In the last chapter but one, I have attempted to ascertain what those circumstances were which, almost immediately after the death of Louis XIV., prepared the way for the French Revolution. The result of the inquiry has been, that the French intellect was stimulated into activity by the examples and teachings of England; and that this stimulus caused, or at all events encouraged, a great breach between the government of France and its literature;—a breach the more remarkable, because during the reign of Louis XIV. the literature, notwithstanding its temporary brilliancy, had been invariably submissive, and had intimately allied itself with the government, which was always ready to reward its services. We have also seen that, this rupture having arisen between the governing classes and the intellectual classes, it followed, that the former, true to their ancient instincts, began to chastise that spirit of inquiry to which they were unaccustomed: hence those persecutions which, with hardly a single exception, were directed against every man of letters, and hence too those systematic attempts to reduce literature to a subserviency similar to that in which it had been held under Louis XIV. It has, moreover, appeared, that the great Frenchmen of the eighteenth century, though smarting from the injuries constantly inflicted on them by the government and the church, abstained from attacking the government, but directed all their hostility against the church. This apparent anomaly, of the religious institutions being assailed, and the political institutions being spared, has been shown to be a perfectly natural circumstance, arising out of the antecedents of the French nation; and an attempt has been made to explain what those antecedents were, and how they acted. In the present chapter, I purpose to complete this inquiry by examining the next great stage in the history of the French mind. It was needful that, before both church and state could fall, men should change the ground of their hostility, and should attack political abuses with the zeal they had hitherto reserved for religious ones. The question, therefore, now arises, as to the circumstances under which this change took place, and the period when it actually occurred.

The circumstances which accompanied this great change are, as we shall presently see, very complicated; and, as they have never yet been studied in connexion with each other, I shall, in the remaining part of this volume, examine them at considerable length. On this point it will, I think, be practicable to arrive at some precise and well-defined results respecting the history of the French Revolution. But the other point, namely, the time at which the change took place, is not only much more obscure, but by its nature will never admit of complete precision. This, however, is a deficiency it possesses in common with every other change in the history of man. The circumstances of each change may always be known, provided the evidence is ample and authentic. But no amount of evidence can enable us to fix the date of the change itself. That to which attention is usually drawn by the compilers of history is, not the change, but is merely the external result which follows the change. The real history of the human race is the history of tendencies which are perceived by the mind, and not of events which are discerned by the senses. It is on this account that no historical epoch will ever admit of that chronological precision familiar to antiquaries and genealogists. The death of a prince, the loss of a battle, and the change of a dynasty, are matters which fall entirely within the province of the senses; and the moment in which they happen can be recorded by the most ordinary observers. But those great intellectual revolutions upon which all other revolutions are based, cannot be measured by so simple a standard. To trace the movements of the human mind, it is necessary to contemplate it under several aspects, and then coÖrdinate the results of what we have separately studied. By this means we arrive at certain general conclusions, which, like the ordinary estimate of averages, increase in value in proportion as we increase the number of instances from which they are collected. That this is a safe and available method, appears not only from the history of physical knowledge,[952] but also from the fact, that it is the basis of the empirical maxims by which all men of sound understanding are guided in those ordinary transactions of life to which the generalizations of science have not yet been applied. Indeed such maxims, which are highly valuable, and which in their aggregate form what is called common sense, are never collected with any thing like the precautions that the philosophic historian ought to feel himself bound to employ.

The real objection, therefore, to generalizations respecting the development of the intellect of a nation is, not that they want certainty, but that they lack precision. This is just the point at which the historian diverges from the annalist. That the English intellect, for example, is gradually becoming more democratic, or, as it is termed, more liberal, is as certain as that the crown of this country is worn by Queen Victoria. But though both these statements are equally certain, the latter statement is more precise. We can tell the very day on which the Queen ascended the throne; the moment of her death will be known with equal precision; and there can be no doubt that many other particulars respecting her will be minutely and accurately preserved. In tracing, however, the growth of English liberalism, all such exactness deserts us. We can point out the year in which the Reform Bill was passed; but who can point out the year in which the Reform Bill first became necessary? In the same way, that the Jews will be admitted into parliament, is as certain as that the Catholics have been admitted. Both these measures are the inevitable result of that increasing indifference to theological disputes, which must now be obvious to every man who does not wilfully shut his eyes. But while we know the hour in which the bill for Catholic emancipation received the assent of the crown, there is no one now living who can tell even the year in which similar justice will be granted to the Jews. Both events are equally certain, but both events are not equally precise.

This distinction between certainty and precision I have stated at some length, because it seems to be little understood,[953] and because it is intimately connected with the subject now before us. The fact of the French intellect having, during the eighteenth century, passed through two totally distinct epochs, can be proved by every description of evidence; but it is impossible to ascertain the precise time when one epoch succeeded the other. All that we can do is, to compare the different indications which the history of that age presents, and arrive at an approximation which may guide future inquirers. It would perhaps be more prudent to avoid making any particular statement; but as the employment of dates seems necessary to bring such matters clearly before the mind, I will, by way of provisional hypothesis, fix on the year 1750, as the period when those agitations of society which caused the French Revolution entered into their second and political stage.

That this was about the period when the great movement, hitherto directed against the church, began to be turned against the state, is an inference which many circumstances seem to warrant. We know on the best authority, that towards the year 1750, the French began their celebrated inquiries respecting political economy,[954] and that, in their attempt to raise it to a science, they were led to perceive the immense injury which the interference of government had produced on the material interests of the country.[955] Hence a conviction arose that, even in regard to the accumulation of wealth, the authority possessed by the rulers of France was mischievous, since it enabled them, under the notion of protecting commerce, to trouble the freedom of individual action, and to prevent trade from running into those profitable channels which traders are best able to select for themselves. Scarcely had a knowledge of this important truth been diffused, when its consequences were quickly seen in the national literature, and in the habits of national thought. The sudden increase in France of works relating to finance and to other questions of government, is, indeed, one of the most remarkable features of that age. With such rapidity did the movement spread, that we are told that, soon after 1755, the economists effected a schism between the nation and the government;[956] and Voltaire, writing in 1759, complains that the charms of lighter literature were entirely neglected amidst the general zeal for these new studies.[957] It is not necessary to follow the subsequent history of this great change; nor need I trace the influence exercised shortly before the Revolution by the later economists, and particularly by Turgot, the most eminent of their leaders.[958] It is enough to say, that within about twenty years after the movement was first clearly seen, the taste for economical and financial inquiries became so common, that it penetrated those parts of society where habits of thought are not very frequent; since we find that, even in fashionable life, the conversation no longer turned upon new poems and new plays, but upon political questions, and subjects immediately connected with them.[959] Indeed, when Necker, in 1781, published his celebrated Report on the Finances of France, the eagerness to obtain it was beyond all bounds; six thousand copies were sold the first day; and the demand still increasing, two presses were kept constantly at work in order to satisfy the universal curiosity.[960] And what makes the democratic tendency of all this the more obvious is, that Necker was at that time one of the servants of the crown; so that his work, looking at its general spirit, has been truly called an appeal to the people against the king by one of the ministers of the king himself.[961]

This evidence of the remarkable change which, in or about 1750, the French mind underwent, and which formed what I term the second epoch of the eighteenth century, might be easily strengthened by a wider survey of the literature of that time. Immediately after the middle of the century, Rousseau published those eloquent works, which exercised immense influence, and in which the rise of the new epoch is very observable; for this most powerful writer abstained from those attacks on Christianity,[962] which unhappily had been too frequent, and exerted himself almost exclusively against the civil and political abuses of the existing society.[963] To trace the effects which this wonderful, but in some instances misguided, man produced on the mind of his own and of the succeeding generation, would occupy too large a share of this Introduction; though the inquiry is full of interest, and is one which it were to be wished some competent historian would undertake.[964] Inasmuch, however, as the philosophy of Rousseau was itself only a single phase of a far larger movement, I shall at present pass over the individual, in order to consider the general spirit of an age in which he played a vast, but still a subsidiary part.

The formation of a new epoch in France, about the year 1750, may be further illustrated by three circumstances of considerable interest, all pointing in the same direction. The first circumstance is, that not a single great French writer attacked the political institutions of the country before the middle of the century; while, after that period, the attacks of the ablest men were incessant. The second circumstance is, that the only eminent Frenchmen who continued to assail the clergy, and yet refused to interfere in politics, were those who, like Voltaire, had already reached an advanced age, and had, therefore, drawn their ideas from the preceding generation, in which the church had been the sole object of hostility. The third circumstance, which is even more striking than the other two, is, that almost at the same moment there was seen a change in the policy of the government; since, singularly enough, the ministers of the crown displayed for the first time an open enmity against the church, just as the intellect of the country was preparing for its decisive onslaught on the government itself. Of these three propositions, the first two will probably be admitted by every student of French literature: at all events, if they are false, they are so exact and peremptory, that it will be easy to refute them by giving examples to the contrary. But the third proposition, being more general, is less susceptible of a negative, and will therefore require the support of that special evidence which I will now adduce.

The great French writers having by the middle of the eighteenth century succeeded in sapping the foundations of the church, it was natural that the government should step in and plunder an establishment which the course of events had weakened. This, which took place in France under Louis XV., was similar to what occurred in England under Henry VIII.; for in both cases a remarkable intellectual movement, directed against the clergy, preceded and facilitated the attacks made on them by the crown. It was in 1749 that the French government took the first decisive step against the church. And what proves the hitherto backward state of the country in such matters is, that this consisted of an edict against mortmain, a simple contrivance for weakening the ecclesiastical power, which we in England had adopted long before. Machault, who had recently been raised to the office of controller-general, has the glory of being the originator of this new policy. In August 1749,[965] he issued that celebrated edict which forbade the formation of any religious establishment without the consent of the crown, duly expressed in letters-patent, and registered in parliament; effective precautions, which, says the great historian of France, show that Machault ‘considered not only the increase, but even the existence of these ecclesiastical properties, as a mischief to the kingdom.’[966]

This was an extraordinary step on the part of the French government; but what followed showed that it was only the beginning of a much larger design.[967] Machault, so far from being discountenanced, was, the year after he had issued this edict, intrusted with the seals in addition to the controllership;[968] for, as Lacretelle observes, the court ‘thought the time had now come to tax the property of the clergy.’[969] During the forty years which elapsed between this period and the beginning of the Revolution, the same anti-ecclesiastical policy prevailed. Among the successors of Machault, the only three of much ability were Choiseul, Necker, and Turgot, all of whom were strenuous opponents of that spiritual body, which no minister would have assailed in the preceding generation. Not only these eminent statesmen, but even such inferior men as Calonne, Malesherbes, and Terray, looked on it as a stroke of policy to attack privileges which superstition had consecrated, and which the clergy had hitherto reserved, partly to extend their own influence, and partly to minister to those luxurious and profligate habits, which in the eighteenth century were a scandal to the ecclesiastical order.

While these measures were being adopted against the clergy, another important step was taken in precisely the same direction. Now it was that the government began to favour that great doctrine of religious liberty, the mere defence of which it had hitherto punished as a dangerous speculation. The connexion between the attacks on the clergy and the subsequent progress of toleration, may be illustrated, not only by the rapidity with which one event succeeded the other, but also by the fact, that both of them emanated from the same quarter. Machault, who was the author of the edict of mortmain, was also the first minister who showed a wish to protect the Protestants against the persecutions of the Catholic priesthood.[970] In this he only partly succeeded; but the impetus thus given soon became irresistible. In 1760, that is only nine years later, there was seen a marked change in the administration of the laws; and the edicts against heresy, though not yet repealed, were enforced with unprecedented mildness.[971] The movement quickly spread from the capital to the remoter parts of the kingdom; and we are assured that, after the year 1762, the reaction was felt even in those provinces, which, from their backward condition, had always been most remarkable for religious bigotry.[972] At the same time, as we shall presently see, a great schism arose in the church itself, which lessened the power of the clergy, by dividing them into two hostile parties. Of these factions, one made common cause with the state, still further aiding the overthrow of the ecclesiastical hierarchy. Indeed, the dissensions became so violent, that the last great blow dealt to spiritual ascendency by the government of Louis XVI. proceeded not from the hands of a layman, but from one of the leaders of the church; a man who, from his standing, would, under ordinary circumstances, have protected the interests which he now eagerly attacked. In 1787, only two years before the Revolution, Brienne, archbishop of Toulouse,[973] who was then minister, laid before the parliament of Paris a royal edict, by which the discouragement hitherto thrown upon heresy was suddenly removed. By this law, the Protestants were invested with all those civil rights which the Catholic clergy had long held out as the reward of adherence to their own opinions.[974] It was, therefore, natural that the more orthodox party should condemn, as an impious innovation,[975] a measure which, by placing the two sects, in some degree, on the same footing, seemed to sanction the progress of error; and which certainly deprived the French church of one of the chief attractions by which men had hitherto been induced to join her communion. Now, however, all these considerations were set at nought. Such was the prevailing temper, that the parliament, though then in a mood very refractory to the royal authority, did not hesitate to register the edict of the king; and this great measure became law; the dominant party being astonished, we are told, how any doubt could be entertained as to the wisdom of the principles on which it was based.[976]

These were omens of the coming storm; signs of the time, which those who run may read. Nor are there wanting other marks, by which the true complexion of that age may be clearly seen. In addition to what has been just related, the government, soon after the middle of the eighteenth century, inflicted a direct and fatal injury upon the spiritual authority. This consisted in the expulsion of the Jesuits; which is an event, important not only for its ultimate effects, but also as an evidence of the feelings of men, and of what could be peaceably accomplished by the government of him who was called ‘the most Christian king.’[977]

The Jesuits, for at least fifty years after their institution, rendered immense services to civilization, partly by tempering with a secular element the more superstitious views of their great predecessors, the Dominicans and Franciscans, and partly by organizing a system of education far superior to any yet seen in Europe. In no university could there be found a scheme of instruction so comprehensive as theirs; and certainly no where was displayed such skill in the management of youth, or such insight into the general operations of the human mind. It must, in justice, be added, that this illustrious society, notwithstanding its eager, and often unprincipled, ambition, was, during a considerable period, the steady friend of science, as well as of literature; and that it allowed to its members a freedom and a boldness of speculation which had never been permitted by any other monastic order.

As, however, civilization advanced, the Jesuits, like every spiritual hierarchy the world has yet seen, began to lose ground; and this not so much from their own decay, as from a change in the spirit of those who surrounded them. An institution admirably adapted to an early form of society, was ill suited to the same society in its maturer state. In the sixteenth century, the Jesuits were before their age; in the eighteenth century, they were behind it. In the sixteenth century, they were the great missionaries of knowledge; because they believed that, by its aid, they could subjugate the consciences of men. But, in the eighteenth century, their materials were more refractory; they had to deal with a perverse and stiff-necked generation; they saw in every country the ecclesiastical authority rapidly declining; and they clearly perceived that their only chance of retaining their old dominion was, by checking that knowledge, the progress of which they had formerly done much to accelerate.[978]

Under these circumstances, the statesmen of France, almost immediately after the middle of the eighteenth century, determined to ruin an order which had long ruled the world, and which was still the greatest bulwark of the church. In this design they were aided by a curious movement which had taken place in the church itself, and which, being connected with views of much wider import, deserves the attention even of those for whom theological controversies have no interest.

Among the many points on which metaphysicians have wasted their strength, that of free-will has provoked the hottest disputes. And what has increased the acerbity of their language, is, that this, which is eminently a metaphysical question, has been taken up by theologians, who have treated it with that warmth for which they are remarkable.[979] From the time of Pelagius, if not earlier,[980] Christianity has been divided into two great sects, which, though in some respects uniting by insensible shades, have always preserved the broad features of their original difference. By one sect, the freedom of the will is virtually, and often expressly, denied; for it is asserted, not only that we cannot of our own will effect anything meritorious, but that whatever good we may do will be useless, since the Deity has predestined some men to perdition, others to salvation. By the other sect, the freedom of the will is as strongly upheld; good works are declared essential to salvation; and the opposite party is accused of exaggerating that state of grace of which faith is a necessary accompaniment.[981]

These opposite principles, when pushed to their logical consequences, must lead the first sect into antinomianism,[982] and the second sect into the doctrine of supererogatory works.[983] But since on such subjects, men feel far more than they reason, it usually happens that they prefer following some common and accredited standard, or appealing to some ancient name:[984] and they, therefore, generally class themselves on the one side under Augustin, Calvin, and Jansenius; on the other side under Pelagius, Arminius, and Molina.

Now, it is an interesting fact, that the doctrines which in England are called Calvinistic, have been always connected with a democratic spirit; while those of Arminianism have found most favour among the aristocratic or protective party. In the republics of Switzerland, of North America, and of Holland, Calvinism was always the popular creed.[985] On the other hand, in those evil days, immediately after the death of Elizabeth, when our liberties were in imminent peril; when the Church of England, aided by the crown, attempted to subjugate the consciences of men; and when the monstrous claim of the divine right of episcopacy was first put forward;[986]—then it was that Arminianism became the cherished doctrine of the ablest and most ambitious of the ecclesiastical party.[987] And in that sharp retribution which followed, the Puritans and Independents, by whom the punishment was inflicted, were, with scarcely an exception, Calvinists:[988] nor should we forget, that the first open movement against Charles proceeded from Scotland, where the principles of Calvin had long been in the ascendant.

This different tendency of these two creeds is so clearly marked, that an inquiry into its causes becomes a necessary part of general history, and as we shall presently see, is intimately connected with the history of the French Revolution.

The first circumstance by which we must be struck is, that Calvinism is a doctrine for the poor, and Arminianism for the rich. A creed which insists upon the necessity of faith, must be less costly than one which insists upon the necessity of works. In the former case, the sinner seeks salvation by the strength of his belief; in the latter case, he seeks it by the fullness of his contributions. And as those contributions, wherever the clergy have much power, always flow in the same direction, we find that in countries which favour the Arminian doctrine of works, the priests are better paid, and the churches more richly ornamented, than they are where Calvinism has the upper hand. Indeed it is evident to the most vulgar calculation, that a religion which concentrates our charity upon ourselves, is less expensive than one which directs our charity to others.

This is the first great practical divergence of the two creeds: a divergence which may be verified by any one who is acquainted with the histories of different Christian nations, or who has even travelled in countries where the different tenets are professed. It is also observable, that the Church of Rome, whose worship is addressed mainly to the senses, and who delights in splendid cathedrals and pompous ceremonies, has always displayed against the Calvinists an animosity far greater than she has done against any other Protestant sect.[989]

Out of these circumstances, inevitably arose the aristocratic tendency of Arminianism, and the democratic tendency of Calvinism. The people love pomp and pageantry as much as the nobles do, but they do not love to pay for them. Their untutored minds are easily captivated by the array of a numerous priesthood, and by the gorgeousness of a well-appointed temple. Still, they know full well that these things absorb a large part of that wealth which would otherwise flow into their own cottages. On the other hand, the aristocracy, by their standing, their habits, and the traditions of their education, naturally contract a taste for expense, which makes them unite splendour with religion, and connect pomp with piety. Besides this, they have an intuitive and well-founded belief that their own interests are associated with the interests of the priesthood, and that whatever weakens the one will hasten the downfall of the other. Hence it is, that every Christian democracy has simplified its external worship; every Christian aristocracy has embellished it. By a parity of reasoning, the more any society tends to equality, the more likely it is that its theological opinions will be Calvinistic; while the more a society tends towards inequality, the greater the probability of those opinions being Arminian.

It would be easy to push this contrast still further, and to show that Calvinism is more favourable to the sciences, Arminianism to the arts;[990] and that, on the same principle, the first is better suited to thinkers, the other to scholars.[991] But without pretending to trace the whole of this divergence, it is very important to observe, that the professors of the former religion are more likely to acquire habits of independent thinking than those of the latter. And this on two distinct grounds. In the first place, even the most ordinary of the Calvinistic party are, by the very terms of their creed, led, in religious matters, to fix their attention on their own minds rather than on the minds of others. They, therefore, as a body, are intellectually more narrow than their opponents, but less servile; their views, though generalized from a smaller field, are more independent; they are less attached to antiquity, and more heedless of those traditions to which the Arminian scholars attach great importance. In the second place, those who associate metaphysics with their religion are led by Calvinism into the doctrine of necessity;[992] a theory which, though often misunderstood, is pregnant with great truths, and is better calculated than any other system to develop the intellect, because it involves that clear conception of law, the attainment of which is the highest point the human understanding can reach.

These considerations will enable the reader to see the immense importance of that revival of Jansenism, which took place in the French church during the eighteenth century. For, Jansenism being essentially Calvinistic,[993] those tendencies appeared in France by which Calvinism is marked. There appeared the inquisitive, democratic, and insubordinate spirit, which has always accompanied that creed. A further confirmation of the truth of the principles just laid down is, that Jansenism originated with a native of the Dutch Republic;[994] that it was introduced into France during the glimpse of freedom which preceded the power of Louis XIV.;[995] that it was forcibly repressed in his arbitrary reign;[996] and that before the middle of the eighteenth century, it again arose, as the natural product of a state of society by which the French Revolution was brought about.

The connexion between the revival of Jansenism and the destruction of the Jesuits, is obvious. After the death of Louis XIV., the Jansenists rapidly gained ground, even in the Sorbonne;[997] and by the middle of the eighteenth century, they had organized a powerful party in the French parliament.[998] About the same period, their influence began to show itself in the executive government, and among the officers of the crown. Machault, who held the important post of controller-general, was known to favour their opinions;[999] and a few years after his retirement, Choiseul was called to the head of affairs; a man of considerable ability, by whom they were openly protected.[1000] Their views were likewise supported by Laverdy, controller-general in 1764, and by Terray, controller of finances in 1769.[1001] The procureur-general, Gilbert des Voisins, was a Jansenist;[1002] so also was one of his successors, Chauvelin;[1003] and so was the advocate-general Pelletier de Saint-Fargeau;[1004] and so too was Camus, the well-known advocate of the clergy.[1005] Turgot, the greatest statesman of the age, is said to have embraced the same opinions;[1006] while Necker, who on two different occasions possessed almost supreme power, was notoriously a rigid Calvinist. To this may be added, that not only Necker, but also Rousseau, to whom a large share in causing the Revolution is justly ascribed, were born in Geneva, and drew their earliest ideas from that great nursery of the Calvinistic theology.

In such a state of things as this, it was impossible that a body like the Jesuits should hold their ground. They were the last defenders of authority and tradition, and it was natural that they should fall in an age when statesmen were sceptics, and theologians were Calvinists. Even the people had already marked them for destruction; and when Damiens, in 1757, attempted to assassinate the king, it was generally believed that they were the instigators of the act.[1007] This we now know to be false; but the existence of such a rumour is evidence of the state of the popular mind. At all events, the doom of the Jesuits was fixed. In April 1761, parliament ordered their constitutions to be laid before them.[1008] In August, they were forbidden to receive novices, their colleges were closed, and a number of their most celebrated works were publicly burned by the common hangman.[1009] Finally, in 1762, another edict appeared, by which the Jesuits were condemned without even being heard in their own defence;[1010] their property was directed to be sold, and their order secularized; they were declared ‘unfit to be admitted into a well-governed country,’ and their institute and society were formally abolished.[1011]

Such was the way in which this great society, long the terror of the world, fell before the pressure of public opinion. What makes its fall the more remarkable, is, that the pretext which was alleged to justify the examination of its constitutions, was one so slight, that no former government would have listened to it for a single moment. This immense spiritual corporation was actually tried by a temporal court for ill faith in a mercantile transaction, and for refusing to pay a sum of money said to be due![1012] The most important body in the Catholic church, the spiritual leaders of France, the educators of her youth, and the confessors of her kings, were brought to the bar, and sued in their collective capacity, for the fraudulent repudiation of a common debt![1013] So marked was the predisposition of affairs, that it was not found necessary to employ for the destruction of the Jesuits any of those arts by which the popular mind is commonly inflamed. The charge upon which they were sentenced, was not that they had plotted against the state; nor that they had corrupted the public morals; nor that they wished to subvert religion. These were the accusations which were brought in the seventeenth century, and which suited the genius of that age. But in the eighteenth century, all that was required was some trifling accident, that might serve as a pretence to justify what the nation had already determined. To ascribe, therefore, this great event to the bankruptcy of a trader, or the intrigues of a mistress,[1014] is to confuse the cause of an act with the pretext under which the act is committed. In the eyes of the men of the eighteenth century, the real crime of the Jesuits was, that they belonged to the past rather than to the present, and that by defending the abuses of ancient establishments, they obstructed the progress of mankind. They stood in the way of the age, and the age swept them from its path. This was the real cause of their abolition: a cause not likely to be perceived by those writers, who, under the guise of historians, are only collectors of the prattle and gossip of courts; and who believe that the destinies of great nations can be settled in the ante-chambers of ministers, and in the councils of kings.

After the fall of the Jesuits, there seemed to be nothing remaining which could save the French church from immediate destruction.[1015] The old theological spirit had been for some time declining, and the clergy were suffering from their own decay even more than from the attacks made upon them. The advance of knowledge was producing in France the same results as those which I have pointed out in England; and the increasing attractions of science drew off many illustrious men, who in a preceding age would have been active members of the spiritual profession. That splendid eloquence, for which the French clergy had been remarkable, was now dying away, and there were no longer heard the voices of those great orators, at whose bidding the temples had formerly been filled.[1016] Massillon was the last of that celebrated race who had so enthralled the mind, and the magic of whose fascination it is even now hard to withstand. He died in 1742; and after him the French clergy possessed no eminent men of any kind, neither thinkers, nor orators, nor writers.[1017] Nor did there seem the least possibility of their recovering their lost position. While society was advancing they were receding. All the sources of their power were dried up. They had no active leaders; they had lost the confidence of government; they had forfeited the respect of the people; they had become a mark for the gibes of the age.[1018]

It does, at first sight, seem strange that, under these circumstances, the French clergy should have been able, for nearly thirty years after the abolition of the Jesuits, to maintain their standing, so as to interfere with impunity in public affairs.[1019] The truth, however, is, that this temporary reprieve of the ecclesiastical order was owing to that movement which I have already noticed, and by virtue of which the French intellect, during the latter half of the eighteenth century, changed the ground of its attack, and, directing its energies against political abuses, neglected in some degree those spiritual abuses to which its attention had been hitherto confined. The result was, that in France the government enforced a policy which the great thinkers had indeed originated, but respecting which they were becoming less eager. The most eminent Frenchmen were beginning their attacks upon the state, and in the heat of their new warfare they slackened their opposition to the church. But in the mean time, the seeds they had sown germinated in the state itself. So rapid was the march of affairs, that those anti-ecclesiastical opinions which, a few years earlier, were punished as the paradoxes of designing men, were now taken up and put into execution by senators and ministers. The rulers of France carried into effect principles which had hitherto been simply a matter of theory; and thus it happened, as is always the case, that practical statesmen only apply and work out ideas which have long before been suggested by more advanced thinkers.

Hence it followed, that at no period during the eighteenth century did the speculative classes and practical classes thoroughly combine against the church: since, in the first half of the century, the clergy were principally assailed by the literature, and not by the government; in the latter half of the century, by the government, and not by the literature. Some of the circumstances of this singular transition have been already stated, and I hope clearly brought before the mind of the reader. I now purpose to complete the generalization, by proving that a corresponding change was taking place in all other branches of inquiry; and that, while in the first period attention was chiefly directed towards mental phenomena, it was in the second period more directed towards physical phenomena. From this, the political movement received a vast accession of strength. For the French intellect, shifting the scene of its labours, diverted the thoughts of men from the internal to the external, and concentrating attention upon their material rather than upon their spiritual wants, turned against the encroachments of the state an hostility formerly reserved for the encroachments of the church. Whenever a tendency arises to prefer what comes from without to what comes from within, and thus to aggrandize matter at the expense of mind, there will also be a tendency to believe that an institution which hampers our opinions is less hurtful than one which controls our acts. Precisely in the same way, men who reject the fundamental truths of religion, will care little for the extent to which those truths are perverted. Men who deny the existence of the Deity and the immortality of the soul, will take no heed of the way in which a gross and formal worship obscures those sublime doctrines. All the idolatry, all the ceremonials, all the pomp, all the dogmas, and all the traditions by which religion is retarded, will give them no disquietude, because they consider the opinions that are checked to be equally false with those that are favoured. Why should they, to whom transcendental truths are unknown, labour to remove the superstitions which darken the truths? Such a generation, so far from attacking ecclesiastical usurpations, would rather look on the clergy as convenient tools to ensnare the ignorant and control the vulgar. Therefore it is that we rarely hear of a sincere atheist being a zealous polemic. But if that should occur, which a century ago occurred in France; if it should happen that men of great energy, and actuated by the feelings I have described, were to find themselves in the presence of a political despotism,—they would direct against it the whole of their powers; and they would act with the more determined vigour, because, believing that their all was at stake, temporal happiness would be to them not only the first, but also the sole consideration.

It is from this point of view that the progress of those atheistical opinions, which now rose in France, becomes a matter of great though painful interest. And the date at which they appeared, fully corroborates what I have just said respecting the change that took place in the middle of the eighteenth century. The first great work in which they were openly promulgated, was the celebrated EncyclopÆdia, published in 1751.[1020] Before that time such degrading opinions, though occasionally broached, were not held by any men of ability; nor could they in the preceding state of society have made much impression upon the age. But during the latter half of the eighteenth century, they affected every department of French literature. Between 1758 and 1770, atheistical tenets rapidly gained ground;[1021] and in 1770 was published the famous work, called the System of Nature; the success, and, unhappily, the ability of which, makes its appearance an important epoch in the history of France. Its popularity was immense;[1022] and the views it contains are so clearly and methodically arranged, as to have earned for it the name of the code of atheism.[1023] Five years later, the Archbishop of Toulouse, in a formal address to the king on behalf of the clergy, declared that atheism had now become the prevailing opinion.[1024] This, like all similar assertions, must have been an exaggeration; but that there was a large amount of truth in it, is known to whoever has studied the mental habits of the generation immediately preceding the Revolution. Among the inferior class of writers, Damilaville, Deleyre, MarÉchal, Naigeon, Toussaint, were active supporters of that cold and gloomy dogma, which, in order to extinguish the hope of a future life, blots out from the mind of man the glorious instincts of his own immortality.[1025] And, strange to say, several even of the higher intellects were unable to escape the contagion. Atheism was openly advocated by Condorcet, by D'Alembert, by Diderot, by HelvÉtius, by Lalande, by Laplace, by Mirabeau, and by Saint Lambert.[1026] Indeed, so thoroughly did all this harmonize with the general temper, that in society men boasted of what, in other countries, and in other days, has been a rare and singular error, an eccentric taint, which those affected by it were willing to conceal. In 1764 Hume met, at the house of Baron d'Holbach, a party of the most celebrated Frenchmen then residing in Paris. The great Scotchman, who was no doubt aware of the prevailing opinion, took occasion to raise an argument as to the existence of an atheist, properly so called; for his own part, he said, he had never chanced to meet with one. ‘You have been somewhat unfortunate,’ replied Holbach; ‘but at the present moment you are sitting at table with seventeen of them.’[1027]

This, sad as it is, only forms a single aspect of that immense movement, by which, during the latter half of the eighteenth century, the French intellect was withdrawn from the study of the internal, and concentrated upon that of the external world. Of this tendency, we find an interesting instance in the celebrated work of HelvÉtius, unquestionably the ablest and most influential treatise on morals which France produced at this period. It was published in 1758;[1028] and, although it bears the title of an essay on ‘the Mind,’ it does not contain a single passage from which we could infer that the mind, in the sense in which the word is commonly used, has any existence. In this work, which, during fifty years, was the code of French morals, principles are laid down which bear exactly the same relation to ethics that atheism bears to theology. HelvÉtius, at the beginning of his inquiry, assumes, as an incontestable fact, that the difference between man and other animals is the result of a difference in their external form; and that if, for example, our wrists, instead of ending with hands and flexible fingers, had merely ended like a horse's foot, we should have always remained wanderers on the face of the earth, ignorant of every art, entirely defenceless, and having no other concern but to avoid the attacks of wild beasts, and find the needful supply of our daily food.[1029] That the structure of our bodies is the sole cause of our boasted superiority, becomes evident, when we consider that our thoughts are simply the product of two faculties, which we have in common with all other animals; namely, the faculty of receiving impressions from external objects, and the faculty of remembering those impressions after they are received.[1030] From this, says HelvÉtius, it follows, that the internal powers of man being the same as those of all other animals, our sensibility and our memory would be useless, if it were not for those external peculiarities by which we are eminently distinguished, and to which we owe every thing that is most valuable.[1031] These positions being laid down, it is easy to deduce all the essential principles of moral actions. For, memory being merely one of the organs of physical sensibility,[1032] and judgment being only a sensation,[1033] all notions of duty and of virtue must be tested by their relation to the senses; in other words, by the gross amount of physical enjoyment to which they give rise. This is the true basis of moral philosophy. To take any other view, is to allow ourselves to be deceived by conventional expressions, which have no foundation except in the prejudices of ignorant men. Our vices and our virtues are solely the result of our passions; and our passions are caused by our physical sensibility to pain and to pleasure.[1034] It was in this way that the sense of justice first arose. To physical sensibility men owe pleasure and pain; hence the feeling of their own interests, and hence the desire of living together in societies. Being assembled in society, there grew up the notion of a general interest, since, without it, society could not hold together; and, as actions are only just or unjust in proportion as they minister to this general interest, a measure was established, by which justice is discriminated from injustice.[1035] With the same inflexible spirit, and with great fullness of illustration, HelvÉtius examines the origin of those other feelings which regulate human actions. Thus, he says that both ambition and friendship are entirely the work of physical sensibility. Men yearn after fame, on account either of the pleasure which they expect the mere possession of it will give, or else as the means of subsequently procuring other pleasures.[1036] As to friendship, the only use of it is to increase our pleasures or mitigate our pains; and it is with this object that a man longs to hold communion with his friend.[1037] Beyond this, life has nothing to offer. To love what is good for the sake of the goodness, is as impossible as to love what is bad for the sake of the evil.[1038] The mother who weeps for the loss of her child, is solely actuated by selfishness; she mourns because a pleasure is taken from her, and because she sees a void difficult to fill up.[1039] So it is, that the loftiest virtues, as well as the meanest vices, are equally caused by the pleasure we find in the exercise of them.[1040] This is the great mover and originator of all. Every thing that we have, and every thing that we are, we owe to the external world; nor is Man himself aught else except what he is made by the objects which surround him.[1041]

The views put forward in this celebrated work I have stated at some length; not so much on account of the ability with which they are advocated, as on account of the clue they furnish to the movements of a most remarkable age. Indeed, so completely did they harmonize with the prevailing tendencies, that they not only quickly obtained for their author a vast European reputation,[1042] but, during many years, they continued to increase in influence, and, in France in particular, they exercised great sway.[1043] As that was the country in which they arose, so also was it the country to which they were best adapted. Madame Dudeffand, who passed her long life in the midst of French society, and was one of the keenest observers of her time, has expressed this with great happiness. The work of HelvÉtius, she says, is popular, since he is the man who has told to all their own secret.[1044]

True it was, that, to the contemporaries of HelvÉtius, his views, notwithstanding their immense popularity, bore the appearance of a secret; because the connexion between them and the general march of events was, as yet, but dimly perceived. To us, however, who, after this interval of time, can examine the question with the resources of a larger experience, it is obvious how such a system met the wants of an age of which it was the exponent and the mouthpiece. That HelvÉtius must have carried with him the sympathies of his countrymen, is clear, not only from the evidence we have of his success, but also from a more comprehensive view of the general complexion of those times. Even while he was still pursuing his labours, and only four years before he published them, a work appeared in France, which, though displaying greater ability, and possessing a higher influence than that of HelvÉtius, did, nevertheless, point in exactly the same direction. I allude to the great metaphysical treatise by Condillac, in many respects one of the most remarkable productions of the eighteenth century; and the authority of which, during two generations, was so irresistible, that, without some acquaintance with it, we cannot possibly understand the nature of those complicated movements by which the French Revolution was brought about.

In 1754,[1045] Condillac put forth his celebrated work on the mind; the very title of which was a proof of the bias with which it was written. Although this profound thinker aimed at nothing less than an exhaustive analysis of the human faculties, and although he is pronounced by a very able, but hostile critic, to be the only metaphysician France produced during the eighteenth century,[1046] still he found it utterly impossible to escape from those tendencies towards the external which governed his own age. The consequence was, that he called his work a ‘Treatise on Sensations;’[1047] and in it he peremptorily asserts, that every thing we know is the result of sensation; by which he means the effect produced on us by the action of the external world. Whatever may be thought of the accuracy of this opinion, there can be no doubt that it is enforced with a closeness and severity of reasoning which deserves the highest praise. To examine, however, the arguments by which his view is supported, would lead to a discussion foreign to my present object, which is, merely to point out the relation between his philosophy and the general temper of his contemporaries. Without, therefore, pretending to anything like a critical examination of this celebrated book, I will simply bring together the essential positions on which it is based, in order to illustrate the harmony between it and the intellectual habits of the age in which it appeared.[1048]

The materials from which the philosophy of Condillac was originally drawn, were contained in the great work published by Locke about sixty years before this time. But though much of what was most essential was borrowed from the English philosopher, there was one very important point in which the disciple differed from his master. And this difference is strikingly characteristic of the direction which the French intellect was now taking. Locke, with some looseness of expression, and possibly with some looseness of thought, had asserted the separate existence of a power of reflection, and had maintained that by means of that power the products of sensation became available.[1049] Condillac, moved by the prevailing temper of his own time, would not hear of such a distinction. He, like most of his contemporaries, was jealous of any claim which increased the authority of the internal, and weakened that of the external. He, therefore, altogether rejects the faculty of reflection as a source of our ideas; and this partly because it is but the channel through which ideas run from the senses, and partly because in its origin it is itself a sensation.[1050] Therefore, according to him, the only question is as to the way in which our contact with nature supplies us with ideas. For in this scheme, the faculties of man are solely caused by the operation of his senses. The judgments which we form are, says Condillac, often ascribed to the hand of the Deity; a convenient mode of reasoning, which has only arisen from the difficulty of analyzing them.[1051] By considering how our judgments actually arise, we can alone remove these obscurities. The fact is, that the attention we give to an object is nothing but the sensation which that object excites;[1052] and what we call abstract ideas are merely different ways of being attentive.[1053] Ideas being thus generated, the subsequent process is very simple. To attend to two ideas at the same time, is to compare them; so that comparison is not a result of attention, but is rather the attention itself.[1054] This at once gives us the faculty of judging, because directly we institute a comparison, we do of necessity form a judgment.[1055] Thus, too, memory is a transformed sensation;[1056] while the imagination is nothing but memory, which, being carried to its highest possible vivacity, makes what is absent appear to be present.[1057] The impressions we receive from the external world being, therefore, not the cause of our faculties, but being the faculties themselves, the conclusion to which we are driven is inevitable. It follows, says Condillac, that in man nature is the beginning of all; that to nature we owe the whole of our knowledge; that we only instruct ourselves according to her lessons; and that the entire art of reasoning consists in continuing the work which she has appointed us to perform.[1058]

It is so impossible to mistake the tendency of these views, that I need not attempt to estimate their result otherwise than by measuring the extent to which they were adopted. Indeed, the zeal with which they were now carried into every department of knowledge, can only surprise those who, being led by their habits of mind to study history in its separate fragments, have not accustomed themselves to consider it as an united whole, and who, therefore, do not perceive that in every great epoch there is some one idea at work, which is more powerful than any other, and which shapes the events of the time and determines their ultimate issue. In France, during the latter half of the eighteenth century, this idea was, the inferiority of the internal to the external. It was this dangerous but plausible principle which drew the attention of men from the church to the state; which was seen in HelvÉtius the most celebrated of the French moralists, and in Condillac the most celebrated of the French metaphysicians. It was this same principle which, by increasing, if I may so say, the reputation of Nature, induced the ablest thinkers to devote themselves to a study of her laws, and to abandon those other pursuits which had been popular in the preceding age. In consequence of this movement, such wonderful additions were made to every branch of physical science, that more new truths concerning the external world were discovered in France during the latter half of the eighteenth century than during all the previous periods put together. The details of these discoveries, so far as they have been subservient to the general purposes of civilization, will be related in another place; at present I will indicate only the most prominent, in order that the reader may understand the course of the subsequent argument, and may see the connexion between them and the French Revolution.

Taking a general view of the external world, we may say, that the three most important forces by which the operations of nature are effected, are heat, light, and electricity; including under this last magnetic and galvanic phenomena. On all these subjects, the French, for the first time, now exerted themselves with signal success. In regard to heat, not only were the materials for subsequent induction collected with indefatigable industry, but before that generation passed away, the induction was actually made; for while the laws of its radiation were worked out by Prevost,[1059] those of its conduction were established by Fourier, who, just before the Revolution, employed himself in raising thermotics to a science by the deductive application of that celebrated mathematical theory which he contrived, and which still bears his name.[1060] In regard to electricity, it is enough to notice, during the same period, the important experiments of D'Alibard, followed by those vast labours of Coulomb, which brought electrical phenomena under the jurisdiction of the mathematics, and thus completed what Œpinus had already prepared.[1061] As to the laws of light, those ideas were now accumulating which rendered possible the great steps that, at the close of the century, were taken by Malus, and still later by Fresnel.[1062] Both of these eminent Frenchmen not only made important additions to our knowledge of double refraction, but Malus discovered the polarization of light, undoubtedly the most splendid contribution received by optical science since the analysis of the solar rays.[1063] It was also in consequence of this, that Fresnel began those profound researches which placed on a solid basis that great undulatory theory of which Hooke, Huygens, and above all Young, are to be deemed the founders, and by which the corpuscular theory of Newton was finally overthrown.[1064]

Thus much as to the progress of French knowledge respecting those parts of nature which are in themselves invisible, and of which we cannot tell whether they have a material existence, or whether they are mere conditions and properties of other bodies.[1065] The immense value of these discoveries, as increasing the number of known truths, is incontestable: but, at the same time, another class of discoveries was made, which, dealing more palpably with the visible world, and being also more easily understood, produced more immediate results, and, as I shall presently show, exercised a remarkable influence in strengthening that democratic tendency which accompanied the French Revolution. It is impossible, within the limits I have assigned to myself, to give anything like an adequate notion of the marvellous activity with which the French now pushed their researches into every department of the organic and inorganic world; still it is, I think, practicable to compress into a few pages such a summary of the more salient points as will afford the reader some idea of what was done by that generation of great thinkers which flourished in France during the latter half of the eighteenth century.

If we confine our view to the globe we inhabit, it must be allowed that chemistry and geology are the two sciences which not only offer the fairest promise, but already contain the largest generalizations. The reason of this will become clear, if we attend to the ideas on which these two great subjects are based. The idea of chemistry, is the study of composition;[1066] the idea of geology, is the study of position. The object of the first is, to learn the laws which govern the properties of matter; the object of the second is, to learn the laws which govern its locality. In chemistry, we experiment; in geology, we observe. In chemistry, we deal with the molecular arrangement of the smallest atoms;[1067] in geology, with the cosmological arrangement of the largest masses. Hence it is that the chemist by his minuteness, and the geologist by his grandeur, touch the two extremes of the material universe; and, starting from these opposite points, have, as I could easily prove, a constantly increasing tendency to bring under their own authority sciences which have at present an independent existence, and which, for the sake of a division of labour, it is still convenient to study separately; though it must be the business of philosophy, properly so called, to integrate them into a complete and effective whole. Indeed it is obvious, that if we knew all the laws of the composition of matter, and likewise all the laws of its position, we should likewise know all the changes of which matter is capable spontaneously, that is, when uninterrupted by the mind of man. Every phenomenon which any given substance presents must be caused either by something taking place in the substance, or else by something taking place out of it, but acting upon it; while what occurs within must be explicable by its own composition, and what occurs without must be due to its position in relation to the objects by which it is affected. This is an exhaustive statement of every possible contingency, and to one of these two classes of laws every thing must be referrible; even those mysterious forces which, whether they be emanations from matter, or whether they be merely properties of matter, must in an ultimate analysis depend either on the internal arrangement, or else on the external locality of their physical antecedents. However convenient, therefore, it may be, in the present state of our knowledge, to speak of vital principles, imponderable fluids, and elastic Æthers, such terms can only be provisional, and are to be considered as mere names for that residue of unexplained facts, which it will be the business of future ages to bring under generalizations wide enough to cover and include the whole.

These ideas of composition and of position being thus the basis of all natural science, it is not surprising that chemistry and geology, which are their best, but still their insufficient representatives, should in modern times have made more progress than any other of the great branches of human knowledge. Although the chemists and geologists have not yet risen to the full height of their respective subjects,[1068] there are few things more curious than to note the way in which, during the last two generations, they have been rapidly expanding their views—encroaching on topics with which, at first sight, they appeared to have no concern—making other branches of inquiry tributary to their own—and collecting from every quarter that intellectual wealth which, long hidden in obscure corners, had been wasted in the cultivation of special and inferior pursuits. This, as being one of the great intellectual characteristics of the present age, I shall hereafter examine at considerable length; but what I have now to show is, that in these two vast sciences, which, though still very imperfect, must eventually be superior to all others, the first important steps were made by Frenchmen during the latter half of the eighteenth century.

That we owe to France the existence of chemistry as a science, will be admitted by everyone who uses the word science in the sense in which alone it ought to be understood, namely, as a body of generalizations so irrefragably true, that, though they may be subsequently covered by higher generalizations, they cannot be overthrown by them; in other words, generalizations which may be absorbed, but not refuted. In this point of view, there are in the history of chemistry only three great stages. The first stage was the destruction of the phlogistic theory, and the establishment, upon its ruins, of the doctrines of oxidation, combustion, and respiration. The second stage was the establishment of the principle of definite proportions, and the application to it of the atomic hypothesis. The third stage, above which we have not yet risen, consists in the union of chemical and electrical laws, and in the progress we are making towards fusing into one generalization their separate phenomena. Which of these three stages was in its own age the most valuable, is not now the question; but it is certain that the first of them was the work of Lavoisier, by far the greatest of the French chemists. Before him several important points had been cleared up by the English chemists, whose experiments ascertained the existence of bodies formerly unknown. The links, however, to connect the facts, were still wanting; and until Lavoisier entered the field, there were no generalizations wide enough to entitle chemistry to be called a science; or, to speak more properly, the only large generalization commonly received was that by Stahl, which the great Frenchman proved to be not only imperfect, but altogether inaccurate. A notice of the vast discoveries of Lavoisier will be found in many well-known books:[1069] it is enough to say, that he not only worked out the laws of the oxidation of bodies and of their combustion, but that he is the author of the true theory of respiration, the purely chemical character of which he first demonstrated; thus laying the foundation of those views respecting the functions of food, which the German chemists subsequently developed, and which, as I have proved in the second chapter of this Introduction, may be applied to solve some great problems in the history of Man. The merit of this was so obviously due to France, that though the system now established was quickly adopted in other countries,[1070] it received the name of the French chemistry.[1071] At the same time, the old nomenclature being full of old errors, a new one was required, and here again France took the initiative; since this great reformation was begun by four of her most eminent chemists, who flourished only a few years before the Revolution.[1072]

While one division of the French thinkers was reducing to order the apparent irregularities of chemical phenomena, another division of them was performing precisely the same service for geology. The first step towards popularizing this noble study was taken by Buffon, who, in the middle of the eighteenth century, broached a geological theory, which, though not quite original, excited attention by its eloquence, and by the lofty speculations with which he connected it.[1073] This was followed by the more special but still important labours of Rouelle, Desmarest, Dolomieu, and Montlosier, who, in less than forty years, effected a complete revolution in the ideas of Frenchmen, by familiarizing them with the strange conception, that the surface of our planet, even where it appears perfectly stable, is constantly undergoing most extensive changes. It began to be understood, that this perpetual flux takes place not only in those parts of nature which are obviously feeble and evanescent, but also in those which seem to possess every element of strength and permanence, such as the mountains of granite which wall the globe, and are the shell and encasement in which it is held. As soon as the mind became habituated to this notion of universal change, the time was ripe for the appearance of some great thinker, who should generalize the scattered observations, and form them into a science, by connecting them with some other department of knowledge, of which the laws, or, at all events, the empirical uniformities, had been already ascertained.

It was at this point, and while the inquiries of geologists, notwithstanding their value, were still crude and unsettled, that the subject was taken up by Cuvier, one of the greatest naturalists Europe has ever produced. A few others there are who have surpassed him in depth; but in comprehensiveness it would be hard to find his superior; and the immense range of his studies gave him a peculiar advantage in surveying the operations and dependencies of the external world.[1074] This remarkable man is unquestionably the founder of geology as a science, since he is not only the first who saw the necessity of bringing to bear upon it the generalizations of comparative anatomy, but he is also the first who actually, executing this great idea, succeeded in coÖrdinating the study of the strata of the earth with the study of the fossil animals found in them.[1075] Shortly before his researches were published, many valuable facts had indeed been collected respecting the separate strata; the primary formations being investigated by the Germans, the secondary ones by the English.[1076] But these observations, notwithstanding their merit, were isolated; and they lacked that vast conception which gave unity and grandeur to the whole, by connecting inquiries concerning the inorganic changes of the surface of the globe with other inquiries concerning the organic changes of the animals the surface contained.

How completely this immense step is due to France, is evident not only from the part played by Cuvier, but also from the admitted fact, that to the French we owe our knowledge respecting tertiary strata,[1077] in which the organic remains are most numerous, and the general analogy to our present state is most intimate.[1078] Another circumstance may likewise be added, as pointing to the same conclusion. This is, that the first application of the principles of comparative anatomy to the study of fossil bones was also the work of a Frenchman, the celebrated Daubenton. Hitherto these bones had been the object of stupid wonder; some saying that they were rained from heaven, others saying that they were the gigantic limbs of the ancient patriarchs, men who were believed to be tall because they were known to be old.[1079] Such idle conceits were for ever destroyed by Daubenton, in a Memoir he published in 1762;[1080] with which, however, we are not now concerned, except that it is evidence of the state of the French mind, and is worth noting as a precursor of the discoveries of Cuvier.

By this union of geology and anatomy, there was first introduced into the study of nature a clear conception of the magnificent doctrine of universal change; while at the same time there grew up by its side a conception equally steady of the regularity with which the changes are accomplished, and of the undeviating laws by which they are governed. Similar ideas had no doubt been occasionally held in preceding ages; but the great Frenchmen of the eighteenth century were the first who applied them to the entire structure of the globe, and who thus prepared the way for that still higher view for which their minds were not yet ripe,[1081] but to which in our own time the most advanced thinkers are rapidly rising. For it is now beginning to be understood, that since every addition to knowledge affords fresh proof of the regularity with which all the changes of nature are conducted, we are bound to believe that the same regularity existed long before our little planet assumed its present form, and long before man trod the surface of the earth. We have the most abundant evidence that the movements incessantly occurring in the material world have a character of uniformity; and this uniformity is so clearly marked, that in astronomy, the most perfect of all the sciences, we are able to predict events many years before they actually happen; nor can any one doubt, that if on other subjects our science were equally advanced, our predictions would be equally accurate. It is, therefore, clear, that the burden of proof lies not on those who assert the eternal regularity of nature, but rather on those who deny it; and who set up an imaginary period, to which they assign an imaginary catastrophe, during which they say new laws were introduced and a new order established. Such gratuitous assumptions, even if they eventually turn out to be true, are in the present state of knowledge unwarrantable, and ought to be rejected, as the last remains of those theological prejudices by which the march of every science has in its turn been hindered. These and all analagous notions work a double mischief. They are mischievous, because they cripple the human mind by imposing limits to its inquiries; and above all they are mischievous, because they weaken that vast conception of continuous and uninterrupted law, which few indeed are able firmly to seize, but on which the highest generalizations of future science must ultimately depend.

It is this deep conviction, that changing phenomena have unchanging laws, and that there are principles of order to which all apparent disorder may be referred,—it is this, which, in the seventeenth century, guided in a limited field Bacon, Descartes, and Newton; which in the eighteenth century was applied to every part of the material universe; and which it is the business of the nineteenth century to extend to the history of the human intellect. This last department of inquiry we owe chiefly to Germany; for, with the single exception of Vico, no one even suspected the possibility of arriving at complete generalizations respecting the progress of man, until shortly before the French Revolution, when the great German thinkers began to cultivate this, the highest and most difficult of all studies. But the French themselves were too much occupied with physical science to pay attention to such matters;[1082] and speaking generally, we may say that, in the eighteenth century, each of the three leading nations of Europe had a separate part to play. England diffused a love of freedom; France, a knowledge of physical science; while Germany, aided in some degree by Scotland, revived the study of metaphysics, and created the study of philosophic history. To this classification some exceptions may of course be made; but that these were the marked characteristics of the three countries, is certain. After the death of Locke in 1704, and that of Newton in 1727, there was in England a singular dearth of great speculative thinkers; and this not because the ability was wanting, but because it was turned partly into practical pursuits, partly into political contests. I shall hereafter examine the causes of this peculiarity, and endeavour to ascertain the extent to which it has influenced the fortunes of the country. That the results were, on the whole, beneficial, I entertain no doubt; but they were unquestionably injurious to the progress of science, because they tended to divert it from all new truths, except those likely to produce obvious and practical benefit. The consequence was, that though the English made several great discoveries, they did not possess, during seventy years, a single man who took a really comprehensive view of the phenomena of nature; not one who could be compared with those illustrious thinkers who in France reformed every branch of physical knowledge. Nor was it until more than two generations after the death of Newton, that the first symptoms appeared of a remarkable reaction, which quickly displayed itself in nearly every department of the national intellect. In physics, it is enough to mention Dalton, Davy, and Young, each of whom was in his own field the founder of a new epoch; while on other subjects I can only just refer, first, to the influence of the Scotch school; and, secondly, to that sudden and well-deserved admiration for the German literature of which Coleridge was the principal exponent, and which infused into the English mind a taste for generalizations higher and more fearless than any hitherto known. The history of this vast movement, which began early in the nineteenth century, will be traced in the future volumes of this work: at present I merely notice it, as illustrating the fact, that until the movement began, the English, though superior to the French in several matters of extreme importance, were for many years inferior to them in those large and philosophic views, without which not only is the most patient industry of no avail, but even real discoveries lose their proper value, for want of such habits of generalization as would trace their connexion with each other, and consolidate their severed fragments into one vast system of complete and harmonious truth.

The interest attached to these inquiries has induced me to treat them at greater length than I had intended; perhaps at greater length than is suitable to the suggestive and preparatory character of this Introduction. But the extraordinary success with which the French now cultivated physical knowledge is so curious, on account of its connexion with the Revolution, that I must mention a few more of its most prominent instances: though, for the sake of brevity, I will confine myself to those three great divisions which, when put together, form what is called Natural History, and in all of which we shall see that the most important steps were taken in France during the latter half of the eighteenth century.

In the first of these divisions, namely, the department of zoology, we owe to the Frenchmen of the eighteenth century those generalizations which are still the highest this branch of knowledge has reached. Taking zoology in the proper sense of the term, it consists only of two parts, the anatomical part, which is its statics, and the physiological part, which is its dynamics: the first referring to the structure of animals; the other, to their functions.[1083] Both of these were worked out, nearly at the same time, by Cuvier and Bichat; and the leading conclusions at which they arrived, remain, after the lapse of sixty years, undisturbed in their essential points. In 1795, Cuvier laid down the great principle, that the study and classification of animals was to be, not as heretofore, with a view to external peculiarities, but with a view to internal organization; and that, therefore, no real advance could be made in our knowledge except by extending the boundaries of comparative anatomy.[1084] This step, simple as it now appears, was of immense importance, since by it zoology was at once rescued from the hands of the observer, and thrown into those of the experimenter: the consequence of which has been the attainment of that precision and accuracy of detail, which experiment alone can give, and which is every way superior to such popular facts as observation supplies. By thus indicating to naturalists the true path of inquiry, by accustoming them to a close and severe method, and by teaching them to despise those vague descriptions in which they had formerly delighted, Cuvier laid the foundation of a progress which, during the last sixty years, has surpassed the most sanguine expectations. This, then, is the real service rendered by Cuvier, that he overthrew the artificial system which the genius of LinnÆus had raised up,[1085] and substituted in its place that far superior scheme which gave the freest scope to future inquiry; since, according to it, all systems are to be deemed imperfect and provisional so long as any thing remains to be learned respecting the comparative anatomy of the animal kingdom. The influence exercised by this great view was increased by the extraordinary skill and industry with which its proposer followed it out, and proved the practicability of his own precepts. His additions to our knowledge of comparative anatomy are probably more numerous than those made by any other man; but what has gained him most celebrity is, the comprehensive spirit with which he used what he acquired. Independently of other generalizations, he is the author of that vast classification of the whole animal kingdom into vertebrata, mollusca, articulata, and radiata;[1086] a classification which keeps its ground, and is one of the most remarkable instances of that large and philosophic spirit which France brought to bear upon the phenomena of the material world.[1087]

Great, however, as is the name of Cuvier, a greater still remains behind. I allude, of course, to Bichat, whose reputation is steadily increasing as our knowledge advances, and who, if we compare the shortness of his life with the reach and depth of his views, must be pronounced the most profound thinker and the most consummate observer by whom the organization of the animal frame has yet been studied.[1088] He wanted, indeed, that comprehensive knowledge for which Cuvier was remarkable; but though, on this account, his generalizations were drawn from a smaller surface, they were, on the other hand, less provisional: they were, I think, more complete, and certainly they dealt with more momentous topics. For the attention of Bichat was preËminently directed to the human frame[1089] in the largest sense of the word; his object being so to investigate the organization of man, as to rise, if possible, to some knowledge concerning the causes and nature of life. In this magnificent enterprise, considered as a whole, he failed; but what he effected in certain parts of it is so extraordinary, and has given such an impetus to some of the highest branches of inquiry, that I will briefly indicate his method, in order to compare it with that other method which, at the same moment, Cuvier adopted with immense success.

The important step taken by Cuvier was, that he insisted on the necessity of a comprehensive study of the organs of animals, instead of following the old plan of merely describing their habits and external peculiarities. This was a vast improvement, since, in the place of loose and popular observations, he substituted direct experiment, and hence introduced into zoology a precision formerly unknown.[1090] But Bichat, with a still keener insight, saw that even this was not enough. He saw that, each organ being composed of different tissues, it was requisite to study the tissues themselves, before we could learn the way in which, by their combinations, the organs are produced. This, like all really great ideas, was not entirely struck out by a single man; for the physiological value of the tissues had been recognized by three or four of the immediate predecessors of Bichat, such as Carmichael, Smyth, Bonn, Bordeu, and Fallopius. These inquirers, however, notwithstanding their industry, had effected nothing of much moment, since, though they collected several special facts, there was in their observations that want of harmony and that general incompleteness always characteristic of the labours of men who do not rise to a commanding view of the subject with which they deal.[1091]

It was under these circumstances that Bichat began those researches, which, looking at their actual and still more at their prospective results, are probably the most valuable contribution ever made to physiology by a single mind. In 1801, only a year before his death,[1092] he published his great work on anatomy, in which the study of the organs is made altogether subservient to the study of the tissues composing them. He lays it down, that the body of man consists of twenty-one distinct tissues, all of which, though essentially different, have in common the two great properties of extensibility and contractility.[1093] These tissues he, with indefatigable industry,[1094] subjected to every sort of examination; he examined them in different ages and diseases, with a view to ascertain the laws of their normal and pathological development.[1095] He studied the way each tissue is affected by moisture, air, and temperature; also the way in which their properties are altered by various chemical substances,[1096] and even their effect on the taste.[1097] By these means, and by many other experiments tending in the same direction, he took so great and sudden a step, that he is to be regarded not merely as an innovator on an old science, but rather as the creator of a new one.[1098] And although subsequent observers have corrected some of his conclusions, this has only been done by following his method; the value of which is now so generally recognized, that it is adopted by nearly all the best anatomists, who, differing in other points, are agreed as to the necessity of basing the future progress of anatomy on a knowledge of the tissues, the supreme importance of which Bichat was the first to perceive.[1099]

The methods of Bichat and of Cuvier, when put together, exhaust the actual resources of zoological science; so that all subsequent naturalists have been compelled to follow one of these two schemes; that is, either to follow Cuvier in comparing the organs of animals, or else to follow Bichat in comparing the tissues which compose the organs.[1100] And inasmuch as one comparison is chiefly suggestive of function, and the other comparison of structure, it is evident, that to raise the study of the animal world to the highest point of which it is capable, both these great plans are necessary; but if we ask which of the two plans, unaided by the other, is more likely to produce important results, the palm must, I think, be yielded to that proposed by Bichat. Certainly, if we look at the question as one to be decided by authority, a majority of the most eminent anatomists and physiologists now incline to the side of Bichat, rather than to that of Cuvier; while, as a matter of history, it may be proved that the reputation of Bichat has, with the advance of knowledge, increased more rapidly than that of his great rival. What, however, appears to me still more decisive, is, that the two most important discoveries made in our time respecting the classification of animals, are entirely the result of the method which Bichat suggested. The first discovery is that made by Agassiz, who, in the course of his ichthyological researches, was led to perceive that the arrangement by Cuvier according to organs, did not fulfil its purpose in regard to fossil fishes, because in the lapse of ages the characteristics of their structure were destroyed.[1101] He, therefore, adopted the only other remaining plan, and studied the tissues, which, being less complex than the organs, are oftener found intact. The result was the very remarkable discovery, that the tegumentary membrane of fishes is so intimately connected with their organization, that if the whole of a fish has perished except this membrane, it is practicable, by noting its characteristics, to reconstruct the animal in its most essential parts. Of the value of this principle of harmony, some idea may be formed from the circumstance, that on it Agassiz has based the whole of that celebrated classification, of which he is the sole author, and by which fossil ichthyology has for the first time assumed a precise and definite shape.[1102]

The other discovery, of which the application is much more extensive, was made in exactly the same way. It consists of the striking fact, that the teeth of each animal have a necessary connexion with the entire organization of its frame; so that, within certain limits, we can predict the organization by examining the tooth. This beautiful instance of the regularity of the operations of nature was not known until more than thirty years after the death of Bichat, and it is evidently due to the prosecution of that method which he sedulously inculcated. For the teeth never having been properly examined in regard to their separate tissues, it was believed that they were essentially devoid of structure, or, as some thought, were simply a fibrous texture.[1103] But by minute microscopic investigations, it has been recently ascertained that the tissues of the teeth are strictly analogous to those of other parts of the body;[1104] and that the ivory, or dentine, as it is now called,[1105] is highly organized; that it, as well as the enamel, is cellular, and is, in fact, a development of the living pulp. This discovery, which, to the philosophic anatomist, is pregnant with meaning, was made about 1838; and though the preliminary steps were taken by PurkinjÉ, Retzius, and Schwann, the principal merit is due to Nasmyth and Owen,[1106] between whom it is disputed, but whose rival claims we are not here called upon to adjust.[1107] What I wish to observe is, that the discovery is similar to that which we owe to Agassiz; similar in the method by which it was worked out, and also in the results which have followed from it. Both are due to a recognition of the fundamental maxim of Bichat, that the study of organs must be subordinate to the study of tissues, and both have supplied the most valuable aid to zoological classification. On this point, the service rendered by Owen is incontestable, whatever may be thought of his original claims. This eminent naturalist has, with immense industry, applied the discovery to all vertebrate animals; and in an elaborate work, specially devoted to the subject, he has placed beyond dispute the astonishing fact, that the structure of a single tooth is a criterion of the nature and organization of the species to which it belongs.[1108]

Whoever has reflected much on the different stages through which our knowledge has successively passed, must, I think, be led to the conclusion, that while fully recognizing the great merit of these investigators of the animal frame, our highest admiration ought to be reserved not for those who make the discoveries, but rather for those who point out how the discoveries are to be made.[1109] When the true path of inquiry has once been indicated, the rest is comparatively easy. The beaten highway is always open; and the difficulty is, not to find those who will travel the old road, but those who will make a fresh one. Every age produces in abundance men of sagacity and of considerable industry, who, while perfectly competent to increase the details of a science, are unable to extend its distant boundaries. This is because such extension must be accompanied by a new method,[1110] which, to be valuable as well as new, supposes on the part of its suggester, not only a complete mastery over the resources of his subject, but also the possession of originality and comprehensiveness,—the two rarest forms of human genius. In this consists the real difficulty of every great pursuit. As soon as any department of knowledge has been generalized into laws, it contains, either in itself or in its applications, three distinct branches; namely, inventions, discoveries, and method. Of these, the first corresponds to art; the second to science; and the third to philosophy. In this scale, inventions have by far the lowest place, and minds of the highest order are rarely occupied by them. Next in the series come discoveries; and here the province of intellect really begins, since here the first attempt is made to search after truth on its own account, and to discard those practical considerations to which inventions are of necessity referred. This is science properly so called; and how difficult it is to reach this stage, is evident from the fact, that all half-civilized nations have made many great inventions, but no great discoveries. The highest, however, of all the three stages, is the philosophy of method, which bears the same relation to science that science bears to art. Of its immense, and indeed supreme importance, the annals of knowledge supply abundant evidence; and for want of it, some very great men have effected absolutely nothing, consuming their lives in fruitless industry, not because their labour was slack, but because their method was sterile. The progress of every science is affected more by the scheme according to which it is cultivated, than by the actual ability of the cultivators themselves. If they who travel in an unknown country, spend their force in running on the wrong road, they will miss the point at which they aim, and perchance may faint and fall by the way. In that long and difficult journey after truth, which the human mind has yet to perform, and of which we in our generation can only see the distant prospect, it is certain that success will depend not on the speed with which men hasten in the path of inquiry, but rather on the skill with which that path is selected for them by those great and comprehensive thinkers, who are as the lawgivers and founders of knowledge; because they supply its deficiencies, not by investigating particular difficulties, but by establishing some large and sweeping innovation, which opens up a new vein of thought, and creates fresh resources, which it is left for their posterity to work out and apply.

It is from this point of view that we are to rate the value of Bichat, whose works, like those of all men of the highest eminence,—like those of Aristotle, Bacon, and Descartes,—mark an epoch in the history of the human mind; and as such, can only be fairly estimated by connecting them with the social and intellectual condition of the age in which they appeared. This gives an importance and a meaning to the writings of Bichat, of which few indeed are fully aware. The two greatest recent discoveries respecting the classification of animals are, as we have just seen, the result of his teaching; but his influence has produced other effects still more momentous. He, aided by Cabanis, rendered to physiology the incalculable service, of preventing it from participating in that melancholy reaction to which France was exposed early in the nineteenth century. This is too large a subject to discuss at present; but I may mention, that when Napoleon, not from feelings of conviction, but for selfish purposes of his own, attempted to restore the power of ecclesiastical principles, the men of letters, with disgraceful subserviency, fell into his view; and there began a marked decline in that independent and innovating spirit, with which during fifty years the French had cultivated the highest departments of knowledge. Hence that metaphysical school arose, which, though professing to hold aloof from theology, was intimately allied with it; and whose showy conceits form, in their ephemeral splendour, a striking contrast to the severer methods followed in the preceding generation.[1111] Against this movement, the French physiologists have, as a body, always protested; and it may be clearly proved that their opposition, which even the great abilities of Cuvier were unable to win over, is partly due to the impetus given by Bichat, in enforcing in his own pursuit the necessity of rejecting those assumptions by which metaphysicians and theologians seek to control every science. As an illustration of this I may mention two facts worthy of note. The first is, that in England, where during a considerable period the influence of Bichat was scarcely felt, many, even of our eminent physiologists, have shown a marked disposition to ally themselves with the reactionary party; and have not only opposed such novelties as they could not immediately explain, but have degraded their own noble science by making it a handmaid to serve the purposes of natural theology. The other fact is, that in France the disciples of Bichat have, with scarcely an exception, rejected the study of final causes, to which the school of Cuvier still adheres: while as a natural consequence, the followers of Bichat are associated in geology with the doctrine of uniformity; in zoology, with that of the transmutation of species; and in astronomy, with the nebular hypothesis: vast and magnificent schemes, under whose shelter the human mind seeks an escape from that dogma of interference, which the march of knowledge every where reduces, and the existence of which is incompatible with those conceptions of eternal order, towards which, during the last two centuries, we have been constantly tending.

These great phenomena, which the French intellect presents, and of which I have only sketched a rapid outline, will be related with suitable detail in the latter part of this work, when I shall examine the present condition of the European mind, and endeavour to estimate its future prospects. To complete, however, our appreciation of Bichat, it will be necessary to take notice of what some consider the most valuable of all his productions, in which he aimed at nothing less than an exhaustive generalization of the functions of life. It appears, indeed, to me, that in many important points Bichat here fell short; but the work itself still stands alone, and is so striking an instance of the genius of the author, that I will give a short account of its fundamental views.

Life considered as a whole has two distinct branches;[1112] one branch being characteristic of animals, the other of vegetables. That which is confined to animals is called animal life; that which is common both to animals and vegetables is called organic life. While, therefore, plants have only one life, man has two distinct lives, which are governed by entirely different laws, and which, though intimately connected, constantly oppose each other. In the organic life, man exists solely for himself; in the animal life he comes in contact with others. The functions of the first are purely internal, those of the second are external. His organic life is limited to the double process of creation and destruction: the creative process being that of assimilation, as digestion, circulation, and nutrition; the destructive process being that of excretion, such as exhalation and the like. This is what man has in common with plants; and of this life he, when in a natural state, is unconscious. But the characteristic of his animal life is consciousness, since by it he is made capable of moving, of feeling, of judging. By virtue of the first life he is merely a vegetable; by the addition of the second he becomes an animal.

If now we look at the organs by which in man the functions of these two lives are carried on, we shall be struck by the remarkable fact, that the organs of his vegetable life are very irregular, those of his animal life very symmetrical. His vegetative, or organic, life is conducted by the stomach, the intestines, and the glandular system in general, such as the liver and the pancreas; all of which are irregular, and admit of the greatest variety of form and development, without their functions being seriously disturbed. But in his animal life the organs are so essentially symmetrical, that a very slight departure from the ordinary type impairs their action.[1113] Not only the brain, but also the organs of sense, as the eyes, the nose, the ears, are perfectly symmetrical; and they as well as the other organs of animal life, as the feet and hands, are double, presenting on each side of the body two separate parts which correspond with each other, and produce a symmetry unknown to our vegetative life, the organs of which are, for the most part, merely single, as in the stomach, liver, pancreas, and spleen.[1114]

From this fundamental difference between the organs of the two lives, there have arisen several other differences of great interest. Our animal life being double, while our organic life is single, it becomes possible for the former life to take rest, that is, stop part of its functions for a time, and afterwards renew them. But in organic life, to stop is to die. The life, which we have in common with vegetables, never sleeps; and if its movements entirely cease only for a single instant, they cease for ever. That process by which our bodies receive some substances and give out others, admits of no interruption; it is, by its nature, incessant, because, being single, it can never receive supplementary aid. The other life we may refresh, not only in sleep, but even when we are awake. Thus we can exercise the organs of movement while we rest the organs of thought; and it is even possible to relieve a function while we continue to employ it, because, our animal life being double, we are able for a short time, in case of one of its parts being fatigued, to avail ourselves of the corresponding part; using, for instance, a single eye or a single arm, in order to rest the one which circumstances may have exhausted; an expedient which the single nature of organic life entirely prevents.[1115]

Our animal life being thus essentially intermittent, and our organic life being essentially continuous,[1116] it has necessarily followed that the first is capable of an improvement of which the second is incapable. There can be no improvement without comparison, since it is only by comparing one state with another that we can rectify previous errors, and avoid future ones. Now, our organic life does not admit of such comparison, because, being uninterrupted, it is not broken into stages, but when unchequered by disease, runs on in dull monotony. On the other hand, the functions of our animal life, such as thought, speech, sight, and motion, cannot be long exercised without rest; and as they are constantly suspended, it becomes practicable to compare them, and, therefore, to improve them. It is by possessing this resource that the first cry of the infant gradually rises into the perfect speech of the man, and the unformed habits of early thought are ripened into that maturity which nothing can give but a long series of successive efforts.[1117] But our organic life, which we have in common with vegetables, admits of no interruption, and consequently of no improvement. It obeys its own laws; but it derives no benefit from that repetition to which animal life is exclusively indebted. Its functions, such as nutrition and the like, exist in man several months before he is born, and while, his animal life not having yet begun, the faculty of comparison, which is the basis of improvement, is impossible.[1118] And although, as the human frame increases in size, its vegetative organs become larger, it cannot be supposed that their functions really improve, since, in ordinary cases, their duties are performed as regularly and as completely in childhood as in middle age.[1119]

Thus it is, that although other causes conspire, it may be said that the progressiveness of animal life is due to its intermittence; the unprogressiveness of organic life to its continuity. It may, moreover, be said, that the intermittence of the first life results from the symmetry of its organs, while the continuity of the second life results from their irregularity. To this wide and striking generalization, many objections may be made, some of them apparently insuperable; but that it contains the germs of great truths I entertain little doubt, and, at all events, it is certain that the method cannot be too highly praised, for it unites the study of function and structure with that of embryology, of vegetable physiology, of the theory of comparison, and of the influence of habit; a vast and magnificent field, which the genius of Bichat was able to cover, but of which, since him, neither physiologists nor metaphysicians have even attempted a general survey.

This stationary condition, during the present century, of a subject of such intense interest, is a decisive proof of the extraordinary genius of Bichat; since, notwithstanding the additions made to physiology, and to every branch of physics connected with it, nothing has been done at all comparable to that theory of life which he, with far inferior resources, was able to construct. This stupendous work he left, indeed, very imperfect; but even in its deficiencies we see the hand of the great master, whom, on his own subject, no one has yet approached. His essay on life may well be likened to those broken fragments of ancient art, which, imperfect as they are, still bear the impress of the inspiration which gave them birth, and present in each separate part that unity of conception which to us makes them a complete and living whole.

From the preceding summary of the progress of physical knowledge, the reader may form some idea of the ability of those eminent men who arose in France during the latter half of the eighteenth century. To complete the picture, it is only necessary to examine what was done in the two remaining branches of natural history, namely, botany and mineralogy, in both of which the first great steps towards raising each study to a science were taken by Frenchmen a few years before the Revolution.

In botany, although our knowledge of particular facts has, during the last hundred years, rapidly increased,[1120] we are only possessed of two generalizations wide enough to be called laws of nature. The first generalization concerns the structure of plants; the other concerns their physiology. That concerning their physiology is the beautiful morphological law, according to which the different appearance of the various organs arises from arrested development: the stamens, pistils, corolla, calyx, and bracts being simple modifications or successive stages of the leaf. This is one of many valuable discoveries we owe to Germany; it being made by GÖthe late in the eighteenth century.[1121] With its importance every botanist is familiar; while to the historian of the human mind it is peculiarly interesting, as strengthening that great doctrine of development, towards which the highest branches of knowledge are now hastening, and which, in the present century, has been also carried into one of the most difficult departments of animal physiology.[1122]

But the most comprehensive truth with which we are acquainted respecting plants, is that which includes the whole of their general structure; and this we learnt from those great Frenchmen who, in the latter half of the eighteenth century, began to study the external world. The first steps were taken directly after the middle of the century, by Adanson, Duhamel de Monceau, and, above all, Desfontaines; three eminent thinkers, who proved the practicability of a natural method hitherto unknown, and of which even Ray himself had only a faint perception.[1123] This, by weakening the influence of the artificial system of LinnÆus,[1124] prepared the way for an innovation more complete than has been effected in any other branch of knowledge. In the very year in which the Revolution occurred, Jussieu put forward a series of botanical generalizations, of which the most important are all intimately connected, and still remain the highest this department of inquiry has reached.[1125] Among these, I need only mention the three vast propositions which are now admitted to form the basis of vegetable anatomy. The first is, that the vegetable kingdom, in its whole extent, is composed of plants either with one cotyledon, or with two cotyledons, or else with no cotyledon at all. The second proposition is, that this classification, so far from being artificial, is strictly natural; since it is a law of nature, that plants having one cotyledon are endogenous, and grow by additions made to the centre of their stems, while, on the other hand, plants having two cotyledons are exogenous, and are compelled to grow by additions made, not to the centre of their stems, but to the circumference.[1126] The third proposition is, that when plants grow at their centre, the arrangement of the fruit and leaves is threefold; when, however, they grow at the circumference, it is nearly always fivefold.[1127]

This is what was effected by the Frenchmen of the eighteenth century for the vegetable kingdom:[1128] and if we now turn to the mineral kingdom, we shall find that our obligations to them are equally great. The study of minerals is the most imperfect of the three branches of natural history, because, notwithstanding its apparent simplicity, and the immense number of experiments which have been made, the true method of investigation has not yet been ascertained; it being doubtful whether mineralogy ought to be subordinated to the laws of chemistry, or to those of crystallography, or whether both sets of laws will have to be considered.[1129] At all events it is certain that, down to the present time, chemistry has shown itself unable to reduce mineralogical phenomena; nor has any chemist, possessing sufficient powers of generalization, attempted the task except Berzelius; and most of his conclusions were overthrown by the splendid discovery of isomorphism, for which, as is well known, we are indebted to Mitscherlich, one of the many great thinkers Germany has produced.[1130]

Although the chemical department of mineralogy is in an unformed and indeed anarchical condition, its other department, namely, crystallography, has made great progress; and here again the earliest steps were taken by two Frenchmen, who lived in the latter half of the eighteenth century. About 1760, RomÉ De Lisle[1131] set the first example of studying crystals, according to a scheme so large as to include all the varieties of their primary forms, and to account for their irregularities, and the apparent caprice with which they were arranged. In this investigation he was guided by the fundamental assumption, that what is called an irregularity, is in truth perfectly regular, and that the operations of nature are invariable.[1132] Scarcely had this great idea been applied to the almost innumerable forms into which minerals crystallize, when it was followed up with still larger resources by HaÜy, another eminent Frenchman.[1133] This remarkable man achieved a complete union between mineralogy and geometry; and, bringing the laws of space to bear on the molecular arrangements of matter, he was able to penetrate into the intimate structure of crystals.[1134] By this means, he succeeded in proving that the secondary forms of all crystals are derived from their primary forms by a regular process of decrement;[1135] and that, when a substance is passing from a liquid to a solid state, its particles are compelled to cohere, according to a scheme which provides for every possible change, since it includes even those subsequent layers which alter the ordinary type of the crystal, by disturbing its natural symmetry.[1136] To ascertain that such violations of symmetry are susceptible of mathematical calculation, was to make a vast addition to our knowledge; but what seems to me still more important is, that it indicates an approach to the magnificent idea, that every thing which occurs is regulated by law, and that confusion and disorder are impossible.[1137] For, by proving that even the most uncouth and singular forms of minerals are the natural results of their antecedents, HaÜy laid the foundation of what may be called the pathology of the inorganic world. However paradoxical such a notion may seem, it is certain that symmetry is to crystals what health is to animals; so that an irregularity of shape in the first, corresponds with an appearance of disease in the second.[1138] When, therefore, the minds of men became familiarized with the great truth, that in the mineral kingdom there is, properly speaking, no irregularity, it became more easy for them to grasp the still higher truth, that the same principle holds good of the animal kingdom, although, from the superior complexity of the phenomena, it will be long before we can arrive at an equal demonstration. But, that such a demonstration is possible, is the principle upon which the future progress of all organic, and indeed of all mental science, depends. And it is very observable, that the same generation which established the fact, that the apparent aberrations presented by minerals are strictly regular, also took the first steps towards establishing the far higher fact, that the aberrations of the human mind are governed by laws as unfailing as those which determine the condition of inert matter. The examination of this would lead to a digression foreign to my present design; but I may mention that, at the end of the century, there was written in France the celebrated treatise on insanity, by Pinel; a work remarkable in many respects, but chiefly in this, that in it the old notions respecting the mysterious and inscrutable character of mental disease are altogether discarded:[1139] the disease itself is considered as a phenomenon inevitably occurring under certain given conditions, and the foundation laid for supplying another link in that vast chain of evidence which connects the material with the immaterial, and thus uniting mind and matter into a single study, is now preparing the way for some generalization, which, being common to both, shall serve as a centre round which the disjointed fragments of our knowledge may safely rally.

These were the views which, during the latter half of the eighteenth century, began to dawn upon French thinkers. The extraordinary ability and success with which these eminent men cultivated their respective sciences, I have traced at a length greater that I had intended, but still very inadequate to the importance of the subject. Enough, however, has been brought forward, to convince the reader of the truth of the proposition I wished to prove; namely, that the intellect of France was, during the latter half of the eighteenth century, concentrated upon the external world with unprecedented zeal, and thus aided that vast movement, of which the Revolution itself was merely a single consequence. The intimate connexion between scientific progress and social rebellion, is evident from the fact, that both are suggested by the same yearning after improvement, the same dissatisfaction with what has been previously done, the same restless, prying, insubordinate, and audacious spirit. But in France this general analogy was strengthened by the curious circumstances I have already noticed, by virtue of which, the activity of the country was, during the first half of the century, directed against the church rather than against the state; so that in order to complete the antecedents of the Revolution, it was necessary that, in the latter half of the century, the ground of attack should be shifted. This is precisely what was done by the wonderful impetus given to every branch of natural science. For, the attention of men being thus steadily fixed upon the external world, the internal fell into neglect; while, as the external corresponds to the state, and the internal to the church, it was part of the same intellectual development, that the assailers of the existing fabric should turn against political abuses the energy which the preceding generation had reserved for religious ones.

Thus it was that the French Revolution, like every great revolution the world has yet seen, was preceded by a complete change in the habits and associations of the national intellect. But besides this, there was also taking place, precisely at the same time, a vast social movement, which was intimately connected with the intellectual movement, and indeed formed part of it, in so far as it was followed by similar results and produced by similar causes. The nature of this social revolution I shall examine only very briefly, because in a future volume it will be necessary to trace its history minutely, in order to illustrate the slighter but still remarkable changes which in the same period were going on in English society.

In France, before the Revolution, the people, though always very social, were also very exclusive. The upper classes, protected by an imaginary superiority, looked with scorn upon those whose birth or titles were unequal to their own. The class immediately below them copied and communicated their example, and every order in society endeavoured to find some fanciful distinction which should guard them from the contamination of their inferiors. The only three real sources of superiority,—the superiority of morals, of intellect, and of knowledge,—were entirely overlooked in this absurd scheme; and men became accustomed to pride themselves not on any essential difference, but on those inferior matters, which, with extremely few exceptions, are the result of accident, and therefore no test of merit.[1140]

The first great blow to this state of things, was the unprecedented impulse given to the cultivation of physical science. Those vast discoveries which were being made, not only stimulated the intellect of thinking men, but even roused the curiosity of the more thoughtless parts of society. The lectures of chemists, of geologists, of mineralogists, and of physiologists, were attended by those who came to wonder, as well as by those who came to learn. In Paris, the scientific assemblages were crowded to overflowing.[1141] The halls and amphitheatres in which the great truths of nature were expounded, were no longer able to hold their audience, and in several instances it was found necessary to enlarge them.[1142] The sittings of the Academy, instead of being confined to a few solitary scholars, were frequented by every one whose rank or influence enabled them to secure a place.[1143] Even women of fashion, forgetting their usual frivolity, hastened to hear discussions on the composition of a mineral, on the discovery of a new salt, on the structure of plants, on the organization of animals, on the properties of the electric fluid.[1144] A sudden craving after knowledge seemed to have smitten every rank. The largest and the most difficult inquiries found favour in the eyes of those whose fathers had hardly heard the names of the sciences to which they belonged. The brilliant imagination of Buffon made geology suddenly popular; the same thing was effected for chemistry by the eloquence of Fourcroy, and for electricity by Nollet; while the admirable expositions of Lalande caused astronomy itself to be generally cultivated. In a word, it is enough to say, that during the thirty years preceding the Revolution, the spread of physical science was so rapid, that in its favour the old classical studies were despised;[1145] it was considered the essential basis of a good education, and some slight acquaintance with it was deemed necessary for every class, except those who were obliged to support themselves by their daily labour.[1146]

The results produced by this remarkable change are very curious, and from their energy and rapidity were very decisive. As long as the different classes confined themselves to pursuits peculiar to their own sphere, they were encouraged to preserve their separate habits; and the subordination, or, as it were, the hierarchy, of society was easily maintained. But when the members of the various orders met in the same place with the same object, they became knit together by a new sympathy. The highest and most durable of all pleasures, the pleasure caused by the perception of fresh truths, was now a great link, which banded together those social elements that were formerly wrapped up in the pride of their own isolation. Besides this, there was also given to them not only a new pursuit, but also a new standard of merit. In the amphitheatre and the lecture-room, the first object of attention is the professor and the lecturer. The division is between those who teach and those who learn. The subordination of ranks makes way for the subordination of knowledge.[1147] The petty and conventional distinctions of fashionable life are succeeded by those large and genuine distinctions, by which alone man is really separated from man. The progress of the intellect supplies a new object of veneration; the old worship of rank is rudely disturbed, and its superstitious devotees are taught to bow the knee before what to them is the shrine of a strange god. The hall of science is the temple of democracy. Those who come to learn, confess their own ignorance, abrogate in some degree their own superiority, and begin to perceive that the greatness of men has no connexion with the splendour of their titles, or the dignity of their birth; that it is not concerned with their quarterings, their escutcheons, their descents, their dexter-chiefs, their sinister-chiefs, their chevrons, their bends, their azures, their gules, and the other trumperies of their heraldry; but that it depends upon the largeness of their minds, the powers of their intellect, and the fullness of their knowledge.

These were the views which, in the latter half of the eighteenth century, began to influence those classes which had long been the undisputed masters of society.[1148] And what shows the strength of this great movement is, that it was accompanied by other social changes, which, though in themselves apparently trifling, become full of meaning when taken in connexion with the general history of the time.

While the immense progress of physical knowledge was revolutionizing society, by inspiring the different classes with an object common to all, and thus raising a new standard of merit, a more trivial, but equally democratic tendency was observable even in the conventional forms of social life. To describe the whole of these changes would occupy a space disproportioned to the other parts of this Introduction; but it is certain that, until the changes have been carefully examined, it will be impossible for any one to write a history of the French Revolution. As a specimen of what I mean, I will notice two of these innovations which are very conspicuous, and are also interesting on account of their analogy with what has happened in English society.

The first of these changes was an alteration in dress, and a marked contempt for those external appearances hitherto valued as one of the most important of all matters. During the reign of Louis XIV., and indeed during the first half of the reign of Louis XV., not only men of frivolous tastes, but even those distinguished for their knowledge, displayed in their attire a dainty precision, a nice and studied adjustment, a pomp of gold, of silver, and of ruffles, such as in our days can nowhere be seen, except in the courts of European princes, where a certain barbarian splendour is still retained. So far was this carried, that in the seventeenth century the rank of a person might be immediately known by his appearance; no one presuming to usurp a garb worn by the class immediately above his own.[1149] But in that democratic movement which preceded the French Revolution, the minds of men became too earnest, too intent upon higher matters, to busy themselves with those idle devices which engrossed the attention of their fathers. A contemptuous disregard of such distinctions became general. In Paris the innovation was seen even in those gay assemblies, where a certain amount of personal decoration is still considered natural. At dinners, suppers, and balls, it is noticed by contemporary observers, that the dress usually worn was becoming so simple as to cause a confusion of ranks, until at length every distinction was abandoned by both sexes; the men, on such occasions, coming in a common frock-coat, the women in their ordinary morning gowns.[1150] Nay, to such a pitch was this carried, that we are assured by the Prince de Montbarey, who was in Paris at the time, that shortly before the Revolution, even those who had stars and orders were careful to hide them by buttoning their coats, so that these marks of superiority might no longer be seen.[1151]

The other innovation to which I have referred is equally interesting as characteristic of the spirit of the time. This is, that the tendency to amalgamate the different orders of society[1152] was shown in the institution of clubs; a remarkable contrivance, which to us seems perfectly natural because we are accustomed to it, but of which it may be truly said, that until the eighteenth century its existence was impossible. Before the eighteenth century, each class was so jealous of its superiority over the one below it, that to meet together on equal terms was impracticable; and although a certain patronizing familiarity towards one's inferiors might be safely indulged in, this only marked the immense interval of separation, since the great man had no fear of his condescension being abused. In those good old times a proper respect was paid to rank and birth; and he who could count his twenty ancestors was venerated to an extent of which we, in these degenerate days, can hardly form an idea. As to any thing like social equality, that was a notion too preposterous to be conceived; nor was it possible that any institution should exist which placed mere ordinary men on a level with those illustrious characters, whose veins were filled with the purest blood, and the quarterings of whose arms none could hope to rival.

But in the eighteenth century the progress of knowledge became so remarkable, that the new principle of intellectual superiority made rapid encroachments on the old principle of aristocratic superiority. As soon as these encroachments had reached a certain point, they gave rise to an institution suited to them; and thus it was that there were first established clubs, in which all the educated classes could assemble, without regard to those other differences which, in the preceding period, kept them separate. The peculiarity of this was, that, for mere purposes of social enjoyment, men were brought into contact, who, according to the aristocratic scheme, had nothing in common, but who were now placed on the same footing in so far as they belonged to the same establishment, conformed to the same rules, and reaped the same advantages. It was, however, expected that the members, though varying in many other respects, were to be all, in some degree, educated; and in this way society first distinctly recognized a classification previously unknown; the division between noble and ignoble being succeeded by another division between educated and uneducated.

The rise and growth of clubs is, therefore, to the philosophic observer, a question of immense importance; and it is one which, as I shall hereafter prove, played a great part in the history of England during the latter half of the eighteenth century. In reference to our present subject, it is interesting to observe, that the first clubs, in the modern sense of the word, which ever existed in Paris, were formed about 1782, only seven years before the French Revolution. At the beginning they were merely intended to be social assemblages; but they quickly assumed a democratic character, conformable to the spirit of the age. Their first result, as was noticed by a keen observer of what was then passing, was to make the manners of the upper classes more simple than they had hitherto been, and to weaken that love of form and ceremony suitable to their earlier habits. These clubs likewise effected a remarkable separation between the sexes; and it is recorded, that after their establishment, women associated more with each other, and were oftener seen in public unaccompanied by men.[1153] This had the effect of encouraging among men a republican roughness, which the influence of the other sex would have tended to keep down. All these things effaced the old lines of demarcation between the different ranks, and by merging the various classes into one, made the force of their united opposition irresistible, and speedily overthrew both the church and the state. The exact period at which the clubs became political cannot, of course, be ascertained, but the change seems to have taken place about 1784.[1154] From this moment all was over; and although the government, in 1787, issued orders to close the leading club, in which all classes discussed political questions, it was found impossible to stem the current. The order, therefore, was rescinded; the club re-assembled, and no further attempt was made to interrupt that course of affairs which a long train of preceding events had rendered inevitable.[1155]

While all these things were conspiring to overthrow the old institutions, an event suddenly occurred which produced the most remarkable effects in France, and is itself strikingly characteristic of the spirit of the eighteenth century. On the other side of the Atlantic, a great people, provoked by the intolerable injustice of the English government, rose in arms, turned on their oppressors, and, after a desperate struggle, gloriously obtained their independence. In 1776, the Americans laid before Europe that noble Declaration, which ought to be hung up in the nursery of every king, and blazoned on the porch of every royal palace. In words, the memory of which can never die, they declared, that the object of the institution of government is to secure the rights of the people; that from the people alone it derives its powers; and ‘that whenever any form of government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the right of the people to alter or abolish it, and to institute a new government, laying its foundations on such principles, and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their safety and happiness.’[1156]

If this declaration had been made only one generation earlier, the whole of France, with the exception of a few advanced thinkers, would have rejected it with horror and with scorn. Such, however, was now the temper of the public mind, that the doctrines it contained were not merely welcomed by a majority of the French nation, but even the government itself was unable to withstand the general feeling.[1157] In 1776, Franklin arrived in France, as envoy from the American people. He met with the warmest reception from all classes,[1158] and succeeded in inducing the government to sign a treaty, engaging to defend the young republic in the rights it had gloriously won.[1159] In Paris, the enthusiasm was irresistible.[1160] From every quarter large bodies of men came forward, volunteering to cross the Atlantic and to fight for the liberties of America. The heroism with which these auxiliaries aided the noble struggle, forms a cheering passage in the history of that time; but is foreign to my present purpose, which is merely to notice its effect in hastening the approach of the French Revolution. And this effect was indeed most remarkable. Besides the indirect result produced by the example of a successful rebellion, the French were still further stimulated by actual contact with their new allies. The French officers and soldiers who served in America, introduced into their own country, on their return, those democratic opinions which they had imbibed in the infant republic.[1161] By this means, fresh strength was given to the revolutionary tendencies already prevalent; and it is worthy of remark, that Lafayette borrowed from the same source one of his most celebrated acts. He drew his sword on behalf of the Americans; and they, in their turn, communicated to him that famous doctrine respecting the rights of man, which, at his instigation, was formally adopted by the National Assembly.[1162] Indeed, there is reason to believe, that the final blow the French government received was actually dealt by the hand of an American; for it is said that it was in consequence of the advice of Jefferson, that the popular part of the legislative body proclaimed itself the National Assembly, and thus set the crown at open defiance.[1163]

I have now brought to a close my examination of the causes of the French Revolution; but before concluding the present chapter, it appears to me that the variety of topics which have been discussed, makes it advisable that I should sum up their leading points; and should state, as briefly as possible, the steps of that long and complicated argument, by which I have attempted to prove, that the Revolution was an event inevitably arising out of preceding circumstances. Such a summary, by recalling the entire subject before the reader, will remedy any confusion which the fullness of detail may have produced, and will simplify an investigation which many will consider to have been needlessly protracted; but which could not have been abridged without weakening, in some essential part, the support of those general principles that I seek to establish.

Looking at the state of France immediately after the death of Louis XIV., we have seen that, his policy having reduced the country to the brink of ruin, and having destroyed every vestige of free inquiry, a reaction became necessary; but that the materials for the reaction could not be found among a nation, which for fifty years had been exposed to so debilitating a system. This deficiency at home, caused the most eminent Frenchmen to turn their attention abroad, and gave rise to a sudden admiration for the English literature, and for those habits of thought which were then peculiar to the English people. New life being thus breathed into the wasted frame of French society, an eager and inquisitive spirit was generated, such as had not been seen since the time of Descartes. The upper classes, taking offence at this unexpected movement, attempted to stifle it, and made strenuous efforts to destroy that love of inquiry which was daily gaining ground. To effect their object, they persecuted literary men with such bitterness, as to make it evident that the intellect of France must either relapse into its former servility, or else boldly assume the offensive. Happily for the interests of civilization, the latter alternative was adopted; and, in or about 1750, a deadly struggle began, in which those principles of liberty which France borrowed from England, and which had hitherto been supposed only applicable to the church, were for the first time applied to the state. Coinciding with this movement, and indeed forming part of it, other circumstances occurred of the same character. Now it was that the political economists succeeded in proving that the interference of the governing classes had inflicted great mischief even upon the material interests of the country; and had, by their protective measures, injured what they were believed to have benefited. This remarkable discovery in favour of general freedom, put a fresh weapon into the hands of the democratic party; whose strength was still further increased by the unrivalled eloquence with which Rousseau assailed the existing fabric. Precisely the same tendency was exhibited in the extraordinary impulse given to every branch of physical science, which familiarized men with ideas of progress, and brought them into collision with the stationary and conservative ideas natural to government. The discoveries made respecting the external world, encouraged a restlessness and excitement of mind hostile to the spirit of routine, and therefore full of danger for institutions only recommended by their antiquity. This eagerness for physical knowledge also effected a change in education; and the ancient languages being neglected, another link was severed which connected the present with the past. The church, the legitimate protector of old opinions, was unable to resist the passion for novelty, because she was weakened by treason in her own camp. For by this time, Calvinism had spread so much among the French clergy, as to break them into two hostile parties, and render it impossible to rally them against their common foe. The growth of this heresy was also important, because Calvinism being essentially democratic, a revolutionary spirit appeared even in the ecclesiastical profession, so that the feud in the church was accompanied by another feud between the government and the church. These were the leading symptoms of that vast movement which culminated in the French Revolution; and all of them indicated a state of society so anarchical and so thoroughly disorganized, as to make it certain that some great catastrophe was impending. At length, and when everything was ready for explosion, the news of the American Rebellion fell like a spark on the inflammatory mass, and ignited a flame which never ceased its ravages until it had destroyed all that Frenchmen once held dear, and had left for the instruction of mankind an awful lesson of the crimes into which continued oppression may hurry a generous and long-suffering people.

Such is a rapid outline of the view which my studies have led me to take of the causes of the French Revolution. That I have ascertained all the causes, I do not for a moment suppose; but it will, I believe, be found that none of importance have been omitted. It is, indeed, true, that among the materials of which the evidence consists, many deficiencies will be seen; and a more protracted labour would have been rewarded by a greater success. Of these shortcomings I am deeply sensible; and I can only regret that the necessity of passing on to a still larger field has compelled me to leave so much for future inquirers to gather in. At the same time, it ought to be remembered, that this is the first attempt which has ever been made to study the antecedents of the French Revolution according to a scheme wide enough to include the whole of their intellectual bearings. In defiance of sound philosophy, and, I may say, in defiance of common understanding, historians obstinately persist in neglecting those great branches of physical knowledge, in which in every civilized country the operations of the human mind may be most clearly seen, and therefore the mental habits most easily ascertained. The result is, that the French Revolution, unquestionably the most important, the most complicated, and the most glorious event in history, has been given over to authors, many of whom have displayed considerable ability, but all of whom have shown themselves destitute of that preliminary scientific education, in the absence of which it is impossible to seize the spirit of any period, or to take a comprehensive survey of its various parts. Thus, to mention only a single instance: we have seen that the extraordinary impulse given to the study of the external world was intimately connected with that democratic movement which overthrew the institutions of France. But this connexion historians have been unable to trace; because they were unacquainted with the progress of the various branches of natural philosophy and of natural history. Hence it is that they have exhibited their great subject maimed and mutilated, shorn of those fair proportions which it ought to possess. According to this scheme, the historian sinks into the annalist; so that, instead of solving a problem, he merely paints a picture. Without, therefore, disparaging the labours of those industrious men who have collected materials for a history of the French Revolution, we may assuredly say, that the history itself has never been written; since they who have attempted the task have not possessed such resources as would enable them to consider it as merely a single part of that far larger movement which was seen in every department of science, of philosophy, of religion, and of politics.

Whether or not I have effected anything of real value towards remedying this deficiency, is a question for competent judges to decide. Of this, at least, I feel certain, that whatever imperfections may be observed, the fault consists, not in the method proposed, but in the extreme difficulty of any single man putting into full operation all the parts of so vast a scheme. It is on this point, and on this alone, that I feel the need of great indulgence. But, as to the plan itself, I have no misgivings; because I am deeply convinced that the time is fast approaching when the history of Man will be placed on its proper footing; when its study will be recognized as the noblest and most arduous of all pursuits; and when it will be clearly seen, that, to cultivate it with success, there is wanted a wide and comprehensive mind, richly furnished with the highest branches of human knowledge. When this is fully admitted, history will be written only by those whose habits fit them for the task; and it will be rescued from the hands of biographers, genealogists, collectors of anecdotes, chroniclers of courts, of princes, and of nobles,—those babblers of vain things, who lie in wait at every corner, and infest this the public highway of our national literature. That such compilers should trespass on a province so far above their own, and should think that by these means they can throw light on the affairs of men, is one of many proofs of the still backward condition of our knowledge, and of the indistinctness with which its boundaries have been mapped out. If I have done anything towards bringing these intrusions into discredit, and inspiring historians themselves with a sense of the dignity of their own calling, I shall have rendered in my time some little service, and I shall be well content to have it said, that in many cases I have failed in executing what I originally proposed. Indeed, that there are in this volume several instances of such failure, I willingly allow; and I can only plead the immensity of the subject, the shortness of a single life, and the imperfection of every single enterprise. I, therefore, wish this work to be estimated, not according to the finish of its separate parts, but according to the way in which those parts have been fused into a complete and symmetrical whole. This, in an undertaking of such novelty and magnitude, I have a right to expect. And I would, moreover, add, that if the reader has met with opinions adverse to his own, he should remember that his views are, perchance, the same as those which I too once held, and which I have abandoned, because, after a wider range of study, I found them unsupported by solid proof, subversive of the interests of Man, and fatal to the progress of his knowledge. To examine the notions in which we have been educated, and to turn aside from those which will not bear the test, is a task so painful, that they who shrink from the suffering should pause before they reproach those by whom the suffering is undergone. What I have put forward may, no doubt, be erroneous; but it is, at all events, the result of an honest searching after truth, of unsparing labour, of patient and anxious reflection. Conclusions arrived at in this way, are not to be overturned by stating that they endanger some other conclusions; nor can they be even affected by allegations against their supposed tendency. The principles which I advocate, are based upon distinct arguments, supported by well-ascertained facts. The only points, therefore, to be ascertained, are, whether the arguments are fair, and whether the facts are certain. If these two conditions have been obeyed, the principles follow by an inevitable inference. Their demonstration is, in the present volume, necessarily incomplete; and the reader must suspend his final judgment until the close of this Introduction, when the subject in all its bearings will be laid before him. The remaining part of the Introduction will be occupied, as I have already intimated, with an investigation of the civilizations of Germany, America, Scotland, and Spain; each of which presents a different type of intellectual development, and has, therefore, followed a different direction in its religious, scientific, social, and political history. The causes of these differences I shall attempt to ascertain. The next step will be to generalize the causes themselves; and having thus referred them to certain principles common to all, we shall be possessed of what may be called the fundamental laws of European thought; the divergence of the different countries being regulated either by the direction those laws take, or else by their comparative energy. To discover these fundamental laws will be the business of the Introduction; while, in the body of the work, I shall apply them to the history of England, and endeavour by their aid to work out the epochs through which we have successively passed, fix the basis of our present civilization, and indicate the path of our future progress.

Footnotes: