The Law of the Sea / A manual of the principles of admiralty law for students, mariners, and ship operators

CHAPTER VI CARRIAGE BY SEA

The purpose of the ship is the carriage of goods and passengers and the earning of freight- and passenger-money. The underlying purpose of the maritime law is to facilitate these transactions and provide reciprocal rights for the parties engaged in them, hence the ship will have a lien on the cargo for its freight, demurrage and other charges; and, correspondingly the cargo will have a lien on the ship for any damages it may sustain by breach of the contracts of carriage. A ship is held to a high degree of care for the cargo and the cargo-owner must be prompt in his relations to the ship.

1. Common and Private Carriers.—

The ship may be either a common or private carrier of goods or of passengers. In many respects carriage by water is only a subdivision of the general law of carriers and the more general principles apply as well to the ship as the railroad.

The common carrier is one who offers to carry for all who may choose to employ him. The private carrier is one who transports by virtue of a special agreement. The private carrier appears more frequently in water carriage than in land transportation. Most ships, for example, carrying bulk cargoes by special arrangement are private carriers. Most passenger ships are common carriers of passengers. Ships carrying miscellaneous or package freight, and running over regular routes, are common carriers. In general the distinction is by what they profess or offer to do,—whether to carry generally for the public, or only by special agreements.

2. Liabilities.—

The liability of a private carrier may be more closely limited by agreement than that of common carrier, but in general it will be sufficient to consider his liability as that of a shipowner carrying goods for hire. That liability is practically very stringent; he is responsible for any damage to the goods in his charge unless he can show that it was occasioned by the act of God or the public enemy, subject to two important statutes,—the Limited Liability Act (Rev. St. §§4282-4289, Act of June 26, 1884) elsewhere considered, and the Harter Act of February 13, 1893, 27 S. 445. Under this last mentioned statute, if the ship is actually seaworthy in all respects at the commencement of the voyage, there is no liability for losses sustained by faults or errors in her navigation or management. The general scope of the Act is to prohibit stipulations in the bill of lading which curtail the shipowner's liability for negligence in the proper loading, stowage, care or delivery of the cargo and to exempt him from the consequences of faults or errors in navigation or management if the ship was seaworthy when the voyage began. The word "management" does not include acts of preparing the ship for the voyage; and where she had reached her destination and sank while being discharged on account of her unstable condition and a broken coal port, the fault was held not to be one in her management.

3. Seaworthiness.—

A warranty of seaworthiness underlies all the relations of ship and cargo. This means, primarily, that the vessel is responsible for loss or damage to the goods if she was not in a seaworthy condition when she commenced the voyage, and if the loss would not have arisen but for that unseaworthiness. This liability may frequently involve the owner personally, as when the defect is attributable to his own fault or want of care. He is held to warrant that she is fit to carry the cargo which she loads and with it to encounter safely whatever perils may be reasonably expected to ensue and assumes liability for any defects in hull, machinery or equipment, even if not discoverable by careful examination. The ship must be fit in design, structure, condition, and equipment to encounter the ordinary perils of the voyage. This includes a competent master and a sufficient crew. The test is, of course, a relative one and depends upon the facts and circumstances involved in each particular case. A ship may be perfectly seaworthy for a particular cargo and voyage and quite unseaworthy for another. It is frequently said that the warranty does not require an absolutely perfect ship and that the true criterion is that degree of fitness which the average prudent and careful owner requires of his vessel at the commencement of the voyage, having given due consideration to all the circumstances which may reasonably be anticipated to attend it.

In the case of the Caledonia, 157 U.S. 124, it appeared that the vessel was chartered to transport cattle from Boston to Deptford. Sufficient fodder was provided for fifteen days, a longer period than the usual length of the voyage, being all the fodder customarily provided for such voyages. When nine days out from Boston in smooth water, the propeller shaft broke straight across in the stern tube. The breakage was due to weakening of the shaft in heavy seas on previous voyages. Its weakened and unfit condition existed when the vessel put to sea on the voyage under consideration, but the defect was invisible and could not have been detected by usual and reasonable means if the shaft had been taken out and examined. No negligence on the part of the owners was proven. Because of the breakage the voyage lasted twenty-five days and the cattle were put on short allowance of food. In consequence they were landed at Deptford in emaciated condition. They were sold in London on the first market day following their arrival. The shipper of the cattle sustained a loss due to their shrinkage in weight and to a fall in the market which occurred during the period of delay. Chief Justice Fuller in the opinion of the court reviewed many of the leading English and American cases, and held:

The proposition that the warranty of seaworthiness exists by implication in all contracts for sea-carriage, we do not understand to be denied; but it is insisted that the warranty is not absolute, and does not cover latent defects not ordinarily susceptible of detection. If this were so, the obligation resting on the shipowner would be, not that the ship should be fit, but, that he had honestly done his best to make her so. We cannot concur in this view.

In our opinion, the shipowner's undertaking is not merely that he will do and has done his best to make the ship fit, but that the ship is really fit to undergo the perils of the sea and other incidental risks to which she must be exposed in the course of the voyage; and, this being so, that undertaking is not discharged because the want of fitness is the result of latent defects.

The warranty of seaworthiness implies that the vessel shall be fit for the particular service in which she is to engage. A vessel intended to be used in river navigation is not required to be made fit for ocean transportation. Taking into consideration the nature of the voyage, it has been said that:

She must be so tight that the water will not reach the cargo; so strong that these ordinary applications of external force will not spring a leak in her or sink her; so sound that she will safely carry the cargo in bulk through these ordinary shocks to which she must every day be subjected. If she is capable of this, she is seaworthy; if she is not, she is unfit for the navigation of the river. (The Keokuk, etc. v. Home Ins. Co., 9 Wall. 526.)

The opinion just quoted had reference to a barge in tow. The Court held that the barge was considered as belonging to the tug, which had her in tow, and that the warranty of seaworthiness extended to the barge equally with the tug.

While under the act of February 13, 1893, (27 St. at L. 445, supra) the owner is relieved of liability to the cargo by reason of faulty navigation, the employment of a competent master and crew is implied in a warranty of seaworthiness and the owner is liable under the warranty if he fail to employ a competent personnel. In other words the relief from liability occurs where the owner had employed competent men, but they negligently or faultily operated the ship. Thus Justice Clifford in Germania Ins. Co. v. Lady Pike, 21 Wall. 1, said:

(The vessel) must be provided with a crew adequate in number and competent for their duty with reference to all the exigencies of the intended route, and with a competent and skillful master, of sound judgment and discretion, and with sufficient knowledge of the route and experience in navigation to be able to perform in a proper manner all the ordinary duties required of him as master of the vessel.

4. Loading and Stowage.—

These are done in accordance with the provisions of the contract of carriage or custom of the port at which the cargo is taken on board. Proper loading and stowage is an important element of seaworthiness of the ship. The cargo must be so disposed as to keep her trim and seaworthy and also so that one portion may not injure another. This work is frequently done by stevedores, whose services, when employed by the ship, are now recognized as maritime and secured by a lien on the vessel. They are, however, subject to the master's control and he is not to take on more cargo than he thinks the vessel can safely carry nor permit its stowage to interfere with the general safety of the adventure. He may refuse to take on more cargo than in his honest opinion is prudent, and must not permit any overloading at all. A fair test is the depth which the vessel was constructed to draw or that which the master and others of experience on the spot believed to be proper. The shipper of goods by sea must disclose their real character and value. He is bound to know whether they have explosive or other dangerous qualities, and, if concealment has been practiced by him on the shipowner, he will be liable for all the damages sustained from their effects. In every shipment there is an implied warranty on the part of the shipper that his goods are not of a character to cause injury to other goods on board, unless otherwise specially stipulated, and he is held liable for all the consequences of its breach; if the carrier has thereby been obliged to compensate other shippers, he may recover over against the delinquent what he was so compelled to pay.

In the case of Barker v. The Swallow, 44 Fed. 771, a small steamer, in use in the lumber trade on the Great Lakes, took a cargo of pine boards, laden as usual on deck. She encountered a strong wind and heavy sea, causing her to roll badly so that a portion of the lumber slid off the starboard side and another portion off the port side as the vessel careened in either direction. It was conceded that it was not the usage to lash deck loads of lumber vessels with ropes or chains, but with ordinary safe loading the boards would be held in place by the frictional contact of their surfaces under the weather conditions ordinarily encountered on Lake Michigan. The libellant (owner of the lumber) contended that too much lumber had been loaded upon the deck and thereby made her top-heavy, and caused her to roll more than she would have done had she not been overloaded on deck, and that the rough weather encountered did not amount to a "tempest". The Court held

while a vessel is not liable for the loss of her deck-load when it is lost by stress of weather, or what can be properly called "a peril of the sea," yet, if she takes on so heavy a deck-load as to become top-heavy, and endangers loss of the deck-load, or puts it in peril in an ordinary wind, or anything less than a gale of wind, or such stress of weather as is clearly unusual, it should, I think, be accounted bad stowage and negligence. Overloading the vessel so as to render her unmanageable, or susceptible of becoming unmanageable, by such a wind as is shown to have prevailed on the night in question, is, I think, a manifest negligence on the part of the carrier, and such as should not acquit him of liability if the cargo is lost.

In this case there was testimony that the vessel had carried much heavier deck cargo in safety, but the Court considered that this proved no more than her good luck.

Where the particular method of stowage is determined by the shipper, and damage results, the vessel is not liable for damage to cargo so stowed. A distinction is also to be noted between underdeck cargo and cargo stowed on deck. These principles are illustrated by the case of Lawrence v. Minturn, 17 How. (U.S.) 100. In that case certain boilers and chimneys were shipped aboard the Hornet and stowed on deck with the consent of their owner. The vessel encountered bad weather and began to roll gunwale deep, shipping large quantities of water, opening seams and endangering the safety of the underdeck cargo, as well as the lives of those on board. After consultation with his officers and members of the crew the master lightened ship by throwing overboard the deck cargo. The owner of the boilers and chimneys libeled the ship. In directing the libel to be dismissed the Supreme Court said:

It was strongly urged by the libellant's counsel that the shipper could not be supposed to have, and should not suffer for not possessing, a knowledge of the capacity or sufficiency of the ship; that the carrier was bound to know that the instrument, by which he agreed to perform a particular service, was sufficient for that service; and that, as these carriers contracted to convey this deck-load to San Francisco, they were obliged to ascertain whether placing it on deck would overload their vessel. This appears to have been the ground on which the court below rested its decree.

This reasoning would be quite unanswerable if applied to a shipment of cargo under deck, or to its being laden on deck without the consent of the merchant, or to a contract in which perils of the sea was not excepted. But the maritime codes and writers have recognized the distinction between cargo placed on deck, with the consent of the shipper, and cargo underdeck.

There is not one of them which gives a recourse against the master, the vessel, or the owners, if the property lost had been placed on deck with the consent of the owner;...

The carrier does not contract that a deck-load shall not embarrass the navigation of the vessel in a storm or that it shall not cause her so to roll and labor in a heavy sea as to strain and endanger the vessel. In short, he does not warrant the sufficiency of his vessel, if otherwise staunch and seaworthy to withstand an extraordinary action of the sea when thus laden. If the vessel is in itself staunch and seaworthy, and her inability to resist a storm arises solely from the position of a part of the cargo on her deck, the owner of the cargo who has consented to this mode of shipment, cannot recover from the ship or its owners, on the ground of negligence or breach of an implied contract respecting seaworthiness....

The master is bound to use due diligence and skill in stowing and staying the cargo; but there is no absolute warranty that what is done shall prove sufficient.

In this connection, however, it should be noted that the foregoing decision has not been interpreted to mean that where a shipper assumes the risk of deck cargo he thereby bargains away his right to recover for loss of such cargo if the ship were inherently incapable of carrying it. Thus the court in the Royal Sceptre, 187 Fed. 224, where the shipper himself was the charterer and loaded the cargo on deck, said:

Pressed to its logical limit, the untenable nature of the argument seems very plain; for if a vessel can become unseaworthy by piling up deckload, without any liability to the owner of the same, she may capsize as soon as her fasts are thrown off. Deck cargo at shipper's risk does not mean such absolute surrender of all rights. The risk assumed presupposes proper loading for deck stowage and a seaworthy ship. It is not thought that Lawrence v. Minturn asserts any doctrine opposed to this. It speaks only of a jettison; while, if even a jettison be rendered necessary by unseaworthiness existing at commencement of voyage, the ship is liable, as is shown by the summary of decisions given in Compania De Navigacion la Flecha v. Brauer, 168 U.S. 120, 121.

Shipwreck or disaster does not affect the title of the owners of the cargo but the goods themselves may become subject to superior liens for salvage and general average.[13] If the voyage is broken up the owner may take his property wherever he can find it, subject to such maritime liens as may have lawfully accrued and, also, in some cases, to a claim for freight in proportion to the part of the voyage which has been performed. In the absence of the owners, the master is the agent of all concerned and has as much authority as the necessities of the situation require.

In practice almost all matters growing out of a disaster are dealt with by the underwriters. Cargoes are seldom uninsured. The owner should promptly notify his insurers or brokers and tender an abandonment and the underwriters will attend to the situation which develops. If the abandonment be accepted, the shipper receives the insured value of his goods and the insurers stand in his stead as owners. The policy will also ordinarily protect against the loss if less than total and cover all charges for salvage, general average, and warehousing to which the property may be subjected. The shipper and his representatives are entitled to a copy of the master's protest and all other information in regard to the disaster and also to be consulted in regard to operations for the release of the ship and cargo if they so desire.

6. Arrival and Discharge.—

It is the duty of the consignee of the cargo, apart from local custom or special contract, to be reasonably diligent to ascertain when the ship arrives with his goods on board and the master is not bound to seek him out and notify him.[14] He should, however, report at the Custom House or make such other public notification of arrival as is usual in the port. If the consignee does not appear to claim and receive his goods, the master may land and warehouse them at his expense. The master is bound to deliver the goods to the right person, that is, the person entitled to them as owner or as holder of the bill of lading and all outstanding bills of lading should be taken up. They are quasi-negotiable, and, in the hands of third parties, may become the basis of a claim for the goods.

The consignee, producing a proper bill of lading, is, of course, entitled to inspect the goods before accepting them and the ship must afford him the opportunity even if the instructions be not to deliver them until paid for. If damaged, he may decline to receive them, but if he accepts he should closely observe the provisions of his contract in regard to notice and claim for damages. Most bills of lading contain provisions limiting the time within which claims may be made and these, when explicit, are enforced by the courts. Failure to present a claim in accordance with such stipulations will usually exonerate the carrier even if the damage was occasioned by his fault or negligence.

This subject is fully discussed by the Supreme Court in the case of Constable v. National Steamship Co., 154 U.S. 51. The S.S. Egypt arrived at New York from Liverpool at 1.45 P.M. and there being no room for her at her owner's pier, was taken to the pier of the Inman Company, where she was unladen, pursuant to a permit issued by the Collector of Customs whereby the cargo was allowed to remain on the wharf for forty-eight hours upon agreement by the owners of the ship that the goods should be at the sole risk of the owners of the ship who would pay the consignees the value of such cargo as might be stolen, burned or otherwise lost. Notice of the time and place of discharge was then posted upon the bulletin board of the Custom House in accordance with the usual practice, but no notice was sent to the consignee, nor did he have actual notice or knowledge of the arrival and unloading of the vessel. On the night of the day of the arrival the goods were burned on the pier upon which they had been unladen without negligence on the part of the owners of the Egypt. The bill of lading contained this provision:

The goods to be taken alongside by the consignee immediately the vessel is ready to discharge, or otherwise they will be landed by the master and deposited at the expense of the consignee, and at his risk of fire, loss or injury in the warehouse provided for that purpose or in a public store as the Collector of the Port of New York shall direct.... The United States Treasury having given permission for goods to remain forty-eight hours on wharf at New York, any goods so left by consignee will be at his or their risk of fire, loss or injury.

The Court (Brown, J.) held:

1. That the stipulation in the bill of lading that respondent should not be liable for a fire, happening after unloading cargo was reasonable and valid.

2. That the discharge of the cargo at the Inman pier, was not in the eye of the law a deviation such as to render the carrier and insurer of the goods so unladen.

3. That if any notice of such unloading was required at all, the bulletin posted in the Custom House was sufficient under the practice and usages of the port of New York.

4. That libellants, having taken no steps upon the faith of the cargo being unladen at respondent's pier, were not prejudiced by the change.

5. That the agreement of the respondent with the Collector of Customs to pay the consignees the value of the goods was not one of which the libellants could avail themselves as adding to the obligations of their contracts with the respondents.

7. Freight and Demurrage.—

Freight is the price of transportation by sea and demurrage has been called a kind of extended freight but is more generally understood as the price of delay in loading or receiving the cargo on the part of the shipper or consignee. Freight must be earned by conveyance and delivery of the cargo but the ship is entitled to hold the goods until payment is made. The contract of affreightment is very succinctly described by Lord Ellenborough, in Hunter v. Prinsep, 10 East 378:

The shipowners undertake that they will carry the goods to the place of destination, unless prevented by the dangers of the seas, or other unavoidable casualties; and the freighter undertakes that if the goods be delivered at the place of their destination he will pay the stipulated freight; but it was only in that event, viz., of their delivery at the place of destination, that he, the freighter, engages to pay anything. If the ship be disabled from completing her voyage, the shipowner may still entitle himself to the whole freight, by forwarding the goods by some other means to the place of destination; but he has no right to any freight if they be not so forwarded; unless the forwarding them be dispensed with, or unless there be some new bargain upon this subject. If the shipowner will not forward them, the freighter is entitled to them without paying anything. One party, therefore, if he forward them, or be prevented or discharged from doing so, is entitled to his whole freight; and the other, if there be a refusal to forward them, is entitled to have them without paying any freight at all. The general property in the goods is in the freighter; the shipowner has no right to withhold the possession from him, unless he has either earned his freight, or is going to earn it. If no freight be earned and he decline proceeding to earn any, the freighter has a right to the possession.

Where a ship does not "break ground," that is to say, does not commence her voyage at all, as in the case of the Tornado, 108 U.S. 342, in which it appeared that the vessel was destroyed by fire before sailing, the contract of affreightment is dissolved, or does not become effective, and the shipper cannot recover freight which she did not even begin to earn.

The lien for freight is a qualified one and will be lost by an unconditional delivery. The same is true of demurrage but the personal liability of the shipper or consignee will, of course, remain. The amount of freight is usually fixed by agreement and specified in the bill of lading.

So, also, are clauses in regard to demurrage. Strictly speaking, the latter can only be recovered where it is expressly reserved in the contract of carriage, but, where such stipulations have been omitted, the same result is sometimes obtained by an action for damages in the nature of demurrage on account of wrongful detention of the ship. The question of whether the ship has been unreasonably delayed or wrongfully detained is often a very confused one and its solution depends to a great extent on the surrounding circumstances. When emergency demands prevail and ports are crowded, the ship assumes some of the incidental risks of delay in obtaining and discharging her cargo, and, unless the contract is plain, can hardly insist upon more than the same treatment as others in similar situations are obtaining. When disputes arise, neither party should press his position to the extent of causing further delay, as by withholding or refusing the goods. Admiralty practice abounds in opportunities to prevent unnecessary delay by bonds or stipulations and the parties should take advantage of these or risk the disfavor of the court in which their litigation proceeds.

8. Unfair Freight Rates.—

The Merchant Marine Act of June 5, 1920 (see Appendix), forbids and makes a misdemeanor the allowance of deferred rebate of freight to any shipper; the use of fighting ships, i.e., vessels used for reducing competition by driving any carrier out of the trade; retaliation against other shippers by refusal of space accommodations when the same are available, and the making of any unjustly discriminatory contract with any shipper based on the volume of goods offered, or the making of any unjustly discriminatory charge against any shipper in the matter of accommodations, loading and landing or settlement of claims. The Shipping Board is authorized to investigate alleged violations of these provisions and the Secretary of Commerce is directed to refuse the right of entry to any ship owned or operated by a carrier whom the Shipping Board has found to be guilty of such violations.

9. Passengers.—

The carriage of passengers by water is regulated by substantially the same rules in regard to fares, tickets, special contracts and baggage as carriage by land.

The passenger is entitled to a reasonable amount of baggage having regard to his station in life and the character of the journey. As to articles which he retains in his personal custody the carrier is not an insurer but is liable only for negligence; the mere fact of loss creates no presumption against the carrier (Clark v. Burns, 118 Mass. 275). The carrier is liable for articles stolen from the passenger by its employees (Minnetonka, 146 Fed. 509) and the conditions and limitations as to value of baggage usually printed on the tickets are of slight value in the courts (Majestic, 166 U.S. 375).

10. Reciprocal Duties.—

The real differences between rules of law applicable to land and sea travel result from their own peculiar circumstances. Thus, the relation of passenger and ship necessarily implies something more than mere ship room and personal existence on board. For the time being the ship's company and the passengers constitute a community by themselves and remote from the rest of the world. There must be a certain amount of mutual toleration and concession. The situation requires, indeed, not mere toleration but respectful treatment,—"That decency in demeanor which constitutes the charm of social life, that attention which mitigates evils without reluctance, and that promptitude which administers aid to distress." (Chamberlain v. Chandler, 3 Mason 242; Western States, 151 Fed. 929.) The passengers must be prepared to submit on proper occasions to the authority of the master, which may, indeed, occasionally become despotic where the safety of the ship is involved. He may compel passengers to work at the pumps, for example, in the face of actual danger (1 Parsons' Shipping and Admiralty, 637) or even to risk their lives if the common safety requires it (Boyce v. Bayliffe, 1 Campbell, 58). Of course this power must be judiciously exercised and if it is overstepped the law will afford redress. The old case of Prendergast v. Compton, 8 C. & P. 454, is illustrative; the defendant was master of a ship from Madras for London, in the days when long voyages around the Cape were common. The plaintiff was a passenger whose table manners were distasteful to the other members of the master's table; he first attempted to correct them by mild suggestions and remonstrances, but the plaintiff responded by threatening to cane the master, who thereupon excluded him from the cabin and otherwise subjected him to discipline during the voyage. On arrival in port the plaintiff brought this action and the case affords an interesting discussion of the subject; the question was finally left to a jury who concluded that the master had exceeded his authority and allowed the plaintiff twenty-five pounds as damages.

The maritime law required a high degree of care for the protection of the passenger from personal injury. A ship must answer for such damages as might have been avoided by the exercise of unusual diligence and extraordinary skill. Although not technically an insurer, a presumption against a ship will be heavy in such cases, and ordinarily damages will follow unless it can be shown that the injury was entirely due to the passenger's own fault.[15]

11. Baggage.—

Passengers' baggage or luggage is in, substantially, the same class as cargo as far as the liability of the ship is concerned. Some cases have held that there was an exception of property which the passenger retained in his own custody but the general rule is that this only relieves the carrier where the passenger's own negligence occasioned the loss; in such cases the passenger must show that the shipowner failed to exercise reasonable and proper care. The matter is frequently covered by express stipulations in the ticket or contract of carriage but these will not usually be enforced in the American courts unless reasonable and plainly agreed to by the passenger. Thus arbitrary limitations of the value of the baggage of a steamship passenger are void. Passengers' baggage is not limited to wearing apparel and similar articles, although the general rule is that it must be confined to such articles as are reasonably required for the purposes of the journey, having in mind its general scope and the station and circumstances of the passenger. It is not permitted to impose extraordinary liabilities upon the ship by carrying as baggage goods of great value which should be otherwise shipped. In a recent case recovery was allowed for the loss of a manuscript of a manual on Greek grammar contained in the passenger's trunk; he valued it at $5,000; the Court, however, allowed only $500, on the theory that it was an imposition on the carrier to place so valuable an original in his baggage when he might have carried an equally serviceable copy.

12. Personal Injuries.—

Passenger carriers by water are subject to the same general liabilities of carriers by land. The highest degree of care for the safety of the passenger is required of the ship and negligence is presumed where an injury is sustained on board. It is the duty of the vessel to protect its passengers from harm by reason of defects in construction or acts of the ship's company or other passengers. Actions for damages may be brought against the ship or the owner. An injured passenger is entitled to at least the same degree of care and attention that a member of the crew is and may have an additional claim if this is neglected. The cases exhibit a wide range of injuries on shipboard for which recoveries have been allowed; thus, where a sailor carelessly fell from the foretopmast upon a passenger, a libel was sustained; so where a passenger was thrown from his berth by the pitching of the ship in a storm, through absence of a protecting board; so for failure to accord to a passenger respectful treatment by the officers and crew; for failure properly to protect exposed parts of machinery and openings in the deck; failure to provide a sufficient supply of wholesome food; furnishing unsanitary drinking water; and, indeed, for the negligence of those conveying passengers to and from the ship or on excursion trips on shore when advertised as a part of the voyage in question. The ship is required to have a doctor on board for the care of passengers but, when due care has been exercised in his selection, there is no liability for his mistakes or negligence in his professional work.

Cases abound illustrative of these principles. For example the old cases of Behrens v. Furnessia, 35 Fed. 798, and the City of Panama, 101 U.S. 453, in both of which passengers were injured by falling down open hatchways, which were customarily kept closed, and the more modern case of Dempster Shipping Co. v. Pouppirt, 125 Fed. 732, where the plaintiff while on deck was struck by a beam which was being thrown overboard. In the two cases first mentioned plaintiffs recovered damages, it being considered that under the circumstances the ship was negligent in leaving open and unguarded hatchways which were customarily kept closed and over which passengers were accustomed to pass. In the case last cited plaintiff failed to recover because it appeared that he had voluntarily placed himself in dangerous proximity to boards that were being swung over the side. The law is quite fully reviewed in these cases. In the City of Panama, it was said:

Owners of vessels, engaged in carrying passengers, assume obligations somewhat different from those whose vessels are employed as common carriers of merchandise. Obligations of the kind in the former case are, in some few respects, less extensive and more qualified than in the latter, as the owners of the vessel carrying passengers are not insurers of the lives of their passengers, nor even of their safety; but in most other respects the obligations assumed are equally comprehensive and even more stringent....

Passengers must take the risk incident to the mode of travel which they select, but those risks in the legal sense are only such as the utmost care, skill and caution of the carrier, in the preparation and management of the means of conveyance are unable to avert.

In the case of Shipping Co. v. Pouppirt, the court quoted with approval the following language from Railway Co. v. Myers, 80 Fed. 361:

If a passenger of mature age leaves the place which he knows has been provided for him, and, without any occasion for so doing, or to gratify his curiosity, goes to another, where the dangers are greater, or places himself in a dangerous attitude, which he was not intended to assume, or if he disobeys any reasonable regulation of the carrier, it should be held that he assumes whatever increased risk of injury is incurred in so doing.

13. Loss of Life.—

Until March 30, 1920, the general maritime law did not give any right to recover for loss of life. On that date an act of Congress was approved, the text of which follows:

That whenever the death of a person shall be caused by wrongful act, neglect or default occurring on the high seas beyond a marine league from the shores of any State, or the District of Columbia, or the Territories or dependencies of the United States, the personal representatives of the decedent may maintain a suit for damages in the district courts of the United States, in admiralty, for the exclusive benefit of the decedent's wife, husband, parent, child, or dependent relative against the vessel, person, or corporation which would have been liable if death had not ensued.

Sec. 2. That the recovery in such suit shall be a fair and just compensation for the pecuniary loss sustained by the persons for whose benefit the suit is brought and shall be apportioned among them by the court in proportion to the loss they may severally have suffered by reason of the death of the person by whose representative the suit is brought.

Sec. 3. That such suit shall be begun within two years from the date of such wrongful act, neglect, or default, unless during that period there has not been reasonable opportunity for securing jurisdiction of the vessel, person or corporation sought to be charged; but after the expiration of such period of two years the right of action hereby given shall not be deemed to have lapsed until ninety days after a reasonable opportunity to secure jurisdiction has offered.

Sec. 4. That whenever a right of action is granted by the law of any foreign State on account of death by wrongful act, neglect, or default, occurring upon the high seas, such right may be maintained in an appropriate action in admiralty in the courts of the United States without abatement in respect to the amount for which recovery is authorized, any statute of the United States to the contrary notwithstanding.

Sec. 5. That, if a person die as the result of such wrongful act, neglect, or default as is mentioned in section 1 during the pendency in a court of admiralty of the United States of a suit to recover damages for personal injuries in respect of such act, neglect, or default, the personal representative of the decedent may be substituted as a party and the suit may proceed as a suit under this Act for the recovery of the compensation provided in section 2. Sec. 6. That in suits under this Act the fact that the decedent has been guilty of contributory negligence shall not bar recovery, but the court shall take into consideration the degree of negligence attributable to the decedent and reduce the recovery accordingly.

Sec. 7. That the provisions of any State statute giving or regulating rights of action or remedies for death shall not be affected by this Act. Nor shall this Act apply to the Great Lakes or to any waters within the territorial limits of any State, or to any navigable waters in the Panama Canal Zone.

Sec. 8. That this Act shall not affect any pending suit, action, or proceeding.

It will be observed that this act places loss of life on the high seas in the same category as personal injuries. The suit is to be brought by the personal representative of the decedent for the benefit of the decedent's wife, husband, parent, child or dependent relative. It would appear that if there are no such persons an action could not be maintained. This would seem to exclude a right of action where the decedent leaves only creditors or heirs of more remote degree than those enumerated. Nearly all the states have statutes providing for recovery on account of loss of life at sea and these statutes have hitherto been enforced in the admiralty courts. Section 7 provides that the federal act shall not affect rights of action or remedies for death provided by state laws. The act is broad enough in terms to include a right of action for the death of seamen, but there is another statute covering such cases (see Chapter V, §6, supra).

The act does not affect the right of the owners of a ship to limit their liability. Claims for loss of life when properly payable under the act would apparently be included among claims to be paid out of the limited liability.

The act does not enlarge the responsibility of the owners. Whether they are responsible in personam, or whether the vessel is solely responsible in rem depends on the privity or knowledge of the owner, as discussed in Chapter VIII, §9 infra.

REFERENCES FOR GENERAL READING

Carriage of Goods by Sea, T.G. Carver. London, 1909; Stevens and Sons, Ltd.

Law of Carriers, E.P. Wheeler. New York, 1890; Baker, Voorhis & Co.

Maritime Law, Albert Saunders. London, 1901; Sweet & Maxwell, Ltd. Fitzgerald, 212 Fed. 678.

Wildcroft, 201, U.S., 378.

Sumner v. Caswell, 20 Fed. 249.

Dan, 40 Fed. 691.

Harlem, 27 Fed. 236.

Hattie P., 63 Fed. 1015.

Manitoba, 104 Fed. 145.

Majestic, 56 Fed. 244.

Normania, 62 Fed. 469.

Kensington, 183 U.S. 263.

[13] See p. 181.

[14] Prior to the advent of steam navigation this was not the rule. A carrier, in order to discharge his liability, was obliged to deliver the cargo upon the usual wharf of the vessel, and give actual notice to the consignee, if he were known.

[15] See §2, this chapter, infra.

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