Cleveland Row, Feb. 2nd, 1798.
My dearest Brother,

I saw yesterday in Pitt's hands your letter to him. The sacrifice you make is certainly very great, and such as I could not have thought myself at liberty to advise, though I am glad on the whole that your determination is such as it is; not that I am very much attached (but quite the contrary) to the idea of raising public supplies by voluntary contributions, and still less by contributions soi-disant voluntary, but in reality extorted by popular clamour and prejudice. But after that business has been carried as far as it has, it would have been too invidious for you to have put yourself in a breach which I think ought never to have been made. I am much concerned at what you say in your letter to Pitt respecting the personal inconvenience to which this step will subject you, and particularly as to the idea of your doing anything that can look like an avowed intention of suspending your residence at Stowe. It seems to me that nothing is more natural than that this state of things should lead to reduction of your establishments; and I believe in so doing you will only follow a very general example, though I appear to be selected as a much more striking instance of it than I have yet been able, with my best endeavours, to make myself. It will also be very easy for you, quartered in Essex, to be as much or as little as you please at Stowe in the course of the year; but any avowal of quitting that residence would, I think, do you a needless injury.

You will receive in a day or two the circular letter for calling out the supplementary Militia, with the explanation of the manner in which this is intended to be executed, so as to make it a muster of the whole, but an embodying only of a part.

War with America and Portugal seems quite determined on at Paris; nor do I see how Denmark can keep herself out of the scrape, though she will most certainly do her best. The general opinion is that Mulin has established his superiority over Barras and Buonaparte. There can be no doubt of the intention to invade us here or in Ireland, or both.

The capture of the packet leaves us still without official or direct accounts from the West Indies, but all the accounts we get are favourable.

I enclose you, in confidence, a paper, which I think will be interesting to you. You will be so good as not to have seen it, and to return it to me. It is of course to be kept under lock and key. It is unpublished, and meant to remain so.

Ever most affectionately yours,
G.

Charles Street, April 27th, 1798.
My dearest Brother,

It is only from your letter to William that I have learnt what is the actual state of the discussion which you had begun upon the subject of the flank companies of the Militia, and very sorry I am to find that it is likely to take any shape which can be unpleasant or disagreeable to you. The measure itself is one which I have understood to be one of the few measures upon which, in point of necessary military preparation, all our officers are agreed, and which, if I recollect right, you yourself are as strongly inclined to as anybody, though not precisely in the mode recommended by the Commander-in-chief; if the objections which you felt on the point of Militia establishment had been equally felt and adopted by the generality of the commanding officers of Militia, some way or other must, I suppose, have been found to accommodate the difficulties of such a representation; but in the present instance (as far as I could collect from Fortescue, who was at a pretty numerous meeting of all the Militia commanders who were in town), there was not any one of those who did not express their readiness to adopt this plan, and their approbation of it; so that, in fact, this matter, so far from being taken up by the generality of commanding officers in the same light in which you had objected to it, has really the sanction of every commanding officer, except, as I am told, Lord Berkeley, Lord Carnarvon and yourself.

Under these circumstances, much as I regret that any arrangement could be proposed and could be likely to be carried, which is so disagreeable to you, you will, however, I am sure, agree with me that it stands upon very different ground, when it stands upon the ground of individual opinions, from what it would have done if it had been taken up by the whole or the majority or a large part of the Militia. My best hopes are that some mode may yet be found which may place your own regiment in the shape that you had wished; and William has, I know, taken all the pains he can to urge the adoption of all or of any of the modifications of this order, which may make it less objectionable to you; and I cannot therefore but hope that his zeal and anxiety in this will carry it to a better shape for you as far as you are immediately interested. But we live in times of such pressing public duty, and the military post to which you are called and in which you are placed, is one so forward both in danger and in honourable distinction to you, that I should not do my duty by you if I did not (however uncalled upon for that opinion) add that, in my poor judgment, no state of military arrangements or orders can for a moment admit of the possibility of your giving up your command in an hour of danger, as immediate as that in which I write. I know you will give me credit for the honesty of this opinion, as well as for the affection which calls it forth from me.

God bless you, my dearest brother.
Ever most affectionately yours,
T. G.

Cleveland Row, April 27th, 1798.
My dearest Brother,

On receiving your letter to Pitt, I sent it to him, and have since seen him and Dundas. I understand from them that you have been misinformed about the idea of their intending to bring in any new Bill on the subject of forming the flank companies of Militia into light infantry battalions, as the opinion both of the Attorney and Solicitor-General is quite clear on the interpretation of the present law. With respect to the measure itself, I must say that as far as I understand it, my opinion is and always has been clearly for it. But what is much more important is, that the Duke of York, all the Generals of districts and Lord Cornwallis, the only military Cabinet Minister, all put the salvation of the country upon it. In this situation I do not think that Pitt, or Dundas, or any of us, could take upon ourselves the responsibility of omitting a measure, stated to be clearly within the law, and in which so large a proportion of the Militia officers are disposed to acquiesce with cordiality and cheerfulness.

Nothing certainly can be further from their wishes, even as public men only, than to place you in any unpleasant or difficult situation; but you will not think this a moment when points of real importance can be given up to personal considerations of regard and good-will.

It has occurred, that adopting the measure generally, the application of it to your particular regiment might be avoided, by permitting you to form a separate light infantry battalion, under the command of Fremantle, he being an army officer, and one whom the Duke of York himself allows to be as fit for that purpose as any he could select; and that this permission may, under certain circumstances and conditions, be extended to other colonels desirous of taking that mode preferably to the other.

But this is not without its difficulty, nor is it possible for any man, beforehand, to engage for the Duke of York's consent to a measure, on which he has so much right not only to have voix au chapitre but to have a voice nearly decisive, so long as his regulations do not interfere with the law. All, therefore, that I can say is, that I am persuaded Dundas will do whatever he can to promote this arrangement, the only solution that I see to difficulties, one side of which, in the alternative stated by you, present consequences to which I am very sure, whatever else happens, you will never bring yourself to look. If I had the least doubt upon that point, I certainly could and should say much of the time, of the situation of the country, of the local position of your regiment in its present quarters, and of the possibility of any man, under such circumstances, resigning a command because he disapproves in his own judgment, even supposing him right in that judgment, of a military order which the Commander-in-chief has clearly a right to give, and for the omission, as well as the giving of which, he and the Government are exclusively responsible.

I know nothing more of the supplementary Militia than that they are to be immediately called out.

Dropmore, May 1st, 1798.
My dearest Brother,

I got your letter here last night. I should not have gone out of town even for one day, if I had not understood from Dundas that the Duke of York, though quite determined against adopting the substitution you propose, seemed to think that in order to avoid putting you under difficulties of any sort, he could forbear to make the demand on your regiment.

I do not say that I like this expedient, but I see no other without his abandoning a measure which, for one, I should be very sorry to see abandoned, believing, as I do, that things of much more importance than the matter of any legal question of a Militia Act, depend upon it. I really believe that you are not accurately informed when you speak of the wishes of the Militia in general being against this measure. But on this point you have certainly better means of knowing individual opinions than I can have. On the legal point, the opinion of the King's law servants must of course be the only guide for a Commander-in-chief, even if he were not a Prince of the blood, but much more when he is so, and consequently not supposed to enter into discussions of that sort, or to be responsible for them.

I grieve that in these times you should set the example of raising these questions; but I am confident you would not do so if you did not think it right. I own I should have thought that any idea of disobeying, as a Militia officer, a command of the Commander-in-chief, was out of the question in the present moment, and that if the case (I had almost said) which you yourself put, had occurred, that of being ordered to embark on board Lord Bridport's fleet, you would have done so, with a protest of ne trahatur in exemplum.

Dundas will, as I understand from him, explain to you what he considers to be the case about your letter, which he states to me to have been an official letter addressed, I think, to P. W. Howe or his Adjutant-General, and which therefore he did not consider in any other light than as an accurate statement of the doubt given in officially and meant to be so considered. But all this is of very little consequence in comparison of that of the light in which the thing itself places you, if it were possible that you could adopt the resolution you speak of.

I take it for granted that Dundas's Bill is meant only to extend to British subjects, or may easily be so limited. As such, it is surely highly advantageous in the present moment to have the services of the men who, of all British officers, have seen the most real service.

I do not think that the Vienna news at all lessens the expediency of calling out the remaining third of the Militia. It is highly probable that the French, seeing that they cannot hope to contend again with England and Austria joined together, may determine to accelerate their attack on us, and put the whole on that one desperate issue.

Ever, my dearest brother,
Most affectionately yours,
G.

Cleveland Row, May 25th, 1798.
My dearest Brother,

Accounts of a very satisfactory nature have been received here this morning from Dublin. They were upon the very brink of an insurrection, which was to have taken place on the 22nd. They had intelligence of it, and by the arrest of Lord Edward Fitzgerald and the two Sheares's, who were at the head of the plot, they have not only disconcerted this plan, but have procured indisputable evidence for proceeding against these traitors, and have now, I trust, the certainty of convicting them. A special Commission is preparing for the purpose of bringing them to trial as speedily as possible, but it will require about a month before all the forms can be got through. We are sending back O'Connor to them, and it is probable that his trial may be included in the same Commission.

They write on the 21st, in the best possible spirits, from the Castle. The attack was intended against Chapelizod, the magazine in the Phoenix, and the Castle, at the same time; and in order to increase the confusion, the houses of some of the leading people were also to have been attacked, and the individuals, at the head of whom of course was the Chancellor, were to be put to death. The camp near Dublin was also to be assaulted.

In the desk of one of the Sheares's was found the proclamation ready drawn, which was to be issued for the establishment of the Republican Government.

A letter was written on the 21st, to the Lord Mayor of Dublin, by Lord Castlereagh, to acquaint him with this design, and to order him to make search for arms, &c., and a message was to be sent to Parliament the 21st or 22nd. They are not quite sure that the idea of the insurrection was abandoned, even after this blow-up; but they were so completely on their guard, that there was nothing to be apprehended.

You will have seen that Lord E. F. made a desperate resistance when he was taken. It is, however, supposed that Ryan will recover, though stabbed in the belly. They had already taken about two thousand pikes in Dublin alone, and great numbers in the adjacent counties. On the whole, I trust that with vigorous measures, such as every one will feel this crisis requires, the seeds of the rebellion will be crushed.

I think there are full grounds to proceed against Lord Thanet and Co. for a conspiracy to rescue, as well as for the riot. O'Connor's acquittal is imputed to Miller's charge, and that to his being completely exhausted, so as to omit some of the most material points in the evidence.

Ever most affectionately yours,
G.

Cleveland Row, June 1st, 1798.
My dearest Brother,

I did not answer your letter earlier, because I waited to know the opinion of others on the subject of the proposal which you mention. I find that there is a very strong apprehension of creating by it dissatisfaction among the Militia, and of impeding the future raising and augmentation of that force. For it is reasoned thus: although in the present moment the public spirit is so high that it is probable a very large part would readily concur in a similar proposition, yet there would certainly be many individuals, and perhaps some bodies among them, who would be reluctant to alter their original terms of service. These persons would hardly be placed in a fair situation, because although the option would still nominally be left to them; yet that would be attended with so much odium, and would so much carry the appearance of backwardness, that any persons in such a time as this, and particularly persons engaged in military service, would naturally be very unwilling to expose themselves to it. By this means, all security and confidence in the original terms of enlistment would be lost, and both officers and men, deliberating about entering into the Militia, would do it with the idea that they might continually be called upon to serve out of the kingdom, which would destroy the whole Militia system.

Besides this, another objection strikes me, which I think perhaps even stronger than the preceding. It is that of the loss of security to this country, both in point of fact and opinion, from rendering that force applicable otherwise than to the immediate protection of Great Britain. I hope that in all cases we should have done our best, according to such judgment as we could form at the time: but I will fairly own to you that I do not myself believe that England would have been now as secure as I trust it is, if we had possessed the power of disposing of the Militia regiments for Channel or Irish service, and much less if that power had also been extended to the continent in general.

A third argument I think of little weight, but I know from what I have heard in general conversation on the subject, that it would make considerable impression among a particular class of men. The Militia is now raised by a sort of direct burthen on the landed interest, who are reconciled to it from the apparent and visible protection which their property derives from it. Whereas, if it was applied to purposes of more general, though possibly greater, public advantage, that would be called unfair upon the counties, as the term now is, and we should infallibly have proposals for throwing the whole burthen, in all its various shapes, more equally on the general mass of property within the kingdom.

For all these reasons, tempting as it would be in the present state of the war, to avail ourselves of the service of that which constitutes the greatest part of our regular force for the purpose of those operations, with the necessity of which we are thoroughly impressed, yet I really do not think, nor is it thought by others, that we can prudently attempt it.

A more limited idea has occurred to me, in which I think your zeal might be useful in the way of example. It is this. In any case of invasion (which is by no means to be put out of the question, however the public love to flatter themselves about it) I think it is evident that there might, and probably would be, much boat service. It is by no means impossible that, even in the very act of landing, they might have to be opposed by gun-boats, et id genus omne, and that troops would be wanted for that service. If landed, and having taken Dumourier's "position on the coast" to wait for reinforcements and provisions, perhaps the General who commands our force in that quarter may wish to attack them from the sea, without waiting for the certain arm of starvation which would be hanging over them. The same principle applies to the defence of our tide rivers, harbours, &c. Now, for all this, I should think it would be highly useful that our troops should in some degree be trained to this boat work, and though perhaps an inland regiment of Militia might not be thought the best to begin with, yet by suggesting this idea to Sir W. Howe, and expressing your readiness and that of your regiment to lend yourselves to it, an example might be set to others and a very useful practice introduced.

I wrote this early in the morning and before the arrival of the post, so that I do not know whether there will be any accounts from Dublin. If there are, I will add them before I close this letter. Those of yesterday were, as I understood from the Duke of P. and King, perfectly good, but I did not see them. The only thing that appears at all distressing is that the communication with the south was still interrupted, and although this may arise from the disturbed state of any one point through which the roads pass, yet it is productive of uneasiness, and may afford opportunities for spreading alarms in the south, the consequences of which might be very serious. No disturbance had shown itself in the north.

Buonaparte is gone to Toulon instead of Rastadt, and it is now publicly declared at Paris that his object is Cadiz, Portugal, or Ireland. If we are not more than commonly unfortunate, il trouvera À qui parler en chemin.

I do not think Pitt could avoid answering Fremy's call, and as it has turned out it is certainly better as it is. One shudders to think what might have happened.

Ever most affectionately yours,
G.

I do not enclose the "Gazette," because I conclude you have it. There was nothing else of any importance from Ireland last night, and nothing at all this morning.

Aylesbury, June 11th, 1798.
My dearest Brother,

By a letter from Cleveland Row which I have this moment received, I find the Irish storm, which I told you I had seen gathering, is likely to fall as I had expected it. It is settled that Lord Cornwallis is to go Lord-Lieutenant, and in case of Pelham's declining on account of his health, I see I shall be urged in the strongest manner possible to fill his situation there. I have already talked this matter so much over with you, and you know so entirely, both my utter aversion to it, and my reluctance to decline any personal risk or inconvenience in these critical times, that I cannot on either side add anything upon this subject; but upon a matter of so much anxiety and importance to me, a matter too of which you are in every respect qualified to give me so good an opinion, you will not be surprised at the solicitude which I express to know all that you may think about it. Perhaps it may not come in question, if Pelham is strong again and in health, but if it does, as very possibly it may, I cannot enough say how desirous I shall be to discuss the whole matter with you; and as time may press in the instant of its being proposed, I know that you will readily turn this in your mind in the present moment. I shall be in town on Thursday, which being a fair day here, ends our eight days' exercise; it has passed very prosperously, they do extremely well, and have been from seventy to eighty out, and working every day seven or eight hours. We go on to beat the rebels in Ireland, but we beat them into soldiers.

God bless you, dearest brother.

Cleveland Row, June 13th, 1798.
My dearest Brother,

I do not hear of any Irish news this morning; if there is any, I will add it before I close this letter. I entirely agree with you in thinking the situation of Irish Secretary to be in rank and estimation much below Tom's calibre. In point of real utility and scope for displaying the powers of his mind, God knows it is difficult, extensive, and important enough for the talents of the greatest man this country ever saw. It is, however, as you will have learnt by my note of yesterday, out of the question; and Pelham's rank is too much on a level with his, to admit of the idea of interposing Tom or Lord D. between Lord C. and him.

When I wrote yesterday, I had not seen Nugent's letter, nor indeed heard much of the particulars, as you will have seen from my letter. I think nothing can be better than Nugent's conduct seems to have been, and his letter is extremely manly, distinct and judicious. But what a picture does it offer of our officers! I believe I do not know this Lumley; but I do not, as far as I have known them, think that there is one of the race fit to be trusted with the command of a patrole of watchmen, from Lord Scarborough downwards. Walpole I had long known, and certainly I should have said the same of him. What a calamity it is, that our army has not yet been taught that the command of troops in moments of difficulty and danger requires skill and knowledge, and is not a faculty bought with a commission at the regulated price.

Je vois trÈs en noir about this Irish business; but with me that feeling never has, I trust, operated otherwise than as an incitement to greater exertion, "to bate no jot of heart, or hope, but still bear up, and steer right onward." We have gone through such scenes as this country has never before known; where we have been wanting in firmness, we have suffered for it; where we have shown courage adequate to the danger, God has borne us through it; and so I trust He will do. At all events, our lives, and honour, and the existence of our country, are staked upon the issue, and nothing but resolution can save us.

I saw with the greatest pleasure the address of your regiment. I am happy it has taken that shape, because I think it the least exceptionable, and still am inclined to the measure. If it depended on my choice alone, I do not think many hours would pass over before you would be in march.

It really looks as if Buonaparte was after all in sober truth going to Egypt: and Dundas seems to think the scheme of attacking India from thence not so impracticable as it may appear. I am still incredulous as to the latter point, though as to the former I am shaken. But as Buonaparte on the 23rd was still off Toulon, and as Lord St. Vincent must have detached on the 21st at latest, there is much reason to hope that Nelson may destroy all these visions, be they what they may. From the coasts of Normandy and Brittany the troops are in great part withdrawn—they do the Germans too much honour!

Ever yours,
G.

Cleveland Row, June 28th, 1798.
My dearest Brother,

I this morning received your letter from Liverpool. I rejoice to think that the Wexford news will probably make your stay at Dublin of no long continuance, and much as I regret the present inconvenience to yourself, yet I will own that it is gratifying to me that this news did not arrive time enough to stop your embarkation. I consider it as very important on many accounts that some of the British Militia regiments should actually arrive in Ireland, and I would not willingly forego the pride of knowing that your regiment was the first of them. We have no news here of any kind; indeed Ireland has engaged the whole attention of everybody here, and left us no leisure to think of anything else except to cast now and then a longing wish to the Mediterranean. We have, as you will have heard from my brother, accounts of Nelson's being actually in the Mediterranean, and such particulars as seem to leave no doubt of his having been joined by the ten of the line and the fifty under Trowbridge. I am more and more convinced that Buonaparte's intention was only to proceed to Corsica and to wait there the event of the negotiations, hanging upon the rear of Naples and Tuscany, but without any other present object, and then to be determined by circumstances as to the future destination of his fleet, for Portugal, Great Britain, Ireland, or the West Indies. If we have tolerable luck, Nelson will disappoint all these plans.

When you see Lord Clare, pray tell him that in consequence of his having been spoken of by the Duke of Bedford and Lord Holland last night in a manner extremely galling to my feelings, I took the opportunity to express the sentiments which I believe he knows I entertain of his character and conduct. This passed with the doors of the House shut, so that he will not see any account of it in the papers. He will not suppose that I claim any thanks for a bare act of duty and justice, nor should I have wished it to be mentioned to him from me, if I had not thought it just possible that he might hear of the attack, in which case I should have felt much concern if he had not at the same time known that it had been treated with as much indignation and scorn as it merited.

The business of Williams is arranged to your wishes. I shall be anxious to hear of your son after his arrival at Dublin, for I did not think the account of his leg at all comfortable. If the Irish news continues good, you will not, I think, have any other Militia regiments besides those now there. We expect Lord Camden to-day. Lord Darnley made a useful speech last night, in which he told us, amongst other things, that he had never witnessed so much satisfaction from any event at Dublin, as from the destruction of Lord Moira's town. Lord M. was not there, and kept the Prince of Wales away.

Ever most affectionately yours,
G.

As far as I can judge from the public accounts in the newspapers, the rebellion seems rather to have changed its shape than to have abandoned its object, and it may be a question whether much advantage is gained in its becoming a Maroon war of plunderers and banditti, rather than continuing to be a formal array regularly opposed to the regular army in the country; because though it may be true that the danger of a large army of rebels may be a danger of greater magnitude, as well as more immediate, yet it furnishes at least the opportunity of meeting that danger, and of grappling with it; whereas this plundering, robbing, and burning war, carried on by an infinite number of small parties, associated together and hiding together like the thieves in the cave of Gil Blas, puts the peace and the security of the country in greater danger, keeps up a more constant alarm, is more difficult to resist, because it is more difficult to find and to prepare against, and, what is not the least consideration, it utterly ruins and destroys the hopes of these men, after indulging long in such habits, returning again either to labour or even to subordination.

To me, therefore, I own it seems to be more necessary than ever to make the most active exertions in order to counteract this new shape of evil; and I do hope and trust that, however ungracious and mortifying it may be to military habits and military education to be opposed to what may be deemed petty bands of robbers and incendiaries, Lord Cornwallis will feel the necessity of applying his best military talents in a service where no military glory can be obtained, except as it may be applied to the restoration of the security and tranquillity of the country.

I do not know how to trust my own judgment upon the very small lights which (entre nous) Lord C. gives us as to what he is doing in Ireland. But as far as I can judge, he is proceeding very fast indeed, particularly when he allows rebels to stipulate for the point of honour of not naming their confederates, and thereby accepts a fresh act of misprision of treason, as a satisfaction for former acts of treason. But this of course is only to you. The great point I wish to be assured of, if I could, is that he has not suffered a nearer view of difficulties to discourage him from the pursuit of the only measure which can make it signify one farthing what he does in the present moment. Let him carry that, and I will willingly compromise for all the rest.

Dropmore, August 27th, 1798.
My dearest Brother,

I am much obliged to you for your letter, which I got last night, with the other accounts of the landing at Killala. I hope we are not too sanguine in thinking that the French are much too late for their object, and that the result of this expedition will give us fresh security. The interval is however unavoidably one of some anxiety, and I confess I regret now Lord Cornwallis's security in declining to receive any further reinforcements, though it is seldom that a General fails on that side. All this can only be with a view to the possibility of a general insurrection; for without that their twelve hundred men are not worth a second thought, and their arms are merely thrown away.

I see in their full force all the difficulties that might arise in the contingency of Lord Cornwallis's death. But I trust that danger is as remote as the death of any man can reasonably be said to be. There would be much inconvenience in its being suspected or known that he had a provisional successor named and resident on the spot, because Irish speculation would extend the contingency thus provided for, from the case of his death to that of his resignation. The subject shall however be considered, and your name shall certainly not be brought forward unless I see that the thing would be wished; the only footing on which it is possible to place so liberal and generous an offer.

God bless you.

No more news of Buonaparte or Nelson. I terribly fear that the latter will do something too desperate.

Austria and Russia are evidently, at last, preparing for war. But we are now in the end of August, and with a very little more hesitation and delay the possibility of acting this year is gone, and then France must use the winter to divide us all by separate negotiations.