I was asked to inform Mr. Kerr of this trip. I told him all about it, and asked him if he could get Mr. Balfour and Mr. Lloyd George to give me a general indication of their point of view on peace with Russia; what they would be prepared to do in the matter.

Mr. Kerr and I then talked and prepared what we thought might be the basis of peace with Russia.

I then received from Mr. Kerr, before I left, the following letter, which is a personal letter, which I regret greatly to bring forward, but which I feel is necessary in the interest of an understanding of this matter. [Reading:]

[Private and confidential.]

BRITISH DELEGATION,
Paris, February 21, 1919.

MY DEAR BULLITT: I inclose a note of the sort of conditions upon which I personally think it would be possible for the allied Governments to resume once more normal relations with Soviet Russia. You will understand, of course, that these have no official significance and merely represent suggestions of my own opinion.

Yours, sincerely,

P.H. KERR.

That was from Mr. Kerr, Lloyd George's confidential secretary. Mr. Kerr had, however, told me that he had discussed the entire matter with Mr. Lloyd George and Mr. Balfour, and therefore I thought he had a fair idea of what conditions the British were ready to accept. The note inclosed reads as follows:

1. Hostilities to cease on all fronts.

2. All de facto governments to remain in full control of the territories which they at present occupy.

3. Railways and ports necessary to transportation between soviet Russia and the sea to be subject to the same regulations as international railways and ports in the rest of Europe.

4. Allied subjects to be given free right of entry and full security to enable them to enter soviet Russia and go about their business there provided they do not interfere in politics.

5. Amnesty to all political prisoners on both sides: full liberty to all Russians who have fought with the Allies.

6. Trade relations to be restored between soviet Russia and the outside world under conditions which, while respecting the sovereignty of soviet Russia insure that allied supplies are made available on equal terms to all classes of the Russian people.

7. All other questions connected with Russia's debt to the
Allies, etc., to be considered independently after peace has
been established.

8. All allied troops to be withdrawn from Russia as soon as
Russian armies above quota to be defined have been
demobilized and their surplus arms surrendered or destroyed.

You will see the American and British positions were very close together.

Senator KNOX. With these statements from Col. House as to the American position and from Mr. Kerr as to the British position, and with the instructions which you had received, you proceeded to Russia, and, as you said a moment ago, you made a written report?

Mr. BULLITT. I did, sir. Do you want it read, or shall I state the substance and then put it in the record? I think I can state it more briefly if I read the first eight pages of it and then put the rest of it in the record.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well; do that.

Mr. BULLITT. This report I made to the President and to the American commissioners, by order of the President transmitted to me on my return by Mr. Lansing. I should like to say, before I read this report, that of course I was in Russia an extremely short time, and this is merely the best observation that I could make supplemented by the observation of Capt. Pettit of the Military Intelligence, who was sent in as my assistant, and with other impressions that I got from Mr. Lincoln Steffens and other observers who were there.

Senator KNOX. How long were you in Russia?

Mr. BULLITT. For only one week. I was instructed to go in and bring back as quickly as possible a definite statement of exactly the terms the Soviet Government was ready to accept. The idea in the minds of the British and the American delegation were that if the Allies made another proposal it should be a proposal which we would know in advance would be accepted, so that there would be no chance of another Prinkipos proposal miscarrying.

I might perhaps read first, or show to you, the official text. This is the official text of their proposition which they handed me in Moscow on the 14th of March. Here is a curious thing—the Soviet foreign office envelope.