Up to the autumn of 1918 Germany was under the Empire of the Constitution of April 16, 1871. Then in November, 1918, the work of Bismarck was suddenly overthrown and military defeat and revolution plunged Germany into chaos. How she worked out of it, through what vicissitudes she passed and with what groping she finally achieved her new Constitution is the question to examine first.
SECTION 1
THE REVOLUTION
The revolution of November, 1918, was preceded by partial reforms embodied at a late hour in the Constitution of 1871; and when it broke out, in a few hours it completely threw over all the apparatus of the old rÉgime. A new government sprang up which for several weeks held power in the name of a minority and without any right other than that of force.
1.—THE CONSTITUTION OF APRIL 16, 1871, AND THE REFORMS OF OCTOBER, 1918.
The principal characteristics of the Constitution of April 16, 1871, are well known.
Germany was a federal state, that is to say, above the member states, which renounced a part of their individual independence to strengthen their collective political and economic power, there existed a central state in whose favor they had given up that degree of independence—the German Empire.
In the Reich sovereign power belonged to an assembly of Princes and of governments represented by the Bundesrat or Federal Council. This council which consisted of representatives of all the member states shared with the Reichstag the power to initiate and vote legislation. It promulgated the general administrative measures necessary for the execution of the laws; and with the consent of the Emperor it could dissolve the Reichstag.
The nation was presided over by the German Emperor. He exercised generally the rights which modern nations reserve to the executive power. In particular he represented the Empire in its international relations; promulgated its laws; watched over their execution; appointed civil and military officials, etc.
Several remarkable details have to be pointed out. Although in principle the Emperor’s actions had to be countersigned by a minister he was free from that restriction in such matters as concerned military affairs, particularly in the nomination of the superior officers of the army and the navy. The German Emperor was the absolute chief of the forces of the Empire on sea and land. Furthermore, although he could not declare war without the consent of the Bundesrat he could act on his own authority in case of attack by a foreign power against the territory or the coasts of the German Confederation.
The Emperor nominated the Chancellor, who was after the Emperor himself, the sole chief of the political and administrative organization of the Empire. “The Chancellor,” says Article 15, “presides over the Bundesrat and directs its labours.” But as he clearly could not himself assume such an overwhelming task, he was authorized by the law of March 17, 1878, to call assistance and be supplemented at need by high functionaries placed at the head of Imperial departments—those of foreign affairs, of the interior, justice, treasury, railroads, marine, colonies, posts and telegraphs. These officials carried the title of State Secretaries, which seemed to give them something of the nature of ministers, though in reality they were completely subordinated to the Chancellor.
Just as the Bundesrat represented the federated Princes so the Reichstag represented the German people. Elected by direct and universal suffrage the Reichstag had the right to initiate legislation; and no law was operative unless it had obtained a majority both in the Bundesrat and in the Reichstag. Furthermore the Reichstag had the right to interpellate, not the Secretaries of State but the Chancellor himself and to ask questions; and discussions of a question could be closed by voting an expression of the confidence of the Assembly.
Under the Empire there were twenty-five states[1] and the territory of Alsace-Lorraine.
These states were governed by constitutions of the greatest variety. There were three free cities, Hamburg, Bremen and LÜbeck; twenty-two monarchies, which carried different titles; Kingdoms—Prussia, Bavaria, Saxony, Wurtemberg; Grand Duchies—Baden, Hesse; Duchies—Saxe-Coburg-Gotha, Saxe-Meiningen; and Principalities—Waldeck, Schaumburg-Lippe, etc.
Among these states some, a large majority but the least important, had adopted the system of the single legislative chamber, which, with one or two exceptions, comprised, beside the deputies elected by universal suffrage, members named by the princes of the state, or by special electoral colleges such as groups of the heaviest tax payers, chambers of commerce, industrial and agricultural organizations, the clergy, the professions, etc.
The other states, four kingdoms and the Grand Duchies of Baden and of Hesse, had two chambers each. The upper house was almost entirely composed of members of the reigning families or their kin and of personages charged with representing the nobility or the great landed proprietors. The lower house was elected sometimes by universal suffrage, sometimes by a system of plural voting; or by a system that divided the population in such a way that the voice of the people was nullified almost entirely in favor of the big taxpayers as in Prussia.
All this would present an erroneous and incomplete picture if one did not take the precaution to search beyond the letter of these constitutions and inquire how the government of Germany was actually conducted. The political institutions of Germany presented a certain number of aspects which it is important to bring out clearly:[2]
1. These institutions were anti-democratic. It is true the Reichstag was elected by universal and direct suffrage. But, on the one hand the electoral legislation of the Reich contained certain provisions which were singularly behind the times, such as the denial to the poor of the right to vote, the fixing of the voting age at twenty-five, etc. On the other hand, the Bundesrat, which was not elected, possessed powers superior to those of the Reichstag; and the latter could do nothing without the Bundesrat. The same situation existed within the individual states, which either did not have a chamber elected by universal suffrage or else limited it in power by the check of an upper house, feudal and conservative in character.
2. These institutions were anti-parliamentary. The Reichstag could interpellate the Chancellor but could not depose him. To a question or to an interpellation the Chancellor was always free to respond that he did not wish to reply; or he could fix his own time for replying; and finally, if he was in the minority in the house he did not have to resign.
3. The Reich encroached more and more on the domain of the individual states. This encroachment, this evolution toward unitarism, manifested itself in most divers ways. In military matters it took the form of a fusion of fighting contingents which belonged more or less nominally to the various states, but which, with the exception perhaps of Bavaria, placed their whole force at the direct command of the Emperor. As for Bavaria, at the outbreak of the war its “reserved rights” had almost completely disappeared. The development of the legislation of the Empire had accentuated this evolution toward unitarism. In the measure that the Reich legislated in a large number of domains, it wiped out in these matters the different regulations that existed up to then in the individual states. It is true that the execution of the national legislation was entrusted to functionaries within these states; but these officials were under the control of the Bundesrat and subject to the supervision of the Reich. Even in financial matters the liberty of the individual states was more and more limited. While it is true that they conserved their autonomy in matters of duties and taxes, the more the Reich discovered new sources of revenue the more the legislation of the Empire imposed on the several states the task of collecting this revenue and the more narrow became the scope in which the states could manage their own financial affairs, and the dependency of the states grew the more on the financial legislation and the budgetary dispositions allowed them by the Reich.[3]
4. In contrast to the other federated states whose Constitutions were based on the principle of equality of the component states, Germany was based on the notion of the inequality of the states federated in it. Prussia exercised a true hegemony in Germany. In the Bundesrat it was represented by 17 votes whereas the other most favoured state, Bavaria, had but 6; two others, Saxony and Wurtemberg, had only 4 each; two, Baden and Hesse, 3 each; Mecklenburg and Brunswick, 2 each; and all the others but 1 apiece. In addition the Rhineland was also represented by 3 votes in the Bundesrat but these votes were instructed by Prussia. The latter, therefore, had 17 votes, 20 with those of Alsace-Lorraine, 21 with that of Waldeck, since the latter by its treaty of entry into the Confederation had abandoned its governmental rights to Prussia. It had therefore numerically a third of the total strength of the Bundesrat, while in actual influence it counted much more. Only Prussia could feel assured that its representation made it mistress of the situation in the Bundesrat; fourteen votes were sufficient to head off a constitutional change. Consequently Prussia possessed absolute veto power. It must not be forgotten that the representatives of the Princes in the Bundesrat received imperative mandates from them and that the representatives of the state had to cast their votes as a bloc—that is, as a unit. It mattered little, therefore, that such and such was the numerical representation in the Bundesrat of the particular states, that Prussia had 17 votes, Bavaria 6, etc. As to legislative changes relating to the army or the navy, and to taxes feeding the treasury of the Empire, nothing of this kind could be enacted if it was opposed by the “presidency.” And the “presidency” belonged by undisputed right to Prussia.
In the Reichstag Prussia exercised the same preponderance. The Reichstag was composed of deputies, one for each 100,000 inhabitants. There Prussia counted much more than half, for its population was nearly two-thirds that of the whole Empire—40,165,217 out of 64,925,933. She also elected 236 deputies out of the 397 that made up the Reichstag.
To the same degree she was in control of executive action. While sovereignty nominally resided in the assemblage of Princes in the Bundesrath, it resided no less in the hands of the King of Prussia who had full rights as the German Emperor; and it was he who nominated the Chancellor, the sole responsible minister of the Empire. The Chancellor was almost always a subject of the King of Prussia and, following a rule to which there were few exceptions, at the same time the Prime Minister of Prussia.
Thus, therefore, Prussia elected a majority in the Reichstag, and if by some extraordinary chance the latter voted against the desire of Prussia the decree could be nullified by the Prussian representative in the Bundesrath. The King of Prussia was Emperor. He nominated the Chancellor, chief of all the administrative machinery of the state. The King of Prussia was master of the government of the Empire. Germany was a veritable Prussia enlarged.
We can now distinguish the essential traits that characterized constitutional Germany on the eve of the war. There was in Germany, under the infinite complexity of written provisions, behind a deliberately effected juxtaposition of the most modern formula by the side of some of the most archaic, a living reality. It was a despotic organization that placed full power in the hands of a feudal monarch. It was, to put it in the words of President Wilson, the largest enterprise of domination that the world has ever known.
Such a system and that which made it such an anachronism could not survive the test of war and still less that of defeat.
Already during the war several demands for reforms made themselves felt. In proportion as the war was prolonged and the heavier became the burdens that weighed on the people together with the sacrifices that were imposed upon them, there developed a pressure on the part of the people for recognition, for compensation, for the right to participate in a more effective fashion in the conduct of public affairs. The Reichstag appointed a commission to investigate to what extent it was possible to modify the Constitution of the Reich in conformity with the desires of the people. On his part the Emperor in a message on April 7, 1917, declared that it was the duty of the Chancellor to satisfy the exigencies of new times with every means appropriate; and to reconstruct the constitutional edifice in such a way as to insure a free and spontaneous collaboration of all the elements of the nation. The Chancellor seemed to be in accord with the Emperor on the necessity and urgency of a “new orientation.”
On the 15th of May, 1917, Bethmann-Hollweg spoke of realizing a programme of “trusting collaboration of the Emperor and the nation.” On July 19, 1917, Michaelis foreshadowed the establishment of a close contact between a government and parliament, the creation of a bond of mutual confidence between the government of the Empire and the Reichstag, in the sense that the management of various affairs should be entrusted to men who, aside from their professional abilities, would enjoy the full confidence of the great parties in the popular branch of the government.
They were nothing but vague words; and this “parliamentarization” of the government of the Reich did not commence to show itself until the pressure of defeat came, such as was felt in the summer of 1918. The adoption of a parliamentary rÉgime then seemed the sole means of obtaining from the masses the sacrifices which were still expected of them both on the firing line and in the interior.
The true reforms commenced with the letter which the Emperor wrote on September 30, 1918, to the departing Chancellor von Hertling, and which was a real message to the German people and to the Reichstag. “I desire,” said the Emperor, “that the German people shall collaborate more effectively than in the past in the determination of the destiny of our Fatherland. It is my wish therefore that men invested with the confidence of the people shall participate in a large measure in the rights and duties of the government.” Legally it was only an expression of the hitherto recognized imperial will. But from a political point of view this message constituted the recognition of a new system of government, in virtue of which the centre of gravity of political institutions passed from the organs of the government, the Bundesrath and the Emperor, to the popular assembly, the Reichstag.
The spirit in which the new reforms were to be carried out and the importance which they were to assume were made clearer several days later when, on October 5, 1918, Chancellor Maximilian of Baden in a programme speech addressed in the Reichstag said, “It is in the essence of the system of the government which we are now instituting that I now state clearly and without reservation the principles by which I shall seek to fulfil my heavy responsibilities. These principles were accepted before I assumed my duties as Chancellor in an agreement reached between confederated governments and the chiefs of the parties of the majority of this Chamber.… It is only when the people take an active part to the largest measure in the determination of the destiny of the nation; and when the sense of responsibility is also shared by the majority of the political chiefs freely elected, that a statesman can accept direction of the helm with confidence and himself participate in this responsibility. Otherwise the shoulders of one man will be too feeble to support the immense responsibility that now confronts our government. I am convinced that the manner in which the directing government has been formed to-day with the collaboration of the Reichstag is not temporary in its nature and that in times of peace hereafter no government can be formed that has not the support of the Reichstag, that does not lean on the Reichstag, and that does not take from the Reichstag its principal chiefs.”
As a consequence two laws were passed which carried the date of October 28, 1918. They were designed to meet the three most important exigencies of the hour:
1. They realized the parliamentarization of the government of the Reich. Article 15 of the Constitution of 1871, which dealt with the nomination of the Chancellor had the following amendment added: “The Chancellor in order to continue direction of the affairs of the Reich must have the confidence of the Reichstag. The Chancellor is responsible for all the political acts of the Emperor performed in the exercise of his constitutional rights. The Chancellor and his representatives are responsible for the conduct of affairs to the Bundesrat and the Reichstag.”[4]
This text established not only the responsibility of the Chancellor; it also recognized constitutionally the right of parties or their parliamentary groups to participate in the nomination of the Chancellor and it specified that when the confidence of the Reichstag is withdrawn from the Chancellor he must resign.
The responsibility of the Chancellor, who was answerable both to the Reichstag and to the Bundesrat, extended not only to the general and particular decrees issued by the Emperor and countersigned by the Chancellor but also to acts of a political nature on the part of the Emperor; and it followed from this that the Chancellor and his representatives were also responsible for their own actions of the same character.
Further, one of the laws of October 28, 1918, in abrogating paragraph 2 of Article 21 of the Constitution of 1871, permitted thereafter members of the Reichstag to become secretaries of state while fulfilling at the same time their functions as members of the Reichstag. On the other hand the incompatibility between the Bundesrat and the Reichstag (article 9, paragraph 2, of the Constitution of 1871) was not abolished. It followed from that, therefore, that while a member of the Reichstag could become a Secretary of State, he could not become a member of the Bundesrat and therefore could not become Chancellor; for that office was open only to members of the Bundesrat.
2. The laws of October 28, 1918, broadened considerably the authority of the Reichstag and diminished correspondingly the Imperial authority in the right to declare war and conclude treaties. The Emperor could never again under any circumstances declare war in the name of the Reich without the consent of the Reichstag and the Bundesrat. He was required to obtain the same consent of the two assemblies to conclude treaties of peace and all other treaties that touched matters in which either of the assemblies had competence.
3. The authority of the Emperor as military commander was put under parliamentary control.
These reforms constituted certainly important progress along the road of parliamentary rule and it can be said that it placed Germany thereafter among the nations that are governed by such a system.
The texts of the laws of October 28, 1918, were accompanied by a letter of the Emperor to the Chancellor in which he wrote: “Prepared by a series of governmental acts a new order comes into being in which fundamental rights of the Emperor pass to the people. After the events of these our times the German people must not be denied a single right that is needed to guarantee them a free and happy future. I acquiesce together with my highest colleagues in the decisions of the representatives of the people and do so with the firm determination to co-operate to the greatest effectiveness, convinced that I will thus serve the welfare of the German people. The Emperor is at the service of the people.”
German jurists with good reason characterized this letter as a “political abdication.” But the changes which went with it came too late, and a simple “political abdication” appeared thereafter as strikingly insufficient. The German Empire was falling into ruin and it was no longer a question of partial reforms.
2.—THE FALL OF THE OLD RÉGIME.
Revolution broke out in Germany at the beginning of November, 1918.
From the end of October riots and revolts had been taking place on board the vessels of the Imperial navy. But on November 4 at Kiel there broke out a revolt among the sailors, who became masters of the situation. They formed a Council of Soldiers which presented to the mayor of the city a list of demands—the liberation of arrested sailors; the suppression of a military hierarchy outside of the service; a demand that the approval of the Council of Soldiers be necessary for all military measures, etc.
The next day the workers of Kiel declared a general strike and formed Workers Councils which united with Councils of Soldiers consisting of the marines of the city.
From Kiel the movement spread the same day to LÜbeck and to Hamburg. On the 6th, a general strike was proclaimed in the dock yards of Hamburg and revolution broke out in Bremen.
Simultaneously revolution won other cities: Hanover, Cologne, Magdeburg, Brunswick, Leipzig, and Dresden, where Councils of Workers and Soldiers were formed. From November 4th to the 9th all North Germany, the South and the Centre fell into the hands of the Councils.
The movement, which at its beginning could be considered as principally a military revolt, took on for the first time a political character most clearly marked in Munich, where in the night of the eighth of November after a great manifestation by the Independent Socialists serious disturbances broke out. The royal family was expelled and the Republic proclaimed.
With few exceptions the revolutionists met with no opposition. The bourgeoisie did not react. It was enough for some thirty marines from Kiel to enter a town or for a group of soldiers returning from the fighting front to present themselves at the city hall. Immediately every one yielded to their orders and the Councils were able to install themselves in power without firing a shot. In this revolution, to which no serious opposition had been presented and which appeared rather as the collapse of an old rÉgime whose reason for existence had vanished, there lacked only to complete it the fall of the capital and the abdication of the monarch.
At Berlin the military power devoted itself to the defence of the city. On the fifth a state of siege was proclaimed and on the seventh a decree forbade the formation of Councils of Soldiers and of Workers “on the Russian model.”
But the same day the Social Democrats sent to Chancellor Maximilian of Baden the Secretary of State Scheidemann, the bearer of an ultimatum demanding the immediate abrogation of the decree forbidding meetings; such a transformation of the government of Prussia that those in control of it should be of the same political complexion as the majority of the Reichstag; the strengthening of the Social Democratic influence in the government; and finally the abdication of the Emperor and the renunciation by the Crown Prince of all claims to the throne.
Although confronted with imminent revolution only officials and functionaries were overthrown. The bourgeoisie here as elsewhere looked on passively and attempted no resistance.
As for Maximilian of Baden he hoped to find a basis for negotiation. He pondered measures to parliamentarize still further the old government and contemplated the immediate convocation of a constituent assembly to develop a new constitution. Meanwhile he did not reply to the ultimatum of the Social Democrats. Whereupon there were organized Councils of Workers and Soldiers in Berlin who made themselves felt with their first act on the morning of the ninth of November by declaring a general strike.
The Chancellor could no longer delay action. On the ninth at two o’clock in the afternoon, after a telephonic conversation with William II, he announced officially that the Emperor had abdicated and that the Crown Prince had renounced the throne. He declared that he, Maximilian of Baden, would remain in office until the installation of the Regent. He would propose to the Regent the nomination as Chancellor of the Social Democratic leader Ebert, and the convocation of electoral colleges with the view of choosing a national constituent assembly to which would be given the task of directing the future of the state.
Thus the Chancellor hoped to the last moment to effect in an almost legal manner the transition from the old to the new Germany. But the pressure of events was too strong for him and he was not able to realize his hope.
In the early part of the afternoon, Ebert accompanied by Scheidemann appeared at the Chancellery and declared in the name of their party that in order to avoid bloodshed and to maintain public order they considered it necessary to take power in their hands and assume the direction of the government. When Vice-Chancellor von Payer asked Ebert if he intended to conduct the government on the basis of the Constitution or in the name of the Councils of Workers and Soldiers, Ebert replied, “Within the frame work of the constitution.” After short deliberation and in view of the fact that the troops in Berlin had deserted the old government the cabinet of Maximilian decided to place in the hands of Ebert the powers of Chancellor of the Empire “subject to the approval of the legislature.” Ebert at once entered into office without the question of the regency being decided.
But the Socialist parties pressed for the proclamation of a republic. This proclamation took place several minutes after the installation of Ebert as Chancellor. In answer to the clamor of a great gathering of the people in front of the Reichstag Scheidemann appeared on the terrace and declared in substance, “We have conquered everywhere along the line. The old rÉgime is no more. Ebert is Chancellor. Our deputy, Lieutenant GÖhre, is associate minister of war. We must now strengthen our victory and nothing will stop our march. The Hohenzollerns have abdicated. Let us see to it that this magnificent day is marred by nothing. May this be a day of eternal glory in the history of Germany. Long live the German Republic!”
The same day and almost the same hour similar events took place in all the states of Germany. Everywhere under the threat and under the pressure of the Councils of Workers and Soldiers the old Diets and the old governments vanished. The kings, the grand dukes and the dukes resigned or were simply replaced. The republic was proclaimed. One can say that on November 9, 1918, when at two in the afternoon in front of the Reichstag Scheidemann proclaimed the Republic, the ancient rÉgime had fallen in Germany.
From this date on all the organs of government which had incarnated the old rÉgime disappeared or were entirely transformed.
The Bundesrat, in which the sovereignty of the old Reich was incorporated, ceased to exist as such. It is true that the new leaders of the Reich permitted the Bundesrat “the right to continue the exercise of administrative powers according to laws and regulations” (decree of November 14, 1918); and thus there continued a Bundesrat of limited power. But it was no longer the old Bundesrat, for the governments of the individual states, having changed through revolution, sent new delegates who no longer represented princes but republics.
Naturally there was no longer any question of the Emperor. Having lost his crown on November 9, he fled across the Dutch frontier on the 10th, as a private individual and his letter from Amerongen on November 28, 1918, in which he, William II, declared that he expressly renounced for all time the crown of Prussia and thereby “the Imperial German crown,” had only, so to speak, a moral effect.
After the resignation of Maximilian of Baden there was no longer a Chancellor of the Empire. It is true that he had passed on his powers to Ebert but we will see shortly that Ebert did not consider himself as such except for a few hours.
As for the Reichstag whose last session ended on October 26, 1918, it was not exactly dissolved after the revolution. At the same time no formal dissolution was necessary, for a new sovereignty had been installed and had taken the place of the old Reichstag. Meanwhile, taking advantage of the fact that no formal decision had been made as to the old Reichstag the chairman of that assembly, Fehrenbach, refused to recognize its implied dissolution. On November 12, 1918, he addressed a circular to the deputies in which he declared that owing to the exigencies of the hour and without the consent of the government he would convoke the Reichstag, reserving to himself the right to announce later the time and place of the assembly. The revolutionary government thereupon notified Fehrenbach that a conflict would ensue thereat. Notwithstanding this Fehrenbach several days later repeated the announcement of the convocation. But the old Reichstag never met again. In February, 1919, it was dissolved by decree which also declared that its last session was dated as of November 9, 1919.
3.—THE REPUBLIC OF THE COUNCILS.
While the Empire was collapsing there arose quickly on the ruins of the old edifice a new structure. In place of the Empire, the government of a bourgeois and military oligarchy, came the dictatorship of the proletarian masses at one blow, the republic of the working class. Everywhere Councils of Workers and Soldiers were formed, which, taking political power in their hands, appeared to be thereafter the only and real holders of sovereignty.
But the Councils lacked the needed agreement in aim and action. Two diametrically opposed tendencies divided the new powers in control. On the one hand the members of the Social Democratic party within the Councils pursued a purely political goal—the creation of a German republic on a democratic basis to be effected by a Constituent Assembly to be convoked as soon as possible. On the other hand the Independent Socialists, the Communists, the Spartacists and other left wing elements set up as the principal aim an economic change—the quick and complete socialization of all means of production. But they also had in view a political objective, the establishment of a dictatorship of the proletariat on the model of the Russian Soviet Republic, by the complete organization of the system of Councils of Workers and Soldiers. The particular question on which the antagonism between these two groups broke out was whether or not there should be called a new constituent assembly.
The revolution was undoubtedly the work of the Independents. Their leader, Ernest DÄumig, had been to Moscow to study the Bolshevist movement, and Russia had come back with him in the persons of Joffe and his agents of propaganda. Already during the strikes of January, 1918, which had been organized by them, there had appeared for the first time in Germany Workers Councils; and in the days preceding the insurrection of November, 1918, Councils of Workers and Soldiers had been secretly organized at Kiel as well as in Berlin. The Social Democrats, on the other hand, to the last moment warned the people against the consequences of an ill-considered insurrection. But when the success of the revolts seemed assured it was seen that many who had condemned it were now joining it. Thanks to Maximilian of Baden it was the Social Democrats, Ebert and Scheidemann and the trade unions that were installed in power on the 9th of November, 1918. The history of the German revolution is the story of a revolution made by one political group and its fruits garnered by another. At first the two Socialist parties divided power equally. But after several weeks of collaboration the Social Democrats eliminated the Independents and remained in sole control of the government.
1. At first the two socialist parties participate equally in control.—On the 9th of November early in the afternoon Ebert had received from the former Imperial cabinet his functions of Chancellor of the Empire. He considered himself such at the time. His intention was to nominate Scheidemann and Landsberg as secretaries of state, but to keep in the cabinet the old state secretaries; in addition to which the Independent Socialists were to enter the government. He proclaimed immediately several decrees signed, “Chancellor of the Empire, Ebert.”
It must be observed that up to then the change which had been brought about constituted without doubt a revolution, but a revolution remarkably moderate. It is true that constitutional right did not give the Chancellor the authority to name his successor; from the legal point of view the nomination of Ebert certainly constituted a violation of the old constitutional law. Nevertheless in its outer aspect the new government with Ebert at the head sought to appear as the expression of the will of the former government. The idea of a radically new law had not yet made its appearance.
In the course of a few hours, however, the situation completely changed. The Independents submitted as the condition of their entry into the government the following twofold demand: The cabinet was to consist only of socialists, and it was to recognize officially that political sovereignty resided in the hands of the Workers and Soldiers Councils. The next day the Social Democrats accepted these conditions—for the Independents were still the actual power in control and “the street belonged to them”—and a government of six chiefs was constituted. It comprised three Socialist Democrats, Ebert, Scheidemann and Landsberg, and three Independents, Haase, Dittmann and Barth.[5] In the evening there was held at the Busch Circus a plenary session of the Workers and Soldiers Councils of Berlin. This assembly passed a resolution which declared among other things the following: “Old Germany is no more. The dynasties are gone forever. The holders of thrones are stripped of their power. Germany is now a Republic, a Socialist Republic. The Workers and Soldiers Councils are now the holders of political power.” Then the assembly nominated an executive committee (Vollzugsrat) of twenty-four members, six Social Democrats, six Independents, and twelve Soldiers, and they proclaimed as the men in control of the government the six named above.
Following this meeting the cabinet was constituted. It formed a “college” of which all the members had equal rights and which took the name of “Council of Commissars of the People” (Rat der Volksbeauftragten); Ebert and Haase were nominated chairmen. All the decrees of the government would have to be promulgated by these two in accord and signed jointly by them. It was, so to speak, a Chancellorship of two.
The Council of Commissars of the People thus found itself invested with political power by the General Assembly of the Councils of Workers and Soldiers of Berlin. Making immediate use of its power the Council of Commissars issued on November 12, 1918, a proclamation which constituted a declaration of rights of the new rÉgime: The state of siege was revoked. Freedom of assembly and meeting were restored without restriction. All political offences were amnestied. The eight-hour day went into effect on January 1, 1919. All elections thereafter would be held on the basis of equal, direct, universal suffrage based on proportional representation for all men and women who had passed the twentieth birthday, etc.
But difficulties arose soon between The Council of Commissars of the People and the Executive Committee of the Workers and Soldiers Councils of Berlin. Each of these two bodies considered itself the chief holder of sovereignty and launched proclamations issuing orders. It became absolutely necessary to put precise limits to their respective powers. That was the object of an agreement reached by these two bodies November 22, 1918.
According to the terms of this agreement sovereignty belonged wholly to the Executive Committee. The Council of Commissars was to exercise executive power under the permanent control of the Executive Committee.
The latter had the power to nominate or recall members of the Council of Commissars. In reality the situation was somewhat different; for the Council of Commissars exercised to some extent legislative powers according to which it claimed the right to issue decrees that had the force of laws.
For a month the two bodies worked in this accord. Collisions occurred, of course. The functionaries of the old rÉgime endured impatiently the supervision of the Councils of Workers and Soldiers. Inflaming rumours circulated of the extravagance with which these Councils managed the public finances. Worst of all was the increasing opposition that developed all over the country to the Executive Committee of Workers and Soldiers Councils, which, consisting exclusively of Berlin members, claimed to represent the Councils of all Germany and which acted in effect as though it were delegated by the Councils of the whole country. The fact that on November 23 this Executive Committee had added to itself a certain number of delegates of Workers and Soldiers Councils of states other than Prussia, delegates who had authority to deliberate in matters that concerned all of Germany, did not strengthen the position of the Executive Committee. Meanwhile, however, its machinery appeared to be functioning.
2. The social democrats eliminate the independents and remain in sole control.—In the struggle that ensued among socialists, the Social Democrats brought to their side the support first of individual states, then that of a general Congress of Workers and Soldiers Councils.
1. From November 10 Ebert and his party showed an increasing determination to call a constituent assembly. However, they did not attempt to act upon it at once, being restrained by the strength that still lay in the hands of the Councils. But on November 25 under the name of “the conference of German Federated States” there was held at Berlin a meeting of representatives of the revolutionary governments of several states. It was presided over by the Commissar of the People, Ebert.
Speaking of the forthcoming constitution, Ebert declared, “The system of collaboration between the government of the Reich and the Federated States, which should be very definitely specified, must be established by a National Assembly. The government has firmly resolved to call this National Assembly with the least delay. Till then nothing but a provisional agreement can be effected between the Reich and the States.” In the course of the discussion the most conflicting opinions possible were expressed; but finally the immense majority of the delegates present adopted the following twofold resolution:
“It is to a National Assembly that the power of establishing the constitution of the Reich should be entrusted. Till such a time, however, the Workers and Soldiers Councils are the representatives of the will of the people.”
Strengthened by this decision the Council of the Commissars of the People promulgated on November 30 a decree for the election of a National Assembly.
2. It was the general congress of Workers and Soldiers Councils at its meetings in Berlin from December 16 to 20, more than any other factor, that gave the Social Democrats the opportunity they had been seeking to disembarrass themselves of the Executive Committee of the Workers and Soldiers Councils of Berlin; and by this means to deliver a decisive blow at the system of Councils as a whole. The Social Democrats had an overwhelming majority in this congress and the delegates, well disciplined and little familiar with parliamentary debate, carried out punctiliously the instructions which had been given them by the official spokesmen.
The congress passed a number of important resolutions:
a. The Councils or Soviet System is rejected.—On December 19 by a vote of 334 against 98 the congress rejected the motion made by DÄumig that “under all circumstances the Councils system shall be adhered to as the basis of the Socialist Republic in the sense that the Councils shall possess supreme legislative, executive and judiciary powers.”
b. The Council of the Commissars of the People is strengthened.—The congress, which declared itself invested with complete political power, delegated legislative and executive power to the Council of Commissars of the People up to the time the National Assembly convened. Further, it nominated a central committee (Zentralrat) of the Workers and Soldiers Councils of Germany, consisting of twenty-seven members which was to exercise parliamentary control over the German and Prussian cabinets; that is to say, according to the official explanation of Commissar of the People Haase, all projects of law must be submitted by the Council of the Commissars of the People to the Central Committee and discussed by them. The Central Committee had the right to appoint and recall Commissars of the People for Prussia and for the Reich. Finally the Council of the Commissars of the People was to appoint to each Secretary of State two delegates, a Social Democrat and an Independent, who would be charged with the conduct of affairs within the ministries. As for the Executive Committee of the Workers and Soldiers Councils of Berlin it was limited by the congress to authority only in matters pertaining to the Berlin group.
c. Elections for the National Assembly are held January 19, 1919.—The victory of the Social Democrats was complete. The Independents, because of the small number of representatives they had elected, refused to form a part of the Central Committee, which thereupon consisted only of Social Democrats and was presided over by Leinert, then by Max Cohen, both very moderate in their opinions. The conflict between the Executive Committee of Workers and Soldiers Councils of Berlin and the Central Committee never gave the government any trouble.
But the Independents and the Spartacists had not at all decided to give up the game, for they believed themselves to be at least “masters of the street.” And Christmas week of 1918 in Berlin was a bloody one. A detachment of marines which had installed itself in the royal castle and had refused to leave it in spite of the orders of the government of Prussia had tried to capture Commissars of the People, Ebert and Landsberg, to keep them as hostages against the non-payment of wages due them. Their attempt failed and troops were summoned by the government to force the sailors to leave the castle. Bloody fights ensued in Berlin which lasted till Christmas.
These events produced a crisis in the government. On December 29 the Independents, Haase, Dittmann, and Barth, resigned from the Council of the Commissars of the People; whereupon the remaining three Commissars immediately handed their resignations to the Central Committee. The latter reappointed the three Social Democrats and completed the Government by adding to them three new Commissars, all Social Democrats, Noske, Wissel, LÖbe. LÖbe declined and his post remained vacant; but Noske and Wissel entered the Government. Scheidemann replaced Haase as co-president with Ebert.
The Independents and the Communists made another attempt. On January 3, the Independents who had entered the Government of Prussia handed in their resignations. But Eichhorn, since the revolution president of the Berlin police, refused to resign his powers and, being recalled, refused to relinquish his post. That was the signal for a veritable insurrection which had been called, not without reason, “the second revolution.” Troops of Spartacists met in bloody encounters in the streets with the troops of Noske and the affair ended with the assassination of Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg.
When, three days later the elections for the National Assembly took place, Germany found itself under an exclusively Social Democratic Government.
The National Assembly elected on January 19, 1919, had as its foremost task the conclusion of peace and the creation of a new constitution for Germany. But in view of the problems that it was confronted with, it will be difficult to understand precisely how it was led to take this or that position and to know how to reconcile the intent of the different resolutions voted if one does not keep constantly in mind the spirit in which they were drawn up, the forces that met in conflict within the Assembly, and the proportion of strength they bore to one another—if one does not follow at least in its ensemble the long process of elaboration in the midst of which the work of the Assembly was accomplished.
1.—THE COMPOSITION OF THE ASSEMBLY.
The Constituent Assembly had been elected according to what was perhaps the most democratic suffrage ever known.
All Germans were electors, men and women, soldiers and officers, poor and feeble, provided they had passed the twentieth birthday. All electors were eligible to vote who had been Germans for at least a year.
The election took place on the basis of general tickets which could not be “split,” that is, an elector could not vote for candidates of different tickets; but facility was offered for parties to present lists in common.
The distribution of seats followed the system of proportional representation known under the name of Hondt.
These elections sent to the Assembly 423 deputies, of whom 39 were women.
At the extreme right were the German Nationalists (Deutschnationalen) with forty-two members. They were the former Conservatives of whom the least one can say is that they had learned but little from the war. It was the party of the big landed proprietors and the big manufacturers. Politically they declared themselves in December, 1918, in favour of the restoration of the monarchy and willing to accept a parliamentary monarchy. Economically they did not ask a single reform. Reactionary in politics they were in economic matters strongly conservative. Their leaders, Clemens von DelbrÜck, former minister of the Emperor and former chief of the Emperor’s civil cabinet, DÜringer, raised their voices whenever it was necessary to defend the old rÉgime, opposing all diminution in Prussia’s share of the government, and combatting every democratic institution.
To the left of them sat twenty-two members of the German People’s Party (Deutsche Volkspartei). The name is new; their ideas resembled those of the former National-Liberals.[6] It was the party of business men. Of the future form of government they said nothing. In fact, most of them remained monarchists, but that was a minor question. Their main concern was to establish in a tranquil and well regulated state freedom of commerce and a guarantee of protection for private property. They did not shut their eyes completely to the realities of the hour and intended to scrutinize certain reforms which it would be useless to oppose; such as new governmental monopolies, the participation of workers in industry control, etc. They were nationalist in feeling and would not sign a peace except one that safeguarded the economic prosperity of Germany. They were democrats in the sense that they were in favor of a strict legal equality for all persons. This group was presided over by Stresemann, whose cleverness in manipulating the parliamentary game was widely recognized.
Then came the Centre with eighty-nine deputies. Of all the parties it was this one that remained since its inception most faithful to itself. Its programme had not changed. It contained several propositions which formed its solid framework and for which the party was prepared to fight with all its power: the union of Church and State, confessional public schools, liberty of instruction, etc. On the political and economical problems of the hour the Centre certainly had its opinions; but it always ended by conceding whatever was necessary to safeguard the essential principles of a religious state and of freedom of instruction. Among those elected to the Centre there were Fehrenbach, who presided over the Assembly, Trimborn, Professor Beyerle, and Erzberger, whose indefatigable activities and limitless fertility of resources assured him perhaps a preponderant rÔle in the government for some months, and who as much as the Minister of Finance was to effect a fundamental reform in the German fiscal system.
Then came seventy-four Democrats. Their party was born after the revolution of 1918 of a fusion of the old Progressives with the group of National-Liberals who did not go with the Volkspartei. Their program was that of the classic liberalism: national sovereignty, universal suffrage, equality of right of all citizens, individual rights, the right of private property and commerce. They opposed the intervention of the State except in extraordinary circumstances. This party attempted to group about itself all Germans in favour of a bourgeois republic, and was resolute in its opposition to both reaction and revolutionary socialism. This group counted among its members some of the men whose personal worth impressed itself on the assembly and who played rÔles perhaps the most important in the development of the constitution—Haussmann, president of the committee on the Constitution; Frederick Naumann, whose idealism had free reign when he proposed with Beyerle the list of fundamental rights and duties of the Germans; Dernburg, Minister for the Colonies under the old rÉgime and Minister of Finance under the Revolution; Koch of Cassel, future minister, and others.
There were 163 Social Democrats. They formed the most numerous group in the Assembly but, accustomed to the facile negations of opposition they seemed little prepared for the constructive rÔle, at that time particularly difficult, which their electoral success suddenly called upon them to exercise. Theoretically they declared themselves faithful to the programme of Erfurt and to the Marxian theory of the class struggle. But at the same time they declared their faith in democracy, opposed all dictatorship and counted only on universal suffrage and the parliamentary rÉgime to effect their socialistic reforms. It is from this Social Democratic group that there came the three Chancellors who governed Germany while the National Assembly sat—Scheidemann, Bauer and Hermann MÜller. It is to this group that belonged Legien, president of the German Federation of Labour, Wissel who as Minister tried in vain to organize systematic control of business, and the Ministers Noske, David, the deputy Sinzheimer, who drew up the remarkable report on the Workers Councils, and others.
Finally there came the group of Independents of whom there were twenty-two. They accused the Social Democrats of having betrayed the cause of Socialism. As for their own program they did not specify any measures more definite than did the Social Democrats. They contented themselves with demanding that socialization be immediately commenced in order to break capitalist domination, to promote production to the highest possible degree and to distribute the fruits thereof among all citizens. Their spokesmen were Cohn and Haase, former Commissar of the People, who was later assassinated in July, 1919.
To sum up one can present the following table of the forces of the respective parties in the National Assembly:
PARTY | VOTES | DEPUTIES |
German National People’s Party | 3,200,000 | 42 | (3 women) |
German People’s Party | 1,200,000 | 22 | (1 woman) |
Centre | 6,000,000 | 89 | (6 women) |
Democrats | 5,600,000 | 74 | (7 women) |
Social Democrats | 11,400,000 | 163 | (17 women) |
Independents | 2,300,000 | 22 | (3 women) |
Other parties | 500,000 | 9 | (2 women) |
Besides these, troops from the Western front sent two deputies, both Social Democrats.
2.—THE PROVISIONAL CONSTITUTION OF FEBRUARY 10, 1919.
The National Constituent Assembly met at Weimar February 6, 1919. It wisely avoided meeting in Berlin where it would be tempting prey for organizers of revolts and insurrections.
Elected by the people the Assembly incorporated the sovereignty of the people. It was the supreme power. That power was universally accorded to it.
The first question that had to be dealt with by the Assembly was that of a provisional government of Germany. It was true that a Constitution was to be adopted by the Assembly eventually; but that would be a labour of several months at least. Meanwhile it would be necessary for Germany to be governed in its internal affairs by some authority created in the spirit of democracy, one which could be represented abroad by delegates of the German people. A provisional constitution would have to be adopted, and adopted at once.
On February 8 Secretary of State of the Interior Preuss submitted a draft of a provisional government of the Reich. It was only an improvisation. Commencing with January 25, 1919, a conference of more than one hundred representatives of different states met with the Minister of the Interior to consider the project of this provisional constitution. The draft presented by Preuss was approved by them. This gave assurance that no fundamental objections would be raised. On the other hand, to assure a quick vote on it the author of the project had prudently avoided all vexing questions whose immediate settlement was not indispensable; and on the questions which he had to treat he wisely did so in the spirit of compromise. Thanks to these precautions the draft by Preuss was adopted on February 10. It dealt with these four points:
1. Constitutional laws.—The National Assembly was to retain all power in dealing with this province. Elected above all to furnish Germany with a constitution this was its essential work.
Only the Assembly could decide constitutional questions and could do so without consulting anybody else. Meanwhile, however, although keeping control the members could limit themselves, if they wished, in authority—and this is one of the instances in the provisional constitution characterized by its spirit of compromise—if this limitation seemed to them in the general interest and necessary to the prompt accomplishment of their work. In fact, the National Assembly limited itself in this matter of the constitution only on one point, a fundamental one—the territorial status of the states. According to Article 4, paragraph 2, of the law dealing with that question “the territories of the component republics cannot be modified except by their consent.” This meant that the sovereign National Assembly did not permit even itself to change the territorial map of Germany. Minister Preuss explained to the Assembly that he had to make this concession, for they could not with a stroke of the pen and by a simple decision change the boundaries of the respective states without their consent. This provision was necessary to reassure the states, being given especially in view of the announced intentions of the government of the Reich on a territorial regrouping and a partition of Prussia. But it was distinctly specified by Preuss that this provision would hold only until the definitive action on the Constitution by the Assembly. For in this Constitution the National Assembly could of its own accord and without limitations take whatever decision it wished. In other words after the definite adoption of the Constitution the states could no longer invoke article 4, paragraph 3 of the law of February 10, 1919, in order to oppose the operation of article 18 of the Constitution of Weimar,[7] in case an individual state were so minded.
2. Ordinary laws.—The National Assembly had other work to do besides the Constitution. They recognized (Article 1 of the law of February 10, 1919) that beside the Constitution they had to vote “other urgent laws for the Reich.” But here in contrast to the procedure in the adoption of constitutional laws the National Assembly did not adopt laws except in agreement with the representatives of the individual states. No project could become a law until it was accepted both by the representatives of the individual states and by the National Assembly. For this purpose the law of February 10, 1919, created a Commission of States.
This Commission recalled in several respects the old Bundesrat but differed fundamentally in certain other respects. It was composed of representatives of all the German states whose governments were based on the confidence in them of their representative assemblies elected by universal suffrage. Each state had at least one vote; but the more important states could have additional votes; one vote for every million inhabitants, and a fraction in excess would be counted as a supplementary vote provided that fraction was equal at least to the number of inhabitants of the least populous state in the Reich. No state was allowed more than two-thirds of the total number of votes. Some writers find this reform important. “The traditional proportion of representation is broken,” writes Apelt in “Das Werden der neuen Reichsverfassung, Deutsche Juristen Zeitung,” 1919, p. 205. “It has been replaced by the modern principle of the distribution of influence according to the number of inhabitants.” But we must not delude ourselves. The application of paragraph 2 of the law of February 10 resulted in the following: Prussia had 19 votes, Bavaria 7, Saxony 5, Wurtemberg 3, the Grand Duchy of Baden 3, the Grand Duchy of Hesse 2; the other states one each, in all 58, and after the fusion of the two states of Reuss, 57. Thus Prussia had two votes more than in the Bundesrat, Bavaria and Saxony each one vote more, Wurtemberg, Hesse, Mecklenburg-Schwerin and Brunswick each at least one vote. If one considers the loss of Alsace-Lorraine and the disappearance of the two Reuss states it is quite remarkable to note that in the Bundesrat and in the Commission of States the total number of votes was exactly the same and the distribution almost the same in both.
However, the Commission of States differed in other respects from the Bundesrat, especially in authority. It is true that as formerly no law could be enacted except with the approval of the Assembly. But now the centre of gravity of political power passed from the Assembly of States to the popular assembly. From this came the following consequences: formerly if a projected law emanating from the Presidency of the Empire did not secure a majority in the Bundesrat it could not be considered by the Reichstag, and was thereby definitely buried. Whereas now the government could submit for decision by the National Assembly a project which had been rejected by the Commission of States. Formerly, too, in a disagreement between the two assemblies over a projected law which the Reichstag had accepted but the Bundesrat had rejected, the last word rested with the negative party, that is to say, the Bundesrat, where naturally the project was buried. Now, however, the government was never bound by a decision of the majority of the Commission of States and it could always bring a project up again before the National Assembly, which had been defeated in the Commission. The members of the government of the Reich and those of the Commission of States had the right to participate in the National Assembly and defend their respective points of view; but it was the National Assembly that always made the final decision. If, however, a discord between the two Assemblies could not be broken the President of the Reich had the right to submit this difference to a popular referendum for decision. This situation, however, has not as yet presented itself.
The differences between the former Bundesrat and the new Commission of States were considerable. The champions of a united Reich criticized the Commission as an obstacle to the foundation of a united German Republic and this objection seemed from their point of view justifiable. It must be noted also that the provisional constitution does not specify which, the state’s parliament or its government, in each member state nominates the delegates to the Commission. We know only that the members of the Commission of States had an imperative mandate, for its representatives defended the point of view of their governments.
A law became operative when it was adopted by both the National Assembly and the Commission of States.
3. The president of the Reich.—The Provisional Constitution placed at the head of the Reich a president.
The president of the Reich had to be elected by an absolute majority of the National Assembly. He was to remain in power until the inauguration of the president elected in conformity with the permanent constitution.
To avoid discussions which would retard the adoption of the law and not to have to specify the powers of the president the provision attributed to him generally the powers of a chief of state in a modern republic.
However, the Provisional Constitution specifically described the authority of the president on certain particular points which because of special circumstances and on account of German traditions were especially delicate. The right to declare war and to conclude peace was taken away from him and given to the National Assembly. He represented the Reich, however, in foreign relations, accredited and received ambassadors and signed treaties. But in this last respect his right was limited by two restrictions. He could not without the consent of the National Assembly and of the Commission of States conclude any treaty containing matters on which the authority rested with these bodies; and were Germany to enter a league of nations that excludes secret treaties, all the treaties with states which are members of that league would have to be submitted to the approval of the National Assembly and the Commission of States. In other words, secret treaties were in principle forbidden; but in order not to place Germany in a disadvantageous position with regard to other states it was specified that this prohibition would be effective only in regard to treaties with other states that forbade secret treaties.
4. The ministers.—The president of the Reich nominated a ministry charged with the government of the Reich.
The law specified nothing on the organization of the ministry. However, there were several provisions which clearly indicated an essentially parliamentary rÉgime. Thus ministers could remain in power only as long as they had the confidence of the Assembly. Decrees and ordinances of the president were operative only when signed by a minister. The ministers were responsible to the National Assembly for the conduct of their departments.
The provisional constitution of February 10 became operative immediately upon its adoption.[8] Two series of acts thereupon naturally followed.
First the authorities who received their powers from the Revolution resigned these into the hands of the National Assembly. On February 10, Commissar of the People Scheidemann declared before the Assembly, “Since the National Assembly is in session and the Provisional Constitution is adopted the historic mission which had been entrusted to us as a provisional government is terminated. We return the powers which we have received from the Revolution into the hands of the National Assembly.”
The next day, February 11, there was read before the Assembly a letter from the Central Committee of the German Socialist Republic in which three propositions should be noted. First, the Central Committee returned to the German National Assembly the powers which it had held by virtue of the authority given it by the Congress of Workers and Soldiers Councils. Secondly, it demanded the incorporation of the Workers and Soldiers Councils in the future Constitution of the Empire to strengthen the representation of the workers and to defend the interests of the producers as well as to assure a popular organization of the Empire’s armed forces. Thirdly, it opposed with utmost energy the dangerous reappearance of the rights of sovereignty of individual states when these rights went beyond the domain of questions affecting the autonomy and the culture of the states.
There remained the task of organizing the new government in conformity with the provisions of the law. On February 11, Commissar of the People Ebert was elected President of the Reich by a vote of 277 out of a possible 328. He resigned as deputy and named a ministry headed by Scheidemann. As David, who had been elected President of the Assembly, was also appointed member of the Ministry without portfolio he was replaced as President of the National Assembly by Fehrenbach on February 12.
3.—THE ADOPTION OF THE CONSTITUTION AND THE SUPPLEMENTARY LAWS.
The elaboration of the permanent Constitution lasted nearly seven months. There were preliminary drafts, drafts and supplementary drafts; which were studied in conference with the states, in sub-committees and committees, and in full session of the National Assembly with countless changes and modifications up to the last minute.
The man who was constantly in the breach throughout all this labour and who may be considered the principal author of the Constitution was Professor Preuss.
Before the Revolution he belonged to the Progressive Party; after which he joined the Democrats. Under-secretary of State for the Interior, on February 15, 1918; Minister of the Interior in Scheidemann’s cabinet of February, 1919; representative of the government at the National Assembly to discuss the Constitution when, in June, 1919, he left office; it was on him from the beginning to end that the chief burden of these discussions rested. Master of constitutional law he showed himself in politics essentially a realist. He fought stubbornly for the ideas he put forward in his first draft—the necessity of unifying the Reich and dismembering Prussia, the need of creating confidence in democracy, the superiority of a parliamentary rÉgime. He fought for these to the very end with vigour of argument and such fertility of resources that the greater part of his ideas survived every attack. Certainly the definitive text of the Constitution is quite different from his original project; Preuss did not underestimate the forces and influences with which he had to deal; nevertheless he won great support on his principal issues and he is really the chief artisan of the work of Weimar.
The Constitution was adopted on July 31 by a vote of 262 for and 75 against. Those who voted against it were the German Nationalists, the German People’s Party, The Independents, The Bavarian Peasant Union, and several members of the Bavarian People’s Party, among them Dr. Heim.
It was promulgated and published on August 11, 1919, and became operative at once.
Having concluded peace and adopted the Constitution the National Assembly, it would seem, should have dissolved. But it did not. It had the authority to fix the duration of its mandate. The Assembly considered that its work was not finished on August 11, 1919, two tasks still remaining to be accomplished; the first of these to draw up and pass the principal laws needed for the application of the constitution. The latter in a number of its provisions necessitated the passing of a series of special laws and ordinary laws regulating details which, in the course of the deliberations on the Constitution, the members could not find time to enact or on which they had not been able to agree. Among such were laws regulating the election of the Reichstag and of the President of the Reich, laws on initiative and referendum, on the state of siege, the army, Workers Councils, and Economic Councils, laws regulating the transfer of railroads and postal systems of the various states to the control of the Reich, etc.
The Assembly in addition considered itself bound to study and pass laws of a character not necessarily constitutional but urgently needed by the Reich. In the front rank in importance were the laws designed to create the financial resources of which the Reich had great need in order to meet the enormous charges imposed upon it by the treaty of peace, the losses of five years of war and the increased public expenditure. It was also urgent to enact laws governing pensions and indemnities to the wounded, the mutilated, and the widows of the war, etc.
But from the moment the Constitution entered into force on August 11, Germany was under a new constitutional rÉgime. It was no longer the rÉgime of the Provisional Constitution of February 10, 1919; that Constitution was abolished by the definitive one. Nor had it as yet entered on the complete rÉgime of the definitive Constitution; for that provided for a Reichstag, and no one would dream of calling a Reichstag to sit at the same time as the National Assembly. It was a transitional rÉgime; from August 12, 1919, to June 6, 1920, the Constitution of August 11 was in force but the National Assembly performed the function of the Reichstag, and the President of the Reich, elected by the National Assembly, remained in office until the people should elect his successor (Article 180 of the Constitution).
In conformity with this decision on August 21, 1919, President of the Reich, Ebert, took the oath of allegiance to the new Constitution before the National Assembly in the course of its last session at Weimar.
From September 30 on, the Assembly sat in Berlin in the palace of the Reichstag, where it discussed and passed important financial legislation, which included “a law on the income tax”; another “on a consumption tax on liquors”; and still others dealing with “factory councils and with the relief of public distress throughout the Reich.”
In the early part of March, 1920, the parties of the Right, who hoped by means of new elections to obtain considerable increase in strength, submitted a proposal in which the Reich was asked to make known at once what projects for laws it expected to submit to the Assembly before its dissolution; and demanding that the Assembly submit as soon as possible proposals regulating the elections to the Reichstag, the election of the President, on initiative and referendum; and in addition proposing that the Assembly declare itself dissolved on May 1, 1920. This motion was defeated on March 10 after the Minister of Interior, Koch, had indicated the laws which still remained to be enacted. He insisted on the necessity of a profound study of the project of the law governing the election of the Reichstag; and that the first Reichstag of the Republic should not be elected according to the provisions of a temporary and little studied law. He declared that the National Assembly could not be dissolved nor the elections held before the autumn of 1920.
But two days later came the putch of Kapp and LÜttwitz. Berlin fell into the hands of a military faction who announced openly their determination to bring back the old rÉgime. The regular government fled to Stuttgart, where it hastily convoked the National Assembly. A general strike was declared everywhere. Defeated by this, Kapp and LÜttwitz fled and the regular government came back to Berlin. But the workers refused to resume work without receiving first the guarantees they considered necessary against the return of the military dictatorship. Then followed also troubles in the Ruhr and the occupation of German cities on the right bank of the Rhine by Franco-Belgian troops.
All these events were too important and upset too profoundly the political situation to make it feasible to go on without an immediate consultation with the people of Germany. Therefore, after hastily enacting the last of the immediately urgent laws, particularly electoral provisions, the Assembly dissolved at the end of May, 1920.