CHAPTER VI.

Previous

Lord Lake’s campaigns—Captain Hutchinson’s proceedings in the neighbourhood of Rampoorah—Sieges of Komona, Gunnourie, and Adjeegurh—Augmentation by adding golundaz—Increase of horse artillery—Ordnance-drivers organized—Colonel Horsford, Commandant—Expeditions to the Isle of France and Java—Bundlecund campaigns—Callingur—Gribeauval pattern carriages introduced—Additional golundaz companies—Head-quarters removed to Dum Dum.

The conduct of the Mahrattas having rendered hostilities unavoidable, the Governor-General determined to carry them on upon such a scale as would completely destroy their power, and, at the same time, eradicate the French party from the Dooab, where Mr. Perron, nominally a commander of Scindia’s disciplined brigades, had in reality established a small independent principality of his own.

To carry out his intentions, the Governor-General assembled forces in the Dukhun, Guzerat, Cuttack, Mirzapoor, Allahabad, and in the Dooab; with all of which, except the first, were portions of the Bengal Artillery.

The main army (in Bengal) was under the personal command of the Commander-in-Chief, General Lake; the corps composing it were put in motion early in August, 1803, and collected, on the 13th, at Arowl, on the Kali Muddee. They reached Coel on the 28th of the same month.

The following artillery were attached to it:—

Lieutenant-Colonel Horsford, Commandant. Lieutenant Brown, Brigade Major. Lieutenant Butler, Brigade Quarter-Master.
Company. Battalion. Lascar Companies. Captains. Captain-Lieutenants. Lieutenants.
1 1 19, 24, 26 T. Greene
2 2, 15 Raban Winbolt
3 6, 8 Nelly
1 2 4, 23, 28 Constable
2 3, 13 Hutchinson
3 2 7, 21, 22 W. Shipton Best Morris
4 14, 16 J. Robinson A. Mathews

On the 29th August, General Lake attacked Perron’s army, drawn up behind a jheel, with their right resting on Aligurh. The attack was made by the cavalry and gallopers, and the enemy drew off towards Agra. Mr. Perron was left in charge of the fort, with instructions to defend it to the last extremity.

General Lake determining to storm the fort on the 4th September, during the night preceding two batteries of four 18–pounders each, under Captains Greene and Robinson, were erected by Colonel Horsford at a village in the vicinity and at Perron’s country house, to cover the advance to the party.

Before daylight the storming party, under Colonel Monson, moved out to within 400 yards of the fort, and there awaited the morning gun, the signal for the advance; on its being fired, they moved on, covered by a heavy fire from the supporting batteries. The fort had been alarmed, and the gates were closed. The ladders proved too short. A 6–pounder was sent for to burst the gate open, but proving insufficient, a 12–pounder was substituted, which succeeded after four or five rounds. During this delay, the party was exposed to a heavy fire, by which many were wounded; among others, Captain Shipton, who commanded the guns; notwithstanding this, he continued to advance with the party. The second and third gates were stormed, but at the fourth, his gun was again required, this gate resisted its fire, but the wicket being forced, the party entered, and obtained possession of the fortress, capturing 281 pieces of ordnance of all kinds.

The artillery lost but 2 Europeans and 4 lascars killed, 7 Europeans and 1 lascar wounded, in addition to Captain Shipton. The services of the artillery were acknowledged by the Commander-in-Chief in his report to the Governor-General:—“To Captain Shipton, of the artillery, who had charge of the guns which forced the gate, and who, though wounded, still remained at his post, I feel myself much indebted. To Colonel Horsford, who commanded the artillery, as well as Captains Greene and Robinson, who commanded the covering batteries, I feel myself under infinite obligations, and indeed the whole corps merit my warmest praise for the gallantry displayed on this occasion as well as in every other in which they have been engaged.” The Governor-General in General Orders, 15th September, 1803, “desires that his particular approbation may be signified to Captain Shipton, of the artillery, and also to Lieutenant-Colonel Horsford, Captains Robinson and Greene;” and also says, “it is with the greatest satisfaction that the Governor-General expresses his approbation of the bravery, discipline, and steadiness of the corps of artillery who were employed on this occasion.”

A small detachment of half a corps, with one gun, under Lieutenant Winbolt, at this time in the cantonment of Shekoabad or Etawah, were attacked by a large body of horse, under a Mr. Fleury. The first attack, on the 2nd September, was beaten off, but being renewed on the 4th September, after several hours’ resistance, the party capitulated, and were allowed to march off to Cawnpoor with their guns and arms. Lieutenant Winbolt was wounded in this affair.

The army reached the Jumna, near Delhi, on the 11th, and found the Mahrattas posted behind intrenchments, with their park of artillery in front, the whole covered by long grass. The Commander-in-Chief moved on to reconnoitre with the cavalry, and directed the artillery and infantry to follow; the front alone was accessible, and the cavalry were exposed to a heavy cannonade. They moved to the rear to avoid this, and to cover the advance of the line, but the enemy mistaking it for a retreat, moved out from their intrenchments. The cavalry opened to allow the infantry to pass through, who attacked in line, the cavalry forming as a support in their rear. The advance was made under a tremendous fire of round and grape, without returning a shot until close, when, firing a volley, they charged, broke into open column, and allowed the cavalry and gallopers to pass through and complete the victory.

Colonel Horsford was employed covering the left with four guns and a battalion from a threatened attack by a body of Seik cavalry.

The loss of the artillery consisted of 3 Europeans and 1 lascar killed, 1 subaltern, 13 Europeans, and 16 lascars wounded. Lieutenant Mathews[57] lost his leg by a cannon-shot; 67 brass and iron guns, 37 tumbrils of ammunition (besides 24 blown up), and 2 tumbrils of treasure, were captured on this occasion. The iron guns were of European manufacture, the brass nearly all cast in India on French models; the carriages were all fitted with elevating screws, strong and neat, and of the French pattern; the tumbrils stout, but clumsy; some with modern draught-chains, others with a trace of raw hide.

General Lake wrote to the Governor-General:—“To Colonel Horsford and every officer of the corps of artillery I feel myself infinitely indebted for their meritorious exertions on this occasion;” and in the general orders of the Governor-General of 1st February we find,—“To Colonel Horsford and the artillery the Governor-General in Council repeats the public testimony of approbation which that meritorious corps has uniformly deserved in every exigency of the service.”

The officers present were the same as at Aligurh, with the exception of Captain-Lieutenant Best, who was left in charge of the ordnance in that fortress.

The Governor-General in Council deemed “it to be the duty of the Government to anticipate the sanction of His Majesty and the Honourable the Court of Directors for the distribution of the treasure captured, as a testimony of the applause and gratitude with which the British Government viewed the exemplary valour, discipline, zeal, and firmness displayed by the army;” and directed that “the general principles of this order should constitute the proceedings of the Governor-General in Council with respect to all prize-money captured during the progress of the war.”

The heavy artillery and stores intended for the siege of Agra were embarked on the Jumna in boats, the army marching down along the western banks. On the 7th October they reached Agra, and cut off all communication with the country, and on the 10th the enemy’s battalions outside the fort were driven from the ravines and glacis, with a loss of 600 men and 26 guns. In this affair Lieutenants Beagham and J. Hay (who together with Lieutenant W. Parker joined the army a little previously) are mentioned as having distinguished themselves.

“The intrepidity and courage evinced by Lieutenant Beagham, of the artillery, employed in the assault, calls for his Excellency’s warmest approbation and thanks.”

“Lieutenant Hay, of the artillery, who went with a detachment of that corps to bring off the enemy’s guns, merits my approbation for his successful exertions in this service.”

The siege commenced, and by the 17th a breaching battery of eight 18–pounders and four howitzers, with an enfilading battery of four 12–pounders on its left and another of two 12–pounders on its right, were ready and commenced firing, and on the 20th the fort capitulated.

Seventy-six brass and 86 iron guns, 20 tumbrils, with two lacs of rupees and ammunition, &c. were captured; among them was the celebrated great gun of Agra, which lay on the banks of the Jumna until some twenty years afterwards it was broken up and sold, an attempt to carry it down the Jumna having failed, as also a fine brass 72–pounder, now in the barrack square at Dum-Dum.

General Lake wrote:—“I attribute the early surrender of Agra to the great impression our breaching battery made on the walls, which opened yesterday within 350 yards, and which would have caused a practicable breach in a few hours more battering.

“To Colonel Horsford, of the artillery, * * * as well as to every officer of the * * * corps, I feel myself under great obligations for their unremitted exertions on this occasion, and to which I principally attribute my early success against this place.”

Twenty-four lacs of rupees of prize-money were on this occasion divided among the troops, in accordance with the principle of the General Order 1st November, 1803, above quoted.

On the 27th October the army marched from Agra, and on the 31st (having previously left their baggage and heavy guns under a guard at Futtypoor Sicoree) had nearly come up with the Mahrattas. In the evening, General Lake moved on again with the cavalry, directing the infantry to follow at three o’clock next morning, and after a march of twenty-five miles overtook the Mahrattas at sunrise, near Laswaree, amounting to about 9,000 infantry and 5,000 cavalry, with 72 guns. As they appeared to be in some confusion, he was tempted to make an attack at once, without waiting for the artillery and infantry.

The enemy retarded this movement by cutting a bund and flooding the road, and availed themselves of the time gained to form their line, the right resting on Laswaree and the left on Mohalpoor, the front covered by the guns, and, as at Delhi, the country around covered with long grass. The cavalry charged boldly through the guns several times, the gunners falling down as they passed and reopening on their return, while the infantry plied them with musketry from behind an intrenchment formed of the baggage-hackeries: the guns could not be secured from want of infantry.

The loss having been great, and the men and horses much fatigued, the cavalry were withdrawn to wait the arrival of the infantry, the enemy having been effectually stopped and crippled. By noon the infantry reached the banks of the nullah, but some slight rest was necessary after a march of twenty-five miles; and as the enemy offered to surrender their guns on certain terms, a favourable answer was returned, though preparations were made for renewing the attack when the stipulated time should expire.

The enemy threw back their right, so as almost to encircle Mohalpoor, their whole front bristling with guns. The British infantry prepared to attack in two columns, the right, under Major-General Ware, against Mohalpoor, the left, under Major-General St. John, against the enemy’s right, covered by the cavalry. All the guns which had come up were formed with the gallopers into four distinct batteries to support these attacks. The whole advanced under a heavy fire from the enemy’s artillery, which were well and quickly served, and by four P.M. had entirely routed the enemy, capturing elephants, camels, 1,600 bullocks, 72 guns, 5,000 stand of arms, 44 colours, 64 tumbrils of ammunition and 3 of treasure, and 57 carts with stores.

In this brilliant action the artillery suffered but little,—4 Europeans and 3 lascars killed, and 6 Europeans and 5 lascars wounded: the brunt fell upon the other branches.

From Laswaree the army returned towards Agra, sending in the wounded and captured stores, and remained in the neighbourhood till the end of the month, when Colonel White, with a proportion of artillery, was detached to aid the Bundelcund force in the siege of Gwalior. The main army soon after moved to a position near the Biana Pass, where the horse artillery troop (formed from the experimental horse artillery), under Captain Clement Brown, with Lieutenants Starke and Young, joined; but we must make a slight retrospect to bring up the proceedings of the other forces to this point.

The detachment of artillery, with Lieutenant-Colonel Fawcett’s force, destined for Bundelcund, consisted of—

Major C. Wittit, Commandant.
Company. Battalion. Captains. Captain-Lieutenants. Lieutenants.
1 3 Tomkyns Feade Richards.
2 Dowell M. Brown.
W. Hopper.

The force reached the banks of the Caine, near Tiroha, on the 23rd September, and on the 10th October crossed, and, after a long march over a rough country, came in sight of Shumsheer Bahadur’s troops. A distant cannonade was all that occurred, the enemy made off as fast as he could, and the force proceeded against Culpee, which surrendered on the 4th December, as soon as a battery opened against it.

Its next move was to Gwalior, where the whole or a portion joined Colonel White, with whose detachment were Captain Green, Lieutenants Hay, Morris, Swiney, and Pollock. Batteries were opened, and on the 5th February, 1804, Gwalior had once again fallen into our possession.

The following General Order was issued on its capture: “The Commander-in-Chief is particularly happy to notice the valuable services of the artillery employed at Gwalior; and the great effect produced by the fire of the batteries under circumstances peculiarly unfavourable reflects the highest credit on the abilities of Captain Green, and on the officers and men under his command.”

The detachments under Major-General Deare, of the artillery, and Lieutenant-Colonel Broughton, at Mirzapoor and Sumbulpoor, were equally successful, though not so brilliantly employed; their exertions frustrated the Mahrattas’ hopes of plundering Mirzapoor and Benares.

The Balasore force met with complete success; they had chiefly, however, to contend against the difficulty of moving guns through a swampy, heavy country; the different towns surrendered with but little opposition. The fort of Barabutty alone required batteries to be erected against it; they were ready on the 13th October, and the defences being taken off, and the enemy’s guns silenced, the storming party advanced, accompanied by some artillerymen, under Lieutenant G. Faithfull, with a 6–pounder, for the purpose of blowing open the gate. In passing the bridge, the party was exposed for 40 minutes to a heavy fire of musketry ere the gate could be forced, it was so blocked up with masses of stone: these removed, the attack was soon successful. Lieutenant Faithfull was wounded, though not dangerously, and his conduct, as well as that of Captain-Lieutenant Hetzler, was praised in General Orders by the Governor-General:—“He trusts that Lieutenant Faithfull, of the artillery, will be speedily restored to the public service, in which his courage and resolution has already been distinguished.

“The Governor-General expresses his sense of the conduct of Captain Hetzler, of the Bengal artillery.”

To bring up the events of the campaign in all quarters, we must here turn briefly to the force in Guzerat, with which was the 5th company 3rd battalion. This force marched on the 21st August; at Bargood they met with but a feeble resistance on the 24th, and on the 26th a battery of two 18–pounders was completed against the fort of Baroach, and opened. By the 29th a breach was made, but the storm was delayed till 3 P.M., in hopes of profiting by the assistance of the Fury gun-vessel (on board which was a detail of Bengal artillery), and an armed boat, which were hourly expected, but which were prevented by the shallowness of the water; the storming party therefore advanced at the given signal (two 6–pounders fired in quick succession), and overcoming a vigorous resistance, gained possession of the fort.

With this company Captain-Lieutenant Dunn and Lieutenant Drummond appear to have been.

The main army, with the Commander-in-Chief, remained encamped near Biana until the 9th February, when they moved in the direction of Jeypoor, to which town a detachment under Colonel Monson was sent from Dowsah on the 18th April; on the 10th May, a second detachment, under Colonel Don, was sent against Tonk Rampoorah from Nurwalee; and on the 18th May, the main army broke up, and retraced its steps towards Agra, suffering much from the extreme heat of the weather ere it reached its destination in June.

Lieutenant-Colonel Don’s force arrived before Rampoor on the 14th May, and to avoid exciting the enemy’s suspicions and inducing him to block up the gateways really intended to be attacked, took up its position on the opposite side of the fort. At two A.M. on the next morning, the storming party advanced, headed by a 12–pounder, to blow the gates open, and followed by another, to keep in check a body of the enemy’s cavalry; while Captain Raban, with one 12–pounder and four 6–pounders, took up a position from which he was enabled to fire upon any point of the works which the enemy might man to meet the attack; a picquet of the enemy was driven in, the first gate was blown in by the gun, the second was found open, and the third and fourth were also blown in; the storming party entered, and the town was taken possession of.

Thanks were given to Captain Raban and every officer and soldier of the detachment; the 2nd company 1st battalion, or a portion of it, was employed on this duty.

Hitherto the operations of the army had been perfectly successful, but we have now to recount two failures, in both of which, but particularly in that in Bundelcund, the artillery suffered heavily.

The Bundelcund force, under Lieutenant-Colonel Fawcett, had been protecting that province from Holkar’s incursions, and was encamped in May, 1804, near Kooch. A detachment of seven companies of native infantry, under Captain N. Smith, and fifty European artillery, from the 1st and 2nd companies 3rd battalion, under Captain-Lieutenant Feade and Lieutenant Morris, were sent against a small fort, named Baillah, in the neighbourhood. The guns having opened on the 21st May, the killidar offered to surrender on the following morning if the firing was directed to cease; his offer was accepted, but availing himself of the respite, he immediately despatched intelligence to Ameer Khan, who was in the vicinity, and requested him to fall on the detachment, which he did the next morning with 8,000 cavalry, and cut up two companies of the infantry, and the whole of the artillery,[58] with their officers, and took possession of the guns,[59] except one, which, with the remaining five companies, made good their retreat to Lieutenant-Colonel Fawcett’s head-quarters. This officer, alarmed at the reports he received, and unequal to the emergency in which he was placed, immediately retreated to Betwah; which movement caused much annoyance to the Commander-in-Chief, as it opened Bundelcund to Holkar, and left him undistracted to turn his whole force against Colonel Monson’s detachment in Rajasthan. Lord Lake would have ordered the command of this force to have been previously made over to “Lieutenant-Colonel Wittit, of the artillery, a most excellent officer; but for his ill-health;” this was very indifferent; so much so, indeed, that he died on the 27th May. In him the regiment lost a most valuable officer; as a subaltern he had served with his company in Lord Cornwallis’s campaigns on the coast, and was considered by Sir John Horsford one of the most superior officers in the regiment.

Colonel Martindell, after some changes, was appointed to the command of the force, and in June succeeded in capturing Mahobar, and defeating the Ram Rajah and Nagahs, and with this the campaign closed.

We must now follow Colonel Monson’s force, with which was the 2nd company 2nd battalion of artillery, commanded by Captain Hutchinson and Lieutenant Winbolt, in its unfortunate retreat. Advancing, after the capture of Hinglaizgurh to the Mokundra Pass, with the object of co-operating with Colonel Murray’s force from Guzerat, on the 7th July Colonel Monson received intelligence of Holkar’s having crossed the Chumbul, and moved to meet him; but almost immediately learning that Colonel Murray had fallen back on the Myhie, he retired to the pass on the 8th, beating off the attacks of the enemy. Fearful, however, of the enemy getting behind him, he commenced his retreat on Kotah. On the 12th he was again attacked, and again beat Holkar off; he pushed on for the Janee Nuddee, but the rain falling heavily, he did not reach the ghat till the morning of the 13th, and then finding the rivulet not fordable, he was obliged to halt till the 15th; the state of the roads was such that the guns sunk deep in the mud, several were abandoned, and most of the ammunition destroyed. On the 17th the Chumbul was reached; the Europeans were passed over on elephants, and sent on to Rampoorah, while the main body crossed over in detachments wherever fords could be found. On the 24th there was another severe contest with the enemy, and it was not until the 27th that the last battalion, with Colonel Monson, reached Rampoorah; but here this unhappy detachment found no rest,—want of provisions forced them to push on, and after leaving a garrison under Captain Hutchinson, of the artillery, they again moved (they were however reinforced by two battalions, four guns, and some irregular cavalry, under Major Frith) to the Bunass. On the 22nd August they reached its banks, and found it so swollen that the largest elephants could scarcely pass; three boats only could be found, and in them the treasure was sent across. On the 23rd the enemy appeared in force, and on the 24th, the river having run off a little, the baggage was got over, Monson covering the retreat by an attack on the enemy, which was at first successful, but the enemy rallying, forced him back, with the loss of his last gun; the baggage was abandoned, and, harassed by the enemy’s cavalry, the broken army reached Koosialgurh during the night; from hence they moved in a square to the Biana Pass, where they hoped for some respite; but Holkar, bringing his guns to bear, forced them to continue their flight, and parties of broken and disordered fugitives were all of Monson’s army that arrived at Agra.

In crossing the Bunass on the 24th Lieutenant Winbolt, of the artillery, was drowned. He was an officer of high promise, and one who stood high in the opinion of Sir J. Horsford, in whose company he had served on the coast in the campaigns of 1790–1–2.

To check Holkar, the army was called out again; the horse artillery and other troops from Cawnpoor marched on Agra on the 3rd September, and towards the end of the month the camp was formed between Agra and Secundra. Holkar was too wary to be led into a general action, and moving northwards with his main body, he was followed by Lord Lake, who reached Delhi and relieved the siege on the 15th October. Holkar moved towards Parriput, and crossed the Jumna into the Upper Dooab; Lake (with the horse artillery, cavalry, and reserve brigade, under Colonel Don) crossed near Delhi on the 31st, and leaving all private wheel-carriages and all baggage that could possibly be spared, pushed on, determined to give Holkar no rest. This rapid movement relieved Colonel Burn, who, with some nujeebs, was shut up in the ruined fort of Shamlee by Holkar. Following closely, Lord Lake came in sight of him near Meerut, but he fled with all speed, by the route of Hassur to Futteygurh. On the 16th, Lake was within sixty miles of Futteygurh, and starting again at night, he made great exertions to come up with him. Just as he mounted his horse, news came of the decisive victory gained by Major-General Fraser over the Mahrattas at Deig, an inspiriting omen to his own troops. At dawn on the 17th, they reached the skirts of the enemy’s camp; the horses were at their picquets, the men sleeping beside them, when their sleep was either broken or rendered final by discharges of grape poured in upon them from the horse-artillery guns; the dragoons charged, and the enemy took to flight,—Holkar among the first. The blowing up of a tumbril had first alarmed him, but he was persuaded it was the morning gun being fired at Futteygurh; but the firing continuing, the cry of “Lord Lake’s army” arose, and a general flight followed; some took refuge in trees, and might have escaped, but from their indiscretion in firing on our troops, who, thus taught in what direction to look, soon brought them down with their pistols. The pursuit continued for upwards of 10 miles, which, added to the previous march of 58, made a total of 68 miles in 24 hours, and when it is recollected that this had been preceded by 350 miles in a fortnight, it may be considered one of the most surprising feats on record, and speaking more powerfully to the state of efficiency of the regiments so employed, than words can do.

The services of the horse artillery were acknowledged by Lord Lake; in writing to the Governor-General, he says: “I have great satisfaction in reporting to your lordship the very meritorious conduct of Captain Brown and the corps of horse artillery under his command, who, by the rapidity of their movements, were able to do great execution. Captain Brown’s great attention in the management of his corps, and his zeal and activity when called into action, have on every occasion merited my best acknowledgments.” And in the General Order, November 18th, he returned his thanks “to Captain Brown, and officers and men of the horse artillery, for their highly meritorious and intrepid behaviour in the engagement of yesterday.”

The officers with the horse artillery were Captain C. Brown, Lieutenants H. Starke and J. Young. The wounded were 1 European, 1 Indian, and 4 horses; the killed 1 lascar and 7 horses.

The main body of the army, which had been left at Delhi on the 1st November, moved in the direction of Govindhur, and on the 13th attacked the Mahratta army under the walls of Deig, gained a complete victory, and captured 87 guns, all mounted on field-carriages, and fitted with elevating screws and every apparatus; among them were six of the 18–pounders presented to the Mahrattas in 1791, and (which must have been a pleasing circumstance to Colonel Monson, who fell into the command on the death of Major-General Fraser) fourteen of the guns, nine tumbrils, and four casts of those which had been lost in his disastrous campaign.

In this action the artillery lost 4 Europeans and 5 natives killed; 6 Europeans and 19 natives wounded: Captain Butler had a horse killed under him.

Lord Lake followed Holkar from Futtehgurh on the 20th; crossed the Jumna near Muttra, on the 28th; sent on the captured guns to Agra, and ordered out a battering-train, which joining him on the 10th, he moved towards Deig, and on the 13th took up a position. Trenches were opened during the night, and a breach being ready by the 23rd, the place was carried by storm. Captain Raban accompanied the storming party with a detail of artillery to spike the guns, and distinguished himself by the way in which he performed this duty.

Lieutenant Groves, of the artillery, was killed on the 20th December, and Lieutenant T. D. Smith wounded; 100 guns were taken, together with many tumbrils.

The details of this siege, as well as those of Bhurtpoor, Gunnourie, Komona, and Adjegurh, are so fully recorded in that valuable publication the East-India Military Repository, that it would only unnecessarily swell this work, were more than the briefest allusion made, compatible with our object.

For this siege six or eight 18–pounders, four 8–inch and four 5½-inch mortars were all the siege ordnance available.

The insufficient provision of ordnance and stores for siege purposes will henceforth often strike the reader; and the question why—possessed, as Bengal is, of an inland navigation from one extremity of the presidency to the other, offering every facility for a speedy and cheap conveyance of stores—ample materials had not been pushed forward to meet our wants, must continually recur. The suddenness of the campaign cannot be admitted as a valid reason; the war had been deliberately entered on eighteen months before, and it was known that the enemy possessed many strongholds which required battering-trains for their reduction. The first campaign had given us Agra, a place admirably situated for a depÔt, with reference to the scene of war, to which an adequate equipment should have been forwarded; but it was not done, and the want was severely felt in the course of this campaign. If ample supplies are not available against a fortified place, and it is absolutely necessary to reduce it, men’s lives must be substituted for shot and shells; in some cases, no doubt, time is most precious, and it may be a matter of calculation whether time or men can best be spared; but when near our own frontier, there can be no excuse for the improvidence which has failed to provide the requisite stores, and by that means to take from the commander the choice between expenditure of his troops or of the munitions of war.

In most we must attribute the blame to the cumbrous and inefficient machinery of the Military Board, in whose province lies the supervision of the magazines; but the Board, composed of many members, becomes a screen for individual responsibility, and this must always be the case until each member is vested with the sole control of the details of his own department, subject only to a discussion in the Board of the general question, that each may have the benefit of his colleagues’ opinions, and be made aware of what is going on in other departments, that all may work in concert.

The opinion above given of the inefficient state of our siege-trains is fully borne out by that recorded by the Marquis of Hastings in his “Summary,” when, speaking of Hattrass, he says, “One of my earliest military cares on arriving in India had been to satisfy myself why we had made so comparatively unfavourable a display in sieges.” The details at once unfolded the cause: it is well known that nothing can be more insignificant than shells thrown with long intervals; and we never brought forward more than four or five mortars where we undertook the capture of a fortified place. Hence the bombardment was futile, so that at last the issue was to be staked on mounting a breach and fighting hand to hand with a soldiery skilful as well as gallant, in defending the prepared intrenchments. This was not the oversight of the Bengal Artillery officers, for no men can be better instructed in the theory, or more careful in the practice of their profession than they are; it was imputable to a false economy on the part of government. The outlay for providing for the transport of mortars, shells, and platforms in due quantity would certainly have been considerable, and it was on that account forborne; the miserable carriages of the country, hired for the purpose, where a military exertion was contemplated, were utterly unequal to the service, and constantly failed under the unusual weight in the deep roads through which they had to pass. Therefore we never sat down before a place of real strength furnished with the means which a proper calculation would have allotted for its reduction.

These remarks have been particularly brought out by studying the details of the attack on Bhurtpoor, which next employed Lord Lake’s army, but which we shall not enter into, referring the reader to the same authority as mentioned when speaking of the siege of Deig, and contenting ourselves with a very concise account of the operations.

The army marched from Deig to Bhurtpoor; trenches were opened on the 4th of January, 1805; batteries were erected, a breach effected, and an unsuccessful storm attempted, on the 9th; other batteries were raised and a fresh breach made, but the enemy were so active in stockading it every night, that a second attack could not be made until the 21st: this, also, was unsuccessful. During the storm, the British cavalry were forced to turn out to keep off Holkar. On the 23rd, a convoy, slenderly escorted, was plundered; a second and a larger one was successfully brought in on the 28th, containing, among other stores, 8,000 18–pounder shot. On the 6th February the army changed ground; Meer Khan crossed the Jumna on the 7th, and was pursued by Major-General Smith, with all the cavalry and horse artillery, who came up with and defeated him at Afzulgurh, near Moradabad, on the 2nd of March; the scattered remains of this army recrossed the Ganges, and Major-General Smith returned to camp on the 23rd, after a march of 700 miles.

The siege had been still carried on; the Bombay army joined on the 10th February, but the troops, although nearly exhausted, petitioned to be allowed to finish the operation; the artillery were particularly eager, for, though few in number, and fatigued beyond conception by working the guns without a relief since the commencement of the siege, the thoughts of being deprived of their post distressed them exceedingly, and they entreated permission to be allowed to discharge the duties of their station alone.

Regular approaches were made, and the batteries pushed on to within 400 yards of the walls, but the means of arming them were very insufficient; six 18–pounders, four heavy mortars, four light mortars, and two 12–pounders to take off the defences, appear to have been the extent of ordnance preparations brought against a place six or eight miles in circumference! On the morning of the 21st, a sally made by the enemy was driven back, and in the afternoon a storm was attempted, covered by the artillery guns drawn out on the plain, but without success. A fourth attack was made the following day, but it equally failed. The siege was still continued, but the enemy offering to give up the fortress on certain terms, it was accepted, and the army finally broke up from its melancholy camp at Bhurtpoor on the 21st April, and after remaining a short time on the banks of the Chumbul, watching Scindiah, retired to Agra the following month.

During the siege, the artillery lost Lieutenant Percival, killed on 9th January; Lieutenant Gowing, killed on 22nd February; Captain Nelly, wounded on 21st February; Captain Pennington, wounded on 22nd February; and Lieutenant Swiney, wounded on 21st February.

From this melancholy detail it is cheering to turn to the successful proceedings of Captain Hutchinson, of the artillery, who, it will be recollected, was left during Monson’s retreat in command of Rampoorah, and whose judicious application of a small force led to the most brilliant results.

On the 17th January, 1805, he marched with his company, 2nd company 2nd battalion (or a portion of it), 320 sipahis, a few irregulars, and two 6–pounders, against Gemeena; reaching it as the moon rose on the 18th, he instantly commenced the attack. The road to the gate was blocked up by loaded hackeries, their wheels removed, and thus the approach of the guns was prevented; the hackeries were set fire to, steps were cut in the side of the ramparts, and the sipahis mounted; their only officer, Lieutenant Purvis, being wounded. Captain Hutchinson supplied his place, and aided by Corporals Cross and Hislop, mounted the ramparts; a hole was made through the parapet, and the assailants increasing in number, the enemy were driven back on the gate; but the wicket being forced open by the butt ends of the muskets, the place was captured with but little loss.

Lord Lake, reporting the above to Lord Wellesley, says, “The enterprise and gallantry this meritorious officer has on every occasion manifested during his command at Rampoorah has never been more conspicuous than on the present occasion, where he appears to have accomplished a most arduous and dangerous undertaking, with a spirit and perseverance which reflects on him the highest credit.”

On the 22nd February, he went against Bommongaon, a mud fort, with high ramparts and a ditch; the gates built up and remarkably well defended by a garrison of 300 men. His party consisted of his own company and 160 sipahis, with two 6–pounders and two howitzers; these light guns made no impression, but on the 24th two 12–pounders arrived, and by the evening a practicable breach was effected, but the assault being delayed till morning, the garrison made off in the night.

On the 25th February he moved to Karawul, a large walled town, with a number of bastions, four small guns, and 1,100 men as a garrison; he placed his two 12–pounders and one 6–pounder in battery within 300 yards of the walls; his battery was formed with empty tumbrils and ammunition-boxes filled with earth, finished up with bags of grain; his two howitzers and remaining 6–pounder were placed in a similar manner in another direction. By the afternoon of the 26th a breach was made, which he immediately stormed.

Captain Hutchinson was not unmindful of the deserts of his subordinates; he says: “I should be proud if his Excellency General Lake would notice Corporals Cross[60] and Hislop; they are soldiers who have distinguished themselves more than once, and there are not two better or braver men in the 2nd company 2nd battalion of artillery.”

His next exploit was against Darrara, a fort with a broad and deep ditch and high ramparts, the gate defended by a ditch and covered with an outwork. Captain Hutchinson placed his garrison in two batteries, one at 35 yards from the counterscarp, one still nearer, and by noon on the 21st March, a breach was effected; the storming party, headed by six artillerymen, whom it would be injustice not to name,—Corporals Cross and Hislop, Gunners Campbell and Johnstone, Matrosses Muller and Hudson,—moved to the attack, and after overcoming a severe opposition, succeeded in gaining possession of the fort; of the enemy between 60 and 70 were killed, and the remainder taken prisoners. Of the artillerymen, Johnstone was killed, and Hudson shot through the body and arm, after which he charged and killed three of the enemy.

But we must once more return to Lord Lake’s army, whom we left at Agra. The rainy season limited their repose. Holkar’s restless spirit urged him to collect his scattered followers, at the head of whom, equipped with 60 guns, he approached Muttra in October; Lord Lake followed, and Holkar moved to the north. It soon became a perfect chase. Holkar fled into the Punjab; Lake crossed the Sutlej on the 7th December, and was on the point of engaging him on the banks of the Beas on the 25th, but was prevented by positive instructions from the Governor-General, who probably wished to avoid embroiling himself with the Seikhs. A treaty was therefore reluctantly entered into, and the army returned slowly to Dehli.

Captain Pennington was commissary of ordnance with this force; Captain C. Brown, Lieutenant-Fireworkers Frith and Boileau, were with the horse artillery, and Captain T. Greene, Lieutenants Hay and Rodber, with the 1st company 1st battalion.

In closing the account of these glorious campaigns, it will not be out of place here to record the names of the officers sharing in them, and we fortunately have a memorandum, in Sir John Horsford’s writing, of those entitled to share in the prize-money, which gives the necessary information.

1st Campaign.
Lieut.-Col. Horsford,
Capt. Butler,
Capt. T. Greene,
Capt. Raban,
Capt. Nelly,
Capt. Constable,
Capt. Hutchinson,
Capt. W. Shipton,
Capt. Best,
Capt. J. Robinson,
Capt. Mathews,
Lieut. M. Browne,
Lieut. Morris,
Lieut. S. Hay, Agra and Laswaree only.
Lieut. Beagham,
Lieut. W. Parker.
2nd Campaign.
Lieut.-Col. Horsford,
Capt. C. Brown,
Capt. Raban,
Capt. Nelly,
Capt. Hutchinson,
Capt. Best,
Capt. Butler,
Capt. Paschaud,
Capt. Mathews,
Lieut. M. Browne,
Lieut. H. Starke,
Lieut. Swiney,
Lieut. Young,
Lieut. Grove,
Lieut. Gowing,
Lieut. Pollock,
Lieut. Parker,
Lieut. Hay,
Lieut. Percival,
Lieut. T. D. Smith,
Capt. Hinde, Bhurtpoor from January to April.
Capt. Dunn,
Capt. Pennington,
Lieut. W. H. Frith,

The paucity of British troops in the ceded provinces induced several of the zemindars to resist the revenue authorities, and, among others, Doondia Khan, who possessed two strong mud forts in the vicinity of Aligurh. The failure of the attacks on Bhurtpoor added to their contumacy, but the want of power to punish, rendered it necessary to pass it over for the time, and be content with some show of submission, which Doondia Khan made to Major-General Smith on his return from Afzulgurh to Bhurtpoor.

Causes of complaint continued to arise, and towards the end of 1806, the collector reported he had strengthened Komona with a new outwork and attacked a neighbouring zemindar.

All efforts at accommodation proving useless, a force was collected in August, 1807, under Major-General Dickens, and proceeded against Komona on the 12th of October. With this force were—

Company. Battalion. Captain-Lieutenant. Lieutenants.
3 1 Lindsay M?Quake, Harris, Pryce,
2 2 Forrester, and Parlby.

Lieutenant-Colonel Horsford was also present, commanding a brigade, but also specially directing the artillery.

An assault was made on the 18th November, but proved unsuccessful, owing to the determined opposition the enemy made, and the way in which he defended the breach, with mines, powder-bags, burning choppahs, &c. The assailants were beat back with heavy loss, but the enemy deserted the place during the night.

Lieutenants Harris and M?Quake, acting as engineers, were wounded; 5 Europeans and 9 natives killed; 10 Europeans and 10 lascars, of the artillery, were wounded.

From Komona the force proceeded to Gunnouree on the 22nd November, and carried on the attack of that fort until the 11th December, when the enemy evacuated it.

For the detail of these operations we would refer the reader to the fourth volume of the East-India Military Repository.

The strength of the artillery, as fixed in 1802, having proved itself quite insufficient for the duties of the Presidency, in August, 1805, five companies of golundaz were raised; they were formed from the “component parts” which remained on the alteration in 1802. These companies were added without any officers, but in the following year (19th June, 1806) a lieutenant-colonel and major were added to each battalion.

The regiment, therefore, at this period consisted of—

Colonels. 3
Lieut.-Colonels 6
Majors. 6
Captains. 21
Capt.-Lieutenants. 21
Lieutenants. 42
Lieut.-Fireworkers. 42
Horse. Serjeants. 4
Corporals. 4
Gunners. 10
Trumpeters.
Matrosses. 40
Foot. Serjeants. 105
Corporals. 105
Gunners. 210
Drummers. 42
Matrosses. 1680
Golundaz. Native Officers. 10
Havildars. 40
Naicks. 40
Drummers.
Lascars. Privates. 500
Serangs. 40
1st Tindals. 81
2nd Tindals. 81
Lascars. 2750

The staff are omitted in this abstract, as they would only tend to swell the headings, and their number is trifling.

In July three additional companies of golundaz were added of similar strength.

In Bundelcund disturbances still continued, and during several years a force continued to find employment in that district. In February, 1806, Gohud was taken, and in January, 1807, Chumar, near Kooch. The General Orders on the capture of the latter, notice “the professional ability and zealous emulation displayed by Captain Hopper, of the artillery * * * employed on that service in preparing the way * * * for which all are entitled to his lordship’s particular praise and thanks.”

Captain Turton and Lieutenant G. Faithfull also appear to have been in this campaign.

The following year, towards the conclusion, the force again took the field to reduce Adjeegurh, which Luchmun Dowlah refused to yield, agreeably to stipulation.

A portion marched against Heerapoor, with which were Major Brooke, Lieutenants Granishaw and C. H. Campbell, of the artillery; after ascending the pass on the 19th December, with much difficulty, the fort was reconnoitred, and batteries formed of fascines and sand-bags on the 20th, and by 3 P.M. a breach was made; a fire was kept up at intervals during the night, the enemy made a feeble attack on an outpost, and evacuated the fort during the night.

The report of the Governor-General’s agent to the secretary to Government said, “The exertions of the pioneers and their officers, and those of Captain Brooke, Lieutenants Granishaw and Campbell, the Europeans and lascars of the artillery, in preparing the batteries and serving and laying the guns, could not be surpassed.”

Captain Brooke’s services were also acknowledged in orders by Major-General Martindell.

On the 22nd January the force was brought into contact with the enemy, who, surrounded in the strong position of Rugowley, made a desperate resistance, and, although driven to a corner, rendered it necessary to withdraw the troops from the attack.

Major Brooke, Captain-Lieutenant Ferris, Lieutenants D. Macleod, Granishaw, Campbell, and Marshall, were present in this action.

On the 27th January the army took up their position before Adjeegurh; a battery was erected on the plain, but the distance was found to have been miscalculated, probably from the overhanging appearance which forts built on hills assume, and it was found necessary to occupy the spur up which the road ran to the gate. Much labour was required to convey the heavy guns to their positions, and it was not until the morning of the 11th February that they opened their fire; it continued during the 12th and the morning of the 13th, when the whole of a wall came down; the killidar then came out, and the fort was given up.

“To the artillery the heavy duties of the siege more particularly fell; their exertions were great, and vied with the natural objects they had to encounter. Their fire was inimitably well directed, and the commanding officer must ever feel himself indebted to the officers and men who conducted it.

“The judgment, zeal, and energy of Captain Brooke, commanding the artillery, his personal and unremitting exertions, were so conspicuous during the siege, that to do ample justice to the merits of that valuable officer, the commanding officer cannot convey in terms too strong his high sense of approbation and approval.”

A small force was also employed this year in reducing Bhowanee, a fort in the Hurrianah country. The inhabitants had been in the habit of plundering all travellers, and at length ventured on the baggage of a British detachment. The chief met a representation by a peremptory denial of reparation in terms of insolence. The force in Rewaree, under Lieutenant-Colonel Ball, moved out towards the end of August, and arriving on the 27th, allowed the enemy twenty-four hours to consider. The terms were absolutely rejected, and on the 28th batteries were quickly erected; their fire opened the following morning, and by noon a breach was made, and the place carried by assault after a vigorous resistance.

“To Captain Mason, in the general command of the artillery, the very able arrangement of that officer’s department throughout, but particularly in conducting the duties of the breaching-batteries, with the very heavy and well-directed fire that was so rapidly kept up, in covering the advance and approach of the storming party to the points of attack, entitles Captain Mason to every commendation, and reflects great credit on the officers and men under his command.”

This detachment order was republished in the Government General Order, detailing the service.

We have been unable to ascertain what portion of the regiment, and what officers, were on this occasion employed.

We must now advert to two important additions which were made to the regiment in the course of this year. In August the Governor-General, adverting to the original establishment of the experimental horse artillery, the success of which on various occasions in the field has fully confirmed the judgment which was formed of the superior efficiency of a corps of that description for service in India, determined to make a considerable augmentation to the corps, and place it on a permanent establishment. It was accordingly directed to be increased to three troops; the officers and men to be drawn from the foot artillery.

per Troop. Total
Captains. 1 3
Capt.-Lieutenants. 1 3
Lieutenant. 3 9
Adjutant. 1
Riding Master. 1
Serj.-Major. 1
R. R. Sergeant. 1
Qr.-Master Serj. 1
Serjeants. 6 18
Corporals. 6 18
Gunners. 10 30
Matrosses. 80 240
Trumpeters. 2 6
Farriers. 1 3
Native Farriers. 1 3
Native Doctors. 1 3
Serangs. 1 3
Tindals. 2 6
Lascars. 24 72
Horses. 145 438
Syces. 145 438
Grass-cutters. 145 438

The senior captain exercised the command over the whole, in addition to the command of his own troop, subject to the orders of the commandant of artillery.

In December orders were issued for the formation of a corps of ordnance-drivers. Hitherto the drivers for the ordnance carriages had been hired as required, and discharged when the service was over; this system had worked so ill, and its faults had been so strongly brought to light in the late campaigns, that it was now resolved to introduce a better plan. An organized corps was raised, sufficient to provide a driver to every two bullocks, and divided into companies, which were attached to companies of artillery, in the same manner as the lascars, with whom they were assimilated as much as possible. They were clothed in uniform, and were not to be discharged except by the authority of the commandant of artillery or officers commanding the principal stations of the army.

Raised from the middle castes,—the Gwalas and Aheeas chiefly,—and attached to the service by the regular pay, the pension when worn out, and the treatment they received, this proved a valuable addition to the regiment.

In November two companies of independent golundaz were raised, to take the duties of Prince of Wales’ Island.

We have omitted to state that in May, 1808, Colonel Carnegie resigned the command of the regiment and sailed for England. He was succeeded by Colonel Horsford, who had, with so much credit to himself, been commanding the artillery in the field. Colonel Horsford originally entered the corps as a private; he was born of a good family, and well educated, but his friends wishing him to enter the church, he evaded it by enlisting in the Honourable Company’s service, and coming to Bengal as a private in the artillery, under the assumed name of Rover, and in 1778 he was a serjeant in Captain Thelwall’s, or the 1st, company.

Inquiries having been made for him, it is said he was suspected by Colonel Pearse, who had employed him in copying some papers, from his pointing out an error in a Greek quotation; his appearance answering to the description may also have furnished a clue. Colonel Pearse tried him by calling out his name suddenly as he was leaving the room; the test was successful; his confusion betrayed his identity, and he was promoted to a cadetship in the regiment, and continued to rise by seniority. He was employed in the campaigns against Tippoo in 1791–2 and 1799, establishing for himself a high name, both as a practical and scientific artillery officer; his advent to the command of the regiment was hailed with universal pleasure and satisfaction, for much benefit was expected to the corps by the manner in which he would exercise his authority, increased as it was by the great personal influence which his character had established.

In 1810 the regiment was again called on to take part in an expedition, beyond seas. In the preceding year a force, chiefly of Madras troops, was sent against the Isle of France, and occupied Rodriguez; it was reinforced by Bengal troops, and directed against the remaining islands in 1810.

The 6th company 1st battalion of artillery sailed on the expedition, but had little opportunity of gaining distinction. Bourbon was occupied in July, and the force sailing for the Isle of France, landed at an unexpected point, and moved forward with rapidity and decision. Fort Malartic was carried by assault, and the town surrendered in December.

The officers in the margin[61] accompanied the artillery; and the native troops were decorated with a medal, not so much for the service, probably, as for the purpose of stimulating the native army to embark with alacrity for service beyond seas.

In this year the regiment furnished a portion for a far more serious conflict, in which native troops were once again brought into personal contest with Europeans, an event which had not occurred since the destruction of the French power in the Carnatic; we refer to the expedition to Java.

The artillery detachment was as follows:—

Major Caldwell, Commandant. Lieut. J. Scott, Adjutant.
Company. 7 1
Battalion. 1 2
Lascar Companies. 15, 16 19, 24
Captains. W. Richards J. Dundas
H. Faithful
Captain Lieutenants. J. D. Smith J. Farrington
Cameron
Lieutenants. Harris
Lieutenant-Fireworkers. Archer Farnabie
W. Bell
3rd Independent Golundaz.

The detachment embarked on the 11th March, and reached Malacca in April, where the Madras division joined; the expedition remained inactive till the 11th June, almost the only event being the burning of one of the Bengal store-ships laden with powder; and this occurred fortunately without doing any damage to the fleet. Lieutenant Archer died on the voyage.

On the 4th August the fleet anchored near Chillingching; the troops were landed, and took possession of Batavia without opposition on the 8th; an attempt by the enemy to drive them out the following night failed; and on the 10th the British advanced and drove the enemy from their intrenched camp at Weltervreeden. Captain Noble, with the Madras horse artillery, performed the chief artillery duties on this occasion.

The enemy having concentrated their force in the strong lines around Fort Cornelis, a battering-train was landed, and trenches were opened at about 800 yards from the position. These the enemy flooded by cutting dams on the 19th; on the 20th batteries for twelve and eight 18–pounders and nine howitzers and mortars were commenced; on the 21st the enemy opened a heavy fire on the unfinished batteries; but nevertheless the guns were mounted by the 22nd, when the enemy made a vigorous sally, and overcoming the unarmed working parties, who were not even protected by a guard, succeeded for a moment in capturing the batteries; but they were quickly driven back. On the 23rd and 24th a heavy fire was kept up by the enemy from twenty-four 32–pounders on the batteries and trenches; but although, on the 24th the fire of the nearest redoubt was repeatedly silenced, and towards evening several of the enemy’s guns were dismounted by the fire from the batteries, yet it became evident that without regular approaches the place could not be carried (unless by a coup de main), and this would require time, labour, and exposure in a baneful climate, which was to be avoided by all means.

Lieutenant Farnabie was killed by a stray shot while standing in the trench, and Captain Richards was wounded by some cartridges taking fire in the battery during these two days.

It was determined to storm the lines on the 26th. To occupy the enemy, a party, covered with nine guns, took post behind a rising ground on the right, and opened their fire, while the main column, under Major-General Gillespie, attacked the left, and after sustaining a severe loss, finally succeeded in carrying the lines,—capturing 6,000 prisoners and 280 pieces of fine brass ordnance.

In the orders issued to the army after this exploit, no mention is made of the artillery; and this omission has been attributed to a dislike said to have been taken to the Bengal artillery. That some such feeling was supposed to exist, we may conclude from the following passage, which appears in a letter from an engineer officer on the island to Colonel Horsford, written in October:—“You will see that the artillery were left out in the thanks to the army on the 26th August; but allow me to say, and that decidedly, that had it not been from the fire of our 18–pounders on the 23rd, 24th, and 25th, I believe not a man would have returned from the storm of the 26th without some remembrance, as the day before the storm 130 men and 4 officers were killed and wounded by our batteries; the consequence was, that their artillerymen positively refused to work at the batteries, and hardly a gun was fired by the enemy during the storm, although they had plenty of time; in short, I declare to you that I scarcely ever saw a more destructive fire kept up than by our batteries; indeed the killed and wounded in a hospital four miles to the south of Cornelis showed it, as well as the number of guns that were dismounted. I was constantly in the batteries. * * * The effect of our artillery, when they did fire, was so conspicuous, that at a practice I never saw better firing, especially of three guns on the right of the twelve-gun battery, commanded by Lieutenant Cameron. I declare to you I never witnessed anything like it, for every shot he fired went into the enemy’s embrasures; the consequence was, that in an hour and a half the redoubt which was opposed to it was silenced.”

In Sir Samuel Achmuty’s report to Lord Minto, the following mention is made of the ordnance branches:—“I have the satisfaction to assure you that both the artillery and engineers were actuated by the same zeal in performing their respective duties which has been so conspicuous in all ranks and departments, though, from deficiency of the means at their disposal, their operations were unavoidably embarrassed with uncommon difficulties.”

From Cornelis, General Jansens fled to Bintenzorg, and thence to Samarang, near which town he took up a position, Jattoo, on high and rugged hills, defended by thirty pieces of artillery, and the road cut off by cheveux de frise; he was attacked on the 16th of September by a detachment of 1,200 men, under Colonel Gibbs, with whom were 110 artillerymen and six guns; with the artillery were Major Caldwell, Lieutenants Scott, Farrington, Cameron, and Ralfe. Two of the guns were sent to the right with a force to seize on a hill which overlooked the enemy’s left, while the remainder were placed in a position in front to throw their shot across the valley into the enemy’s position. As soon as the two detached guns opened their fire, the advance rushed on; the enemy were surprised and fled, doing little execution with their artillery, which was all taken.

This was the last effort of General Jansens; he fled to Salatiga and capitulated; Fort Ludovick was surrendered, and the war, as far as the Dutch were concerned, may be said to have ended; but to avoid returning to Java again, we will here notice such other affairs as occurred during the time the British held possession of the island. But before continuing the narrative, we will here insert a sketch of the medal granted to the native troops employed in the expedition; and we may also state that medals were for this service granted to officers in H.M.’s service, but to none under the rank of commanding officer of a corps, or holding an important staff office.

The next service on which this force was employed was the expedition under Gillespie to the Palmsbury river, in April, 1822, in which were Captain S. Shaw, Lieutenants Hill and Delafosse.

In June, they again started for Samarang. Major Butler, who had previously come round, commanded the artillery; Lieutenants Farrington, Cameron, and Hill accompanied. They reached Djocjocarta on the 17th of June, and prepared for the attack of the “kraken,” or fortified residence of the Sultan of Mataram, three miles in circumference, armed with many guns, and defended by a broad wet ditch with drawbridges, by 17,000 regular troops, and an armed population of 100,000. The enemy were kept on the alert by a heavy fire till three in the morning of the 20th, they were then allowed a respite, and two hours before daylight the troops moved to the assault and carried the works. Major Butler, one drummer, and eleven rank and file of the artillery, were wounded.

In the Orders, we find, “The Commander of the Forces performs a pleasing task in recognizing the valuable services of Major Butler, commanding the artillery, who has uniformly displayed his wonted zeal and indefatigable exertion; the Commander of the Forces is therefore happy in the opportunity of bearing public testimony to the professional superiority and valuable acquirements of this excellent officer;” and Lieutenant Cameron’s conduct is also spoken of.

Other expeditions[62] took place during the time we held possession of the island, in which, Captain-Lieutenant Shaw, Lieutenant Farrington, Lieutenants Cameron, Harris, and Delafosse, took part; in those against the town of Boni, in 1814, and against Macassar, in 1816, Lieutenant Farrington is mentioned in Orders, and attention drawn to his exertions.

Bundlecund still continued the seat of war; Gopal Sing, availing himself of the natural fastnesses of the country, evaded our troops continually. He was overtaken near Perereea in February (and Lieutenant Timbrell is mentioned on this occasion), but escaping, he fled to the hills, from whence he came out the following month, and before assistance could be sent, burned the cantonment of Tiroha, maintaining a harassing and desultory warfare, which, without producing any marked events, kept the troops constantly on the move during that and the following year; and it was only brought to a close by the siege of Callingur, in February, 1812; after which, Gopal Sing returned to his allegiance.

Callingur is a fort situated on one of those detached rocky eminences abounding in Bundlecund, and which require little aid from art, as they are almost natural fortifications. The rock at the summit forms a natural scarp, of from ten to twenty feet high, and the whole side of the hill is very difficult of access. The only entrance is in the centre of the northern wall, and the approach to it is by a steep pathway winding up the face of the hill; this gained, a succession of gates bar the entrance to the fort.

The force under Colonel Martindell assembled on the 19th January; on the 21st occupied a small hill, within 800 yards, which promised to be the most favourable point for attack. The 22nd, 23rd, and 24th were employed in clearing the jungle and making a road for the guns, and, on the 25th, two 18–pounders were, with great labour, got up. In the night, two more guns and two mortars followed, and were placed in battery: two other batteries were erected at the foot of the hill, against the main gateway, and the whole being ready by the 28th, opened with great effect. The enemy’s guns were immediately dismounted, and the bastion opposed to the guns on the hill demolished.

The town was taken this day; and the batteries continuing to play till the 2nd of February, the breach was supposed practicable, and a party advanced to storm it, but finding a perpendicular ascent of twenty feet, their ladders crushed and broken by the showers of large stones the enemy rolled down, the party were forced to retire with heavy loss: the killadar, however, was glad to come to terms, and capitulated on the 8th February.

Major Fuller commanded the artillery in this siege, and their exertions were acknowledged in General Orders:—“The Governor-General deems it his duty to express his concurrence in the honourable testimony borne to the distinguished services of the artillery and engineer departments by Colonel Martindell.”

The neighbouring districts of Boglecund and Rewah were, during the next year, the scenes of petty warfare, similar to what had taken place in Bundlecund; marked by no features of great importance, yet involving much exertion on the part of the troops, particularly the artillery employed, from the mountainous and rugged features of the country and the number of nullahs and rivers intersecting it. We have but few records of this campaign, and are therefore unable to give the details, interesting as they would be to those who are acquainted with the country, and can, from the present state of the Heerapoor, Bisramgunge, and Bundry ghats, easily imagine the difficulties they presented at the time of which we are now writing.

About this period an alteration took place in the matÉriel of the regiment, by the introduction of the Gribeauval pattern of gun-carriage and the long caisson for ammunition, a description of which will be found in the fourth chapter. The matÉriel and the means of draught occupied much attention at this period, and there is every reason to believe that the recently organized driver corps and the gun bullocks about this period, under the particular care and attention of Lieutenant-Colonel Grace, commanding the artillery in the field, were in a most efficient state. The bullocks were carefully selected and trained, fairly worked and well looked after, and the consequence was, that we find the gun bullocks condemned as past their work, selling, from the high condition they were in, for the purpose of slaughter, at a higher rate than the good young cattle bought to replace them were costing.

As the next war in which the army was engaged proved how insufficient the strength of the regiment was, and caused a considerable addition to the native portion of it, we propose here to notice the additions to the end of 1815, although the war commenced the preceding year: by so doing, we shall avoid breaking the thread of the narrative of the Goorkha war.

The last additions we have noticed were two companies of independent golundaz, added in 1809; a third company was raised in February, 1812, and a fourth in August, 1814; in 1815 four additional companies of golundaz were raised to meet the wants of the service; so that the regiment now consisted of 1 horse brigade of three troops, 3 European battalions of 7 companies each, and 1 Native battalion of 16 companies, together with lascars (42 companies) and ordnance-drivers (26 companies); but these additions to the numerical strength of the regiment had been made without any corresponding increase to the ranks of the commissioned officers. This was peculiarly galling; for while struggling with the difficulties of their position, the officers had the mortification of seeing the numbers of the infantry increased by whole regiments at a time, bringing fair promotion with the augmentations, while, in their own branch, from 1802 to 1815, the troops and companies had increased from 21 to 40, yet, with the exception of the field officers added in 1806, not an officer had been given: the infantry had during that time risen from 25 to 31 regiments.

An important change in the location of the regiment took place in 1813. The head-quarters had hitherto been in Fort William, and moved out to Dum-Dum during the cold months for practice and exercise; this year, barracks having been completed, Dum-Dum was permanently occupied as the head-quarters of the artillery,—a change, no doubt, adding much to the comfort of all ranks, for there can be no comparison as to the comfort and health of men cooped up within the narrow limits of a fortress, and those occupying an airy roomy cantonment,—even if a cantonment surrounded with swamps, as Dum-Dum is; and in spite of which it is now one of the most salubrious of stations for European troops. As it had been used as a practice-ground for upwards of thirty years, many bungalows of different degrees of stability had sprung up,—chiefly, we believe, of mat and thatch; and as the officers doubtless were not idle while the barracks were building, we may believe that they found plenty of accommodation ready for them; and houses, of a more durable nature, soon began to spring up, some on new sites, others replacing the temporary habitations. A mess-house, we believe, had been previously built by Government; occupying the site of the centre room of the present building, which, by gradual additions and alterations, has reached its present handsome proportions. These were chiefly made in 1824–5, in 1836, and in 1841–2, when the verandah was raised and the portico added. The last improvement was made in 1845, when the roof, put on twenty years before, requiring to be renewed, the centre rooms were raised several feet. The other houses in the cantonment have hardly undergone less change: brick walls first replaced the mats, and then puckah roofs superseded the thatch; the usual additions of rooms and verandahs taking place. The very last of the old bungalows was recently transformed into a puckah house, and, save the old avenue, which all declare to have been exactly in its present state when they landed half a century ago, there is little in the present cantonment which can be recognized by those who first occupied it permanently. The barracks had an upper story placed on them about 1830; the church was built in 1819; and a year or two ago a racket-court, for the men of the regiment, was built: the officers erected one for themselves in 1834.

For many years Dum-Dum was a very favourite station; its mess, its amateur theatre, its band, and, at one time, its pack of fox-hounds, rendered it a place of resort to many from Calcutta and the neighbouring stations; but the gradual change in the location of the artillery has necessarily reduced the numbers there, and the heavy tax upon the means of living, caused by the station being placed on half-batta in 1829, causes all who can to avoid it; and consequently hardly any are to be found there save the staff of the regiment of the station and the battalions quartered there, with the young men just arrived from England and awaiting their dispatch to the provinces.

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           

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