Value of History and Philosophy for Jurisprudence; the new proposals for the reform of legal studies in Austria

Our theme; Relation to Ihering’s lecture before the Vienna Law Society

Twofold meaning of the expression “natural right”

Points of agreement with Ihering; rejection of the “jus naturae” and “jus gentium”; pre-ethical political statutes

Opposition to Ihering; There exists a universally valid naturally recognizable moral law. Relative independence of the question

The notion “natural sanction”

Manifold misconception of the same by philosophers

Habitually developed feeling of compulsion as such is no sanction

Motives of hope and fear as such not yet sanction

The thought of the arbitrary command of a higher power is not the natural sanction

The ethical sanction is a command similar to the logical rule

The aesthetic point of view; as little in ethics as in logic the right one

Kant’s Categorical Imperative an impracticable fiction

Necessity for preliminary psychological inquiries

No willing without a final end

The problem: which end is right? the chief problem of ethics

The right end is the best among attainable ends; obscureness of this definition

Of the origin of the conception of the good; it has not its origin in the sphere of the so-called external impression

The common characteristic of everything psychical

The three fundamental classes of psychical phenomena; idea (Vorstellung), judgment, feeling (GemÜtsbewegung)

The contrasts, belief and denial, love and hate

Of these opposed modes of relation one is always right, one wrong

The conception of the good

Distinction of the good in the narrow sense from what is good for the sake of some other good

Love is not always a proof that an object is worthy to be loved

“Blind” and “self-evident” judgment

Analogous distinction in the sphere of pleasure and displeasure; criterion of the good

Plurality of the good; problems associated therewith

Whether by “the better” is to be understood that which deserves to be loved with more intensity

Right determination of the conception

When and how do we recognize that anything is in itself preferable? The case of the opposite, of absence, of the addition of like to like

Cases where the problem is insoluble

Whether the Hedonists in this respect would have the advantage

Why these failures prove less disadvantageous than might be feared

The sphere of the highest practical good

The harmonious development

The natural sanction respecting the limits of right

The natural sanction for positive ethical laws

The power of the natural sanction

True and false relativity respecting ethical rules

Derivation of well known special enactments

Why other philosophers, by other ways, arrive at the same goal

Whence arise the universally extended ethical truths? Unclearness concerning processes in one’s own consciousness

Trace of the influence of the moments severally mentioned

Lower currents exercising an influence

Necessity of guarding against overlooking the distinction between ethical and pseudo-ethical development

Value of such developments in the pre-ethical time; establishment of the social order; formation of dispositions; outlines of laws at the disposal of legislative ethical authority; security against doctrinaire tendencies

Beneficent influences which still operate continually from this side

A further word on the reform of politico-legal studies

In defence of my characterization of Herbart’s ethical criterion

Of Kant’s Categorical Imperative

The Nicomachean Ethics and Ihering’s “fundamental idea” in his work; Der Zweck im Recht

Of the cases of smaller chances in the effort after higher ends

Of the dependence of the conceptions upon concrete perceptions

The term “intentional”

The fundamental classification of mental states in Descartes

Windelband’s error in respect of the fundamental classification of mental states; short defence of various attacks upon my Psychology from the Empirical Standpoint; Land, on a supposed improvement on formal logic; Steinthal’s criticism of my doctrine of judgment

In criticism of Sigwart’s theories of the existential and negative judgments

Descartes on the relation of “love” to “joy” and of “hate” to “sadness”

Of the notions of truth and existence

Of the unity of the notion of the good

Of “evidence.” Descartes “Clara et distincta perceptio.” Sigwart’s doctrine of “evidence” and his “postulates”

Of ethical subjectivism. Aristotle’s oversight in respect of the source of our knowledge of the good. Parallels between his error in respect of the feelings (GemÜtsthÄtigkeit), and Descartes’ doctrine of the “Clara et distincta perceptio” as a pre-condition of the logically justified judgment; modern views which approach to this doctrine

Of the expressions “gut gefallen” and “schlecht gefallen”

Typical case of a constant geometrical relation of mental values

Cases in which something at the same time both pleases and displeases

Establishment of universal laws of valuation on the basis of a single experience

Certain moments in the theory of ethical knowledge are of more importance for the theodicy than for ethics itself

Explanation of the manner in which anything in certain cases is recognized as preferable

The two cases, unique in their kind, in which preferability becomes clear for us from a certain character in the act of preference

Gauss on the measurement of intensities

Against exaggerated expectations from the so-called psycho-physical law

Defence against the objection of a too great ethical rigour

Love of neighbour in harmony with greater care of one’s own good

Why the narrowness of human foresight should not do injury to moral courage

In criticism of Ihering’s view of the notion of right and of his criticism of older views

Of the provisional ethical sanction of objectionable laws

Self-contradiction of Epicurus

Proof for the law of addition of like to like; testimony for it in the teaching of the Stoa, of the theistic Hedonists, and in the demand for immortality; Helmholtz

The great theologians are opponents of the arbitrary character of the divine law of morals

John Stuart Mill on the doctrine of the distinction between “blind” and “self-evident judgments”

Short sketch of the essential features treated in Miklosich’s article

Critical remarks