 
The connection of the MarÁthÁs with GujarÁt can be divided by the chronicler into the following periods. First, the time of predatory inroads from 1664 to 1743, before the leaders of these expeditions had permanently established themselves within the province. Secondly, what may be termed the mercenary period, when the MarÁthÁs partly by independent action, but far more by a course of judicious interference in the quarrels of the Muhammadan officials and by loans of troops, had acquired considerable territorial advantages. Towards the end of this period, as has been already seen, their aid was usually sufficient to ensure the success of the side which had managed to secure it, and at last the capital itself was claimed and held by them. Then came the time of domination, from 1760 to 1801, during which period the GÁikwÁr influence was occasionally greater than that of the Peshwa. From 1802, internal dissensions at the courts of Poona and Baroda weakened the hold the MarÁthÁs had on the province, and the paramount power had to all intents and purposes passed over to the British long before the downfall of BÁjirÁv Peshwa and the final annexation of his rights and territory in 1819. SivÁji’s First Inroad, 1664.The first MarÁtha force that made its appearance in GujarÁt was led there early in 1664 by SivÁji. This leader was at the time engaged in a warfare with the Mughals, which, however desultory, required him to keep up a much larger force than could be supported out of the revenues of his dominions. He therefore looked to plunder to supply the deficiency, and Surat, then the richest town of Western India, was marked down by him as an easy prey. His mode of attack was cautious. He first sent one Bahirji NÁik to spy out the country and report the chances of a rich booty, whilst he himself moved a force up to Junnar on pretence of visiting some forts in that direction recently acquired by one of his subordinates. On receiving a favourable report from Bahirji, SivÁji gave out that he was going to perform religious ceremonies at NÁsik, and taking with him 4000 picked horsemen, he marched suddenly down the GhÁts and through the DÁng jungles, and appeared before Surat. There he found an insignificant garrison, so he rested outside the city six days whilst his men plundered at their leisure. On hearing of the tardy approach of a relieving force sent by the governor of AhmedÁbÁd, SivÁji beat a retreat with all his booty to the stronghold of RÁygad. By the time the reinforcement reached Surat, the only trace of the invaders was the emptied coffers of the inhabitants. About the same time, or shortly after, the fleet which SivÁji had equipped at AlibÁg about two years before came up to the mouth of the gulf of Cambay and carried off one or two Mughal ships which were conveying to Makka large numbers of pilgrims with their rich oblations. SivÁji’s Second Attack, 1670.This insult to the Muhammadan religion was enough to incense the bigoted Aurangzeb, apart from the additional offences of the sack of Surat and the assumption in 1665 of royal insignia by SivÁji. He therefore sent an expedition to the Dakhan strong enough to keep the MarÁthÁs for some time away from GujarÁt. One of SivÁji’s officers, however, seems to have attacked a part of the Surat district in 1666, and to have got off safely with his spoils. In 1670, SivÁji again descended upon that city with about 15,000 men. The only serious resistance he experienced was, as before, from the English factors. He plundered the town for three days, and only left on receiving some information about the Mughals’ movements in the Dakhan, which made him fear lest he should be intercepted on his way back to the country about the GhÁts. 1671.SivÁji left a claim for twelve lÁkhs of rupees to be paid as a guarantee against future expeditions. It is possible, however, that as he does not appear to have taken any immediate steps to recover this sum, the demand was made only in accordance with MarÁtha policy, The conduct of the military authorities in GujarÁt with regard to this expedition of 1670 was such as to render it highly probable that the Mughal leaders were in complicity with the MarÁthÁs in order to gain the favour and support of their leader. Shortly before SivÁji’s arrival there had been a large garrison in Surat, apparently kept there by the governor, who suspected that some attempt on the town would soon be made. This garrison was withdrawn before SivÁji’s attack, and almost immediately after his departure 5000 men were sent back again. The commanders of the Mughal army in the Dakhan were Jasvant Singh the RÁhtor chief of Jodhpur and prince Muazzam. Jasvant Singh had been viceroy of GujarÁt from a.d.1659 to 1662, and in a.d.1671 shortly after SivÁji’s second expedition was re-appointed to that post for three years. He had, moreover, been accused of taking bribes from SivÁji during the operations in the Dakhan. Prince Muazzam, again, had every reason for wishing to secure to himself so powerful an ally as SivÁji in the struggle for the imperial crown that took place, as a rule, at every succession. Aurangzeb, reasoning from his own experiences as a son, refused to allow a possible heir to his throne to become powerful at court; and accordingly sent him against SivÁji with an army quite inadequate for such operations. It is therefore not unreasonable to suppose that if there had not been some previous understanding between SivÁji and the Mughal leaders, the troops that were known to be within easy reach of Surat would have been found strong and numerous enough either to have repulsed him altogether or at least to have prevented the three days’ sack of the city. SÁler Taken, 1672.In a.d.1672 SivÁji took some of the small forts to the south of Surat, such as PÁrnera and BagvÁda, now in the PÁrdi sub-division of the Surat district, whilst Moro Trimal got possession of the large fort of SÁler in BÁglÁn, which guarded one of the most frequented passes from the Dakhan into GujarÁt. The MarÁthÁs were thus able to command the routes along which their expeditions could most conveniently be despatched. The Narbada Crossed, 1675.No further incursion was made till 1675, in which year a MarÁtha force first crossed the Narbada. On the resumption of hostilities between SivÁji and the Mughals, HasÁji Mohite, who had been made SenÁpati, with the title of HambirrÁv, marched up the North Konkan, and divided his army into two forces near Surat. One portion plundered towards BurhÁnpur, the other commanded by himself plundered the Broach district. Ten years later a successful expedition was made against Broach itself, either preconcerted or Raids by DÁbhÁde, 1699.In a.d.1699 RÁm RÁja appointed one of his most trusted officers, KhanderÁv DÁbhÁde, to collect in BÁglÁn the chauth 1713.In 1713 some treasure was being conveyed from Surat to AurangÁbÁd escorted by a large force under Muhammad TabrÍzÍ. The party was attacked in the jungles east of Surat and the treasure carried off. Just before this, Sarbuland KhÁn, the deputy viceroy, on his way to take up his office at AhmedÁbÁd, was attacked and robbed in the wilds of SÁgbÁra on the north bank of the TÁpti. As KhanderÁv had a short while previous to these occurrences taken up his position near NÁndod DÁbhÁde, 1716.As the BurhÁnpur road was one of those most frequented by both pilgrims and merchants, the Dehli authorities were obliged, in 1716, to organize an expedition against DÁbhÁde. The leader of the force was one Zulfikar Beg, an officer inexperienced in MarÁtha warfare. DÁbhÁde found little difficulty in decoying him into a mountainous country, and there completely defeated him with the usual MarÁtha accompaniment of plunder.
The Peshwa’s Negotiations, 1717.KhanderÁv remained away from GujarÁt for three years, accompanying, meanwhile, BÁlÁji VishvanÁth the Peshwa to Dehli, where the latter was engaged in negotiations for the confirmation of the MarÁtha rights to chauth and other tribute from certain districts in the Dakhan. It is evident that at this time there was no definite claim to tribute from GujarÁt on the part of the MarÁtha government; for in spite of the intrigues of BÁlÁji and the weakness of the court party at Delhi no concessions were obtained with regard to it, although the MarÁtha dues from other parts of the country were fully ratified. The grounds on which BÁlÁji demanded the tribute from GujarÁt were that ShÁhu would thereby gain the right to restrain the excesses of MarÁtha freebooters from the frontier and would guarantee the whole country against irregular pillage. The argument was a curious one, considering that the most troublesome and notorious freebooter of the whole tribe was at the elbow of the envoy, who was so strenuously pleading for the right to suppress him. It is probable that BÁlÁji foresaw that KhanderÁv’s newly acquired rank would take him for a time from BÁglÁn to the court, so that meanwhile an arrangement could be made to prevent the growth of any powerful chief in the GujarÁt direction who might interfere with the plans of the central government. The MarÁtha statesman was as anxious to ensure the subordination of distant feudatories as the Mughals to secure the freedom of the GhÁt roads to the coast. In the redistribution of authority carried out about this time by BÁlÁji VishvanÁth, the responsibility of collecting the MarÁtha dues DÁmÁji GÁikwÁr, 1720.At the battle of BÁlÁpur, fought against the NizÁm-ul-Mulk, one of the officers of KhanderÁv, by name DÁmÁji GÁikwÁr, so distinguished himself that the SenÁpati brought his conduct prominently to the notice of RÁja ShÁhu. The latter promoted DÁmÁji to be second in command to KhanderÁv with the title of Shamsher BahÁdur, which had been formerly borne by one of the Atole family in 1692. This is the first mention of the present ruling family of Baroda. Before many months both KhanderÁv and DÁmÁji died. The former was succeeded by his son TrimbakrÁv, on whom his father’s title was conferred. PilÁji, nephew of DÁmÁji, was confirmed in his uncle’s MarÁtha Tribute, 1723.The year 1723 is noteworthy as being the date of the first imposition of the regular MarÁtha demand of one-fourth, chauth, and one-tenth, sardeshmukhi, of the revenue of GujarÁt. Whilst PilÁji was directing his attacks against Surat and the south of the province another of RÁja ShÁhu’s officers, who had been sent up towards MÁlwa, entered GujarÁt by the north-east, and after ravaging the country round Dohad, KantÁji Kadam.This officer, KantÁji Kadam BÁnde, was soon after engaged by one of the parties struggling for the viceroyalty of AhmedÁbÁd to bring his cavalry into the province and take part in the civil war. The leader of the opposite party, Rustam Ali, enlisted the services of PilÁji GÁikwÁr. The NizÁm-ul-Mulk, whose influence in the Dakhan was very great, managed to detach PilÁji from Rustam Ali’s side. This was the easier, as Rustam had already defeated PilÁji more than once in attacks by the latter against Surat, of which district Rustam was governor. There are two different accounts MarÁtha Dissensions, 1725.This division led to quarrels and at last to an open rupture between the two MarÁtha leaders, which was only patched up by the The Peshwa, 1726.Next year they returned for the tribute and plundered as usual. The Peshwa BÁjirÁv then opened for the first time direct negotiations with the viceroy of GujarÁt. The rapid increase of the authority of the BrÁhman ministers at the RÁja’s court in the Dakhan had aroused the jealousy of the MarÁtha nobles, amongst whom TrimbakrÁv DÁbhÁde was one of the most influential. BÁjirÁv, being fully aware of the fact, and having by this time acquired from the RÁja the power of acting with foreign powers independently of the throne, determined to undermine TrimbakrÁv’s authority in GujarÁt by aiming at the rights said to have been formally granted to him by Hamid KhÁn over the country south of the Mahi. He therefore applied to the viceroy for a confirmation of the right to levy chauth and sardeshmukhi over the whole country, on condition that he would protect it from the inroads of KantÁji, PilÁji, and other irresponsible freebooters. The viceroy had still some resources left at his disposal and was in hopes that his repeated applications to Dehli for assistance would soon meet with a favourable answer. Cession of Tribute, 1728.He declined therefore to accede to BÁjirÁv’s proposals at once, on the grounds that the court at Dehli had repudiated the concessions made to PilÁji and KantÁji by his predecessor’s deputy. As however the depredations on the frontier caused serious injury both to the revenues and the people, he allowed the Peshwa to send a feudatory, UdÁji PavÁr, chief of DhÁr, through the Mughal territories to operate against PilÁji. The latter, who was fully aware of these negotiations, persuaded KantÁji to join him in expelling the agents of the Peshwa party, as it was clear that if PilÁji’s forces were scattered the way would be open for UdÁji to attack KantÁji himself. The two then proceeded to Baroda and after a while drove back UdÁji, and occupied Baroda and Dabhoi. Here PilÁji remained, and next year KantÁji succeeded in taking ChÁmpÁner, thus advancing his posts nearer the centre of the province. With such an advantage gained these two chiefs instituted raids still more frequently than before. In these straits, and finding himself utterly neglected by the emperor, the viceroy re-opened negotiations with the Peshwa, who lost no time in sending his After this agreement was executed, BÁjirÁv made over part of the sardeshmukhi to the DÁbhÁde, as well as the mokÂsa or three-fourths of the svarÁj as settled by BÁlÁji VishvanÁth. The consideration as set forth in the preamble of this agreement was the great improvement effected by the MarÁtha rulers as regards the wealth and tranquillity of the Dakhan provinces. This was inserted either to give the transaction the appearance of having been executed on the part of the emperor (for otherwise the viceroy had no concern in the state of the Dakhan), or simply as an expression of gratitude on the part of this special viceroy towards the MarÁthÁs who had just brought to terms the NizÁm-ul-Mulk, his former rival and enemy. It is even probable that it was merely intended, as usual with such preambles, to veil the forced nature of the treaty. The hostile movements of the Pratinidhi in the Southern MarÁtha Country induced the Peshwa to return to the Dakhan. KantÁji returned from Sorath to ChÁmpÁner, plundering part of the viceroy’s camp on his way. TrimbakrÁv DÁbhÁde, jealous of the interference of the Peshwa in the affairs of GujarÁt, began to intrigue with other chiefs to overturn the power of the BrÁhman ministers. Coalition against the Peshwa, 1730.As soon as NizÁm-ul-Mulk became aware of this discontent on the part of TrimbakrÁv, of whose power he was well informed, he proposed to assist him by an attack on the Peshwa from the east, whilst the MarÁthÁs operated in another direction. TrimbakrÁv was successful in his overtures with PilÁji GÁikwÁr, the BÁnde, the PavÁrs, and a few other chiefs resident in KhÁndesh or the north Dakhan. The troops sent by them to join his standard soon amounted Defeat of the Allies, 1731.The Peshwa’s army was inferior in numbers but consisted of better trained men. He closed at once with the allies near Dabhoi, and easily defeated the undisciplined forces of the PavÁrs and BÁnde. The DÁbhÁde’s army, however, had more experience of regular warfare and made a stand. But a stray shot killed TrimbakrÁv as he was endeavouring to rally the forces of his allies, and as usual in such engagements, the loss of the leader disheartened the army. Utter confusion ensued, in which many of the nobles fell, others ran away, and the Peshwa, without the necessity of pushing further his advantage, made good his retreat to the Dakhan. The NizÁm, who was in pursuit, only managed to capture some of the baggage with the rear guard as it was crossing the TÁpti near Surat. Safe again in the Dakhan, the Peshwa at once began negotiations with both the NizÁm and the adherents of TrimbakrÁv DÁbhÁde. He recognized the rights of the former to some possessions in GujarÁt independent of the viceroy of AhmedÁbÁd, and agreed to further his designs of severing the Dakhan from the possessions of the emperor. He conciliated the DÁbhÁde family by establishing at Poona an annual distribution of food and presents to BrÁhmans such as had formerly been the practice in the native village of KhanderÁv. BÁjirÁv acquiesced also in the general tendency amongst MarÁthÁs of all offices to become hereditary, and conferred the title of SenÁpati on YeshvantrÁv the minor son of the deceased TrimbakrÁv. The widow UmÁbÁi became guardian, and PilÁji GÁikwÁr deputy or mutÁlik in GujarÁt. This latter appointment seems to have been made by the Peshwa and not by the DÁbhÁde, for PilÁji received at the same time a new title, namely that of SenÁ KhÁs Khel or commander of the special band or perhaps the household brigade. He was also bound on behalf of the SenÁpati to respect the Peshwa’s rights in MÁlwa and GujarÁt, and to pay half the collections from the territory he administered to the royal treasury through the minister. A provision was also inserted with regard to future acquisitions. This reciprocal agreement was executed at the special command of the MarÁtha RÁja ShÁhu, who had not yet quite abrogated his authority in favour of the Peshwa. PilÁji after these negotiations retired to GujarÁt.
GÁikwÁrs Secure Baroda, 1734.In this year also JÁdoji, a younger son of TrimbakrÁv, made an expedition to collect tribute through GujarÁt as far as Sorath. Next year MÁdhavrÁv GÁikwÁr, brother of PilÁji, obtained possession of Baroda during the absence of Sher KhÁn BÁbi the governor. Since that date this town has been the capital of the GÁikwÁr family. Sindia and Holkar soon afterwards joined the chief of Ídar against the MusalmÁn deputy, and extorted from the latter a considerable sum as ransom. The MarÁtha Deputy Governor, 1736.UmÁbÁi had recognized DÁmÁji as her agent in succession to PilÁji; but as she required DÁmÁji in the Dakhan the latter had been obliged to leave in his turn a locum tenens in GujarÁt. There ensued quarrels between this deputy, named Rangoji, and KÁntÁji Kadam which brought DÁmÁji back again, and after obtaining from the Muhammadan viceroy, who had espoused the cause of KantÁji, a grant of one-fourth the revenues of the country north of the Mahi he went as usual to Sorath. KantÁji Kadam, who as a partisan of the Peshwa was hostile to the SenÁpati, harassed the country within reach of his frontier. DÁmÁji, meanwhile, had again proceeded to the Dakhan, where UmÁbÁi was intriguing against the Peshwa and required all the help she could obtain to further the ambitious schemes she was devising in the name of her half-witted son. His deputy Rangoji, by demanding a heavy price for his aid at a time when an aspirant to the viceroyalty of AhmedÁbÁd was in distress, managed to secure for the MarÁthÁs half the revenue of GujarÁt with certain exceptions. AhmedÁbÁd Riots, 1738.DÁmÁji then moved into GujarÁt again, and on his way to join Rangoji extorted Rs. 7000 from the English at Surat as a 1742.Rangoji in the absence of DÁmÁji took up his residence in Borsad. There he fell into several disputes with the Muhammadan officials, in the course of one of which he was taken prisoner, but escaped the next year (1743). Meanwhile DÁmÁji had joined with RÁghoji BhonslÉ in attacking the Peshwa. Whilst RÁghoji was preparing his army in the east, DÁmÁji made a feint against MÁlwa, which had the desired effect of withdrawing a large portion of the ministerial army. The GÁikwÁr’s troops retreated without giving battle, but to prevent any future junction between DÁmÁji and the BhonslÉ party in BerÁr, BÁlÁji Peshwa confirmed the PavÁr family in their claims to DhÁr, which had never been acknowledged as their territory since the defection of the PavÁrs to the DÁbhÁde party in 1731. It is worth remarking that though the rank of SenÁpati had apparently been made hereditary in the DÁbhÁde family (for the owner of the title was quite unfit for the command of an army), the GhorpadÉ family applied at this time to have it restored to them on the ground that it once had been held by one of their house. The Peshwa, however, managed to secure their alliance by a grant of land, and their claims to the chief command of the army seem to have been waived. 1743–44.For the next two years the MarÁtha force in GujarÁt under Rangoji and DevÁji TÁkpar was employed by the MusalmÁns in their quarrels regarding the viceroyalty. The MarÁtha practice of appointing deputies gives rise to some confusion as to the negotiations that took place about this time between the GÁikwÁr’s party and the rival candidates for the office of subhedÁr. For instance, UmÁbÁi DÁbhÁde had appointed the GÁikwÁr family as her agents-in-chief, but the principal members of that house were absent in the Dakhan. DÁmÁji GÁikwÁr had appointed Rangoji, who in his turn left one KrishnÁji in charge of the MarÁtha share of the city of AhmedÁbÁd. On the departure, however, of DÁmÁji from GujarÁt, UmÁbÁi left RÁmÁji as her agent. RÁmÁji, who seems to have 1745.On KhanderÁv GÁikwÁr’s return from the Dakhan he demanded the accounts of the tribute from Rangoji, and not being satisfied with this agent confined him in Borsad and appointed one TrimbakrÁv in his place. UmÁbÁi caused Rangoji to be set at liberty and sent to her in the Dakhan, after which she reappointed him her agent. He expelled TrimbakrÁv from AhmedÁbÁd, but was attacked by KrishnÁji and GangÁdhar, two other late deputies. DÁmÁji and KhanderÁv were obliged at last to come to GujarÁt and summon all these deputies to their presence. A private arrangement was concluded under which KhanderÁv was allowed by DÁmÁji to keep Na?iÁd and Borsad as a private estate and to act as the GÁikwÁr’s deputy at Baroda. Rangoji was to live at Umreth when not on active service. GangÁdhar and KrishnÁji were censured and forbidden to engage in any independent alliances with the Muhammadan leaders. 1746.After this DÁmÁji sent a general named KÁnoji TÁkpar to collect the Sorath tribute whilst he himself retired to Songad. Rangoji returned to AhmedÁbÁd, and not long after began to quarrel with the viceroy about the MarÁtha share in the revenue of the city ceded in 1728. The GÁikwÁr in Surat, 1747.In a.d.1747 KedÁrji GÁikwÁr, cousin of DÁmÁji, was asked by Syed Achchan, an aspirant to the governorship of Surat, to assist him in maintaining possession of that city. Before KedÁrji could reach Surat the disputes as to the succession had been settled by negotiations, and the aid of MarÁtha troops was no longer required. KedÁrji, however, finding himself in a position to dictate terms, demanded three lÁkhs of rupees for the aid that he was prepared to give, and as the Surat treasury could not afford to pay this sum in cash, one-third of the revenues of Surat was promised to the GÁikwÁr. 1748.Rangoji meanwhile attacked HaribÁ, an adopted son of KhanderÁv GÁikwÁr, and recovered from him the town and fort of Borsad, which had been seized during the time that Rangoji had been occupied with his disputes in AhmedÁbÁd. KhanderÁv and DÁmÁji both turned against him and captured the fort after a long siege. Rangoji was then again imprisoned, and not released until the next year when the Peshwa sent a body of troops into GujarÁt. In 1748 UmÁbÁi, widow of TrimbakrÁv DÁbhÁde, died, leaving one BÁburÁv guardian of YeshvÁntrÁv her son. Partly through the solicitations of KhanderÁv, who had private influence with the DÁbhÁdes, partly from the fact of previous possession, DÁmÁji was confirmed as deputy of the MarÁthÁs in GujarÁt. He there began to collect an army as quickly as possible, in order to co-operate with RaghunÁth BhonslÉ against the Peshwa, in answer to an appeal by SakvÁrbÁi, widow of ShÁhu, to support the throne against the ministers, and to secure the 1750.The Peshwa accordingly entered into some negotiations with JawÁn Mard KhÁn, then in power at AhmedÁbÁd, but was unable to lend substantial aid in GujarÁt against DÁmÁji’s agents, as the whole MarÁtha power was required in the Dakhan to operate against the son of the late NizÁm-ul-Mulk. DÁmÁji GÁikwÁr Arrested, 1751.Next year DÁmÁji, at the request of TÁrÁbÁi, guardian of RÁm RÁja, ascended the Salpi ghÁt with a strong force, defeated the Peshwa’s army, and advanced as far as SÁtÁra. From this position he was forced to retire, and whilst in treaty with the Peshwa was treacherously seized by the latter and put into prison. BÁlÁji at once demanded arrears of tribute, but DÁmÁji declined to agree to any payment, on the ground that he was no independent chief but only the agent of the SenÁpati. He therefore refused to bind his principal or himself on account of what was due from his principal. BÁlÁji then imprisoned all the members of the GÁikwÁr and DÁbhÁde family that were at that time in the Dakhan. The Peshwa and Surat.The state of Surat was at this time such as to afford a good opportunity to the Peshwa to obtain a footing there independently of the English or of DÁmÁji. He had recently had dealings with the former in the expeditions against Ángria of KolÁba, and as the merchants had found him one of the most stable and powerful rulers of the country, they were willing to treat with him for the future security of their buildings and goods in Surat. Taking advantage of DÁmÁji’s confinement, BÁlÁji sent RaghunÁthrÁv to GujarÁt. This leader, afterwards so well known as RÁghoba, took possession of a few tÁlukas in the north-east of the province, but was recalled to the Dakhan before he could approach Surat. JawÁn Mard KhÁn also took advantage of DÁmÁji’s absence to make an expedition into Sorath and KÁthiÁvÁ?a where the GÁikwÁr family had now established themselves permanently. Release of DÁmÁji, 1752.The news of these two expeditions made DÁmÁji very eager to return to his province; and as he had full information as to BÁlÁji’s plans with regard to GujarÁt, he bribed freely, and in order to regain his liberty consented to much harsher terms than he would otherwise have done. He agreed to maintain an army for defence and collection purposes in GujarÁt, as well as to furnish a contingent to the Peshwa’s army in the Dakhan, and to contribute towards the support of the RÁja, now in reality a state-prisoner dependent upon the wishes of his minister. The GÁikwÁr was also to furnish the tribute due on account of the DÁbhÁde family, whom the Peshwa was apparently trying to oust from the administration altogether. After deducting the necessary expenses of collection and defence, half the surplus revenue was to be handed over to the Peshwa. Even after acceding to all these proposals, the GÁikwÁr was not at once released. The Peshwa protracted the negotiations, as he had Capture of AhmedÁbÁd, 1753.DÁmÁji now came back with a fresh army, which was soon reinforced by RaghunÁthrÁv. They marched towards AhmedÁbÁd, and JawÁn Mard KhÁn was too late to intercept them before they invested the capital. He managed, however, by a bold movement to enter the town, but after a long siege was obliged to capitulate and march out with the honours of war. The MarÁthÁs conferred on him an estate in the north-west of GujarÁt, which, however, was recovered by them some time afterwards. After taking possession of AhmedÁbÁd in April 1753, RaghunÁthrÁv went to Sorath, and on his return extorted a large sum as tribute from the NawÁb of Cambay. He left a deputy in AhmedÁbÁd, 1754.who marched against the same chief again in 1754, but on this occasion he could levy no tribute. As the NawÁb had firmly established himself and considerably enlarged his dominions, the Peshwa’s deputy marched against him in person a second time, but was defeated and taken prisoner. The nominee of RaghunÁthrÁv procured his release, and the Peshwa’s deputy continued to demand 1755.arrears of tribute for his master till he obtained an agreement to pay at a future date. He then retired to the Dakhan, and the NawÁb, taking advantage of the lull to strengthen his army, captured AhmedÁbÁd from the MarÁtha garrison and established himself in the city. After a while DÁmÁji and KhanderÁv GÁikwÁr, with an agent sent direct by the Peshwa, arrived before the town and commenced a siege. 1757.It was not until April 1757 that the MarÁthÁs again entered the city. The NawÁb surrendered after the MarÁthÁs had fully ratified the conditions he himself had proposed. 1758.SayÁjirÁv, son of DÁmÁji, remained in AhmedÁbÁd on behalf of his father, and the Peshwa’s agent SadÁshiv put in a deputy in his turn and went himself to Surat. Here he was soon joined by SayÁji, who had to arrange the shares of the tribute in accordance with the partition treaty of 1751. Next year a body of MarÁtha troops was sent to the aid of the RÁv of Kachh, who was engaged in an expedition against Thatta in Sindh. SadÁshiv lent the NawÁb of Cambay some money on the part of the Peshwa to enable him to liquidate the arrears of pay due to his army, but a year afterwards the MarÁtha army appeared at the town gates with a demand for 1759.The Peshwa had supported Syed Achchan of Surat with the view of putting him under an obligation so as to secure some future advantages, and this year lent him some troops as a bodyguard. The NawÁb of Cambay, who was also indebted to the ministerial party, left his dominions to pay a visit to the Peshwa at Poona. KhanderÁv meanwhile plundered LunÁvÁ?a and Ídar, whilst SayÁjirÁv was similarly engaged in SorÁth. 1761.DÁmÁji GÁikwÁr accompanied the Peshwa to Delhi, and was one of the few MarÁtha leaders that escaped after the defeat at PÁnipat. On his return to GujarÁt he successfully opposed an expedition by the NawÁb of Cambay against BÁlÁsinor and re-took the estates of JawÁn Mard KhÁn. He also strengthened his position in Sorath and KÁthiÁvÁ?a against the Peshwa’s party. 1761.The Peshwa, being hard pressed by his rival the NizÁm, began in this year to make overtures to the East India Company’s officers in Bombay, with a view to getting the aid of European artillery and gunners. He at first offered to give up a valuable tract of land in Jambusar. But the English would accept no territory but the island of SÁlsette, the town of Bassein, and the small islands in the harbour of Bombay. These the MarÁtha government declined to give up, so negotiations were broken off. 1762.Next year RaghunÁthrÁv, as guardian of the son of BÁlÁji, named MÁdhavrÁv, who was still a minor, conferred the title of SenÁpati on one of the JÁdhav family who had formerly borne it. The administration of GujarÁt, however, which had always accompanied the title when held by the DÁbhÁde family, was left practically in the hands of DÁmÁji, and no mention of any transfer of it was made at the time JÁdhav was appointed commander-in-chief. Discontented with the empty honour thus conferred, RÁmchandra, the new SenÁpati, joined the NizÁm’s party, and on account of this defection the Peshwa, two years afterwards, cancelled the appointment and restored the office to the Ghorpade family, one of whose members had held it long before. This put an end to the connection of GujarÁt with the chief military dignity of the MarÁtha state. Intrigues of RÁghoba, 1768.After MÁdhavrÁv BÁlÁji came of age he had constantly to be on this guard against the plots of his uncle RaghunÁthrÁv, who had refused to accept the share in the government offered him by the young Peshwa. RaghunÁthrÁv, perhaps instigated by his wife, had no doubt great hopes of obtaining a share in the whole power of the administration, and suspecting MÁdhavrÁv to be aware of his designs, looked upon all the overtures made by the latter as intended in some way or other to entrap him. He therefore collected an army of some 15,000 men in BÁglÁn and NÁsik, and hoping to be joined on his way by JÁnoji BhonslÉ, advanced towards Poona. In his army was GovindrÁv, son of DÁmÁji GÁikwÁr, with a detachment of his father’s troops. The Peshwa, without giving JÁnoji time to effect Death of DÁmÁji GÁikwÁr, 1768.Not long after this action DÁmÁji died. He had brought the fortunes of the GÁikwÁr house to the highest pitch they ever reached and not long after his death the family influence began to decline. It was his personal authority alone that was able to counteract the usual tendency of quasi-independent MarÁtha states towards disintegration, especially when they are at a distance from the central power. KhanderÁv and SayÁjirÁv had shown frequent signs of insubordination (as for instance in their espousal of the cause of Rangoji) and a desire to establish themselves in an independent position, but the sagacity of DÁmÁji foresaw the advantage such a partition would give an enemy like the Peshwa, and his tact enabled him to preserve unity in his family, at least in resistance to what he showed them to be their common foe. Disputed Succession.The quarrel for the succession that arose on DÁmÁji’s death was the first step towards the breaking up of the GÁikwÁr’s power. DÁmÁji had three wives. By the first he had GovindrÁv, who however was born after SayÁjirÁv, the son by the second wife. His sons by the third wife were MÁnÁji and Fatesingh. GovindrÁv was in confinement at Poona near the court, and therefore in a position to offer conditions for the confirmation of his rights without loss of time. In the Hindu law current amongst MarÁthÁs, there are to be found precedents in favour of the heirship of either GovindrÁv or SayÁjirÁv. Some authorities support the rights of the son of the first wife whether he be the eldest or not, others again regard simply the age of the claimants, deciding in favour of the first born, of whatever wife he may be the son. RÁmrÁv ShÁstri, the celebrated adviser of MÁdhavrÁv Peshwa, is said to have expressed an opinion in favour of the rights of SayÁjirÁv. GovindrÁv, however, was on the spot where his influence could be used most extensively. SayÁji, moreover, was an idiot and a puppet in the hands of his half brother Fatesingh. GovindrÁv applied at once for investiture with the title of SenÁ-KhÁs-Khel. A payment of 50½ lÁkhs of rupees to the Peshwa on account of arrears of tribute and a fine for his conduct in taking part with RÁghobÁ was a strong argument in his favour, and when he agreed to a tribute previously demanded from his father of Rs. 7,79,000 yearly and to maintain a peace contingent at Poona of 3000 horse, to be increased by a thousand more in time of war, there could be little doubt as to the legitimacy of his claim, and he was duly invested with his father’s title and estate. 1771.For reasons not apparent SayÁji’s claims were not brought forward till nearly two years later. GovindrÁv had never been allowed to join his charge in GujarÁt, so that he could exercise no interference in that direction, and the court affairs in the Dakhan left perhaps little time for the disposal of SayÁjirÁv’s application, even if it had been made. SayÁji had entrusted his interests to Fatesingh, a man 1773.Fatesingh retired in triumph to Baroda, and opened negotiations with the English in Surat, as he had been endeavouring to do for a year past without success. In January 1773, however, he succeeded in getting an agreement from the Chief for Affairs of the British Nation in Surat, that his share in the revenues of the town of Broach, which had been taken by storm in 1772 by the English, should not be affected by the change of masters. In the same year NÁrÁyanrÁv Peshwa was murdered, and RÁghobÁ was invested by the titular king at SÁtÁra with the ministerial robe of honour. GovindrÁv GÁikwÁr, still in Poona, reminded the new Peshwa of the good offices of the GÁikwÁr family at Dhorap and elsewhere, and found means of getting reinstated as SenÁ-KhÁs-Khel. In 1774 he set out for GujarÁt, and collecting a fair number of adherents on his way, he attacked Fatesingh. 1774.After various engagements of little importance, the latter found himself shut into the city of Baroda, which was invested by GovindrÁv in January 1775. RÁghobÁ Peshwa, 1774.In the meantime RÁghobÁ had been driven from power by the intrigues of BrÁhmans of a different class from that to which he belonged, headed by the afterwards well-known NÁna Phadnis. The ex-Peshwa first betook himself towards MÁlwa, where he hoped to be joined or at least assisted by Holkar and Sindia. As soon however as he got together some scattered forces he marched down the TÁpti and opened negotiations with the English through Mr. Gambier, the chief at Surat. The Bombay Government at once demanded the cession of Bassein, SÁlsette, and the adjacent islands. RÁghobÁ refused, partly, in all probability, on account of the pride felt by the MarÁtha soldiery in their achievements before Bassein at the time of the great siege. He however offered valuable territory in GujarÁt, yielding a revenue of about eleven lÁkhs, and to pay six lÁkhs down and 1½ lÁkhs monthly for the maintenance of a European contingent with artillery. The English at Bombay were debating whether this offer should not be accepted when news reached them that the Portuguese were about to organise an expedition to re-take Bassein. Negotiations with RÁghobÁ were hastily broken off and a small force sent to forestall the rival Europeans. Before the end of 1774, both ThÁna and Versova fort in SÁlsette had been taken. RÁghobÁ in GujarÁt, 1775.RÁghobÁ now heard that Sindia and Holkar had been bought over by the ministerial party and would not come to his assistance. RÁghobÁ Defeated.The ministerial army of 30,000 men under Haripant Phadke entered GujarÁt and obliged GovindrÁv and RÁghobÁ to raise the siege of Baroda and to retire towards the Mahi. Fatesingh’s force then joined Haripant. An attack on all sides was made (Feb. 17th). RÁghobÁ, who was in the centre, was first charged, and before GovindrÁv and KhanderÁv GÁikwÁr could come to his assistance his best officers were wounded, some of his Arab mercenaries refused to fight as large arrears of pay were due to them, and he was defeated on both flanks. He fled to Cambay with only 1000 horse; whilst the two GÁikwÁrs and ManÁji Sindia (Phadke) led the rest of the scattered army to Kapadvanj, where it was again set in order. The NawÁb of Cambay, fearing lest the MarÁtha army should come in pursuit, shut the town gates on the fugitive and refused to give him shelter. Reaches Surat.Mr. Malet, chief of the English residents, who had been informed of the negotiations in progress between his Government and RÁghobÁ, contrived to get the ex-Peshwa conveyed privately to BhÁvnagar and from thence by boat to Surat. Here he arrived on February 23rd. Treaty of Surat, 1775.The stipulations of the treaty negotiated by NarotamdÁs, agent of RÁghobÁ, and the Bombay Government were: The English to provide a force of 3000 men, of which 800 were to be Europeans and 1700 natives, together with a due proportion of artillery. In return for this RÁghobÁ, still recognized as Peshwa, was to cede in perpetuity SÁlsette, Bassein and the islands, Jambusar, and OlpÁd. He also made over an assignment of Rs. 75,000 out of the revenues of Anklesvar, the remaining portion of which district, together with Ámod, HÁnsot, and BalsÁr was placed under British management as security for the monthly contribution of 1½ lÁkhs for the support of the troops in his service. He also promised to procure the cession of the GÁikwÁr’s share in the revenues of Broach. Sundry other provisions (dealing with different parts of the MarÁtha dominions) were inserted, RÁghobÁ being treated throughout as the representative of the MarÁtha kingdom. This treaty was signed on March 6th, 1775, at Surat, but on the previous day there had been a debate in the Council at Bombay as to the propriety of continuing to support RÁghobÁ, as the news from GujarÁt made the British authorities doubtful whether the contingent they had already sent to Surat was enough to ensure success. Colonel Keating in GujarÁt.Just before the treaty was drawn up, at the end of February Lieut.-Colonel Keating had been despatched in command of 350 European infantry 800 sepoys 80 European artillerymen and 60 gun lascars with others, in all about 1500 men, ready for active service. This force landed at Surat four days after RÁghobÁ had arrived from BhÁvnagar. Keating Sails with RÁghobÁ for Cambay.When the news reached Surat that GovindrÁv’s troops and the rest had been reorganized at Kapadvanj, it was determined to effect a junction with them by landing Colonel Keating’s detachment at Cambay and from thence marching north. RÁghobÁ in Cambay, 1775.Considerable delay occurred in carrying out the first part of this proposal. First of all RÁghobÁ detained the army at Dumas GovindrÁv GÁikwÁr’s Army.The British contingent encamped at a place called NÁrÁyan-Sarovar, just north of the town. Here they waited until the reinforcement from Bombay arrived, bringing the whole force up to the complement stipulated for in the treaty. RÁghobÁ’s army under GovindrÁv GÁikwÁr was reported to be moving southwards, and Colonel Keating agreed to let it pass the SÁbarmati river before joining it. Meanwhile the enemy, said to number 40,000 infantry and 12,000 cavalry, marched north to intercept GovindrÁv. The latter, however, by forced marches succeeded in crossing the SÁbarmati before the arrival of the ministerial army, and encamped a few miles north-east of Cambay at a place called Darmaj or Dara. Here Colonel Keating joined him about the middle of April. GovindrÁv’s army consisted of about 8000 fighting men and nearly 18,000 camp followers. These latter were chiefly PindhÁris who used to attach themselves to the camp of one of the MarÁtha chiefs, on condition of surrendering to him half their plunder. Each chief had his separate encampment, where he exercised independent authority over his own troops, although bound to general obedience to the commander-in-chief of the whole army. The confusion of this arrangement is described by an eye-witness as utterly destructive of all military discipline. To add to the cumbrousness of such an expedition, most of the PindhÁris brought their wives and children with them, the cooking pots and plunder being carried on bullocks and ponies, of which there were altogether nearly 200,000 attached to the troops. In every camp there was a regular Advance of the Combined Forces.When all needful preparations had been made, the army, accompanied by a battery of ten guns, besides mortars and howitzers, all of which were manned by Europeans, moved out against the enemy. The latter slowly retreated, burning the crops and forage and destroying the water-supply on its way. On the 20th April the first engagement took place at UsÁmli, resulting in the repulse of the ministerial troops. On May 1st a similar skirmish on the banks of the VÁtrak drove the ministerialists into Kaira. From this post they were driven after a series of slight engagements with the army of RÁghobÁ, which crossed the river at MÁtar. Fatesingh now received a reinforcement of 10,000 horse under KhanderÁv GÁikwÁr, but to counterbalance this aid, Sindia and Holkar from some unexplained cause, connected probably with intrigues at Poona, withdrew from further co-operation with him. Colonel Keating was unable to follow up the advantages he had gained owing to the large proportion of cavalry in the enemy’s army. He therefore continued his march southwards, after persuading RÁghoba to spend the monsoon in Poona, where he would be on the spot to counteract intrigues, instead of at AhmedÁbÁd, as had been at first proposed. On May 8th the army reached Na?iÁd, after repulsing on the road two attacks by the enemy’s cavalry. This result was obtained chiefly by means of the European light artillery. Na?iÁd belonged at this time to KhanderÁv GÁikwÁr, and to punish his defection to Fatesingh, RÁghobÁ inflicted a fine of 60,000 rupees on the town. The amount was assessed on the several castes in proportion to their reputed means of payment. The BhÁts, a peculiar people of whom more hereafter, objected to being assessed, and slaughtered each other in public: so that the guilt of their blood might fall on the oppressor. The BrÁhmans, who also claimed exemption from all taxation, more astutely brought two old women of their caste into the market place and there murdered them. Having made this protest, both castes paid their contributions. RÁghobÁ injudiciously wasted seven days over the collection of this fine, and in the end only levied 40,000 rupees. Defeat of Fatesingh, 1775.On May 14th the march was resumed, under the usual skirmishing onslaughts of the ministerial party. At ArÁs, where RÁghobÁ had been defeated shortly before, he was in imminent danger of a second and still more serious discomfiture. An order mistaken by a British company, and the want of discipline on the part of RÁghobÁ’s cavalry nearly led to a total defeat with great slaughter. The European infantry and artillery, however, turned the fortunes of the day. The troops of Fatesingh were allowed to approach in pursuit to within a few yards of the batteries, all the guns of which then opened on them with grape, the infantry meanwhile plying their small arms along the whole line. Fatesingh was obliged to withdraw his diminished forces and the army of RÁghobÁ received no further molestations The Ministerial General Retreats.Here they remained until June 8th, when Colonel Keating was about to move south again. Luckily, as it turned out for him, the nearest ford was impassable and he had to march to one higher up at a place variously called BÁba PiÁra or BÁva Pir. On his way thither he heard that Haripant, the ministerial commander-in-chief, was halting on the north bank by the ford; he therefore pushed on to make an attack on the rear, but owing partly to timely information received and partly to the confusion caused by the irrepressibility of RÁghobÁ’s cavalry, Haripant had time to withdraw all his force except some baggage and ammunition, which, with a few guns, he was forced in the hurry of his passage across the river to leave behind. Colonel Keating at Dabhoi, 1775.Colonel Keating then marched fourteen miles north from the ford and halted before proceeding to Dabhoi, a town belonging to Fatesingh. The general ignorance of tactics and want of discipline in the native army had determined Colonel Keating not to lead his force as far as Poona, but to spend the monsoon near Baroda. RÁghobÁ detached one of his generals, Amir KhÁn, in pursuit of Ganeshpant, whom Hari Pant had left as his deputy in GujarÁt. Ganeshpant with a detachment of the ministerial army had separated from Hari at the BÁba PiÁra ford and found his way through the wild country on the north of the TÁpti towards AhmedÁbÁd. He was finally caught by Amir KhÁn. Dabhoi was at this time in charge of a BrÁhman governor, who submitted on the approach of RÁghobÁ’s army. Colonel Keating quartered his force in the town, but RÁghobÁ, after exacting a levy of three lÁkhs of rupees, encamped at BhilÁpur on the DhÁdhar, ten miles from Dabhoi. Here he began to negotiate with Fatesingh in Baroda through the mediation of Colonel Keating. Fatesingh was all the more ready to come to definite terms of agreement, as he knew that GovindrÁv was on the watch to recover Baroda. RÁghobÁ and the GÁikwÁrs.It is not certain what the terms proposed and agreed to really were. The only record of them is a copy sent in 1802 to the Resident at Poona by Governor Duncan. According to this document GovindrÁv was to lose his pension and to occupy the same position as before the accession of RÁghobÁ. KhanderÁv was to revert to the situation in which he had been placed by DÁmÁji. The provision of the treaty of the 6th March regarding the GÁikwÁr’s claims on Broach was ratified, and as a reward for the mediation of the Bombay Government, the GÁikwÁr ceded to the British in perpetuity the sub-divisions of Chikhli and VariÁv near Surat and Koral on the Narbada. Before this treaty could be concluded, Colonel Keating received orders to withdraw his contingent into British territory and to leave RÁghobÁ to manage for himself. This change of policy was due to the disapproval by the Supreme Government of the treaty of 6th March, which they alleged had been Withdrawal of the British Contingent.As soon as the roads were open Colonel Keating moved towards Surat, but at the solicitation of RÁghobÁ he disobeyed his orders so far as to encamp at Kadod, about twenty miles east of Surat, but not in British territory. Here he awaited the results of the overtures of Colonel Upton. This envoy remained at Poona from the 28th December 1775 till the 1st March 1776, on which date Negotiations at Poona.he signed the treaty of Purandhar, in which the office only and not the name of the Peshwa is mentioned. By this compact the Peshwa ceded all claims on the revenue of Broach together with land in the neighbourhood of that town to the British. He also paid twelve lÁkhs of rupees in compensation for the expenses of the war. SÁlsette was to be either retained by the English or restored in exchange for territory yielding three lÁkhs of rupees annually. The cessions made by Fatesingh GÁikwÁr were to be restored to him if the Peshwa’s Government could prove that he had no right to make them without due authorization from Poona. The treaty of the 6th March was declared null and void. RÁghobÁ was to disband his army and take a pension. If he resisted, the English were to give him no assistance. If he agreed to the terms proposed, he was to live at Kopargaon RÁghobÁ at Surat, 1776.RÁghobÁ was at MÁndvi Colonel Upton meanwhile offered RÁghobÁ, on behalf of the ministers, a larger pension with liberty of residing at Benares. This also was declined, and the ex-Peshwa fled to Bombay, where he lived on a monthly pension allotted him by the Government.
Negotiations at Poona, 1777.At the end of 1776, a Bombay officer was sent in place of Colonel Upton to be a resident envoy at Poona for the carrying out of the provisions of the treaty. Mr. Mostyn was the person selected, and he arrived in Poona in March 1777. He soon found that the ministers had little intention of adhering to the treaty, so he at once took up the question that he thought it most important to the Bombay Government to have settled, namely the relations of the Peshwa’s Court with Fatesingh GÁikwÁr as regards the cessions of territory. The ministers asserted that the GÁikwÁrs merely administered GujarÁt on the part of the Peshwa and were entirely dependent upon the Poona government, so that they could conclude no agreement with foreign states except with its approbation. Fatesingh did not deny the dependence, but evaded the question of his right to make direct treaties and claimed the restitution of the cessions on the ground that RaghunÁthrÁv had failed to perform his part of the stipulations. The point was discussed for some time, and at last the question of dependence seems to have been let drop, for in February 1778 Fatesingh paid up the arrears of tribute, made the usual presents to the ministers and their favourites, and was again invested with the title of SenÁ-KhÁs-Khel. In October a despatch from the Court of Directors reached the Governments of Bengal and Bombay, disapproving of the treaty of Purandhar, but ratifying it on the principle factum valet. It was suggested, however, that in case of evasion on the part of the ministers, a fresh treaty should be concluded with RÁghobÁ on the lines of that of 1775. Fresh Alliance with RÁghobÁ, 1778.In November 1778 it was rumoured that the ministers in Poona were intriguing with the French, so the Bombay Government took this opportunity of entering into a treaty with RÁghobÁ, who was still in Bombay. He confirmed the grants of 1775, and as security for the pay of the British contingent that was to help in placing him on the Peshwa’s throne in Poona, he agreed to assign the revenues of BalsÁr and the remainder of Anklesvar, as he had done before. He stipulated, however, that his own agents should collect the dues from these districts, and that the British should take charge of them only in case of the full sum due not being paid and then merely as a temporary measure. The Convention of Bhadgaon, 1779.On the 22nd November 1778 the force moved out of Bombay, and by dint of mismanagement and internal dissension the campaign was brought to an end by the convention of the 16th January 1779. Negotiation with the GÁikwÁr.The Council at Bombay disavowed the convention and were inclined to adhere only to the clause allotting Broach to Sindia. Mr. Hornby proposed to the Supreme Government an alliance with Fatesingh, engaging to free him from dependence on the Poona Government and to reconcile the disputants within the GÁikwÁr family itself. After the arrival of General Goddard with reinforcements from Bengal the Governor General approved of the alliance proposed with Fatesingh as head of the Baroda state, but specially declined to admit any participation or support in the family disputes. The British were to conquer for themselves the Peshwa’s share of GujarÁt, if they were able to do so. RÁghobÁ Escapes from Sindia, 1779.RÁghobÁ, meanwhile, who had been given over to Sindia to be conveyed to Bundelkhand, escaped with the connivance of his custodian and fled to Broach. This was evidently a move calculated by Sindia to bring on hostilities between NÁna Phadnis, the head of the ministerial party, and the English. General Goddard, who was conducting the negotiations with Poona on the part both of the Supreme Government and of the Government of Bombay, received RÁghobÁ on June 12th, but evaded any proposals for a direct alliance. At the end of the rains of the same year, information was received by the English that a coalition against them had been League against the English, 1780.formed by the MarÁthÁs, the NizÁm, and Hyder Ali of Mysor. The rumour was partially confirmed by the demand by NÁna Phadnis for the cession of SÁlsette and the person of RÁghobÁ as preliminaries to any treaty. No answer was given, but reinforcements were called for and the overtures with Fatesingh pushed forward. This chief prevaricated about the terms of the treaty and evidently did not like to enter into any special engagement that might perhaps bring down upon him the Poona army. General Goddard therefore advanced on 1st January 1780 against Dabhoi, which was garrisoned by the Peshwa’s troops from the Dakhan, whilst the English in Broach expelled the MarÁtha officers from their posts and re-took possession of Anklesvar, HÁnsot, and Ámod. On January 20th Dabhoi was evacuated by the MarÁthÁs and occupied by General Goddard. Fatesingh now showed himself willing to enter into the proposed treaty, and on the 26th January 1780 signed an offensive and defensive alliance. Treaty with Fatesingh GÁikwÁr.In the re-opening of hostilities there was no mention of RÁghobÁ, but the ground given was simply the non-fulfilment on the part of the Peshwa of his treaty engagement. RÁghobÁ remained under English supervision in the enjoyment of a large allowance. Dabhoi was occupied by an English civil officer with a detachment of irregulars, and General Goddard moved towards AhmedÁbÁd.
General Goddard takes AhmedÁbÁd, 1780.As soon as these conditions were agreed upon, General Goddard went with his own army and the contingent furnished by Fatesingh to AhmedÁbÁd. After encamping before it for five days, he took the city by storm on 15th February 1780. Operations against Sindia and Holkar.Sindia and Holkar had combined their forces against the English and were marching up GujarÁt, plundering on their way. They were opposed by General Goddard, who marched across the Mahi early in March. The allies turned off towards ChÁmpÁner without risking a pitched battle on the plain. Sindia at once opened negotiations with the view of wasting time during the fair season. His first proposal was that RÁghobÁ should be sent to JhÁnsi, where Sindia had allotted him an estate, and that BÁjirÁv, RÁghobÁ’s son, should be appointed divÁn or manager of the Peshwa MÁdhavrÁv, who was a minor. BÁjirÁv himself was under age, so Sindia was, of course, to assume temporarily the reins of government. Goddard at once refused to force RÁghobÁ to take any course other than the one he should select of his own free will; for Sindia did not appear to be aware that the English were now at war with the ministers on their own account and not as allies of an ex-Peshwa. Negotiations were broken off and Sindia and Holkar dislodged from place after place without any decisive engagement being fought. General Goddard was preparing monsoon quarters for his army, when he heard that a division of a MarÁtha force which had been plundering the Konkan in order to cut off supplies from Bombay had attacked parts of the Surat AthÁvisi. He detached some troops under Lieut. Welsh and sent them to the south, whilst he remained himself on the Narbada. Lieut. Welsh drove back the marauders and took possession of the forts of PÁrnera, Indargad, and BagvÁda. After the monsoon of 1780, General Goddard went to besiege Bassein, leaving Major Forbes in charge of the GujarÁt army. This officer posted one body of troops at AhmedÁbÁd for the protection of Fatesingh, another at Surat, and a third at Broach. Two battalions of Bengal infantry were sent to Sinor and some few men to Dabhoi. 1781.An attack was made by Sindia on the newly acquired district of Sinor, but Major Forbes successfully resisted it and Sindia’s position with regard to his own dominions was now such as to prevent him from sending more expeditions against GujarÁt. The military necessities of other parts of India were such as to induce General Goddard to apply to Fatesingh for an increase to Treaty of SÁlbai, 1782.No further attack was made in this direction during the continuance of the war which came to an end on 17th May 1782. The treaty of SÁlbai between an envoy of the Governor General on one side and MahÁdÁji Sindia as plenipotentiary for the Peshwa and minister of Poona on the other, replaced the MarÁtha territory in GujarÁt exactly where it was on the outbreak of hostilities against RÁghobÁ in 1775. It was, however, specially stipulated that no demand for arrears of tribute during the late hostilities should be made against the GÁikwÁr, a clause that led to misunderstandings many years later. The town of Broach was given over to Sindia in accordance with the secret negotiation of 1779 and the votes of the Bengal and Bombay Councils. The territory round Broach yielding a revenue of three lÁkhs of rupees, ceded by the Peshwa, was likewise returned. RÁghobÁ was granted a pension of 25,000 rupees a month and allowed to select his own place of residence. He went to Kopargaon and there died a few months after the conclusion of the treaty of SÁlbai. Thus came to an end one of the chief sources of disturbance to the Poona government. For the next six years no event of any political importance took place in GujarÁt, which province was left almost entirely to the administration of the GÁikwÁr family. Death of Fatesingh, 1789.In 1789, however, Fatesingh died, leaving SayÁjirÁv without a guardian. MÁnÁji, a younger brother, at once seized the reins of government and began the usual sort of negotiations to secure his recognition by the Poona government. He paid a nazarÁna of 3,13,000 rupees and agreed to pay up thirty-six lÁkhs of rupees as arrears, though it is not clear on what account, unless that sum had accrued since the treaty of SÁlbai, or was part of the long standing account left open by DÁmÁji in 1753. MÁnÁji, however, was not allowed to succeed to the post of guardian without opposition. GovindrÁv GÁikwÁr was living at Poona, and, though he had himself little influence with the Peshwa’s immediate adherents, he had managed to secure the then powerful Sindia on his side. This chief, since his recognition as plenipotentiary at the treaty of SÁlbai, had been gradually making good his position with the Peshwa and his favourites as well as with the leading MarÁtha nobles, so as to be able to successfully oppose NÁna Phadnis when the time came for a coalition of the outlying chiefs against the ministerial party. GovindrÁv offered his son ÁnandrÁv as husband for the daughter of Sindia, a proposal which it is not probable that he ever intended to carry out. A grant of three lÁkhs of rupees was also promised, in return for which Sindia allowed his garrison in Broach to assist GovindrÁv’s illegitimate son KÁnhoji to reach Baroda. MÁnÁji applied to the Bombay Government on the grounds that the steps taken by GovindrÁv were contrary to the provisions of the treaty of 1780. As however this treaty had been abrogated by the later agreement at SÁlbai, the Bombay Government declined to interfere. MÁnÁji’s agents at Poona 1793.NÁna detained GovindrÁv in Poona till he had agreed to hold by former stipulations and to cede to the Peshwa the GÁikwÁr’s share in the districts south of the TÁpti together with his share of the Surat customs. To this the Government of Bombay demurred as an infraction of the provision of the SÁlbai treaty whereby the integrity of the GÁikwÁr’s possessions was assured. NÁna Phadnis at once withdrew his proposals. GovindrÁv at last joined his brother at Baroda on 19th December, and took up the office of regent. Ába Shelukar Deputy Governor of GujarÁt, 1796.For two years GujarÁt remained quiet. In 1796 BÁjirÁv, son of RÁghobÁ, succeeded to the Peshwa’s dignity and at once appointed his younger brother, ten years of age, governor of GujarÁt. In accordance with MarÁtha custom a deputy was sent to take charge of the province, one Ába Shelukar, and he too seems to have administered vicariously, for next year (1797) we find him amongst those taken prisoners with NÁna Phadnis when that minister was treacherously seized by DaulatrÁv Sindia in the Dakhan. Ába was released on promising to pay ten lÁkhs of rupees as ransom. 1797.He then joined his appointment as subhedÁr in order to take measures to get together the money he required. Disputes between Ába and GovindrÁv GÁikwÁr.BÁjirÁv Peshwa was anxious to embroil Ába with GovindrÁv, whom he knew to be favourable to NÁna Phadnis and too powerful to be allowed to acquire influence beyond the reach of head-quarter supervision. A cause of quarrel soon arose. DaulatrÁv pressed Ába for part payment of the above ten lÁkhs, and the latter being unable to squeeze enough out of his own territory, forced contributions from some of the villages administered by the GÁikwÁr. GovindrÁv at once took up arms against him and applied for aid to the English Agent at Surat. In this city Governor Jonathan Duncan had just assumed chief authority in accordance with an agreement between the English and the NawÁb. Duncan was anxious to secure for his government the land round Surat and the GÁikwÁr’s share in the chauth of the town and district. GovindrÁv, when this demand was made, referred the Governor to Poona, knowing that under the treaty of SÁlbai the British Government had no more right to acquire a share of the GÁikwÁr territory than the Poona authorities had when they made a somewhat similar demand in 1793, which was withdrawn as stated above. Before the reference could be made, Ába was penned up by GovindrÁv’s own army in AhmedÁbÁd and forced to surrender that city. He was kept in confinement for more than seven years. GujarÁt farmed to the GÁikwÁr, 1799.In the same year (1799) the Peshwa, apparently without formally revoking the appointment of his brother ChimnÁji as SubhedÁr, gave GovindrÁv a farm for five years of his whole rights in GujarÁt, at the rate of five lÁkhs of rupees a year. These rights included shares in the KÁthiÁvÁ?a and Sorath tribute, the revenue of PetlÁd, NÁpÁd, RÁnpur, Dhandhuka, and Gogha, together with rights to certain customs dues in Cambay and a share in the revenue of the city of AhmedÁbÁd. ÁnandrÁv GÁikwÁr, 1800.As had happened at the death of DÁmÁji, so again now, the heir ÁnandrÁv was all but an idiot and quite incapable of managing his affairs. The disputes as to the guardianship again set the whole state in confusion. KÁnhoji, a son of GovindrÁv by a RÁjputni princess of Dharampor, who had been the first agent of his father in Baroda in 1793, had been put in prison for refusing to give place to GovindrÁv when the latter at length joined him at Baroda. At the death of GovindrÁv, KÁnhoji managed to obtain his liberty and to secure the ascendancy in the counsels of his weak-minded elder brother. He assumed, in fact, the whole government. His arrogant conduct in this new position excited the Arab guard against him and he was again thrown into confinement. His mother GajrÁbÁi, who was a refugee in Surat, endeavoured to get assistance from the English there, and at the same time made overtures to MalhÁr, son of KhanderÁv GÁikwÁr, who had formerly been one of GovindrÁv’s bitterest opponents. 1800.Meanwhile the administration of the GÁikwÁr’s affairs passed into the hands of RÁvji and BÁbÁji Áppa, two brothers who had been brought to Baroda in 1793 by GovindrÁv himself. RÁvji took charge of the civil work, whilst BÁbÁji undertook the military duties, which at that time consisted in great measure in collecting the revenue by show of force. These two ministers, on hearing of the proceedings of The British aid GovindrÁv’s Party.GajrÁbÁi, outbid her for the aid of the Bombay Government. In addition to the cessions formerly offered by GovindrÁv, they were willing to give up Chikhli also. Matters were precipitated by the successes of MalhÁrÁv in the field. RÁvji offered to subsidize five European battalions, and Governor Duncan took upon himself the responsibility of sending an auxiliary force of 1600 men under Major Walker to act with the troops of RÁvji and BÁbÁji north of AhmedÁbÁd. Reinforcements were afterwards sent up, but the campaign was not closed till April 1802, when the fort of Kadi had been taken by storm. MalhÁrÁv surrendered and a residence in Na?iÁd was assigned him with a liberal pension out of the revenues of that sub-division. The fort of Sankheda, which had been held by GanpatrÁv GÁikwÁr for his cousin MalhÁrÁv, was soon after this reduced and the country for a time pacified. The British and the GÁikwÁr, 1800.In March RÁvji had an interview at Cambay with Governor Duncan, which was followed on June 6th by a definite treaty, of which the groundwork had been previously sketched in anticipation of the reduction of the revolted GÁikwÁrs. Two thousand men, besides artillery, were to be subsidized and a jÁidÁd or assignment for their payment was made on the revenue of Dholka and the part of Na?iÁd not assigned to MalhÁrrÁv. Chikhli was given to the British in reward for their aid in storming Kadi, and Residents were to be appointed reciprocally. A large sum of money was borrowed by RÁvji, partly from Bombay partly from Baroda bankers, to pay off the arrears due to about 7000 Arab mercenaries, who had usurped a great deal of objectionable influence in civil affairs at the GÁikwÁr’s The GÁikwÁr’s Minister RÁvji.On the same day was signed a secret compact assuring RÁvji of the support of the British Government and awarding him a village out of the territory ceded by the treaty of June 6th. It was deemed advisable by the British Government to have at the Baroda court some leading personage who might, in the present state of the relations between Bombay and Poona, further the designs of the former government in preventing a recurrence of the coalition of MarÁtha powers. RÁvji was sure of his reward if he served British interests, whilst in case of the reorganization of a MarÁtha confederacy the state he was administering would probably play but a very subordinate part in subsequent events. Treaty of Bassein, 31st Dec. 1802.The treaty of June 6th was disapproved by the Court of Directors as being in direct contravention of the treaty of SÁlbai. Before, however, any orders had been issued by the Home authorities to restore to the GÁikwÁr the territory he had ceded, the Peshwa, out of regard for whom the treaty had been disavowed, was a fugitive before the army of Holkar, and by December had ratified these very concessions at the treaty of Bassein. By this treaty the Peshwa virtually placed his independence in the hands of the British. He ceded his share of Surat, thus giving them sole control over that district. In payment of the subsidiary force required he handed over territory in GujarÁt, the revenue of which amounted to 12,28,000 rupees, and finally he constituted the British Government arbiter in the disputes between his government and that of Baroda. The grants made by the GÁikwÁr for the support of the subsidiary force amounted in 1802 to 7,80,000 rupees. Arabs Disbanded.Major Walker attempted to negotiate with the Arab guard, but the greater part of them flew to arms and released KÁnhoji GÁikwÁr. The latter then tried to collect an army near Baroda, and succeeded in obtaining possession of the person of ÁnandrÁv the titular ruler. The British force then took Baroda by storm, after which most of the Arabs submitted, except a few who joined KÁnhoji. The rest took the arrears due to them and left the country. KÁnhoji was not subdued till February 1803. MalhÁrrÁv in Revolt, 1803.MalhÁrrÁv meanwhile had broken out in rebellion in KÁthiÁvÁ?a and was plundering the MarÁtha possessions there. BÁbÁji ÁppÁji and a young officer named Vithal DevÁji (or DivÁnji) led the operations against him; and to the latter belongs the honour of having captured this troublesome member of the ruling family. The estate of Na?iÁd, which had been assigned to MadhavrÁo by GovindrÁv, was resumed by RÁvji ÁppÁji and made over in its entirety to the British Government. A treaty, supplementary to that of 1802, was drawn up guaranteeing this cession as well as the inÁm or free gift of the fort and district of Kaira, “out of gratitude for the support given in the recent troubles to the GÁikwÁr’s honour and for assistance in securing the good of the State.”
War with Sindia.Whilst these arrangements were being carried out at Baroda, BÁjirÁv Peshwa, chafing at the dependence to which his straits of the previous winter had reduced him with regard to the English, was actively propagating dissension between Sindia and the Calcutta Government. Not long after, the war that had been some time imminent broke out, and a contingent of 7352 men from GujarÁt was ordered to the field. In August or September Broach and PÁvÁga? The Revenue Collecting Force.Under the treaty of SirjÉ Anjangaon in December 1803, both PÁvÁga? and Dohad were restored to Sindia, but Broach remained British. By this means one of the rising MarÁtha powers was extruded from the centre to the outlying portion of the province. The employment of all the British contingent against Sindia’s possessions in GujarÁt precluded Major Walker from furnishing any portion of the army that was annually sent to collect the tribute in KÁthiÁvÁ?a. RÁvji ÁppÁji had expressly stipulated that some part of the contingent might be so used when it could be spared from its main duties. The Supreme Government agreed to the proposal when made by Governor Duncan, on the grounds of the advantage both to the GÁikwÁr and the tributaries of employing on this disagreeable duty a strong and well-disciplined force. Already some of the tributaries had made overtures to Major Walker with a view to obtaining British protection against powerful neighbours. Governor Duncan was in favour of accepting the duty of protection and also of helping the GÁikwÁr’s commander in his expeditions through the peninsula on these grounds. Firstly, the officer in command could exercise a certain supervision over the collections in which the British as part assignees had a direct interest. Secondly, a way could thus be opened for the acquisition of a port on the coast from which the intrigues, supposed to be carried on by agents from the Isle of France, could be watched and counteracted. From such a point, too, the views of the Bombay Government as regards Kachh could be promoted. Thirdly, the commandant could take steps to improve the system of forcible collections, and towards abolishing the barbarous features of this rude method of levying tribute. He could also, perhaps, suggest some system by which the advantages of all three parties concerned would be better secured than by reliance on the uncertainty of temporary expeditions. The fourth and last Renewal of Farm, 1804.Meanwhile the Resident at Poona was doing his best to secure for the GÁikwÁr a further lease for ten years of the farm of the Peshwa’s dominions in GujarÁt, so that the inconveniences of dual government might be avoided. In October 1804 a ten years’ farm was granted in the name of BhagvantrÁv GÁikwÁr at an annual rate of 4½ lÁkhs of rupees. The British and the GÁikwÁr, 1805.This grant led to the consolidation of all previous engagements into a single treaty, which was signed in April 1805. Previous agreements were confirmed and the whole brought into consonance with the treaty of Bassein. Districts yielding 11,70,000 rupees per annum were made over for the support of the subsidiary force, and arrangements were also made for the repayment of the cash loan advanced by the British Government in 1802, when the liquidation of the arrears due to the Arabs was a matter of urgent political necessity. The British contingent was to be available in part for service in KÁthiÁvÁ?a, whenever the British Government thought such an employment of it advisable. Finally, the British Government was constituted arbiter in all disputes of the GÁikwÁr, not alone with foreign powers, but also in the adjustment of his financial transactions with the Peshwa his paramount power. These transactions, which ranged back from the capture of DÁmÁji in 1751, had never been the subject of a formal investigation, and were by this time complicated by the numerous engagements with third parties into which both governments had been obliged to enter at their various moments of distress. BÁjirÁv, who was apparently intriguing for a MarÁtha coalition against his new protectors, was careful not to bring before the notice of the chiefs, whose esteem he wished to gain, a provision which exhibited him as in any way dependent upon the arbitration of a foreign power. He therefore granted the farm for ten years to the GÁikwÁr, as much by way of remanding for a time the proposed inquiries and settlement of their respective claims as for the purpose of diverting the attention of the British to the administration of this new appanage, whilst leaving him free scope for his intrigues in the Dakhan. He used, moreover, every pretext to defer the consideration of the GÁikwÁr question until he could make use of his claims to further his own designs. His success in preventing a discussion of these transactions is apparent by the fact that in the financial statement of the GÁikwÁr’s affairs made by Colonel Walker in 1804, no mention of the Poona demand is to be found.
1807.In 1807 the Resident made over Ába Shelukar, late Sar SubhedÁr of the Peshwa, to the British Government, by whom he could be prevented from engaging in fresh conspiracies. After this Colonel Walker was at last enabled to leave Baroda in order to assist in the settlement of the KÁthiÁvÁ?a tribute question, an object he had long had in view, but which the necessity for his continuous presence at the GÁikwÁr’s capital had hitherto prevented him from undertaking. KÁthiÁvÁ?a Tribute.The changes with regard to the collection of the tribute from the chiefs of KÁthiÁvÁ?a that were carried out in 1807 deserve a special description. Firstly, they placed the relations of the tributary to the paramount power on quite a new basis. Secondly, by them the British influence over both parties concerned was much increased and the connection between the governments of Bombay and Baroda drawn closer. Thirdly, they were subsequently, as will be seen hereafter, the subject of much discussion and delay in the settlement of the questions at issue between the Peshwa and the GÁikwÁr. And lastly, their effect was most beneficial to both the chiefs and their subjects in removing the uncertainty that had hitherto pervaded the whole revenue administration of KÁthiÁvÁ?a. Before entering on the details of the settlement itself, some description is necessary of the social and political state of the peninsula at the time the changes were introduced. State of KÁthiÁvÁ?a, 1807.The greater part of the population of KÁthiÁvÁ?a consisted of two classes, chiefs and cultivators, called BhumiÁs and ryots. The power of the chief ranged from the headship of a single village up to absolute jurisdiction over several score. The ryots were usually tenants long resident in the province. The chiefs were in almost every case foreigners, invaders from the north and north-east; Muhammadan adventurers from the court of AhmedÁbÁd; KÁthis animated by the love of plunder and cattle-lifting; and MiÁnÁs and VÁghelÁs who had settled on the coast on account of the facilities it afforded for their favourite pursuits of wrecking and piracy. More numerous than any others were the RÁjputs, driven south by the disturbed state of their native kingdoms or by the restless spirit of military adventure to be found in a class where one profession alone is honourable. There is a certain uniformity in the building up of all these chieftainships. A powerful leader, with a sufficient band of followers, oppressed his weaker neighbours till they were glad to come to terms and place themselves under his protection, so as both to escape themselves and to take their chance of sharing in the plunder of others. It frequently happened in the growth of one of these states that the bhÁyÁd or relations of the chief (who are sure to be numerous in a polygamous society) were influential enough to assume, in their turn, a partial independence and to claim recognition The groundwork of these states being itself so unstable, their relations with each other were conducted on no principle but the law of the stronger. General distrust reigned throughout. Each chief well knew that his neighbours had won their position as he had won his own by the gradual absorption of the weaker, and that they were ready enough whenever opportunity offered to subject his dominions to the same process. The administration of his territory consisted merely in levying, within certain limits sanctioned by long usage, as much revenue as would suffice to maintain himself and his forces in their position with regard to the surrounding states. When a foreign enemy appeared there was no co-operation amongst the local chiefs in resistance. It was a point of honour not to yield except to a superior force. Each chief, therefore, resisted the demands made upon him until he considered that he had done enough to satisfy the family conscience and then, agreeing to the terms proposed, he allowed the wave of extortion to pass on and deluge the domains of his neighbour. It should be remembered that the peninsula had never been subjugated, though overrun times innumerable. The evil of invasion was thus transitory. To a chief the mere payment of tribute tended in no wise to derogate from his independence. In his capacity of military freebooter he acknowledged the principle as just. His country had been won by the sword and was retained by the sword and not by acquiescence in the payment of tribute, so that if he could avoid this extortion he was justified in doing so. If he weakened his state in resisting foreigners, he knew that his neighbours would certainly take advantage of the favourable juncture and annex his territory. It was his policy therefore, after resistance up to a certain point, to succumb. The Revenue Raid System.Owing to this local peculiarity and to the general want of union in the province, both the Mughals and MarÁthÁs found it advantageous to follow a system of successive expeditions rather than to incur the expense of permanently occupying the peninsula with an army which would necessarily have to be a large one. There is every reason to believe that in adopting the raid system the MusalmÁns were only pursuing the practice of their predecessors, who used to take tribute from Jodhpur to DwÁrka. Some of the subhedÁrs of AhmedÁbÁd divided their tributary district into three circuits of collection and personally undertook the It is worthy of remark that about the beginning of this century the resistance to the collection of tribute was stronger towards the west than in the east and south of the province. In the Mahi KÁntha the lawlessness of the Koli chiefs, who had established themselves in the ravines and on the hills, necessitated the employment of a military force for collections. In the neighbourhood of BijÁpur and Kadi, the chiefs would not pay tribute except under the compulsion of a siege or raid, but the mulakgiri system only reached its full development west of Dholka. From these explanatory remarks the system and practice of the MarÁthÁs can be clearly understood. The MarÁthÁs in Sorath.The MarÁthÁs found their way to Sorath very early in their GujarÁt career. The first raid probably took place about 1711, when the Muhammadans were occupied near AhmedÁbÁd. After this incursions were frequent, and under DÁmÁji GÁikwÁr became, as has been seen above, annual. This leader did more. He took to wife a daughter of the Gohil chief of the small state of LÁthi in east central KÁthiÁvÁ?a, whose dowry in land gave him the standpoint he sought in the heart of the peninsula. He managed also to secure his position in what are known as the Amreli MahÁls, probably under the force of circumstances similar to those which caused the weaker RÁjputs to gravitate towards the stronger of their own tribe. His expedition through the peninsula, generally as near the time of harvest as possible, was made regularly every year as soon as he had amassed a sufficient number of troops on the mainland to admit of a force being detached for mulakgiri. The object of these inroads was plunder, not conquest; the leaders would readily have entered into negotiations for the payment of the tribute had the chieftains been disposed to treat otherwise than after defeat. The expenses It is not on record that the mulakgiri force habitually devastated the country over which it passed, or caused much greater hardships to the ryots than are inseparable from the passage of an army in the field. There are, however, well authenticated stories of the depredations and damage committed during these expeditions. A village is said to have been deserted by order of the bhumia in order that the timber of its houses might furnish fuel for the MarÁtha army on its march. Tortures were doubtless inflicted on men supposed to be well off, who were suspected to have hidden their property. A MarÁtha army was usually, if not always, ill disciplined, as is proved by the testimony of Mr. Forbes, an eye witness of the campaigns of 1775. Securities.This habit of taking securities in all engagements was so prevalent in all parts of the province, and played so prominent a part in the financial administration of the GÁikwÁr’s home and tributary domains, that its main features are worth describing. It is a well known characteristic of Hindu dealings that no transaction is carried on by two parties alone if a third can possibly be dragged in. This practice no doubt originated in the former insecure BhÁts and ChÁrans, 1807.A society of the military type like the RÁjput has a tendency towards caste and privilege. Without a leader the warlike instincts of the tribe would not carry them beyond petty robberies; whilst with a leader they can achieve greater exploits of valour and destruction. The successful chief then is idolized, and after a certain stage the privileges of the chieftainship become hereditary. Once this system is established, the celebration of ancestors follows, and when circumstances are favourable to the perpetuation of the hereditary position, the genealogy of the chief is a matter of the highest importance, and the person entrusted with the record of this is vested with peculiar sanctity. It is the genealogist’s duty to enter in the record, not only the direct line but the names of the more distant relations of the chief by whom he is retained, and also to be the continual chanter of the glorious deeds of their common ancestors. He is therefore a referee of the highest authority in questions of pedigree or of the partition of inheritance. An injury to his person might entail the loss of the pedigree of the ruling family (especially as many of the bards kept no written record) and thus produce a misfortune which would be felt by the whole tribe. The chief, being a warrior, must take his chance in the field with the rest, but the person of the genealogist was sacred and inviolable. Amongst the RÁjputs the greatest reverence was paid to purity of pedigree, and each principal family had its BhÁt to record births and deaths amongst its members and to stimulate pride in their lineage by the recital of the wars and exploits of their ancestors. These BhÁts necessarily multiplied beyond the number of the families that could entertain them, so that many took to banking and some to cultivation. Surrounded as they were by the social system of the Hindus, it was not long before they became differentiated into a distinct caste, and the inviolability of their persons, formerly due only to respect for the pedigree, was now extended to the whole tribe, even though a large proportion of it performed none of the duties of genealogists. Similar to the BhÁts in many respects, notably in that of sacredness of person, were the ChÁrans, numerous in KÁthiÁvÁ?a, where they had founded villages and lived as ordinary Under this system the BhÁts acquired considerable wealth, as they usually demanded a percentage on the amount for which they became security. There are instances in which they presumed upon the strength of their engagements and sacred character to bully or dictate to their employer. Such was the case of the RÁval of BhÁvnagar in 1808, which is also interesting in another way, as showing how the spirit of industry and commerce tends to sap the old observances which have their roots in superstition. This chief engaged in trade, fostered merchants, and increased his revenue. When his security, a BhÁt, got troublesome and interfering, he applied to the power to whom he paid tribute to have the old security bond cancelled and a fresh one taken on his own personal responsibility. In doing this he seems to have been prompted by nothing but his appreciation of the modern code of commercial honour. To return to the mulakgiri. The tribute for which preliminary security had been taken seems to have fluctuated from year to year, but always with reference to a fixed standard. It was one of the MarÁtha rules never to recede from a former demand lest they should be thereby setting up a precedent for future years. They preferred to secure a year or two’s arrears at the full rate to the payment of all the arrears due at a reduced rate. In spite of this fiction of a settled jama or tribute, the MarÁthÁs, when they had a sufficient force at their back, invariably demanded a larger sum, the excess being called kharÁ-jÁt or extra distinct from the actual tribute. This ingenious plan of increasing the collections originated, it is said, with ShivrÁm GÁrdi, and was carried out scrupulously by both BÁbÁji and VithalrÁv in their tours. In fact during the last few years of the old system VithalrÁv had so good a force with him that the extra demand formed a large proportion of the whole tribute collected and had been paid only under strong protest. British Intervention.The British had not long been established in RÁnpur, Gogha, and Dhandhuka before a few petty chiefs of GohilvÁd and Sorath applied to the Resident at Baroda for protection against the mulakgiri of the NawÁb of JunÁga?h and the RÁval of BhÁvnagar, offering to cede the sovereignty of their states to the British on condition that certain rights and privileges were preserved to the chiefs and their families. The conditions they named were not such as were likely to meet with the approval of the British Government, and do Settlement of 1807.Before treating directly with the chiefs a circular was sent round to all of them both by the GÁikwÁr’s agent and by Colonel Walker the Resident, containing the basis of the proposals with regard to the tribute about to be submitted to them. The position of the British Government throughout this negotiation is not clearly defined. VithalrÁv in his circular mentions indeed that a British force was with his own, but urges the chiefs to come to a settlement entirely with the government he represented. Colonel Walker’s note was longer, more explicit, and conciliatory, but at the same time assumes a tone of protection and superiority. The replies of the chiefs were various, and, as a rule, seem to show that they regarded the British Government as the chief mover in these negotiations. They were probably aware of the position in which the engagements of the GÁikwÁr had placed him with reference to the British, and for some years had had the latter as their neighbours in the east of the peninsula. They were therefore not able at once to take in the whole scope of the action of the British Government in the tribute question. Many seemed to take the note as a preliminary to a mulakgiri on the part of the East India Company. The RÁja of MÁlia, who had just been causing disturbances in the dominions of all his neighbours, had repulsed BÁbÁji and permitted the self-immolation of a BhÁt rather than fulfil an engagement, openly proposed a joint expedition across the Ran to plunder Kachh and Sindh. From the inquiries made by the Resident and from information gathered from the GÁikwÁr’s accounts, it was anticipated that separate engagements need only be entered into with the twenty-nine chiefs to whom the circular invitation had been issued, provided that the rights and interests of subordinate members of the BhÁyÁd were clearly defined in the agreement. When, however, these rights came to be investigated in the light of the peculiar rules of RÁjput inheritance, it was found that no less than one hundred and fifty-three persons had a claim to settle independently of each other for their tribute. This greatly prolonged the settlement, but at last the agreements were all framed on one principle. The amount settled was determined by a close scrutiny of the collections of past years, and Colonel Walker found it advisable to make great Settlement of 1807. Political.A second agreement therefore was called for from each signatory state of the nature of a security for good and peaceful conduct. The counter security to this was usually that of another chief. This bond was perpetual. On the execution of both these engagements the chief received a parvÁna or guarantee that the GÁikwÁr government would not take from him more than the tribute agreed upon, and to this deed the countersignature of the Resident on behalf of the British Government was affixed. This guarantee, like the promise of the chief himself, was apparently given in perpetuity. It will be noted that the amount of tribute was fixed permanently, but that it was considered advisable to renew the security every ten years. It is also remarkable that, except in the failzÁmin or bond for good behaviour, the name of the Peshwa’s government, the rights of which over the tribute had only been temporarily alienated, does not appear. The total amount of the tribute thus settled was Rs. 9,79,882. By means of these engagements the relations of the tributaries to their paramount power were made a matter of contract, instead of as heretofore a series of uncertain and arbitrary exactions dependent upon the respective means of coercion and resistance. Peshwa’s Share in KÁthiÁvÁ?a.Seven years of the lease granted to the GÁikwÁr in 1804 by the Peshwa still remained unexpired and during at least six of these It was evident that no accord would be reached on the lines of either of these draft agreements as they stood. Before others were prepared, GangÁdhar ShÁstri had been murdered and the treaty of June 1817 was a completed act, leaving further negotiations unnecessary. Later Arrangements.Meanwhile the tribute since the expiry of the farm of 1804 had been collected by a joint British and GÁikwÁr expedition, for it was found that partly from their own disputes and partly owing to the instigation of the agents of BÁjirÁv, the chiefs were little disposed to act up to the engagements of 1807, either with respect to tribute or good conduct. The Peshwa, whose interference in the affairs of the peninsula had been constantly discouraged, declined to trouble himself to collect the tribute, the responsibility of which he asserted rested entirely upon the British and GÁikwÁr governments. He subsequently ceded the tribute to the British Government on account of military expenses. After his fall in 1819 his territories, including the rights in GujarÁt, fell to the British Government, and in 1820 the GÁikwÁr arranged that the whole of the KÁthiÁvÁ?a tribute, except that due from the districts directly subordinate to Baroda, should be collected by the agency of the British. The Mahi KÁntha.Turning to the events on the mainland, we find that soon after Colonel Walker’s return from the KÁthiÁvÁ?a expedition, he introduced the KÁthiÁvÁ?a tribute system into the Mahi KÁntha, in spite of the opposition of SitÁrÁm RÁvji and the anti-English party in the DarbÁr. Supplementary Treaty, 1808.The territory ceded for the payment of the British contingent in 1805 was found to yield less revenue than had been anticipated, so in 1808 a treaty supplementary to the consolidating one of 1805 was drawn up, allotting additional assignments amounting to about 1,76,168 rupees to the British. This revenue was derived partly from alienated villages in Na?iÁd, Mahudha, Dholka, MÁtar, and near the Ranjar GhÁt. The ghÁsdÁna or tribute of BhÁvnagar was also made over by this agreement. With regard to this latter OkhÁmandal, 1809.Next year the OkhÁmandal chiefs, who had not come under the settlement of 1807, were driven to engage not to continue their piratical depredations along the coast, and to admit one Sundarji Shivji as Resident on behalf of the British Government. The GÁikwÁr government then, too, seems to have become their counter security, an arrangement which led to misunderstandings a short while afterwards. Disturbances in KÁthiÁvÁ?a, 1811.In 1811, some disturbances in NavÁnagar and JunÁga?h and symptoms of discontent in OkhÁmandal took the Resident from Baroda into the peninsula with part of the British contingent. The JÁm of NavÁnagar had got involved in pecuniary transactions with the RÁv of Kachh, and the British Government had mediated with a view of arranging for the repayment by gradual instalments. The JÁm, however, repudiated all the engagements of 1807 both as regards the debt and the tribute, ejected the GÁikwÁr’s agent from his dominions, and prepared for war. He also began to incite the neighbouring chiefs to join in sweeping out the paramount power from the whole of KÁthiÁvÁ?a. It was not till after a considerable show of force that he laid down his arms and came to terms. Captain Carnac, the Resident, got him to submit the Kachh claims to the arbitration of the English Government, and after fixing them at Rs. 4,33,830, Captain Carnac made an arrangement similar to that originally intended. There remained the question of a disputed succession in JunÁga?h. BahÁdur KhÁn, son of a slave girl, was put forward in opposition to a younger aspirant, SalÁbat KhÁn, reputed to be the son of a lady of the RÁdhanpur house. The Baroda government with the concurrence of the Resident had admitted the claims of the latter. On a report, however, by the Assistant Resident in KÁthiÁvÁ?a, Captain Carnac was induced to alter his opinion and to support BahÁdur KhÁn, on the grounds that SalÁbat KhÁn was a spurious child, and that BahÁdur was ready to make concessions of value to the GÁikwÁr government. The Bombay Council, however, disavowed all countenance of the claims of BahÁdur KhÁn, and the matter was let drop. 1812.In the year 1812 the GÁikwÁr had paid off the pecuniary loan borrowed in 1803 from the British Government, but there still 1813–14.The next two years were spent chiefly in discussions with the Poona government about the old claims by the Peshwa on the GÁikwÁr’s estate. There is no doubt that at the time of his death, DÁmÁji had not paid up nearly all that he had bound himself in 1753 to pay. On the other hand there had been at least six intermediate compacts between the Peshwa and various members of the GÁikwÁr family. Amongst others was that of 1768 fixing the arrears of the previous three years, that of 1778 and of 1781, by the tenth clause of which Fatehsingh was excused payment of arrears for the time during which he was engaged in hostilities against RÁghobÁ. Then came the agreement with GovindrÁv in 1797, to which a sort of debit and credit account is appended. Peshwa Intrigue in Baroda, 1814.The Peshwa had been content, for reasons that have been shown above, to let these claims lie dormant during the currency of the ten years’ farm. But, as the question of the renewal of this agreement became imminent, he gradually opened more frequent communications with the Baroda council, using these claims as a pretext for sounding the disposition of the chief officials and ascertaining their feelings especially towards the British Government. When the negotiations for the settlement of these claims were fairly set on foot, he used every possible means to protract them till he had finally decided what he should do in 1814, when the AhmedÁbÁd farm expired. It was easy for BÁjirÁv to discover who were the malcontents at the Baroda Court. SitÁrÁm, the adopted son of RÁvji ÁppÁji, having been found both incompetent and untrustworthy in the management of affairs, had been practically removed from any post of influence in the council, and was moreover chafing at the refusal of the British Government to recognize him in the same way as they had done his father. He had also been superseded as Suba of KÁthiÁvÁ?a by VithalrÁv DevÁji. Under these circumstances, and finding that he had the support of a large number of the older court party against the authority of the Resident and of his native agent, he either himself opened communications with BÁjirÁv or readily listened to the counsels sent to him direct from Poona. Before long, agents were sent to the Peshwa’s Court by TakhtbÁi, wife of ÁnandrÁv, with instructions, it is supposed, to thwart all the proposals and designs of GangÁdhar ShÁstri, who had been recently sent as envoy by the GÁikwÁr council of administration. The chief obstacle to the settlement of the Peshwa’s claims was the counter-demand made by the Baroda government on account of Broach, which had been disposed of without the GÁikwÁr’s consent, and also on account of the damage caused by the inroads of Ába Shelukar, when accredited agent of BÁjirÁv in GujarÁt. There is no need to detail here the events that took place in Poona during these negotiations. On the expiration of the farm in 1814, Meanwhile the JÁm of NavÁnagar had died leaving a disputed succession. The chief’s KhavÁs or family slaves, instigated probably by agents from AhmedÁbÁd, began to usurp the government, and the whole question was submitted by the DarbÁr to the Peshwa as being lord paramount. The AhmedÁbÁd commander sent a body of two hundred cavalry to NavÁnagar, but before they could arrive, the KhavÁs’ revolt had been quelled by a British force detached from the contingent. They therefore dispersed through the province inciting discontent and revolt amongst the JÁts and KÁthis. In Kaira they instigated a tribe of Kolis to attack the British lines by night. SitÁrÁm RÁvji’s adherents also collected a force at DhÁr, a state well-known for lending itself for such purposes, and kept the frontier in confusion. Severe measures at Poona and Baroda soon put an end to this state of things, and at last Trimbakji Dengle was surrendered to the British Government to answer for his share in the murder of GangÁdhar ShÁstri. The discussion of the GÁikwÁr’s debts, however, was carried on all through the year at Poona, whilst BÁjirÁv was maturing his then vacillating plans for extirpating the British from the west of India. OkhÁmandal ceded to the GÁikwÁr.In 1816 the chiefs of OkhÁmandal again betook themselves to piracy. Their territory was occupied by a British force. It will be remembered that in 1809 the GÁikwÁr’s government had become counter security for these chiefs, but owing to the distance of the district from a military post, the Baroda authorities found themselves unable to spare troops enough to put a check on the misconduct of their tributaries. In a.d.1816, at the time of occupation, the Bombay Government informed the Baroda administration that they had no wish to permanently establish themselves at so distant a spot, which contained, moreover, a much frequented shrine of Hindu worship, and that they were willing to put the GÁikwÁr in possession if he would engage to keep up a sufficient force in the district to protect the neighbouring ports and shores from the pirates and wreckers that infested the island of DwÁrkÁ and the adjoining mainland. The Bombay Government made a point of asserting on this occasion, in opposition apparently to some proposal by the Baroda DarbÁr, that they could not admit that the mere fact of having become security or counter-security gave any preferential right to the possession of the country. Finally, the GÁikwÁr government agreed to the condition proposed, and the district was made over to them. British Aid at JunÁga?h.In the same year (a.d.1816) British aid was invoked by the NawÁb of JunÁga?h who was oppressed by a too powerful minister, backed by the Arab mercenaries. After a settlement of this dispute had been satisfactorily brought about, the NawÁb, in gratitude, waived his rights to tribute over the territories recently ceded to Treaty of Poona, 1817.It was intended to bind the Peshwa in such a way that he could never again enjoy the ascendancy amongst the MarÁtha chiefs to which he aspired. The Resident at Poona took this opportunity of also putting an end to the discussions about the mutual claims on each other by the Poona and Baroda governments. The Peshwa agreed to abandon all claims on any territory in possession of the GÁikwÁr and to accept an annual payment of four lÁkhs of rupees in satisfaction of all previous debts. The farm of GujarÁt was made perpetual to the GÁikwÁr on the payment of four and a half lÁkhs annually, but the KÁthiÁvÁ?a tribute was made over to the British Government in liquidation of military expenses. The latter Government, by this treaty, also entered into possession of the Peshwa’s revenue in GujarÁt, except that of UlpÁd, which had been assigned to a favourite officer. All the Peshwa’s rights north of the Narbada were also ceded. Treaty with the GÁikwÁr, 1817–18.These conditions necessitated a readjustment of the agreements with the GÁikwÁr. On November 1817, a definitive treaty, afterwards supplemented by one of November 1818, was executed between the Baroda and British Governments. The force furnished by the former state was found inefficient and the employment of a larger body of British troops was therefore necessary. To pay for these the GÁikwÁr ceded his share in the fort of AhmedÁbÁd and the districts immediately surrounding that city. 1819.At the final settlement of the dominions of the late Peshwa in 1819, the whole of his rights in GujarÁt passed in sovereignty to the British, who remitted the four lÁkhs due from the GÁikwÁr in composition of arrears claimed by BÁjirÁv. 1820.The next year a special inquiry was made into the respective shares of the Peshwa and Baroda governments in the KÁthiÁvÁ?a tribute and in the extra allowance levied by the GÁikwÁr called ghÁs-dÁna allowance. In the course of this inquiry so many abuses of power and instances of extortion on the part of the GÁikwÁr’s officers were brought to light, that the Bombay Government on these grounds, and on account also of the general deterioration in the province since the General Review.It remains to review generally the nature and characteristics of the MarÁtha connection with GujarÁt, the chief events in which have been chronicled above. The most prominent feature has already been indicated at the beginning of this section and is apparent throughout the whole narrative. It is, in fact, the small space in history occupied during this period by the people, compared with the share appropriated to the actions of the government and its delegates. The reasons for this are as easily seen as the fact itself. From first to last the MarÁtha interests in GujarÁt were, except at one or two special junctures, simply pecuniary ones. In comparison with other countries within reach of MarÁtha arms, GujarÁt has always had a very large proportion of inhabitants engaged in commerce and manufacturing industries. It was the object of SivÁji to get as much booty as he could and carry it away then and there; hence the commercial classes and manufacturers presented the most favourable opportunities for pillage, and the agriculturists were at first only mulcted in forage and provisions. Rapidity of action was another of SivÁji’s aims, so not only were his visits short and their effects transitory, but all his booty consisted of property that could be carried away by his horsemen. No women or followers accompanied his expeditions, no prisoners were made excepting the few who could afford to pay a heavy ransom. Torture was resorted to only when the captive was suspected of having concealed his treasure. Cows women and cultivators were, according to SivÁji’s system, exempted from capture. Assignments on revenue were seldom made by him for fear of weakening his own authority. Subsequently the MarÁtha demands became more regular and assumed the form of a certain proportion of the revenue. The sar-deshmukhi and chauth were supposed to be calculated on the standard assessment so as to avoid subsequent claims as tribute or over-collection. In reality, however, they consisted of a fixed share in actual collections together with whatever extras the officer in charge could manage to extort, and which were, of course, kept undefined in any agreement. The expeditions, too, moved more leisurely and in greater force. The passes and roads in their rear were protected by their own comrades, so that the booty could be brought to the Dakhan in carts, and more bulky property therefore was removed than in former times. The times, too, when the demands were likely to be made were known to the headmen of the district and village, so that the cultivators could be pressed beforehand to furnish their share of the When the power of the DÁbhÁde and his deputy the GÁikwÁr was fairly established, a regular system of administration was introduced. It will be remembered that by the treaty of 1729 as few MarÁtha officers were to be employed as possible beyond those necessary to collect the DÁbhÁde’s share of the revenue. In consequence, however, of the internal struggles of the Muhammadan chiefs, this minimum quota grew to be a large establishment, with the usual accompaniment of alienations and assignments for the support of the officers and their religious institutions which the weakness of the central power had allowed to become customary. The DÁbhÁde himself was non-resident and his deputy usually being too valuable an assistant to be spared from the arena of Dakhan politics, the collection was left to sub-deputies and their subordinates, who in turn delegated a great part of their duties to village officers and even to strangers. The DÁbhÁdes, who were throughout more interested in the Dakhan than in GujarÁt, had, no doubt, an idea of raising up a power in the latter province in opposition to the administration of the Peshwa, which was conducted purely by BrÁhman agency. It was soon evident, however, that all that could be done politically with GujarÁt was to make it a treasury for the support of schemes that had to be carried out in the Dakhan. The fertility of the soil and the facilities the country afforded for commerce and manufactures both tended to make it unlikely to become a field for recruiting. The inhabitants of the towns had fixed and lucrative occupations; the cultivators were mostly of a class which on account of the fertility of their land neither Muhammadan nor MarÁtha had been able to impoverish. The MarÁthÁs had still to seek for soldiers in the rugged and barren country on the GhÁts and in the Konkan, where the people could only look for a hand-to-mouth existence if they remained at home. The warlike tribes of GujarÁt were, as has been already seen, too proud by birth and position to engage themselves to fight for any but their own race and interest. The aboriginal races were not likely to prove effective allies even if they had been willing to move from their own woods and fortresses. None of the MarÁtha governors of GujarÁt seem to have consistently attempted to weld the various interests subordinate to them into a cohesion and unity that they might have made politically useful against the Poona influence. All that they endeavoured to do was to draw from their charge as much revenue as possible and to keep out interlopers. To the taxpayer the result was the same, whether his district was invaded by KantÁji or PilÁji. If one anticipated the other in carrying off the harvest, the ryot still had to pay the latter for ejecting the intruder. The only resistance to be feared by the MarÁthÁs was that, not of the cultivators, but of their own race or of the RÁjput GirÁsiÁs. These latter were treated in all districts as mere robbers, probably because the class which bears that name near RÁjpipla, In order to relieve the chief officials of direct responsibility for the revenue, the GÁikwÁr towards the last quarter of the eighteenth century if not before, introduced the system of letting out each revenue sub-division in farm for from one to five years at a fixed annual rate. The farmer was as often as not an absentee, but the supervision and administration were never entrusted to any one but a MarÁtha BrÁhman. The revenue for the year was settled by an inspection of the accounts of previous years and the crops of each village. The amount was taken in kind, but the actual distribution of the whole on individual cultivators was left to the headman, who was in most cases made responsible for the assessment imposed on his village. The frequent passages of hostile armies and other causes had left much culturable land a desert. In order to restore the population and induce colonists to settle and cultivate in such spots, leases on favourable terms were granted to desÁis, who administered the land as they pleased, and were directly responsible to the head revenue authority of the sub-division for the annual rent. The patels and other village officials also made use of their position with reference to the foreign supervisors in appropriating large tracts of waste land to their own uses. The kamÁvÍsdÁr or farmer for the time being was interested only in recouping himself for the amount he had agreed to pay the MarÁtha government, together with a margin for bribes paid to underlings at head-quarters for good offices with regard to the farm. He was ready, therefore, to make use of any agency in collecting his revenue that he found effective, and which saved the cost of a personal establishment. In many parts of the country there were hereditary village headmen accustomed to the duty of extorting money from unwilling ryots. In other places, such for instance as Dholka, it had been customary for certain Muhammadans called KasbÁtis, to become responsible for the revenue of certain villages in return for a discount on the jama or amount collected (manoti). These manotidÁrs were found so useful by the MarÁtha officials that they gradually acquired an hereditary position and claimed proprietary rights in the villages for which they had been formerly mere agents for collection. They also acted as desÁis or colonists, and succeeded in getting their leases of certain tracts renewed long after they had ceased to actively improve the land, which had in fact been all brought under regular cultivation. Such was the agency employed in administering the revenue. The kamÁvÍsdÁr was also the dispenser of justice both civil and criminal. As his object was to make money and not to improve the condition of his charge, his punishments consisted chiefly in fines, and most offences could be paid for. No record of trials was The whole system indicates clearly enough the slight hold the MarÁthÁs had on the province and their desire to make the most out of it for the furtherance of court intrigues or political ends above the GhÁts. There is nothing to show that they contemplated a permanent colonization of the country until the British Government undertook the task of dividing the MarÁtha nation by the establishment of a powerful and independent court at Baroda. The home of the MarÁthÁs was always the Dakhan, and for many years after they had effected a lodgment in GujarÁt, their army regularly returned for the rainy season to the country from whence they originally came. Their leaders were encouraged to be as much as possible near the court by the DÁbhÁde, or the regent on the one side and by the Peshwa on the other: the former on account of their weight with the army and the MarÁtha chiefs, the latter in order that their influence in a distant dependency might not grow beyond what prudence recommended or might be counteracted if its tendency to increase became manifest. For similar reasons no force was allowed to be maintained in GujarÁt sufficient to consolidate the MarÁtha acquisitions there into a manageable whole. DÁmÁji GÁikwÁr, had he lived, would undoubtedly have done much towards this end by means of his personal influence; but, as it happened, the thin crust of MarÁtha domination rapidly disappeared before it either was assimilated into the system of the province or hardened over it. A military occupation of a large and civilised district at a distance from the mother-country, and prevented by the jealousy of the central authority and the short-sightedness of those in charge of its exploitation, from either conforming itself to the elements it found already established, or absorbing the vital forces of the government it dispossessed, a system without the breath of life, without elasticity, without the capacity of self-direction, imposed bodily upon a foreign people, without even the care of preparing a foundation, such seems to have been the MarÁtha government, containing within itself all that was necessary to ensure a precarious, but while it lasted, an oppressive existence. |
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