Memoirs of the Court and Cabinets of George the Third / From the Original Family Documents, Volume 2

1793

Duke of Richard Plantagenet Temple Nugent Brydges Chandos Grenville Buckingham and Chandos

CAUSES AND OBJECTS OF THE WAR—SECESSIONS FROM THE OPPOSITION—REVERSES IN HOLLAND—DISASTERS OF THE ALLIES—STATE OF FRANCE AT THE CLOSE OF THE YEAR.

The policy of England in reference to the proceedings in France had hitherto been that of a conservative neutrality. The letter of Lord Grenville to the Marquis of Buckingham, dated 7th November, 1792, to which attention has been specially directed, clearly and unequivocally establishes that fact. Had the motive commonly imputed to Ministers, of having entered into the war for the vindication of the monarchical principle and the restoration of the Bourbons, been really the actuating object, it would have appeared in these confidential communications. Not only, however, is there no such motive avowed or contemplated, but, on the contrary, Lord Grenville declares that the greatest source of pride and satisfaction he finds on reviewing the line of conduct he had acted upon throughout that reign of anarchy, is in the reflection that he had kept England out of it. Up to the last moment, so long as France confined her public acts and the dissemination of her new doctrines to her own territory, the English Government remained merely a spectator of events in which she took no part, and evinced no concern. The case was altered when France invaded Holland, and passed a decree fraternizing with the people of other countries, and offering them assistance to procure their liberties. These were the measures of oppression and aggrandizement referred to by Lord Grenville in his communications with the French Envoy; and upon these grounds, and these grounds alone, England accepted and prosecuted the war.

Immediately after the declaration of hostilities by the Convention, the King sent a message to Parliament explicitly declaring the causes of the war, which were, the occupation by the French of the Scheldt, the exclusive navigation of which had been guaranteed by treaty to the Dutch; the fraternizing decree which invited the people of other countries to revolutionize their Governments; and the danger with which Europe was threatened by the progress of the French arms. In one aspect this was a war of principles; in another, it was a war of self-defence. In both, it was just and inevitable. Even the Opposition admitted the validity of the grounds on which it proceeded, although they could not resist the temptation of assailing the Minister, while they adopted his measures. The resolutions founded on the message were carried with scarcely a shadow of objection in either House of Parliament. The people of all classes were wholly with Mr. Pitt. Amongst the last to be convinced was Mr. Wilberforce, who had a moral aversion to all wars, but who ultimately expressed himself converted to the necessity of war on this occasion.

The effect of the message from the King was remarkable. Numbers of the most influential men, who had previously voted with the Opposition, passed over to the Ministerial benches, including Burke and Wyndham, and the Lords Portland, Spencer, Fitzwilliam, Loughborough, and many other peers and commoners. Lord Loughborough, who had so often run in couples with Thurlow, was now appointed to succeed him on the Woolsack; and Ministers, acquiring augmented strength from all quarters, addressed themselves vigorously to the task of preparation.

The letters of this year are scanty, but not unimportant, in their references to passing events. Taken in connection with the history of the period, which is too familiar to require any further elucidation, they will be found to throw a new light upon some points of contemporary interest.

LORD GRENVILLE TO THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM.

Whitehall, Jan. 19th, 1793.
My dearest Brother,

It is at length settled that Lord Loughborough shall take the Seals on Wednesday. He has written a long letter to the Duke of Portland, which has not been answered. It is as yet very difficult to say what proportion of the ci-devant Opposition will follow Lord Loughborough's example, and join Government avowedly, but I am inclined to hope a pretty large one. The Prince of Wales has also written to the Duke of Portland, and sent a message to us, declaring his intention to join Government. I have not seen the letter, but my informant, to whom it was shown yesterday morning by the Duke of York, told me it was proper and explicit.

424 against the referring the judgment to the AssemblÉes Primaires, 283 for it.

The first question, of guilty, decided almost unanimously; the third, that punishment should be inflicted, was deferred to the 10th.

Brissot's report, which you will see in the French papers, seems well enough calculated for our purpose. The thing must now come to its point in a few days; and we shall, I trust, have appeared to the public here to have put the French completely dans leur tort.

Ever most affectionately yours,
G.

LORD GRENVILLE TO THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM.

Whitehall, June 12th, 1793.
My dearest Brother,

In consequence of what you requested in the conversation we had at Dropmore, I write to mention to you that the vacant Ribands are to-day to be given to Lord Salisbury, Lord Westmoreland, and Lord Carlisle. I did not learn this yesterday till it was too late to write to you. With respect to what you mentioned to me of your own intentions, you know too well what my opinion is, and how anxiously I am impressed with that opinion, to make me feel it right to urge you with what could only be a repetition of all I have already stated. But I wish to make it my earnest request to you that you will not take any actual step till you have seen Pitt. I have not told him anything of your idea of taking any measure on this occasion but I have stated to him in general terms the uneasiness you still seemed to feel on the subject of the former request, and the possibility that this impression might be strengthened, supposing Lord Camden's death to produce that sort of arrangement to which you had so handsomely consented, but which might, nevertheless, bring the other idea more forward in your mind.

His plan was (if he had not been hindered by the gout) to have run down to Somersetshire for a week, at the close of the business in the House of Commons, and to have been back before he could almost be known to be gone. He had then intended to take Winchester in his way. I have not seen him for several days, and cannot therefore say whether this idea still holds, but at all events there could be no difficulty in your coming to town for a day or two for that purpose.

I urge this because I know you may fully rely upon his friendship, and that even if he should not be able to alter the thing itself, which I am sure I know not how he can, it is still, in my opinion, very desirable that you should not take so marked a step without hearing the advice of those who love you best, supposing even that after all you should not be influenced by their reasoning upon it.

I say nothing about myself in all this, because I am sure you believe me truly sensible of your constant and unvaried affection to me, and unwilling to intrude upon you repetitions which I must fear would be useless. But you will not attribute it to indifference or unconcern about the thing itself, which, God knows, are sentiments the reverse of what I feel upon it.

We have no news of any material event at the army. The siege was to be opened on Monday, and they seem to entertain very sanguine ideas indeed as to its speedy success. I have some doubt whether the report from Paris, respecting Marat's new revolution, is to be credited, though all the late accounts from thence seemed to indicate an approaching crisis. I have a confused account from the Hague, of the Duke of Brunswick having gained a decisive advantage over the army that was Custine's. But it is not distinct enough to place much reliance upon it.

Mudge is returned by the way of China with despatches from Vancouver. I have not yet seen them, but I understand, generally, that some difficulty arose about the restitution of Northa. It is not, however, of a nature to create any real embarrassment. He has brought a letter for poor Lady Camelford from her son, whom he tells me he left in great health and spirits. We have not opened it, but wait till Lord C. comes, which I hope will be about the end of this month at latest. From what he says, Vancouver's expedition is likely to continue so much longer, that I think of proposing to Lady C. that her son should return by the first opportunity, in order to go into some larger ship, which at his age now will clearly be desirable. He will have served his time before he can hear from Europe. Juan de Fuca's inlet is explored, and found to be closed with high lands.

Ever most affectionately yours,
G.

LORD GRENVILLE TO THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM.

St. James's Square, Sept. 11th, 1793.
My dear Brother,

I am sorry to acquaint you that we have unpleasant accounts from the army, and the more unpleasant from their uncertainty. All that seems to be certain is, that the Duke of York thought himself obliged to raise the siege of Dunkirk, at least for the present, in consequence of an attack which I imagine to have taken place on the evening of the 7th; and which must, of course, have been bloody, and the event unfavourable to us. We have no direct account from the army, but the report is that of an officer of the navy, who comes, I understand, from Nieuport, and states that he had prevented any other letters from coming over, in order to prevent the spreading an alarm till the official accounts arrive.

There is also a letter from Watson, the Commissary-General, which seems to confirm the intended retreat, and says that he has provisions, &c., enough in the rear of the army; but he mentions no particulars of what has happened, except that he says the spirit of the troops is good—that they have suffered, but have not been beaten. His letter is from Furnes, on the 8th.

I am sorry for the suspense in which this must leave you, as it does us. If we hear more before the post goes out, I will add a line to this letter.

Ever most affectionately yours,
G.

I should have added, that the same officer brings the account that they had got at Ostend of the capture of Quesnoy, which I credit, because my last letters from the Austrian army state the fall of that place as certain within a very few days. This is the more important, as P. Cob. would then be at liberty to march towards Flanders, if necessary.

Since I wrote the above, I have seen the narrative of the officer in question—Lieutenant Popham. It is long, and full of little details; but the result of the whole is, that he was going, by Macbride's orders, to communicate with the Duke of York, and turned back on account of the news he heard; that he met on the road parties of our cavalry evacuating Furnes on the 8th, and many wounded soldiers going to Ostend; but he does not appear to have collected accounts of what had happened, and indeed it is most probable that individuals could not give any general information. It does not appear whether they were going from Furnes by orders or not.

Five, p.m.

I have just got the enclosed letter to Bruges from a young man I sent as Secretary to Sir James Murray; and as it is very doubtful whether I shall get the particulars time enough to send you anything further, I would not omit letting you have this, which will at least put you at ease for individuals. You will observe it is dated from Furnes, on the 9th. It is brought by an officer charged with the despatches.

LORD GRENVILLE TO THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM.

Dropmore, Sept. 15th, 1793. At Night.
My dear Brother,

You will receive with this letter, which will be sent you from London, the good and the bad accounts together. For the Flanders war, I fear the latter overbalance the former; there is, however, in my opinion, very little reason to be discouraged at these checks, which must be expected whenever the French took the resolution to leave the sieges on the side of Hainault to their fate, in order to break in upon the line of communication. This must have happened equally if the combined armies had remained together, and undertaken a joint operation; and the proposed plan had the advantage of being the only one whose success would have remedied this inconvenience, resulting from the nature of an attack from an open country against such a barrier.

It must be left to military decision what is precisely the best point of attack, combined or separate, which now remains; but the loss of Menin as a post of communication does not tend to lessen the difficulties of any plan, and I am decidedly averse to anything that shall hazard the delaying the West India expedition, for which, when you consider how much is to be done there, you will not think a whole season too much.

After all, a few towns more or less in Flanders are certainly not unimportant; but I am much mistaken in my speculation, if the business at Toulon is not decisive of the war. Only let your own mind follow up all the consequences of that event, and you will, I believe, agree with me that the expression I have used is not too sanguine. We have news that the people of Lyons have defeated Dubois CranÉe, with a loss to the latter, as it is said, of four thousand men. Allow this to be exaggerated, as I suppose it is, but take the fact to be true that he has been defeated, and it is everything to us. The next month or six weeks will be an anxious period, and big with events.

You asked me some time ago about Parliament, and that with a view to your own motions. Nothing can, of course, be absolutely fixed on that subject; but I think it highly improbable that Parliament should meet before January. I heartily wish that we may arrange it so as to meet, though in the present moment I should be afraid even of such a distance as Stowe. At all events, when your camp breaks up, I trust you will take Dropmore in your way, as indeed I believe it will lay directly in your road, if you come by town, and not far out of it, if you go straight to Stowe.

My dear wife desires best love to you and Lady B. Lady Camelford is, I think, better than we could have hoped.

Ever most affectionately yours,
G.

16th.

This ought to have gone to-day, and I am sorry to find it this evening in one of my boxes here. We have nothing new to-day, except the account of the murder of the King of Poland, which is believed.

LORD GRENVILLE TO THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM.

Walmer Castle, Oct. 1st, 1793.
My dear Brother,

Your letter of the 27th followed me here yesterday, and I have just received that of the 29th. With respect to the first, I can only say that I have by this post sent your letters to Pitt, and am very sure that if it depends on him, what you wish will be done.

Lord Amherst's answer of the reduced state of the regiments at home is, however, surely not quite so much out of the way as you state it. It is a great pity that your protÉgÉ is in Canada, where no promotion can be going forward, and from whence, I conclude, he cannot be brought into regiments upon actual service. Sir C. Grey conveyed to me the other day a wish to know whether there was any officer in his army that I felt interested about; but I know of none that I should think it worth laying myself under an obligation for. If Talbot had happened to be in one of the regiments in Nova Scotia, he would probably have been in this predicament; but I suppose the force in Canada is little likely to be weakened, in the present state of America.

I am delighted to find that you are so well pleased with the manifesto. I have hardly had time yet to consider your observations on the particular passages you have marked, but I will do so, and am much obliged to you for the trouble.

The Duke of Richmond will, I am persuaded, not resign in the present moment, though he has been talking and doing foolishly. As far as I can learn, there is no sort of ground for the accusation of delay on his part relative to Dunkirk. When I see you, I can say on that subject what for many reasons I do not choose to write. Au reste, the Duke of Richmond's campaign seems completely to have annihilated the little popularity he ever had; and though I am satisfied he will not resign till after the meeting of Parliament, and perhaps till after the session is over, I am equally persuaded he will not continue another year in the Cabinet.

We are sending Hessians to Toulon, and shall soon have there a really respectable force; the interval is the only thing to be feared; but Mulgrave's being there is a great comfort to me; as great, indeed, entre nous, as if I knew the new Governor was actually arrived there. We have nothing like force enough for all the objects that present themselves, and you know my settled aversion to undertaking little points of detail; some of which might succeed, but the result of the whole must be to cut to pieces the small force we have, without adequate success. Besides this, the reliance on the dispositions of the country, with the single exception of Toulon, pressed as it was by famine at one door, and the guillotine at the other, has always failed us.

I believe it is true, that almost in every part of France they detest the Convention, but that they are quite incapable of giving any solid footing in the country.

Ever yours most affectionately,
G.

LORD GRENVILLE TO THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM

Walmer Castle, Oct. 11th, 1793.
My dearest Brother,

I was just going to write to you when I received your letter. My present plans are to return to town about Tuesday next, and to get to Dropmore by dinner on Friday, if possible; but I would not wish you to let your dinner depend on that. I conclude, from what you say of your having been reviewed, that you will be able to get away soon, and it will be a great gratification to us both to see you, especially if, as I hope, Lady Buckingham comes with you. Lady Camelford writes to Anne that she much wishes to see you, and if she knows of the time of your coming will endeavour to contrive to be with us. I return you Freemantle's letter, for fear of accidents. You have, perhaps, guessed that it anticipates part of what I had to say to you, but I hope you have also felt the singularly embarrassing situation in which the King's Ministers are placed in this respect, with the cause of Royalty to defend, and with the great obligations they owe to the extreme liberality and honour of the King's conduct towards them. They are obliged, therefore, to say nothing, and to let nothing be said: and indeed I hardly know what I should wish to be said, so great is the difficulty in all respects. I know I may reckon upon your discretion, not only in saying nothing from me, but also in saying as little as possible from yourself, which would not fail to be repeated, and to be ascribed to me. We will talk this over fully when I see you, and I really much wish to know what you think ought ultimately to be done on the subject. You will have seen that it is not the camp of Mauberge, but the advanced posts that had been unsuccessfully attacked. The attack of the camp itself was to take place somewhere about this time, and yesterday the British troops marched to Cysoing, where they thought it not improbable they might be engaged with the French, who are collecting at Bouchain and Cambray.

George Nugent had written to me twice on the subject of his proposal, and I sent him Lord Amherst's answer, which is negative, at least for the present. He seems to have an invincible aversion to new corps, I fancy, from all the badgering he got upon that subject last war. He now states only the plea of seniority, that the number intended to be raised is filled up by older Lieutenant-Colonels. I fancy Nugent had not received my letter when he wrote to you.

The language of the Convention looks as if some serious attack might be expected here; serious at least as they intend it, but ridiculous, I trust, it will prove. An attempt in force requires preparations they have not, and a superiority in naval force which they certainly have not. Buccaneering expeditions I take to be practicable, with only the certainty of much greater loss to themselves than to us. They would be unpleasant in their effect here, but what help.

I have profited of your advice about the manifesto, and now send you the English translation which I have prepared, with the transpositions you recommended. I do not think it reads as well in English as in French, which I am sorry for, as it must be read in English by John Bull, whose approbation of my writings I should like to retain. I hardly know how to ask you to correct, as it must be a translation, and a literal one. But mark what you dislike, and I will try if, retaining the translation, it can be altered. I have kept guerre defensive and that pour cause: which indeed you may guess, when you see in the papers that His Prussian Majesty is returned to Berlin, and when I tell you that we had no previous notice of his journey.

Ever most affectionately yours,
G.

LORD GRENVILLE TO THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM.

St. James's Square, Nov. 21st, 1793.
My dearest Brother,

I had already spoken to Pitt upon the idea of G. Nugent's being appointed one of the aides-de-camp, if the promotion mentioned by him should take place. I have reason to be sure, that for the present no idea exists of that promotion. If it had, I should certainly have pressed his declining the offer of the corps; because, though that is no absolute bar according to any rule, yet it may, certainly, in the King's mind, stand in his way; and such exceptions as Lord Chenton and Lord Rawdon do not prove much. I am very confident, that, as it is, whatever can be done by Pitt will be done, if the promotion should hereafter take place; but I am sure you know that the King's Ministers do not name his aides-de-camp; and that the pressing such a request, beyond a certain point, makes difficulties in his mind, instead of removing them. Besides his wish to oblige you, Pitt is personally well-disposed towards Nugent, and I have reason to think that Lord Amherst is so too.

Sir James Murray will, I think, not continue in his present situation; and the mode of removing him, will probably be by putting him at the head of some corps; but this is not yet mentioned to him, and, therefore, I rely on your not speaking of it to any one else. I do not know whether, in that case, the King will fill up his place as aide-de-camp, or not; but one vacancy cannot be expected to make room for Nugent, who is at the end of his year; besides, the natural claim which Manners has on the King. It is, therefore, I think, better on the whole, that Nugent should go on with his corps.

With respect to your lesser army jobs, I say nothing about them, because I really do not understand them, and am unable to judge of the facility or difficulty of Lord Amherst's complying with them. It is useless for me to talk about Pitt's share in all this, though I certainly do not think it very fair that he should bear on his shoulders all the grievances of cornetcies and lieutenancies, which Lord Amherst or any other Commander-in-chief is sure to create.

I have spoken about the prÉcis, and you will certainly have them whenever there is news to send. The army is safe, and I hope quiet, in its winter quarters. Lord Moira sets out to-morrow morning, and will find everything ready for him at Portsmouth. You see how right you was about the impossibility of keeping secret at Portsmouth the new destination of this force. Luckily, it is so ready, that the thing itself will take place even now as soon as the news can reach Paris.

Lord Malmesbury is going to Berlin, to bring our good ally to a point—ay or no. I think it will end in no.

I certainly will not forget my engagement; and I still hope we shall find a Saturday and Sunday for Stowe.

God bless you, my dear brother, and believe me

Ever most affectionately yours,
G.

LORD GRENVILLE TO THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM.

St. James's Square, Dec. 12th, 1793.
My dearest Brother,

At your request, I certainly will do a thing extremely disagreeable to myself, by putting into Mr. Pitt's hands the letter you desire me to show him. In any case where you or yours could have the smallest interest, I should never consider whether a compliance with your wishes is or is not pleasant to me; but I freely own, that I hardly think you would be repaid, by Mr. Pigott's getting his company, for the uneasiness I feel in being made (unprofitably, too, as I think, even to the object) the channel of such a communication between two persons whom I have so much reason to love and value.

The accounts of the Duke of Brunswick's victory, though they have not come to us from any channel that we can consider as strictly official, are such as to leave no doubt of the fact. There appears to have been different actions for three days, from the 29th of November to the 1st of December; and on the last of these days the victory was obtained, which persons, pretty well informed, seem to consider as decisive of the fate of Landan. The great object of the French was to relieve that place, and surround Wurmser; and in both they have failed, having been repulsed in a last attack they made on the latter the 1st instant. It appears likely now that little more will be done on that frontier till Landan is obliged to surrender; nor anything after that.

All our expectations are turned towards Brittany; but the news from that quarter is by no means favourable, as far as it goes. The Royalist army appears unable to make any siege, or even to continue twenty-four hours in the same place; and this for want of provisions. There is, besides, among them much disunion, and a total want of discipline; and they seemed to have formed the resolution of retiring inwards into France. Whether they will be deterred from this by the communications since made to them, and by the knowledge of our force being actually at their doors, remains to be seen.

I did not send you the account of the failure of all our hopes, from Lord Howe. I was not in town; and if I had been, I do not know whether I was not too much vexed to write. He is still off Ushant; so that the idea of sending out the second fleet is, for the moment, at least, out of the question. Some of those ships are, as you know, destined for other services; and the whole, without Lord Howe, would not be strong enough to meet the Brest fleet; and with him, would be much too strong.

The business of St. Domingo is highly important. The possession of the Mole, though not beyond what we had looked to, is much beyond my hopes. Dansey's letter to Williamson expresses much confidence of maintaining himself there, with such a force, as I trust, by this time, and long before, he actually has there.

Ever most affectionately yours,
G.

At the close of the year France was stronger than at the commencement. The destruction of her navy at Toulon was the principal reverse she suffered. On the other side the allies had encountered defeat at almost every point; the Prussians compelled to retreat to Mentz, the Imperialists driven beyond the Rhine, and the English forced to raise the siege of Dunkirk. The enthusiasm of the masses, sustained by these successes, and acted upon by the popular appeals of the Jacobins, placed at the disposal of the Republic an enormous physical force, which the whole winter was occupied in augmenting and organizing for the campaigns of the ensuing year.

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