Kote Kangra—Use of Elephant-draught—Interval of Peace—Reassembling of the Army—Mooltan—Ramnuggur—Chillianwallah—Fall of Mooltan—Goojrat—Close of the Sikh War—Honours to the Artillery—Medals—Concluding Remarks.
In accordance with the treaties entered into with the Sikh government, the Jullundur Doab, and the hill country immediately bordering upon it, became a portion of the British territory. Within the latter stood the celebrated fortress of Kote Kangra, the killedar of which refused to deliver up possession of the place to the British authorities, declaring that, unless the Maharajah Runjeet Singh himself appeared before the gates, he would not surrender the keys. “The fort of Kangra is one of those which is strong from its position: it is built near the conflux of the Bub Gunja with the Beeas; and is bounded, for the most part, by precipices nearly perpendicular; and where the declivities are less formidable, the aid of masonry has been had recourse to, so as to render the place, in the opinion of Vigne, impregnable under European engineers. * * * The occupants of the fort were believed to amount to about 500, principally Akalis, and their guns were said to be ten in number.”[105]
It now, of course, became necessary to reduce this fortress to subjection. Accordingly, a force, under Colonel Wheeler, was sent against it. It consisted of the 2nd, 11th, 41st, and 44th native infantry, with a wing of the 63rd, and a siege-train composed of three 18–pounder guns, two 8–inch howitzers, and six mortars, under Lieutenant-Colonel Wood, with Captain Swinley’s troop (3rd troop 1st brigade), and Captain Fitzgerald’s (2nd company 7th battalion), and Captain Christie’s (4th company 6th battalion) batteries. The march was one of the most arduous character. It seemed impossible that heavy guns could be transported up the precipitous defiles which led to the fort. “With our heavy guns,” writes an officer of the force, “we had to cross the river Gooj no less than fifty-six times between the Beeas and Kote Kangra; and the last day we crossed it, rain having fallen on the hills, it swelled to a roaring torrent. Frequently the guns got completely fixed between enormous boulders of rock, so as to defy all the ingenuity both of artillery officers and engineers; when the united strength of men, horses, and bullocks, aided by two elephants dragging had failed, one fine old mukhna (a male elephant, with tusks like a female) was always called for. Coming forward with an air of pitying superiority—his look seeming to express clearly, ‘What! can’t you do it without me?’ he would look carefully at the gun in every direction, and when he had found the point where his power could be best applied, he put his head to it, and gave it a push, as if to weigh the opposition; then followed another mightier push; and if that did not suffice, a third, given with tremendous force, almost invariably raised the gun out of its fixed position, and sent it on. He would then retire with the air of Coriolanus, when he said to Aufidius, ‘Alone I did it!’—a more valuable ally than Coriolanus, because he said nothing, and was always willing.” Such, indeed, were the difficulties of the march, that the enemy, believing that our heavy ordnance could never be brought under the walls of the fort, determined to hold out. The same opinion of the impracticability of the road was entertained by many of our own officers. “The brigadier,” says the writer above quoted—Colonel Jack, of the 30th native infantry—“was recommended to leave his 18–pounders on the other side of the river Beeas; he, however, determined to take them on as far as possible, and, by extraordinary management and exertion, he succeeded in taking them all the way. They turned out, as the Europeans quaintly remarked, to be the really influential politicals.”
On the 25th of May this tremendous march—one of which it has been rightly said, that it “reflects everlasting credit on the artillery”—had been successfully accomplished. Preparations were commenced for the erection of batteries and the planting of the guns in position; but siege operations were rendered unnecessary by the unconditional surrender of the fortress. A portion of the artillery force, including the heavy guns, remained at Kote Kangra throughout the greater part of the year, being finally withdrawn in December. The return march of the heavy ordnance was little less difficult than the ascent; but on this, as on the former occasion, the elephant-draught was found to be admirably adapted to the required service. “From the experience of this march,” says Lieutenant Clifford in an elaborate report, “I am satisfied, that from their intelligence, docility, and strength, elephants are admirably adapted for the draught of heavy ordnance through a mountainous country; and I doubt whether the heavy guns could possibly have been taken up to Kangra and back without the assistance of these animals; for though bullocks answered sufficiently well for the draught of carts and lighter carriages, the number requisite to move a siege-gun could not have been used at many of the windings and declivities met with during this march, to say nothing of the difficulty of guiding bullocks over narrow, dangerous roads, in which the elephants appeared to show a sense of the necessity of caution. Throughout the march, ten elephants were immediately attached to the four guns; viz. two in draught with each piece, accompanied by two spare.”
The year 1847 was one of almost uninterrupted tranquillity. During the first quarter of the following year little occurred to break the quiet that reigned in the Punjab; but in the month of April, affairs began to wear a more threatening aspect. The refusal of Moolraj, the Dewan of Mooltan, to give up that fortress to the British officers commissioned to transfer it to the hands of another chief, and the murder of those officers (Mr. Agnew and Lieutenant Anderson) by the people of the garrison, led, in the course of that year, to the celebrated siege of that stronghold. Before, however, we dwell upon this important event, it should be mentioned that, in the month of May, some disturbances having been created in the Manjha country by a Sikh Ghooroo (Bhaee Maharaj), two guns of the 4th troop 1st brigade (which had marched from Loodianah to Lahore early in the month), under Lieutenant A. Bunny, accompanied the detachment sent in pursuit of the rebels; and subsequently, the entire troop, under Captain Murray Mackenzie, proceeded on a similar service.
The operations of Lieutenant (now Major) Edwardes having brought him before the walls of Mooltan, it became matter of discussion between the Commander-in-Chief and the Resident at Lahore (Sir F. Currie),[106] whether a regular force should be sent against the fortress at that time, or delayed to a later period. Eventually, the Resident took upon himself the responsibility of ordering the advance of the force; and Major-General W. S. Whish, commandant of the Lahore division, an old and experienced artillery officer, proceeded in command of it.
The artillery with this force was commanded by Major Garbett. Lieutenant J. Mill was appointed major of brigade. The 4th troop of the 1st brigade, under Captain Murray Mackenzie, marched down with the Lahore column, along the left bank of the Ravee. The 4th troop 3rd brigade, under Captain John Anderson,marched with the Ferozepore column along the right bank of the Sutlej. The 2nd company 2nd battalion, the 3rd and 4th companies of the 3rd battalion, and the 6th company 7th battalion, under the command of Major E. F. Day, went by water down the Sutlej with the heavy ordnance. Lieutenant Peter Christie was appointed commissary. These details set out towards the close of July. The land column reached Mooltan before the end of August. On the 4th of September the siege-train arrived. On the 5th, General Whish, in the name of the Maharajah and the Queen of England, called upon the garrison to surrender. No answer being returned to the summons, the engineer officers were called upon to submit their plans for the attack of the place. It was finally determined to commence regular siege operations; and on the morning of the 7th, the first parallel was commenced. It had previously been in contemplation to attempt the seizure of the place by a coup-de-main; and on the 6th, our mortar batteries had commenced playing on the town. On the 7th, 8th, and 9th, there was some slight skirmishing. At daybreak on the 10th, some of our guns were got into position, and a tolerably heavy fire was maintained throughout that day. On the following day orders were issued for an attack upon a position which the enemy maintained in advance of the city. The column named for this service was accompanied by 4th troop 1st brigade of horse-artillery, under Captain Mackenzie. The attack took place on the morning of the 12th, and was highly successful, though attended with considerable loss. Among the officers wounded, was Lieutenant Bunny, of the horse-artillery: General Whish had a horse shot under him. This successful attack placed all the defensible points on this side the city in our hands, and by enabling the heavy guns to be advanced to within 600 yards of the city walls, would have considerably shortened the operations of the siege, but the defection of Shere Singh, which took place on the 14th, entirely altered the aspect of affairs. This circumstance, combined with other causes, the most prominent of which was the numerical inefficiency of the force employed to carry on the various duties of the siege, embracing the formation of trenches and batteries, the protection of the camp and lines of ammunition, as well as the thorough investment of the place, induced the general most unwillingly to suspend operations until the arrival of reinforcements should enable him to proceed with the siege.
In the meanwhile the standard of revolt had been raised in the countries beyond the Indus, and on the banks of the Chenab. The Sikh troops at Bunnoo had mutinied and murdered their officers; and Chuttur Singh, a chief of considerable note, headed the insurrection in the Hazareh. Towards this point the eyes of Shere Singh were directed. He was the son of Chuttur Singh, and after his defection, did not long remain with Moolraj, but marched northward to join the rebels, taking with him 5,000 men, 12 guns and howitzers, and 80 zumbooruks. It was now no longer an isolated case of rebellion in remote provinces. The whole Sikh nation appeared to be rising up in arms against us. The very troops which had been despatched by the Durbar to assist General Whish in his operations, had joined the insurgent force, and it was doubtful whether we had a single friend, Sikh or Mahomedan, in the country. It became necessary, therefore, to take the field on a more extended scale, and the Commander-in-Chief determined to place himself at the head of the army.
It was thus that in vain General Whish applied to Simla for reinforcements. All the available troops were required for the campaign, which appeared inevitable, on the Chenab. Accordingly orders were sent to the Bombay Government to afford the necessary assistance. Here for a time we must quit that division of our army, and follow the movements of the Commander-in-Chief.
In October, 1848, orders were issued for the assembly of the army of the Punjab, under the personal command of Lord Gough; Brigadier Tennant was nominated to the command of the artillery, with the rank of brigadier-general; Brevet-Captain Abercrombie, adjutant of the 3rd brigade horse-artillery, was appointed deputy assistant adjutant-general; Lieutenant H. Tombs, deputy assistant quartermaster-general; Captain Hogge, commissary of ordnance, and Lieutenant P. Christie (with General Whish at Mooltan), deputy commissary of ordnance; Lieutenant H. A. Olpherts was subsequently nominated aide-de-camp to the brigadier-general. Lieutenant-Colonel Brooke, C.B., 2nd brigade horse-artillery, and Lieutenant C. V. Cox, his adjutant, were respectively appointed brigadier and brigade-major of horse-artillery; and Lieutenant-Colonel Huthwaite, C.B., 1st brigade horse-artillery, and Lieutenant E. Kaye, his adjutant, were nominated to the same situations in the foot-artillery.
The artillery division was constituted as follows: Head-quarters and 4th troop (at Mooltan) 1st brigade horse-artillery; head-quarters and 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th troops 2nd brigade horse-artillery; head-quarters, 1st, 2nd, and 4th troops (at Mooltan) 3rd brigade horse-artillery; 1st company 1st battalion (No. 10 horse field-battery); 3rd company 1st battalion (No. 17 horse field-battery); 2nd company 2nd battalion (at Mooltan); 3rd and 4th companies 3rd battalion (at Mooltan); head-quarters, 1st, 2nd, and 4th companies 4th battalion; 2nd company 7th battalion (No. 6 horse field-battery); 3rd company 7th battalion (No. 5 horse field-battery); and 6th company 7th battalion (at Mooltan).
The several components of the army crossed the river Sutlej near Ferozepore, at different times—the majority during the month of October, or early in November; but some of the corps and the artillery train, with No. 6 field-battery, and some reserve companies, did not move across the bridge till the middle of November. Brigadier Huthwaite was intrusted with the equipment and preparation of the train and park, and all arrangements regarding a plentiful supply of ammunition.
Some regiments of cavalry and troops of horse-artillery had been early pushed forward, under command of General Cureton; and Brigadier-General Campbell followed him across the Ravee with his division of infantry and some field-batteries. The Commander-in-Chief followed with General Gilbert’s division.
At the time that our troops crossed the frontier, the Rajah Shere Singh was in force on both banks of the Chenab, with his advanced parties pushed forward to Eminabad and Goojranwallah, and occasionally even to the banks of the Ravee. These, however, fell back before the advancing columns under Brigadier-Generals Cureton and Campbell, and the Rajah abandoned the town of Ramnuggur, and placed the principal part of his force on the right bank of the river, but still holding the left with large masses of cavalry, and some smaller bodies of infantry. The town of Ramnuggur, on the left bank of the Chenab, is situated about two miles from the river, from which it is divided by a low tract of waste cander land, subject to occasional inundation, and intersected by a few easy nullahs. Nearly midway between the town and the river was a small but dense grove of trees, around which hovered the advanced bodies of the Sikh army.
On the 20th November, Brigadier-Generals Cureton and Campbell were within an easy march of Ramnuggur, and during the night they were joined by the Commander-in-Chief. The following day the first collision took place between the army of the Punjaub and the Sikh troops under Shere Singh. It was an unfortunate affair, which led to the loss of some valuable lives without any corresponding advantages to ourselves. Lord Gough was on the ground or in its neighbourhood, but Brigadier-General Campbell was that day in command. However, as the work was entirely confined to the cavalry and horse-artillery, Brigadier Cureton was the actual leader. It was his lordship’s wish to drive Shere Singh completely across the river. The Sikh cavalry were, as before mentioned, hovering between the grove and the left bank. Our cavalry and two troops of horse-artillery (Lane’s and Warner’s) were pushed forward rapidly to dislodge them. The 14th dragoons, charging inconsiderately too far in advance, came unexpectedly upon a nullah filled with Sikh infantry, and were received with a heavy musketry fire, which caused them considerable loss. Colonel Havelock and many others fell in the skirmish, and also the brave old General Cureton. Nor was this all; one of our troops of horse-artillery (2nd troop 3rd brigade) advancing too close to the river’s edge, got under a heavy fire from the enemy’s batteries, and was compelled to retreat with the loss of a gun, which stuck against the bank of a nullah and could not be extricated. Such was the unpropitious commencement of the campaign. The Sikhs were certainly compelled to confine themselves to the right bank, but no doubt the same object might have been gained without so great an expenditure of life.
Meantime the heavy train, with No. 6 horse field-battery, and Penny’s brigade of infantry, were moving up as rapidly as possible. After crossing the Ravee, the detachment diverged from the main road for the purpose of attacking a fort of some strength, called Jhubber, into which a rebel sirdar, Attar Singh, had thrown a small garrison, when he proceeded to join the camp of the sirdar. Two guns of No. 6 field-battery, with small detachments of infantry and irregular cavalry, proceeded in advance against the fort, while the main body followed. The garrison, however, refused to surrender to the nine-pounders, and the walls were too strong for field-pieces. It needed, however, but a sight of the elephant-guns to induce the garrison to throw open their gates, and yield themselves prisoners. Some small pieces of ordnance were captured in the fort, which, together with the neighbouring village, were destroyed by orders from head-quarters.
On the 30th November, the heavy ordnance, anxiously awaited by Lord Gough, joined head-quarters at Ramnuggur, and that very night several pieces were placed in battery near the grove, and also farther to the right and higher up the stream, while Sir J. Thackwell, with nearly all the cavalry, Campbell’s division of infantry, and three troops of horse-artillery, and two field-batteries, marched up the stream to find a ford whereby to effect a passage, and so turn the enemy’s position.[107] This Lord Gough expected could be effected about nine miles above Ramnuggur; but Sir J. Thackwell found himself under the necessity of moving nearly as far as Wuzeerabad before he could effect the passage. This of course occasioned considerable delay.
On the 1st and 2nd there was some exchange of shots between our batteries and those of the enemy on the opposite bank; but the distance was too great to allow of any effect being produced. On the night of the second, our batteries were advanced to within 400 yards of the river’s edge; but in the morning it was apparent that the enemy had drawn back a great part of his camp, though he had left some batteries near the river, between which and ours some desultory firing took place. In the afternoon heavy firing was heard some few miles up the river. This was Thackwell, who had been attacked while resting after several long marches.
There was nothing more than a cannonade from either side. Shere Singh tried to dislodge Thackwell, but could effect nothing by his fire, while, on the other hand, he himself was soon driven from the field by three troops of horse-artillery, 1st and 3rd troop 2nd brigade, and 1st troop 3rd brigade, under Huish, Christie, and Warner, and two field-batteries (No. 5 under Captain Kinleside, and four guns of No. 10 under Captain Austin). Thackwell made no pursuit; being ignorant of the strength of the enemy both in men and guns, and his own troops being somewhat weary, he was unwilling to become more closely engaged. The enemy suffered considerably, but our loss was trifling, and principally in the artillery; Captain E. G. Austin, of No. 10 heavy field-battery, was severely, and Lieutenant J. E. Watson, of 1st troop 2nd brigade horse-artillery, slightly wounded.
As day broke on the morning of the 4th, it was discovered by the indefatigable General Gilbert, as he rode from our batteries to the river’s edge, that the enemy had entirely deserted his position. A ford was immediately sought for, and soon discovered; Thackwell, reinforced from head-quarters,[108] pursued the retreating Sikhs until they entered a thick belt of jungle, into which he did not consider it prudent to follow them. He accordingly encamped at Hailah, his camp equipage and baggage having been sent to join him from Ramnuggur. About the 8th or 9th he was again reinforced. The remainder of the horse-artillery, under Brigadier Brooke, C.B., crossed the river, also No. 17 heavy field-battery under Captain Dawes, and the 1st company 4th brigade with four 18–pounders and two 8–inch howitzers, under Captain Sir R. C. Shakespear. Thackwell had with him now nearly all the force; two brigades of infantry, Hearsay’s brigade of irregular cavalry, Miles’s battery (No. 6), and the park, being all now left at head-quarters. His camp was formed at Hailah, in an extensive and for the most part uncultivated plain. In his front was the broad belt of jungle before mentioned, which extends from the sandy ridge on the banks of the Jhelum, some twelve or fifteen miles into the Dooab. At the further edge of this belt lay Shere Singh, his left resting on Russool, at the western extremity of the sand-ridge, his right flank being at Futteh-shah-ke-chuck, and his back towards the river. After the 5th December, each force remained inactive for a considerable period, save that the Sikhs occasionally sent small parties of horse through the jungle, who annoyed Thackwell by carrying off baggage, camels, &c.
On the 18th, a pontoon bridge having been constructed across the river, head-quarters, Mountain’s brigade of infantry, Hearsay’s of irregular cavalry (with the exception of the 11th under Holmes, left at Ramnuggur), and Brigadier Huthwaite and his staff, crossed the Chenab, and were then joined by No. 10 light field-battery under Lieutenant Robertson. On the 1st January, the head-quarters force moved to Janu-ke (about 1½ miles in rear of Hailah), when the artillery train and park joined from Ramnuggur, at which place a bridge-head had been constructed, armed with two 24–pounders and the guns of No. 6 heavy field-battery.
On the 9th, head-quarters force and that under Madwell changed ground, and effected a junction at Lussooria and Loah Tibbee, on the main road from Lahore to Attock, and about 12 miles in advance of the Chenab. Here it was supposed that the force would remain for a considerable time, and no doubt such was the original intention; but Attock, long defended by the gallant Herbert, fell, and Chutter Singh was known to be in full march to join his son, the Rajah, on the Jhelum; and Mackeson, the Governor-General’s agent, impressed upon the Commander-in-Chief the advisability of overthrowing the latter before reinforced by his father. His lordship, willing always to follow warlike counsels, readily consented: he reviewed his army, ordered up two corps of native infantry from Ramnuggur, on the 12th moved through the jungle, to Dhingee, and on the 13th fought the battle of Chillianwallah.
The strongest part of the enemy’s position was supposed to be his left, at Russool, on the extremity of the sand ridge, where it abuts on the river Jhelum. The immediate neighbourhood of Dhingee was pretty free from jungle, but along the base of the sand ridge, and in front of the whole of the Sikh position, it was exceedingly dense,—rendering all military operations (especially movements of cavalry or artillery) most difficult and hazardous; and concealing effectually the enemy’s line. It was Lord Gough’s original intention to attack Russool with his right (Gilbert’s division), while General Campbell should operate upon Lallianwallah and Futteh-shah-ke-chuck; but there was so much counter advice offered to him on the night of the 12th, that he was induced to forego his intention of attacking the enemy on the following morning. The force, however, marched from camp on the 13th, and the line of contiguous columns at first bore steadily down towards the enemy, the right directed on Russool. After a time, the right was brought more forward, so that the direction of our march became parallel to the enemy’s line, and Lord Gough gave orders to his quartermaster’s department to find a suitable spot for encampment, without going too near the enemy, and, at the same time, without the necessity of retracing our steps towards Dhingee. This was somewhat difficult, as the army had just passed some villages,—Burra and Chota Oomrao, between which and Chillianwallah there was no water. At Chillianwallah, on a mound, or small hillock, was the enemy’s most advanced post; of this, however, we were not aware, till a small party of our cavalry came upon it unexpectedly, and was fired upon; and thus Lord Gough was forced to fight the action on that day.
Our cavalry (with exception of 3rd and 9th irregulars, under Hearsay, our rear-guard) was divided between the two extreme flanks. Gilbert’s division formed the right wing, Campbell’s the left, and Penny’s brigade was in reserve.
The 1st troop 2nd brigade, 3rd troop 2nd brigade, and 2nd troop 3rd brigade, under Lieutenant-Colonel C. Grant, were with the cavalry on the right; Captain Dawes’s, H.F.B. (No. 17), was with Gilbert; No. 5, H.F.B., and three guns of No. 10 (the other three guns being on rear-guard), were, under Major Mowatt, with Campbell. The 2nd troop 2nd brigade, 4th troop 2nd brigade, and 1st troop 3rd brigade, were under Lieutenant-Colonel Brind. The heavy guns (consisting of six 18–pounders and four 8–inch howitzers), under Major Horsford (the respective batteries commanded by Majors Ludlow and Sir R. C. Shakespear), were in the centre of the line. These were all drawn by elephants, which were, however, exchanged for bullocks before the action commenced. Brigadiers Brooke and Huthwaite were, with their respective brigades, on the march, but during the action with the Commander-in-Chief’s staff. The army moved in line of contiguous columns of brigades, at first directed towards the enemy’s position, but subsequently changing front to the left, parallel to the Sikh line, our right towards it. As soon as the Sikh post on the mound at Chillianwallah had been discovered, line was formed from the columns. The outpost was of course soon driven in; after which, Lord Gough again changed front,—to his right this time, so as to bring our front again opposite the Sikh line. The army halted, arms were piled, and the quarter-masters proceeded to mark out ground for encampment. But the Sikhs, determined to bring matters to an issue under cover of the jungle, brought up some light pieces, and fired upon us. As it was evidently impossible to encamp within reach of their guns, which the denseness of the jungle enabled them to move up unobserved by us, and as we could not encamp elsewhere from want of water, without retracing our steps, which would have borne too much the appearance of retreating, Lord Gough was compelled to fight, and that, too, under peculiar disadvantages, as he knew little or nothing of the ground in his front, nor did the thick jungle admit of his reconnoitring. He was forced, too, to abandon his original plan of attacking Russool, as we had now got opposite their centre; the enemy, too, had frustrated all, by moving out of their position into the jungle in front of it.
The enemy’s position was a very extensive one, and Lord Gough was forced to lengthen his own line. The consequence was, that our left and right wings were at a considerable distance apart. The cavalry on the right was divided into two parties; the one under Brigadier Pope comprised the 14th dragoons, a wing of the 9th lancers, the 1st light cavalry, and a wing of the 6th; with these were Huish’s troop (1st troop 2nd brigade) and half of Christie’s (3rd troop 2nd brigade), under Colonel Grant. Further to the right, and somewhat to the rear, so as to cover the right flank of our army, were a wing of 9th lancers and a wing of 6th light cavalry, with Lane’s troop (2nd troop 3rd brigade), and half of 3rd troop 2nd brigade, under a subaltern. To the left of Brigadier Pope was Gilbert’s division, with Dawes’s battery; and left of these again the heavy guns. Campbell’s division and the remaining cavalry, with which were three troops of horse-artillery, under Lieutenant-Colonel Brind, were far removed to the left, and could not be seen from the centre of the line. The action commenced with the heavy guns. It would have been well had they had the battle to themselves a little longer. They produced soon a very considerable effect on the enemy’s fire. In the words of the Commander-in-Chief, “After about an hour’s fire, that of the enemy appeared to be, if not silenced, sufficiently disabled to justify an advance. I then ordered my left division to advance.” Campbell soon became closely engaged. Lord Gough then deemed it necessary to push forward his right wing, and the heavy guns were ordered to cease firing. The Commander-in-Chief soon received intelligence of a great misfortune having happened to Pennycuick’s brigade (one of Campbell’s division)—the 24th regiment of foot especially suffered severe loss.[109] The other brigade, consisting of 61st foot and two native corps, had, however, made a more successful advance. The reserve under Penny was now ordered forward to support Gilbert’s division; but this consisted of but two native regiments (one having been left on rear-guard). Sir W. Gilbert’s division, well supported by Dawes’s brigade, met with but little loss, with the exception of the 30th and 56th native infantry, which corps suffered severely. But further on the right, Pope’s brigade of cavalry, and the horse-artillery under Colonel Grant, were driven back with much loss. The cavalry, it seems, had formed line on the right of the guns, and were then ordered to advance through the jungle. From some unexplained causes, they had only just come within sight of the enemy, when the brigade—notwithstanding the efforts of the officers to stop the movement—retreated, not, however, without loss, for the Sikh cavalry hung closely on their heels. Unfortunately, the men did not retreat directly to the position from whence they had advanced, but, obliquing, came in front of the guns (some of which were unlimbered) and galloped through them, the Sikhs mixed up with them, or close behind; so that our men could not fire without slaying our own cavalry. The consequence was, many of the gunners were cut down at their guns, and six of the pieces fell into the enemy’s hands (two were afterwards recovered by Lieutenant C. Cookworthy, of 3rd troop 2nd brigade, who, after the action, took limbers and horses, and sought for his division). Major Christie received several severe sword and spear wounds, of which he died on the 15th. The other three guns and the cavalry retreated through the jungle, until they reached an open space, near which stood the Chief and his staff. Here the guns drew up, and the cavalry rallied, with the exception of a small party, which continued its flight as far as the field hospital, established on the mound near Chillianwallah.
The Sikh cavalry, who had followed in pursuit, halted at the edge of the jungle, and a few rounds from our remaining pieces soon forced them to retire. Colonel Lane, who commanded on the extreme right, had also been attacked by cavalry, but he had repulsed them with a grape fire from his guns. Meantime our cavalry and artillery on the left had made a successful advance, and Campbell, at the head of the 61st foot and some native infantry, had swept all before him, taking several batteries. Gilbert too, in his advance, had overthrown everything, capturing a great quantity of ordnance. The enemy was everywhere driven from his ground and forced back upon his positions, and our troops, somewhat shattered, remained in possession of the field. But night had now come on, and, seeing the great loss that we had met with, the difficulty of the ground, and that our men were weary and exhausted, the Commander-in-Chief, after consultation with Campbell, considered it expedient to bivouac on the edge of the jungle, at the foot of the mound at Chillianwallah. Unfortunately, this caused the loss of nearly all the guns which we had taken from the enemy—most of them were recovered by them in the night—four of our own too, were carried off, and we secured only thirteen of the enemy’s. Whether the Sikhs claimed the victory, or whether it was in exultation at the trophies gained—some colours besides the guns—or whether it was merely to inform their friends that they still held Russool, they fired a salute that night from the summit of the ridge.
Our loss in this action was severe. Of the artillery, Major Christie, as before mentioned, died of his wounds, as also did Lieutenant Manson, of the 4th troop 2nd brigade; Captain Dawes and 1st Lieutenant Dundas were wounded. The total loss of killed was 2 serjeants, 14 rank-and-file, 1 lascar and 1 syce; wounded, 1 serjeant, 1 trumpeter, 28 rank and file, 8 lascars, and 1 syce; missing, 2 rank and file, and 6 syces.
The morning of the 14th set in wet and gloomy, and the Chief then issued orders to pitch camp upon ground marked out immediately in rear of the mound, fronting the enemy’s position. Whatever intentions Lord Gough may have half-formed of resuming the attack on the 14th, the heavy fall of rain which commenced that evening and continued during several following days, induced him to abandon them. He immediately set about strengthening his position, and the sad task of collecting and burying his dead. And so the British and Sikh armies sat down in sight of each other, with scarcely four miles of ground between their respective camps.
Such was the battle of Chillianwallah; a victory, certainly, insomuch as we remained in possession of the field of battle; but a failure, inasmuch as Lord Gough did not accomplish his object—to drive Shere Singh across the Jhelum, and to completely overthrow him before Chuttur Singh could form a junction with his son.
A month of inactivity succeeded. Our position was a bad one; it covered no road, did not protect the country in our rear, nor guard our communications; neither did it in any way confine the enemy. Our communication with Dhingee was exceedingly precarious; supplies and forage, as well as water, were scarce. We should have felt the want of the latter severely, had it not been for several heavy falls of rain, which filled some dry hollows. As considerable reinforcements were in progress to join Shere Singh, it seemed not at all improbable that he might venture to attack us in our camp. The Commander-in-Chief therefore strengthened our position as much as possible. A good deal of jungle which might conceal the enemy’s designs was cut down; several trenches were dug in front of the line, to afford temporary protection to picquets; the heavy ordnance was placed in battery at the mound to sweep all the ground in front,—and subsequently, a square redoubt was erected to strengthen our right flank, which approached the sand-ridge, and was more liable to attack than any other part. This redoubt was at first armed with some spare field-pieces, drawn by bullocks, but afterwards by the 3rd company 2nd brigade horse-artillery,[110] to which Captain Kinleside, of No. 5 heavy field-battery, had been appointed—Major Ludlow succeeding him in command of the battery. The right flank of our camp was thrown back nearly at right angles. In it were two troops of horse-artillery under Colonel Grant. Fordyce’s troop (2nd company 2nd brigade) of 9–pounders was at the angle, and afterwards placed in a small battery a short distance to the front. Dawes was in the front face with Gilbert, sending out two guns on picquet; the heavy ordnance at the mound; No. 5, with Campbell’s division near the village; No. 10, in rear with Penny. Beyond the village were three troops of horse-artillery under Colonel Brooke (when the 3rd troop 2nd brigade was removed to the redoubts, the number with him was reduced to two). Our left, beyond the village, was slightly retired in an oblique direction. The park was in rear of the mound. As the enemy became stronger and more threatening, several changes took place. The whole of the left was thrown back so as to unite the village of Mojawalla in rear of camp—with the front face, and our right flank was also connected with the village by a rear face—thus our camp formed an irregular quadrilateral figure, or rhomboid, and four pieces of heavy ordnance were placed near Mojawalla. But it was some time before our camp had assumed this form.
The enemy almost daily received accessions of strength. Chuttur Singh joined the Sikh force, and salutes were common in their camp. Reports were frequent of their intention to attack, but little credit was given to them. The Chief, however, considered it prudent to be prepared; half the men, and latterly all, were ordered to sleep in their clothes, and a signal (three guns from the mound) was agreed upon, at which all the troops should turn out. The enemy occasionally made some demonstration. Sometimes his whole line turned out, but more frequently he brought small parties into the jungle, below Russool, and then attacked our right wing, which was frequently on the alert. But the Sikhs gave us the greatest annoyance by capturing our baggage-cattle. This they did frequently, and we were obliged to send out very strong parties of cavalry to protect them. Our horse-artillery, too, had very fatiguing work, guns being frequently out with detachments sent to protect convoys of grain, &c. These had to make long, harassing marches, and latterly it became necessary to send out parties of cavalry and horse-artillery to reconnoitre the country in our right rear.
Thus wearily passed the time, news from Mooltan being most anxiously looked for. At length we had the pleasure to fire a royal salute for its capture and to discuss the circumstances of the successful siege. What those circumstances were, should be here briefly recorded:—On the 26th of December the Bombay troops joined General Whish under the walls of Mooltan. The force now amounted to 17,000 men, with sixty-four pieces of artillery. The time for renewed action had arrived, and Whish was ready to commence operations. Indeed, on the morning of the 26th, before the Bombay division had come up, he had issued an order, expressing his hope that within twenty-four hours after their arrival, “all the enemy’s posts that are a requisite preliminary to the commencement of a regular attack on the citadel,” would be carried; and in the course of the following day they were in our possession. In these operations, four guns of the 4th troop 3rd brigade of horse-artillery, under Captain Anderson, and four guns of the 4th troop 1st brigade, under Captain Mackenzie, were engaged; the former with the centre column, and the latter with the right column. On the following day Whish, reporting these operations to the adjutant-general, wrote, “I hope to-morrow morning to have an 8–inch mortar-battery of six pieces playing on the citadel, at five or six hundred yards’ distance.”
On the 30th the general reported that our batteries were in full play, and that already a shell from a mortar, laid by Lieutenant Newall, had exploded the principal magazine in the citadel. Whish had been with the rocket troop at Hatrass, when the great magazine had been blown up there, and now he wrote that the sight of the Mooltan explosion was “awfully grand, and precisely similar to that at the siege of Hatrass, on the 1st of March, 1817.” “I hope,” he added, “that the consequence may be the same; in which case the enemy would abandon the fort to-night; otherwise I contemplate assaulting the city to-morrow.” The batteries at this time in operation, as reported in the general’s letter, were six 8–inch mortars, three 10–inch ditto, four 5½-inch ditto (opened on the 28th), six 18–pounders (opened on the Kooneeh-Boorj), two 8–inch mortars, two 10–inch ditto, and two 24–pounders (with the mortars in the first line, opened on the 29th). Five more 8–inch mortars were then laid down.
Seldom or never in any part of the world has a city been exposed to such a terrific shelling as the doomed city of Mooltan. The well served ordnance did tremendous execution upon both houses and inhabitants; and soon the ruined streets were choked with the mutilated bodies of the dead. The effect was highly creditable to the skill of both artillery and engineers. On the first day of the new year (1849) the breaches in the city walls appeared to be practicable, and the assault was fixed for the following day. It was on the 2nd of January that the city of Mooltan was carried by the British troops. The gallantry of the infantry column, on this occasion, will never be overlooked by the general historian; but it does not come within the scope of this memoir to record it. Mooltan was carried at the point of the bayonet, but the citadel still remained in the hands of Moolraj.
The batteries now, therefore, opened again, with tremendous effect, on the fortress. The possession of the city had enabled Whish to advance his guns, and he had erected new batteries of heavy ordnance to bear upon the citadel. On the 7th a battery of seven 18–pounders was completed and armed, and a mortar battery for three 10–inch howitzers. On the 8th a battery for six 24–pounders and six 18–pounders was commenced. “The object of this battery,” wrote the general, “is to keep down the fire of the citadel opposite to it, and eventually to breach at the north-east angle.” On the following day a shell from the enemy’s position ignited the seven 18–pounder battery, which was constructed of fascines and sand-bags, and burnt it down, in spite of every effort to extinguish the flames. The engineers in the mean time were sapping up to the foot of the glacis; and the enemy, alarmed by our near approach, were thinking of making terms for themselves. The interior of the citadel had become a ruin; and further resistance was, indeed, hopeless. The garrison declared that they could no longer hold out against the terrible shelling, which was destroying them. Moolraj was at the last gasp. All his efforts to rally his followers were in vain. They told him that he must either sally out at the head of his men and cut his way through the besiegers, or abandon his post and trust himself to the clemency of the victors. So the Dewan began to sue for terms. The answer of the British general was, that nothing would satisfy him but an unconditional surrender. So on the morning of the 22nd of January the garrison laid down their arms, and Moolraj came into the British camp.
The operations had lasted nearly four weeks, throughout which time the artillery were continually engaged—keeping up an incessant fire of shot and shell, from guns, howitzers, and mortars—first upon the city, and then upon the citadel of Mooltan. The practice is admitted to have been excellent. It was, said General Whish, with the enthusiasm of an old artillery officer, “the theme of admiration with all.”[111] The officers of the Bengal division especially named in his official despatch were Majors Garbett and Day; Captains Daniel, Anderson, Master, and Mackenzie; Lieutenant Mill (brigade-major), and Lieutenant Peter Christie (commissary of ordnance).
The following officers were present at the siege of Mooltan:—
Majors—H. Garbett, E. F. Day; Captains—J. H. Daniell, J. Anderson, E. V. Master, M. Mackenzie; Lieutenants—W. Hay, G. Moir, F. W. Swinhoe, F. Alexander, H. Francis, R. Mecham, D. J. Newall, A. Bunny, W. Miller, J. F. Raper, J. Thompson, H. T. Bishop; 2nd Lieutenants—F. R. DebudÉ, J. Hunter, C. T. Graham, F. C. Simons, M. C. Sankey, J. G. Worthington, W. F. Quayles, E. W. Day;—Lieutenant John Mill, brigade-major; Lieutenant P. Christie, commissary of ordnance; Lieutenant W. K. Footes, brigade quarter-master.
In the course of the operations, the casualties in the Bengal artillery amounted to 1 European officer (Lieutenant James Thompson), 2 havildars, and 10 rank and file, killed; with 4 European officers (Lieutenants Bunny, Hunter, Sankey, and Graham), 3 havildars, and 62 rank and file, wounded. These include all the casualties since the raising of the siege. Lieutenant Bunny was wounded in September, and Lieutenant Sankey in November, 1848; the other two officers in the course of the January siege.
Before quitting the subject of these memorable operations, we must insert the following memorandum of the artillery practice at Mooltan, by Lieutenant Newall, which affords much interesting information relative to the details of the siege:—
“During the siege of Mooltan, the Bengal artillerymen were so few, that it was found impossible to afford a relief in the batteries without withdrawing gunners from the troops of horse-artillery. A relief, however, was thus effected daily between 3 and 4 P.M., which was found the most convenient hour, as it afforded time to the relieving officer to ascertain his range, &c. before nightfall, and to prepare and fix his ammunition for expenditure during the night. It was convenient, also, for the men in other respects.
“In the howitzer batteries, it was the practice to receive the charge ready weighed out from the magazine; but in the mortar batteries the charges were invariably weighed out in battery. The bursting charges of all shells were received in battery ready weighed out in small bags, and the shells were always filled by means of a funnel, and fuzes prepared and set by means of a fuze-bench in the battery. Live shells were never sent down to battery from the magazine, as no advantage in point of time was to be gained thereby, the preparing of shells being found in the hands of expert men to fully keep pace with the working of the ordnance. The practice was thus rendered very much more satisfactory, as the length of the fuze could be altered according to circumstances; such as the variation of strength of powder, which was found to be most dependent on the state of the weather, and even of the ordnance, which as the day advanced would gradually warm, contracting the dampness of the powder, and rendering necessary an alteration in the length of fuze. The effects of the howitzers employed in breaching was a subject of satisfaction and astonishment to all; indeed it is doubtful whether the natural mounds of the fort would have been practically breached without their aid. Even against the brickwork their effects were conspicuous. These shells, made to burst at the moment of contact with the walls, afterwards during their passage through the revÊtement, and ultimately with a longer fuze in the earth beyond it, would probably (against such masonry) have alone effected practicable breaches without the assistance of heavy guns.
“At a distance of 150 yards, both the 8–inch and 10–inch howitzers were employed in breaching a scarp wall, part of which was invisible from the battery, and only reached by a plunging fire, obtained by very small charges, and succeeded admirably. At a distance of thirty-five yards, 8–inch howitzers were similarly employed with a charge of 8 oz., a very low velocity being requisite to prevent the shell from burying itself too far in the soft earth. Of the effects of the vertical fire, nothing could have afforded a clearer proof than the ruinous appearance presented by the interior of the fort on its surrender; and the explosion of the great magazine, which took place within one hour of its site being indicated to the batteries, was a subject of congratulation to the Bengal artillery employed, bearing testimony as it did to the accuracy of their practice.
“On the 9th January, 600 shells were fired from an 8–inch mortar battery of six pieces in twenty-four hours, and the mortars did not suffer. No new feature, however, presented itself from the employment of these pieces, nor from that of the heavy guns, which, however, vied with the mortars and howitzers in utility. Doubtless it is by a judicious combination of the three that such powerful effects are produced,—but it may be worth inquiring whether, in the siege-trains employed against fortresses in the East, built as they generally are of old and often crazy materials, a greater proportion of howitzers might not be used with advantage, in cases where no particular object exists to curtail the transport of the shells, which is doubtless great. In addition to what has been above stated of the effects of these most useful pieces in mining the defences and in counter-battery, which was conspicuous throughout the siege, it may be remarked that one shell was often found sufficient to silence the fire from an embrasure of the enemy for a whole day. Rack-lashing platforms were used by the Bengal artillery throughout the siege for the guns and howitzers, and were found to answer most satisfactorily, and the small Bengal mortar platforms, consisting of three sleepers, upon which seven strong planks, each four feet long, were pegged transversely, were made up in the park, and thus taken down to the batteries, where they were expeditiously laid, and stood the firing both of the 8–inch and 10–inch mortars without renewal during the siege; the only difference being, that from the 10–inch mortars other sleepers were laid transversely beneath, to prevent the platforms sinking.”
Having now reduced Mooltan, and captured the Dewan, General Whish determined to move forward, with all possible despatch, to reinforce the Commander-in-Chief. Leaving, therefore, a British garrison in Mooltan, he commenced his march, with the head-quarters, on the 29th January; an advanced brigade, with a troop of horse-artillery, having broken ground two days before. The main body of the Bengal division was accompanied by a siege-train of twelve pieces. The march which he then accomplished, though it has been unaccountably slurred over in the published papers, is one of the most memorable upon record. It was not only distinguished by the energy and rapidity which marked the general’s movements, but by its effect upon the issue of the entire campaign. Had not Whish, with his leading column, reached Ramnuggur, as he did, on the 13th of February, Shere Singh would have ravaged the Rechna Doab, and the campaign would have been a long and desultory one.[112]
Whilst the troops under the Commander-in-Chief were patiently awaiting the coming of General Whish, which would enable them to resume the offensive, the enemy seemed at one time inclined to become the assailant, but by some unaccountable freak of madness chose to abandon his strong position, and take to the open country. His probable object was more readily to procure food. In the second week of February, about half the Sikh army changed ground to its left, and took possession of the Khuri defile, running through the sand-ridge. His advanced parties held Noor Jumal and Dingee, and occasionally even the villages of Burra and Chota Omrao, between our camp and Dingee. They were now on both sides of us; but as our camp was now formed, we were well prepared for an attack. On the 11th, the signal-guns were fired, and our whole army turned out. The enemy was threatening us on both sides; but to our rear, his line had advanced from Khuri, even beyond the villages of Omrao, and could be plainly seen at the edge of the jungle from Mojawalla. Cavalry and horse-artillery were sent out to meet him on this side. The former threw out a chain of videttes, which the Sikhs did not attempt to break. It was not Shere Singh’s object to attack us in camp, but to draw us out into the jungle. After a demonstration of about four hours, the Sikhs withdrew into their camps.
Early on the morning of the 12th, it was discovered, to our surprise, that the enemy had abandoned his position at Russool. His rear-guard was then quickly leaving the sand-ridge. On the 13th, he withdrew also from Khuri. At first we were rather perplexed to ascertain in what direction he had proceeded, but it was soon ascertained that his march was towards Goojerat. Thus he had completely turned our right flank, and our remaining at Chillianwallah was consequently no longer prudent; but, on the contrary, there was the utmost need that we should make a corresponding movement, as it seemed to be the design of the enemy to cross the Chenab, and march straight upon Lahore. Luckily this was frustrated. On the 15th, the army marched to Lussooria, which we had so fruitlessly quitted only a month before. From this it had been intended to cross the river at Ramnuggur, and endeavour to outstrip the enemy in the race to Lahore. But, fortunately, General Whish had now reached Ramnuggur, and, seeing the danger, should the enemy be able to cross the Chenab, he pushed forward the 53rd foot (which had come out from Lahore), with two guns of No. 6 field-battery, and some other troops, to guard the fords near Wuzeerabad, and Markham’s brigade, with two guns of 4th troop 3rd brigade horse-artillery,—those lower down. Thus Shere Singh was foiled, and his army remained encamped near the town of Goojrat, the centre of a richly-cultivated province.
From Lussooria our army moved towards the enemy, slowly, to enable the Mooltan troops to join. On the 16th, they marched to Sadoolapore; on the 17th, to Kunjur; and after a halt, they reached Shahdiwaol on the 20th. By this time all Whish’s force had joined, except Markham’s brigade, and two guns—4th troop 3rd brigade—watching the fords. The brigade, however, crossed before the action.
The accession of strength in artillery which Whish brought us, was as follows:—4th troop 1st brigade horse-artillery, under Captain M. Mackenzie; 4th troop 3rd brigade horse-artillery (2 guns absent), under Captain J. Anderson; a troop of horse-artillery of the Bombay army (the horse field-battery of Bombay was on rear-guard duty), and four 18–pounders, and four 10–inch howitzers, under Major Day.
Our march from Lussooria had been through most beautiful cultivation. We had marched in a line of contiguous columns, encamping in the same order.
On the 21st, our artillery was thus disposed:—On the extreme right, under Lieutenant-Colonel Grant, Warner’s troop, 1st troop 3rd brigade (attached to Lockwood’s cavalry brigade), with Whish’s division; Mackenzie’s and Anderson’s troops, under Major H. Garbett, with Gilbert’s division; Fordyce’s troop, and Dawes’s battery.
In the centre, Major Horsford; four 18–pounders and two 8–inch howitzers, under Major Sir R. Shakespear; two 18–pounders, and two 8–inch howitzers, under Captain J. D. Shakespear.
Major Day; two 18–pounders and two 8–inch howitzers, under Captain Master; two 18–pounders, and two 8–inch howitzers under Captain Austin.
On their left, under Lieutenant-Colonel Brind, Kinleside’s and Lane’s troops, with Campbell’s division—No. 5 (Major Ludlow’s), and 10 (under Lieutenant Robertson), horse field-battery, commanded by Major Mowatt, with the cavalry on the extreme left,—Huish’s and Duncan’s troops.
This time we had everything in our favour—a beautiful, level, open country, with no obstructions, a richly-cultivated plain, dotted with a few villages and trees. It was a bright sunny day: before nine the action was commenced. The enemy’s camp was close to Goojrat, but he moved out about a mile to oppose us, occupying the villages of Burra and Chota Kalrha, in front of his centre and left. But we were not aware at first that he had any troops in them. As soon as he perceived our line, he fired three signal-guns. Our line then halted, while the Commander-in-Chief reconnoitred and made his dispositions. But little delay was, however, necessary—all was so clear—and we had marched from camp in battle order. The action soon commenced.
“At half-past seven o’clock,” says the Commander-in-Chief, in his official despatch, “the army advanced with the precision of a parade movement. The enemy opened their fire at a very long distance, which exposed to my artillery both the position and range of their guns. I halted the infantry just out of fire, and advanced the whole of my artillery, covered by skirmishers. The cannonade now opened upon the enemy was the most magnificent I ever witnessed.[113] The Sikh guns were served with their accustomed rapidity; and the enemy well and resolutely maintained its position. But the terrific force of our fire obliged them, after an obstinate resistance, to fall back.”
In his despatch to the Commander-in-Chief, General Gilbert says,—“Having received orders to push forward my light troops, to force the enemy to show their position, I immediately advanced a troop of horse-artillery (Fordyce’s), and Dawes’s field-battery, which constantly drew a very heavy and well-directed fire from two large batteries which the enemy had established on either side of the village of Kalrha, by which they were nearly screened from the fire of our guns, which, with the light companies, were still further pushed forward. The heavy guns on our centre at this time opened a very destructive fire.”
Of the artillery with his division, General Whish observes,—“Both troops (Anderson’s and Mackenzie’s) began a spirited cannonade, and continued it for about three hours, at the rate of forty rounds per gun per hour, until the enemy’s guns in our front were silenced.”
Nos. 5 and 10, light field-batteries, were attached to the infantry division, under General Campbell. Of these, the General writes:—“I cannot find language to express my sense of the calm, steady, and admirable manner in which these two batteries were commanded and worked by Major Mowatt, the commanding officer, and by Major Ludlow, and Lieutenant Robertson. The infantry of the 3rd division had not occasion to fire a shot. The enemy were driven from their different positions, and from the field, by the fire of these two field-batteries, aided by that of the Bombay troop.”
In the meanwhile, Huish’s and Duncan’s troops on the left, and Warner’s on the right, acted in conjunction with the cavalry on our flanks. Of the former, General Thackwell thus writes:—“To oppose the enemy’s guns, I ordered Captain Duncan to move his troop of horse-artillery to the front, which he did in good style, and opened his fire within 500 or 600 yards. This movement was followed by the advance of Captain Huish’s troop, and both did considerable execution upon the enemy. These troops [the Scinde Horse and a squadron of the 9th Lancers] made a most brilliant charge upon the enemy. At the same time I advanced the guns and cavalry towards the enemy’s line. The fire of the guns soon put the Gowcherras to retreat, and the glorious charge of the troops on the right, caused their whole force to seek safety in flight.” Brigadier Lockwood says:—“At the commencement of the action, I directed Captain Warner to open his fire upon a large body of the enemy near a village in our front. But as they returned a heavy fire within accurate range, I changed position, left back, and the horse-artillery ceased firing. The enemy’s horsemen now appeared in great force on our right, threatening to turn our flank. So I changed front to the right. Captain Warner’s guns opened with great effect upon the horsemen, and turned them; but they only retired a short distance, and then a regiment of their regular cavalry moved round by a circuitous route and got completely into our rear. I immediately detached towards them three guns, with a squadron of the 16th dragoons, who, in conjunction with Major Christie’s corps of irregular cavalry, drove them off. About this time a large gole of horse came on towards me, but as they turned at once from the fire of the guns, I refrained from advancing after them.”
The two troops of horse-artillery under Lieut.-Colonel Brind were in reserve at the commencement of the action, but soon afterwards were brought to the front, for the purpose of enfilading one of the enemy’s batteries.
After detailing the attacks on the villages of Burra and Chota Kalrha, which were taken in the most spirited manner by Brigadiers Penney and Hervey, Lord Gough continues, in his published despatch: “The heavy artillery continued to advance with extraordinary celerity, taking up successive forward positions, driving the enemy from those they had retired to, whilst the rapid advance and beautiful fire of the horse-artillery and light field-batteries, which I strengthened, by bringing to the front the two reserved troops of horse-artillery under Lieutenant-Colonel Brind (Brigadier Brooke having the general superintendence of the whole of the horse-artillery), broke the ranks of the enemy at all points.”
The battle was now over, and the pursuit commenced, the whole of the horse-artillery accompanying. The action was almost entirely an artillery fight. For about two hours and a half that arm alone was engaged. It was before the terrible fire of eighty-eight guns that the Sikh army abandoned the field.
In his official despatch, the Commander-in-Chief thus writes:—“To Brigadier-General Tennant, commanding that splendid arm, the artillery, to whose irresistible power I am mainly indebted for the glorious victory of Goojrat, I am indeed most grateful. Conspicuous as the artillery has ever proved itself, never was its superiority over the enemy, its irresistible and annihilating power, more truthfully shown than in this battle. The heavy batteries manoeuvred with the celerity of light guns; and the rapid advance, the scientific and judicious selection of points of attack, the effective and well-directed fire of the troops of horse-artillery and light field-batteries merit my warmest praise.”
At the two villages alone were the infantry seriously engaged. Penney’s (late Godby’s) and Hervey’s brigades were sent to take them, and were somewhat surprised to find them occupied by some considerable parties. Our left wing scarcely fired a shot. The cavalry was hardly engaged at all. The Scinde horse made one charge. All the horse-artillery suffered severely, especially the 4th troop 1st brigade, the 2nd troop 2nd brigade, and the 4th troop 3rd brigade. Captain Anderson, of the last-mentioned troop, was killed, as was also Lieutenant Day, of No. 10 horse field-battery.
The artillery loss was greater than that of any other branch in proportion to its numbers.
The artillery division lost in killed, 2 officers, 1 sergeant, 20 rank and file, 2 lascars, 1 syce-driver, and 3 syces; wounded, 1 European officer (Sir Richard Shakespear), 1 native officer, 4 sergeants, two trumpeters, 50 rank and file, 10 lascars, 8 syce-drivers, and 7 syces: total, killed and wounded, 111.
The enemy did not attempt to rally at the town of Goojrat, as it was supposed they would, but fled precipitately at once, leaving camp, baggage, and a vast quantity of material and artillery in the hands of the victors. It was almost to be regretted that they did not wait on their ground a little longer; their loss, except in the two villages, was from the artillery alone, and they suffered but little that afternoon in the pursuit.
The broken Sikh army fled across the Jhelum, with a few hundred Afghan cavalry, who had left their mountains, hoping for some opportunity to avenge themselves on their old enemies. Sir W. Gilbert, with two divisions of infantry, and cavalry, and artillery, was ordered in pursuit.
The artillery branch consisted of the 2nd troop 2nd brigade and the 4th troop 2nd brigade horse-artillery, Blood’s troop horse-artillery, Dawes’s horse-battery, the Bombay horse brigade, and four reserve companies, with a well-equipped train, adapted to elephant-draught, the whole under Brigadier Huthwaite, C.B., with Brigade-Major Kaye as his staff officer. The brilliant success which attended Gilbert’s rapid pursuit is well known. No further opportunity was given to our troops to gain distinction in the field. The march was an arduous one, the country most difficult, especially for heavy ordnance; but perseverance overcame all. The Sikhs soon saw the futility of further opposition; the sirdars surrendered,—their army was disarmed, and disbanded at Hoormuch and Rawul-pindee,—and Gilbert drove the Afghans across the Attock, and into the rugged mountains of the Khyber; and thus ended the second Sikh war.
The under-named artillery officers were mentioned in general orders:—
Major-General Whish, C.B.; Brigadier-General Tennant; Lieutenant Olpherts, A.D.C.; Captain Abercrombie, D.A.A.G.A.; Brigadiers Brooke, C.B., and Huthwaite, C.B.; Brigade Majors Kaye and Cox; Captain Hogge, commissary, and Lieutenant Christie, deputy-commissary of ordnance; Lieutenant-Colonel Grant; Majors Garbett, Horsford, Day; Lieutenant-Colonel Brind; Major Mowatt; Lieutenant-Colonel Lane, C.B.; Majors Ludlow, Fordyce; Captains J. D. Shakespear, F. K. Duncan, L. P. Master, R. R. Kinleside, A. Huish, Major Sir R. Shakespear; Captains E. G. Austen, M. Mackenzie, W. K. Warner, M. Dawes; Lieutenants A. Robertson, H. Tombs (deputy assistant quartermaster-general), E. B. Johnson (deputy judge-advocate-general).
The following honorary distinctions were conferred:—
To be a Knight-Commander of the Bath.—Major-General Whish.
To be Commanders of the Bath.—Colonel Tennant, Lieutenant-Colonels Grant, Brind.
To be Lieutenant-Colonels.—Majors Garbett, Horsford, Day, Mowatt, Ludlow, Fordyce, Sir R. Shakespear.
To be Majors.—Captains J. D. Shakespear, Duncan, Master, Kinleside, Huish, Austen, Mackenzie, Warner, Dawes, Hogge, Abercrombie.
Also to be Majors on promotion to Captains regimentally.—Lieutenant E. Kaye, C. V. Cox, A. Robertson, P. Christie, H. A. Olpherts, H. Tombs, E. B. Johnson.
Brigadier-General Tennant was subsequently created a K.C.B.
In commemoration of the victories of the Punjab, a medal was struck, of which the following is a transcript:—
A vote of thanks was passed by both Houses of Parliament and by the Court of Proprietors to the armies engaged in these operations, and the eminent services of General Whish and Brigadier Tennant, of the artillery, were especially named. To the splendid working of the artillery the highest military authorities in the country mainly attributed the brilliant termination of the war: and we know not how this record of the services of the corps can be more fitly brought to a close than with the following well-merited tribute paid to the artillery by Lord Hardinge in the House of Lords, on the 24th of April, 1849:—
“It was, it appeared, to the skilful employment of the artillery that they were indebted for this victory; and great as the result had been with so small a loss of men, he (Viscount Hardinge) felt that that arm of the service was most admirably conducted on that occasion. This argued most admirable conduct on the part of the artillery; and it would appear, by most of the accounts received, that so effectually had this arm of the service been employed, that the Sikh artillery, though managed as usual with great bravery, was, notwithstanding all their efforts, perfectly silenced; so that it was not necessary for the British infantry to fire in line, with the exception of two regiments of Europeans and four regiments of Native Infantry. With the exception of those regiments, not a regiment of their infantry fired a musket-shot, so considerable was the service rendered by the Indian artillery. That force was certainly a most splendid one, and second he would say to none; and it had been mainly instrumental in obtaining for Lord Gough one of his best and most splendid triumphs. The statement made by his Lordship, in his despatch, was, that the heavy artillery—eighteen-pounders—were actually manoeuvred and handled with the facility of field-guns. He (Viscount Hardinge) had seen the same thing done with those eighteen-pounders during the campaign of the Sutlej. Two elephants were harnessed to each eighteen-pounder, and they carried the guns with the greatest facility over every sort of ground without any assistance and without causing any delay or impediment to the infantry. That practice was first resorted to in the campaign of 1846, when the heavy guns were brought up from Delhi, a distance of 300 miles, and were carried on every occasion without any trouble, and he believed that had never before been seen in India. The able officer who commanded the artillery in the late battle had been mentioned,—he referred to Brigadier-General Tennant, who had been so much praised by Lord Gough; and he (Viscount Hardinge) wished to say that he had the honour of knowing him, and he was ably seconded by another excellent officer. Seeing the great importance of artillery in modern warfare, and seeing, also, that its value had been so signally manifested in India, he would remind their Lordships at the same time that a committee was sitting elsewhere to investigate the state of the Ordnance Department; and he trusted that their Lordships would not allow that valuable arm of the service, which took so much time to create, and which when created was so valuable, to be reduced below a scale of proper strength and efficiency. In Bengal alone, the regular army had 200 pieces of artillery ready to be moved, comprising 120 nine-pounders, and the remainder three and six-pounders, and that was exclusive of all the artillery that belonged to local and irregular corps. Besides that, there was during the campaign more than 100 pieces of heavy artillery, of eighteen and twenty-four pounders, actually on the Sutlej, with 1,000 rounds of ammunition per gun. They were all complete and ready for action, and all that was required was the actual necessity for their movement. That was a state of readiness that was very much to be admired, and he hoped they would never consent to cripple that noble arm of their service.”
Note to page 435.—It is stated at page 435, that a monumental column was raised (at Dum-Dum) to the memory of Captain Nicholl and the officers and men of the 1st troop 1st brigade, who perished so gloriously on the retreat from Caubul. As this sheet is going through the press, I learn that the column has been blown down during a typhaun, and that it is the intention of the regiment not to restore it, but to place, in its stead, a monumental slab in the Dum-Dum church. I trust that I shall be pardoned for saying that I believe such a resolution, if carried into effect, will be greatly regretted by many of the relatives of the brave men to whom the column was dedicated, and by some, at least, of the original promoters of the testimonial.—Editor.
In the preface, page x, line 4, for “Sikhs crossed the Punjab,” read “Sikhs crossed the Sutlej.”
Page 130, line 8 from bottom (Colonel Deare’s Epitaph), for “Royal Artillery,” read “Bengal Artillery.”
Page 371, line 8, for “G. R. MacGregor,” read “R. G. MacGregor.”
Page 409, last line of text, for “Walrek,” read “Walker.”
