CannÆ is a small village of Apulia, near the Aufidus, famous for a battle between Hannibal and the Romans; and as the spot where the battle was fought is still pointed out by the inhabitants, and is still denominated "the field of blood," we shall refresh the memories of our readers with an account of it. Both armies having often removed from place to place, came in sight of each other near CannÆ. As Hannibal was encamped in a level open country, and his cavalry much superior to that of the Romans, Æmilius did not think proper to engage in such a place. He was for drawing the enemy into an irregular spot, where the infantry might have the greatest share of the action. But his colleague, who was wholly inexperienced, was of a contrary opinion. The troops on each side were, for some time, contented with skirmishes; but, at last, one day when Varro had the command, for the two consuls took it by turns, preparations were made on both sides for battle. Æmilius had not been consulted; yet, though he extremely disapproved the conduct of his colleague, as it was not in his power to prevent it, he seconded him to the utmost. The two armies were very unequal in numbers. That of the Romans, including the allies, amounted to eighty thousand foot, and about six thousand horse; and that of the Carthaginians consisted but of forty thousand foot, all well disciplined, and of ten thousand horse. Æmilius commanded the right wing of the Romans; Varro the left; and Servilius was posted in the centre. Hannibal, who had the art of taking all advantages, had posted himself so as the south wind should blow directly in the faces of the Romans during the fight[167], and cover them with dust. Then keeping the river Aufidus on his left, and posting his cavalry on the wings, he formed his main body of the Spanish and Gallic infantry, which he posted in the centre, with half the African heavy armed foot on the right, and half on their left, on the same line with the cavalry. His army being thus drawn up, he put himself at the head of the Spanish and Gallic infantry, and having drawn themselves out in a line, advanced to begin the battle, rounding his front as he advanced near the enemy. The fight soon began, and the Roman legions that were in the wings, seeing their centre firmly attacked, advanced to charge the enemy in flank. Hannibal's main body, after a brave resistance, finding themselves furiously attacked on all sides, gave way, being overpowered in numbers. The Romans having pursued them with eager confusion, the two wings of the African infantry, which was fresh, well armed, and in good order, wheeled about on a sudden towards that void space in which the Romans had thrown themselves in disorder, and attacked them vigorously on both sides without allowing them time to recover themselves, or leaving them ground to draw up. In the mean time, the two wings of the cavalry having defeated those of the Romans, which were much inferior to them, advanced and charged the rest of the Roman infantry, which being surrounded at once on every side by the enemy's horse and foot, was all cut to pieces, after having fought with great bravery. Æmilius being covered with wounds, he received in the fight, was afterwards killed by a body of the enemy to whom he was not known. Above seventy thousand men fell in this battle; and the Carthaginians, so great was their fury, did not give over the slaughter till Hannibal, in the very heat of it, cried out to them several times, "Stop, soldiers, spare the vanquished." Ten thousand men, who had been left to guard the camps, surrendered themselves prisoners of war after the battle. Varro, the consul, retired to Venusia with only seventy horse; and about four thousand men escaped into the neighbouring cities. Hannibal remained master of the field, he being chiefly indebted for this, as well as for his former victories, to the superiority of his cavalry over the Romans. Maherbal, one of the Carthaginian generals, advised Hannibal to march directly to Rome, promising him that within five days they should sup in the capital. Hannibal, answering, that it was an affair that required mature examination—"I see," replies Maherbal, "that the gods have not endowed the same men with all talents. You, Hannibal, know how to conquer, but not to make the best use of a victory." It is pretended that this delay saved Rome and the empire. Many authors, and among the rest Livy, charge Hannibal on this occasion as if guilty of a capital error. But others, more reserved, are not for condemning without evident proofs, so renowned a general, who, in the rest of his conduct, was never wanting either in prudence to make choice of the best expedient, or in readiness to put his designs in execution. They, besides, are inclined to judge favourably of him from the authority, or, at least, the silence of Polybius, who, speaking of the memorable consequences of this celebrated battle, says, "That the Carthaginians were firmly persuaded, that they should possess themselves of Rome at the first assault:" but then he does not mention how this could possibly have been effected; as that city was very populous, warlike, strongly fortified, and defended with a garrison of two legions; nor does he anywhere give the least hint that such a project was feasible, or that Hannibal did wrong, in not attempting to put it in execution.

Soon after the battle of CannÆ, Hannibal despatched his brother to Carthage with the news of his victory; and at the same time to demand succours, in order that he might be enabled to put an end to the war. Mago being arrived, made, in full senate, a lofty speech, in which he extolled his brother's exploits, and displayed the great advantages he had gained over the Romans. And to give a more lively idea of the greatness of the victory, by speaking in some measure to the eye, he poured out in the middle of the senate a bushel of gold rings which had been taken from such of the Roman nobility as had fallen in the battle.

A ridge of low hills[168], bare of wood, and laid out in grass or corn land, confines the river for four miles, at the end of which, bounded by knolls, stood the city of CannÆ. The traces of the town, however, are very faint, consisting of fragments of altars, cornices, gates, walls, vaults, and under-ground granaries. "My eyes ranged at large over the vast expanse of unvariegated plains," says Mr. Swinburne: "all was silent; not a man, not an animal, appeared to enliven the scene. We stood on ruins and over vaults; the banks of the river were desert and wild. My thoughts naturally assumed the tint of the dreary prospect, as I reflected on the fate of Carthage and of Rome. Rome recovered from the blow she received in these fields; but her liberty, her fame, and trophies, have long been levelled in the dust. Carthage lies in ruins less discernible than those of the paltry walls of CannÆ; the very traces of them have almost vanished from the face of the earth. The daring projects, marches, and exploits of her hero, even the victory, obtained upon this spot, would, like thousands of other human achievements, have been long buried in oblivion, had not his very enemies consigned him to immortality; for the annals of Carthage exist no more."

The peasants showed Mr. Swinburne some spurs and heads of lances, which had been turned up by the plough a short time before he visited the spot, and told him, that horse-loads of armour and weapons had been found and carried away at different times[169].