have seen, and the judgment they have formed; they contemplate the present generation with the feelings experienced by a traveller who, from an elevated tower, looks down on the cities far below him, and the people incessantly busy, and thronging to perform the part assigned to them in the weary task of humanity.