ROJO'S JOURNAL

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Journal of what occurred at the attack and defense of the city of Manila, the capital of Philipinas islands, and of the archipelago of San Lazaro, from September 22 to October 5, 1762, the day on which it was taken by assault by Brigadier Guillermo Drapert, commander-in-chief of the British troops of the East Indias.

Before commencing this journal, it is fitting to give a brief description of the location of Manila, and of the destitute condition in which the enemy found its fortifications and defenses in order that we may present a clear idea of the vigorous resistance that was made even to the last extremity.1

The city of Manila, according to the map of Father Murillo, is located in 14° 40' of north latitude, and 158° 35' east longitude, on a tongue of land which terminates in a point, and forming the figure of a jug or flagon, whose extremity or neck is formed by the above point itself and contains the royal fort of Santiago. At the west it is terminated by a large bay at the north by the Pasig River, which bathes its walls. On the land side from south to east, it is defended by four flat bastions with their casemates, and right flanks covered with orillons, and with ditches, covered way, and glacis. Along the sea, the city is fortified by a long curtain with five little flat bastions, a reduct located at a great distance from the wall. The lines of defense have such disproportion from one another, that those bastions cannot be defended reciprocally. It is impossible, further, to prevent the approach by the curtain, because there is neither ditch nor terreplein. Then too, the parapets are only one foot wide, and the curtain six.

The curtain embracing the north side, bathed by the river, and which has a kind of curvature where it forms two reËntrant angles, is in the same condition of weakness as that of the sea, and is defended by two small bastions, which present the same defect noted above in their lines of defense.

From the bastion of San Gabriel to the gate of the PariÁn on the east of the city, is located a false screen or barbacan with its parapet and banquette. It is defective, for it is fallen, and has no gate for the retreat of the soldiers. The gate of the PariÁn is covered and defended by a small outer work in the form of a crown, and the royal gate by a ravelin so poorly placed and so poorly ordered, that it cannot defend the faces of the collateral bastions of San AndrÉs and of the foundry. The flanks of the two latter bastions are not any more capable of defending the faces of the ravelin. It must be added to the above that all those fortifications are very old and defective: the walls; the chemise, or revetement, three feet thick at the cordon, without counterfort; the escarp and counter-escarp fallen in part; and almost everything useless.

The covered way is very short and filled with thickets and bushes. Its parapet is in ruins and it has no stockade or palisade. It is so low, that it leaves the most essential parts of the bastions and curtains open clear to the foot. The embrasures are poorly placed. The gates on the sea side, are pierced through, and so old and so used up, that they cannot offer any resistance at all. The esplanades of the boulevards are so irregular and so rough, that it is impossible to maneuver with the artillery, which, besides, was mounted on ship’s carriages so old that they could not be fired without danger of being dismounted.

The royal fort of Santiago is composed of two demi-bastions which dominate the city, and of a third one which points outward and prevents the approach of the enemy. It has two circular platforms, and several flanks intended for the same use. The curtains which unite these bastions have no terreplein, and the places from which to fire are distributed without any measure or proportion.

Plan of city of Manila and its fortifications, 1762, from Le Gentil’s Voyage (Paris, 1779–1781)

Plan of city of Manila and its fortifications, 1762, from Le Gentil’s Voyage (Paris, 1779–1781)

[From copy in library of Wisconsin Historical Society]

The garrison of this place consisted of the royal regiment, which has been composed, since its creation, of twenty companies of one hundred men apiece, under the command of captains, lieutenants, and ensigns. These companies have never been full, and have never amounted to fifteen hundred men. When the enemy arrived, this regiment was diminished to such an extent both by the mortality and desertion of some men, and by the different detachments which were told off for the galleons and for other posts, that there were not more than five hundred and fifty-six soldiers. There were only eighty cannoneers, and those even were native Indians, who were but little skilled in the management of artillery. At the arrival of the enemy, four militia companies were formed, of sixty men each, and called commercial troops.2

Manila never thought that it would be attacked by European nations. It supported the security in which it existed on the distance and remoteness of its position, in relation with Europe, and on the fact that such an example had never happened, although the two crowns had often been at war. In such confidence, they had been satisfied with putting the place in a state of defense against the Moros and neighboring nations who were little skilled in the art of war, the management of large artillery, muskets, and in the terrible artifice of throwing bombs, grenades, shells, etc. For in order that Manila might be defended against European nations, it would have needed four thousand well drilled men and all the corresponding equipment, things which this city has lacked even to the present.3

In this state of defense, on the twenty-second of September, 1762, at half-past five in the evening, a powerful fleet of thirteen vessels was seen. Although so unexpected a novelty caused the greatest surprise and the greatest astonishment, since there was no news in Manila of the war, and it was not supposed even that it had been declared, it was suspected nevertheless, that that was a hostile fleet. Consequently, his Excellency, Archbishop Roxo, governor and captain-general, gave on the spot the orders necessary and in accordance with the circumstances, to put the place in a state of defense, without forgetting to send to Cavite the help needed there.

While the preparations for the defense were being made, it was decided that it was necessary to write to the commander of the squadron, in order to tell him that he was to announce his nationality, for what purpose he had come, and the reason why he had entered the bay, without first having announced himself. The following night, an officer was assigned to bear this letter.4 About eleven o’clock, next morning, a boat which had been sent from the squadron, drew up to the fort. It bore two English officers, and ours who was returning, with a communication signed by Admiral Samuel Cornis, and by Brigadier-general Drapert, commander-in-chief of the land forces of his Britannic Majesty assigned for the present expedition. In their letter they announced that they were coming by order of their sovereign, for the conquest of the islands. Consequently, they urged that the city of Manila, its fortifications, and its territory, be surrendered to them. If that were not done, or indeed if any resistance were made (which they did not expect, unless the authors of the resistance were crazy), they had brought formidable forces to make themselves masters of all the land by force of arms, and they would immediately commence hostilities after hearing the answer.5

The captain-general answered them that the proposition which had just been made could not be accepted by subjects so faithful to their king, and that they were all resolved to sacrifice their lives for the defense of religion and the honor of the arms of their sovereign.6

As soon as they had received the answer, the entire squadron began to move about six o’clock on the evening of the twenty-third. They approached as near as possible to the south shore of the city, opposite the reduct called San Antonio Abad, which was used as a casemate, and which was one good half-league distant from the city. That same night, and until daybreak, the people busied themselves in taking all the gunpowder from that post. But it was necessary to abandon the said post with some effects and a goodly quantity of saltpetre, for the enemy landed at that same place, under support from the artillery of their ships. They took possession of the reduct as well as of the churches of Malate,7 Nuestra SeÑora de Guia, and Santiago, of the suburbs and shops along the seashore, between the church of San Juan de Bagumbayan, which was eighty-five toises from the city, and the reduct. That same night two pickets of musketeers were detached from the garrison, commanded by ——, with orders to attack the enemy, to dislodge them if possible, and to prevent at the same time, the disembarking which was being continued along various places on the shore. The pickets suffered a very severe fire from the musketry of the enemy, who were stationed in the church of Santiago, and the neighboring houses, so that they retired in disorder.

On the twenty-fourth, about eight o’clock in the morning, they began to salute the enemy with artillery from the boulevards of the foundry and from San AndrÉs, but with little effect, because the enemy were behind the churches which protected them.8

At nine in the morning, a small galley entered the bay, coming from the Embocadero of San Bernardino, with the news that the galleon “Philippino” had anchored in Palapa, on its return from Nueva EspaÑa. The hostile squadron detached a swift frigate and four armed chaloupes, which gave chase to the galley. Having fired some shots at it, the galley made shore at Tambobo. At the same time the majority of the people on that galley, soldiers and passengers leaped into the water. Two chaloupes captured it. The captain, a subaltern, who was in charge of the galley, and some persons who had stayed aboard, were made prisoners of war. The chaloupes tried to tow the galley, but not being able to succeed in it, they took all that they could out of it,9 except two six-pounder cannons which they were unable to move; and thereupon abandoned the galley and went back to their squadron. The captain-general had that galley set afire, after the two cannons had been taken out of it.

The following night it was resolved to make a vigorous sortie in order to discomfit the enemy who were fortifying themselves with all haste in the churches of which we have just spoken, namely, Nuestra SeÑora de Guia, Malate, and Santiago. Two four-pounders were detached, with the necessary artillerymen and the men needed to manage those cannons, fifty musketeers of the regular troops, some militiamen, and eight hundred Indian natives with their spears. In charge of this expedition was Monsieur Fayette (a Frenchman in the service of Manila). He attacked the enemy at their posts.10 The action lasted the greater part of the night, with a sharp fire on both sides; but Monsieur Fayette having recognized the invincible strength of the corps opposed to ours, and that fresh forces were continually coming to the enemy, ordered our men to retire a bit, and take position before the church of San Juan de Bagumbayan, where he kept his post all night, firing on the church of Santiago until nine o’clock of the morning of the twenty-fifth, when all the troops came back under protection of a new force which was sent them from the city.11 From that time until three o’clock in the afternoon, firing was suspended, because an officer of the hostile camp was received in the place, who was charged with a special mission.12

The bombardment continued without cessation. It did much damage to the buildings and killed some persons. The bombs that were picked up entire, were eighteen inches in diameter. They were kept to send back to the enemy in two mortars which were found in the royal magazines. That same night, some cannons loaded with grape were discharged on the enemy. To it was joined a fusillade which produced a good effect, for on the day of the twenty-sixth,13 several corpses were to be seen from the place scattered between the glacis and the hostile trenches. Some muskets that had been left by those killed were picked up. Since the enemy did not take them away, their bodies were buried in the bellies of hungry foxes and dogs which were very numerous there, and which devoured them in a short time in the sight of our men who manned the walls.

At eight in the morning, some Indian and mestizo spearmen presented themselves before the enemy’s trenches, without that movement on their part having been preceded by any order. On approaching the advanced outposts who were occupying the sacristies of the church of San Juan de Bagumbayan, the bakery, and other neighboring houses, those Indians (although few in number), threw themselves on the enemy with such fury that they gained possession of the posts which have just been mentioned. They drove out the hostile musketeers, wounding and killing all that they met. But the English were promptly succored by a reËnforcement of three hundred fusileers, who regained the posts that they had lost, and caused the Indians to retreat, to whom a signal was made from the bastion of San Andres to leave a clear field so that the fire of our artillery could have free play. The artillery did, by this means, great harm to the enemy.

During the progress of this bloody action, an officer of the camp was perceived, who was carrying a white flag. He was followed and accompanied by a young man clad in black, and by a drummer beating the chamade. The fire of our artillery was suspended, but the fusillade of the enemy continued with unequaled obstinacy, against the Indian spearmen who always sustained that fire. Consequently, the Indians attacked the English officer, killed him, and gave seven mortal wounds to the young man who accompanied him. The drummer was also killed, and another person who appeared to be the servant of the officer. The Indians cut off the head of the latter, but not being longer able to endure the hostile fire they retired to the covered way of the royal gate, which was opened for them so that they could reËnter. Following are the facts of the case. The nephew of the archbishop, Don Antonio Sierra de Tagle, having been made prisoner on board the little galley and conducted aboard the flagship, of which we have spoken above, the English commander-in-chief had offered in advance to grant him his liberty, and the English officer was conducting him for that purpose. That young man died of his wounds.14

During the whole of this day, the bombardment continued with fury, the enemy having increased their batteries of the church of Santiago by three mortars. After dinner an officer was despatched to the camp of the enemy to agree upon a truce, so that they could take away the body of their officer who had been killed. They did so, but many other dead bodies were left. On our side also, some who had been wounded were brought in.

On the morning of the twenty-eighth, a message was received from the English commander-in-chief, who urgently demanded the head of the English officer which the Indians had taken: as well as the author of that deed, with the threat that if it were not done, he would send the heads of all the prisoners whom they had in their power, and especially those of two officers, who had been made prisoners aboard the little galley. That demand was completely satisfied, and we were exculpated from a deed in which we had no part, and the blame for which was to be attributed to the lack of civilized customs among the Indians, and especially to the Sepoys, who, as has been said, did not cease to continue hostilities by their constant fire. Our captain-general (the archbishop), mounted on horseback, and went to see the hostile camp, in order to appease the trouble that that affair had aroused, and in fact it did not go farther.

The bombardment continued without cessation, and from half-past five in the evening until seven the flagship and another ship fired on the city, but with very slight result, for the balls which were fired horizontally were all buried on the shore, and those to which they gave a slight elevation, nearly all passed over the city, and were lost on the other side.

That same day, two mortars were fixed and placed in a battery on the rampart of the foundry, with which many bombs were thrown into the hostile camp and into the trenches.

On the twenty-ninth,15 at six in the morning, the flagship and another vessel commenced to cannonade the bastion of the foundry, and made a desperate fire, which continued until eight o’clock with the same activity. From that time until ten it was moderated. In the afternoon of that same day, two craft entered by way of the great strait (of Mariveles). Immediately two of the enemy’s squadron were detached, which having joined the two which were coming, anchored with them near Manila. It was learned afterward that those craft were two English frigates, which had become separated from the body of the squadron in a great storm; as was also the case with the “Namur,” which had lost its masts and had been forced to put in at Canton. Hence their total squadron numbered sixteen sail.

The thirtieth, the bombardment continued, and the vessels fired some shots from their cannons.16 From the city four chaloupes were seen which had overturned; they were coming ashore with men and war supplies. The same accident happened to a champan which they had captured in the days preceding. This accident had happened through the violence of the west wind which had freshened. This was at four in the afternoon, and at six, a bomb-ketch made shore opposite the reduct of San Antonio Abad.

October first, the Indians of Passay reported that a raft had made the shore, which was built of large masts, small masts, and yards that had belonged to the bomb-ketch; that this raft had on it the moorings, and artillery of the above bomb-ketch. They reported that they had seen many people drowned on the beach. Upon this report, the native cavalry was detached in order that they might seize those effects. But when they arrived at the place, they were repulsed by the enemy’s musketry, who had hastened from their general quarter of Malate and from the powder factory in order to protect the raft and its load.

At daybreak of the second, the enemy placed in operation a battery of eight twenty-four pounders against the flanked angle of the bastion of the foundry, and against the face which looked upon their camp. That battery was so well served, that at ten in the morning, all the parapet of that part was on the ground. At the same time, they directed their mortars (nine in number and of various calibers) toward the bastion itself. The flagship and another vessel bombarded the same bastion on the side looking seaward, with such fury that along the shore and beyond the walls on the landside, more than four thousand twenty-four pound balls were collected. But what molested us still more was the musketry of the enemy, which was placed in the tower and church of Santiago, which they had arranged for that purpose by opening in all the roofs several windows so that they dominated us. They saw also all that occurred in the city, and although the greatest efforts and the most powerful attempts were made to batter down the church with our artillery, we were unable to do it, or to dislodge the enemy from that post. But it is incredible that our bastion being open without a parapet on either side, it is incredible, I say, that of the various officers who sustained it, and of all the musketeers and artillerymen who were obliged to fire in barbet, there were killed only two artillerymen, two musketeers, and three pioneers, in spite of a desperate fire which all those men suffered from five different parts. It is true that more than twenty wounded and maimed were taken out, among whom was a lieutenant belonging to the artillery who lost his right arm. The greater part of the officers were wounded and bruised from blows with stones, and had contusions, but that did not prevent them from sticking to their posts. The vessels ceased their fire at orisons. That of the camp continued all night with the same activity, so that the artillery of our bastion having been dismounted, they were obliged to abandon that post, leaving there only a few sentinels without shelter.

At the same time, various assemblies and parties of Indians from the provinces were formed to the number of five thousand more or less. But only two thousand five hundred Pampangos were found who were deemed capable of undertaking anything. Consequently, it was resolved to make a sortie.17 It was to be undertaken at the close of the night of the third, as follows. The Pampangos were to form in three columns. The first column was to attack the church of Santiago on the side where the enemies had their batteries of cannons and mortars. The second was to hurl itself on Malate and Ermita where the general quarters were located. The third was to invest by the sea side. Those three columns were to be supported by two pickets of musketeers, commanded by the sargento-mayor of Cavite, two captains, and four subalterns. At the hour set, our Pampangos and pickets sallied out in the best order, but scarce had they set foot outside the PariÁn gate, when they began to utter loud cries in disorder and make a great racket. That allowed the camp of the enemy to get into readiness to receive them. In spite of that, the Pampango troops entered their camp, killed the advance sentinels, and caused great damage to the enemy. Those Indians themselves suffered no less from the hostile musketry. They would have suffered still more if confusion had not reigned there; for the enemy, in their fear of killing one another, did not dare to play some cannon loaded with grape, which they had prepared and posted in different places. The pickets seeing this disorder, halted before the church of San Juan de Bagumbayan, whence they fired against the church of Santiago, thus protecting the retreat of the Pampangos, which took place at nine in the morning. The action was bloody on both sides. One soldier of the pickets was killed and eight wounded. The mortality among the Pampangos was heavy. It was learned afterward that the enemy having lost some of their officers, who were killed in the action, had had more than sixty Pampangos, whom they had captured and taken prisoners, hanged in their camp. That action so intimidated and disconcerted all the other Pampangos that they all retired to their respective villages, so that there remained very few of them who would return to Manila.

That action did not at all interrupt the fire of the battery against the bastion of the foundry, so that when daybreak came, it could be seen that an eighteen-pounder cannon had fallen into the ditch, and it could not be recovered. The greater part of the face and the terreplein of the same bastion had also fallen, and their ruins had dried up the ditch. But what caused the greatest anxiety was that the engineer recognized that the enemy was busy making a new battery for the purpose of dismounting the artillery, the collateral flanks of the bastions San AndrÉs and San Eugenio, which flanked and defended the entrance to the covered way and the approach to the breach. In fact, that battery began to play at noon with so great activity, that it dismounted the cannons of the flanks in two hours time, overthrew the parapets, and killed some fusileers and pioneers. Twice were other parapets made with beams and bags of sand, but each time they were in ruins the moment after. Consequently, the men were obliged to retire from those bastions. The bastion of San AndrÉs did not suffer so much, for it was stronger. However, it had one cannon of the caliber of eighteen, which was placed in the elevated flank, dismounted. We had no other hope than in another cannon of equal caliber, of the two which were in this flank, for while we still had two cannons of the caliber of four in the low place, the latter could be of but little service.

Our captain-general, having been informed of everything, called the council of war in the afternoon of the same day; and that council lasted until the night. The master-of-camp, the sargento-mayor of the city, the sargento-mayor of Cavite, the sargento-mayor of the royal regiment, those of the militia, and the deputies of the merchant body, of the city, and of the various ecclesiastic orders were present, all being introduced by the ordinary engineer. The latter, having reported the fatal condition of the place, advice or opinions were mutually given. All, with the exception of the military men, were of the opinion to continue the defense, by making use of the ordinary means for the repairs necessary to the bastions, and by making ditches, etc. The military men thought that we ought to capitulate.18 But having asked them whether they thought that we ought to capitulate immediately, they answered no, and that they said it only because the breach had commenced, and that it would be practicable next day, and it would be difficult to make the ditches and repairs necessary to prevent the city from being taken by assault.

Having been informed of everything, our captain-general gave the orders and made all the preparations necessary for beginning the work, and for making the proposed ditches. He watched all the operations and all the movements of the enemy.19

At dawn on the fourth, the enemy began to fire shells into the city. They set fire to several of the buildings, and together with the shot from the mortar batteries and the fusillade from the tower of Santiago, which resembled a shower of hail, threw the garrison and the inhabitants into great consternation, which gradually increased.20 All the day of the fourth, and the following night, were passed in this perplexity, no means being found by which to escape the danger. Although orders for the ditches and the defense of the breach were renewed, in order to prevent the assault, and activity was redoubled and the necessary efforts made, yet there was no means of executing any of those things, because of the continual and deadly fire of the enemy.

Consequently, there was no means of getting the bearers of fascines to work. Finally, at six o’clock in the morning of the fifth, the enemy’s troops left their posts in three columns. The first directed its course toward the breach; the second toward the royal gate; and the third marched along the highway surrounding the covered way, toward the east and bordering on the plaza de armas.

The few soldiers left us occupied the gorge of the bastion of the foundry, the royal gate, the flank of the bastion of San AndrÉs, and the curtain joining them. The enemy were supported by their batteries and by the fusileers of the tower of Santiago, who poured in a steady fire. Consequently, it was impossible for ours to occupy the breach in order to defend the approach. The approaching columns discharged two rounds with their muskets, by which they swept the two collateral bastions, the curtain, and all the posts which could oppose them. Finally, all together, they mounted the breach, and seized the bastion of the foundry. At the same instant they attacked the royal gate, which they battered down with axes and iron levers.

After some slight opposition on our side, some officers who were there, not being able to defend those posts, the enemy fired from there on the other posts which they seized also following the cordon, and went to present themselves before the fort whither the governor and captain-general had retired.

At that moment, the militia, the regular troops, and the Indians who were in that fort, threw themselves in disorder from the top of the walls. Many threw themselves into the river, where a number of them were drowned. Consequently, when the captain-general reached the fort, he found only the castellan, Monsieur Pignon, his second, and one artilleryman. The few troops that he found were in confusion and were throwing themselves from the wall. The enemy’s column which entered by the royal gate directed its course toward the plaza de armas and seized the palace.21 That which marched by the highway, took the small fort which defends the bridge across the Pasig River. Thence it went to the city, entering by the PariÁn gate.22

The fort flung a white flag, and terms of capitulation were proposed, which the British officers refused to accept. At the same moment the colonel pressed the fort to surrender, else indeed hostilities would be continued and arms used. The captain-general pressed and greatly embarrassed, resolved to go in person with the colonel, under the good faith of the guaranty of his person in order to treat concerning the capitulation with the general. In fact, they discussed the matter at length in the palace. The archbishop desired to have military honors accorded, insisting on this point several times but not being able to obtain it. He was compelled to give an order for the surrender of the fort, and all the men were made prisoners of war with the exception of the captain-general. The military were granted the honor of keeping their swords and the repeated demands of the captain-general could obtain nothing else.23

The city was given over to pillage, which was cruel and lasted for forty hours, without excepting the churches, the archbishopric, and a part of the palace. Although the captain-general objected at the end of twenty-four hours, the pillage really continued, in spite of the orders of the British general for it to cease. He himself killed with his own hand a soldier whom he found transgressing his orders, and had three hanged.24

In the doings of that day, the sargento-mayor of the royal regiment, two captains, two subalterns, about fifty soldiers of the regular troops, and thirty of the commerce militia were killed on our side, and many were wounded.

In the other doings, and especially in the last sortie, more than three hundred Indians were killed, and more than four hundred wounded.

The number killed on the side of the enemy we have not been able to learn exactly. It has been learned only by some circumstances, that in the review made two days after the taking of the place, the enemy had lost more than a thousand men, among whom were sixteen officers. Among those officers, was a sargento-mayor of Drapert’s regiment, who was killed on the day of the assault by an arrow; and the commandant of the regiment of Chamal, who was killed by a musket ball, as he was watching with a glass the approach from the tower of Santiago. The vice-admiral25 was drowned when coming ashore in a small boat which overturned; and the same accident caused the death of some sailors and soldiers.

The forces of the enemy consisted of fifteen hundred European soldiers, chosen from Drapert’s regiment, and from the battalion of the volunteers of Chamal; two artillery companies of sixty men apiece; three thousand European sailors, fusileers and well disciplined; eight hundred Sepoys, with muskets, forming two battalions, and fourteen hundred of the same troops destined for the fascines. That formed an army of six thousand eight hundred and thirty men.

The two mortar batteries, which, as has been said, were of different caliber, threw more than five thousand bombs into the city.26 The land batteries and those of the ships fired more than twenty thousand shots from twenty-four pounders, and ruined the city in many places. The enemy sent about twenty-five shells, which set fires in five different places; and if all diligence had not been employed, the city, or the greater part of it, would have been in ashes. Manila, December 23, 1762.


1 See Report of the War Department for 1903 (Washington, 1903), iii, pp. 434–446: “Historical Sketch of the Walls of Manila.”?

2 “The English knew as much of the weakness of that city as the Spaniards themselves, because of the voyages that they made there annually. There was (and the same was true in 1766 and 1767) the greatest freedom of going everywhere, of seeing and visiting everything. When I left that city, I could easily have given an idea of the plan of the fortifications of that place. The Spaniards were without distrust in this regard. The English knew besides that the garrison was very weak, and composed of Mexican soldiers, good enough indeed, but of little skill in the military art, as they had never fired a gun; and composed, in a word, of soldiers, sufficient to impose on Negroes, but incapable of opposing well disciplined troops, accustomed for some years to fighting in India.” See Le Gentil, ii, p. 236.?

3 Cf. with this statement the letter by Baltasar Vela, S.J., post, pp. 288–295.?

4 This was Lieutenant Fernando Arcaya. See Sitio y conquista de Manila, p. 36.?

5 Ferrando (Historia de los PP. dominicos, Madrid, 1871, iv, p. 621), says that the first summons for surrender from Cornish and Draper demanded the immediate delivery of eight million escudos, the equivalent of four million pesos.?

6 “After consulting the royal assembly of these islands the governor replied: ‘Gran BretaÑa must know already that fear and threats are not the securest method nor the most fitting means to celebrate treaties with the noble servants of the Spanish sovereign. History has shown the world that Spaniards know how to die like good men for their God, for their king, and for their fatherland, but never to yield in the face of danger, much less to be intimidated by arrogant threats. Go, then, and bear this message to your chiefs; and tell them that we here are ready in any event to sell our lives dear.’ ” See Ferrando, iv, p. 621.?

7 After the taking of the Augustinian convent at Malate, the archbishop issued a circular to all the religious orders, telling them “that it was now time for them to leave their cloisters and aid in the defense of the city,” which they did gladly. Later, he ordered all the orders to furnish soldiers, and many of the religious entered the ranks. See Sitio y conquista, pp. 39, 50.?

8 “These were the two churches that ArandÍa desired to have demolished one year before his death, and for which the friars tried to excommunicate him. It is quite certain that these two citadels which were only eighty toises from the body of the city, hastened and furthered the capture of the city. By favor of these churches, the English raised and formed their batteries of cannons and mortars with the greatest ease …. I have seen the ruins of one of these churches, whose walls were yet high enough to make excellent retrenchments with very little labor.” See Le Gentil, ii, pp. 239, 240.?

9 In this boat were captured money amounting to 30,000 pesos, and other objects of value. See Sitio y conquista, p. 42.?

10 The Marquis de Ayerbe (Sitio y conquista) gives this force as consisting of two companies of fifty Spaniards, and more than two hundred Indians and mestizos with spears, muskets, and two eight-pounders. He was seconded by JosÉ del Busto.?

11 Of this sortie, Le Gentil says (ii, p. 243): “This sortie was only a kind of boast and bravado, for how could one flatter himself, with at the most sixty men (for I do not take any account of the eight hundred Indians and two small cannons) that he could give any trouble to six thousand men of good troops, withdrawn into two or three citadels, which it would really have been necessary to have besieged in order to try to dislodge them; for the walls of all these churches are made of cut stone, and are as thick as the walls of the royal observatory, namely, five or six feet thick, and are octagonal.” The reËnforcements sent to Fayette consisted of two Spanish companies and 1,500 Indians, commanded by Pedro Iriarte; and later one other company commanded by Fernando de Araya.

Opinions are divided as to the conduct of Fayette (Fallet), some accusing him of treason and others exonerating him. Ferrando (iv, p. 623) says, when speaking of his night sortie, that he retired only because of superior numbers, and adds: “Without reason and justice, the suspicion of treason against the French official (Sr. Fallet) who directed that sortie according to good principles of [military] science (which do not always triumph over tenfold the number of legions), would lie then on the conscience of the country.” At the assault, however (ut supra, p. 628), Fayette, who was ordered to guard the breach in the wall, was with some reason accused of treason because of the lukewarmness which he displayed in its defense; and because he finally went over to the British lines, being received there gladly. In fact when the British were forming for the assault Fayette had ordered the Indian archers to retire from the breach under pretext of taking some refreshment and rest before the assault—which was well calculated to aggravate suspicions. The English, seeing this move, were quick to take advantage of it. Monterory Vidal says (ii, p. 27) that he played the traitor at the assault by not offering any resistance. The Marquis de Ayerbe (Sitio y conquista, p. 44) calls him a Swiss.?

12 This was doubtless the officer with the second British summons for surrender. It was probably at the council held in consequence of this (see ante, note 38), that the fiscal, Leandro de Viana, was appointed to see after the supply of provisions for the defense of the city. He issued orders to the alcaldes-mayor of the various provinces, and to the procurators of the convents, from whose estates much rice and other effects were received. Viana advised the archbishop to leave all military matters to the sargentos-mayor of Manila and Cavite, but the latter refused to do so. See Montero y Vidal, ii, p. 17.?

13 On the twenty-sixth 3,000 Indian archers from the provinces of Pampanga, BulacÁn, and Laguna; but neither these volunteers nor 4,000 others armed with quivers, who joined later were very greatly feared by the English because of their inexperience in the art of war and their primitive armor. A contemporary paper gives the following data: “Report of the men-at-arms whom it has been possible to collect inside and outside the place, without including the troops or militia: 600 men from the province of BulacÁn, in Bancusay; 1,950 Pampangos, in San Fernando and the barracks of the accountancy; 150 Pampangos in the palace, in charge of Santa MarÍa; 133 men in the archiepiscopal house, 38 of them with muskets being Tagalogs; 110 men from Meycaoyan and Bocaue, in the house of Dorado; 153 men from Hagonoy; 150 men from BulacÁn; 60 from Guiguinto; 72 from various villages; total 3,378.” See Montero y Vidal, ii, p. 18.?

14 He refused absolutely to accept the freedom offered him by Draper until he received an order from the archbishop to that effect. See Sitio y conquista, p. 43.?

15 The Marquis de Ayerbe (Sitio y conquista, p. 48) says that 500 Indians left the plaza de armas in command of the archbishop, ministers of the Audiencia, and some of the citizens, on the twenty-ninth, but that they were quickly put to flight by the English fire.?

16 September 30, the Spaniards received a reinforcement of 609 men from BulacÁn, as follows: from Paombong, 82 men, under command of Sebastian Lorenzo; Bocaue, 149 men, under command of Augusto Percumenla; Calumpit, 16 men, under Juan Panganiban; Malolos, 45 men, under Anastasio Bautista; Obando, 53 men, under Pedro C. Salvador; Angat, 79 men, under NicolÁs de Aquino; San JosÉ, 30 men, under NicolÁs MatÍas; Polo, 75 men, under Juan Roque; and BigÁa, 80 men, under Domingo Francisco. See Montero y Vidal, ii, p. 21. On the first and second of October they were furnished with arrows, spears, and other weapons (Sitio y conquista, pp. 51, 52).?

17 At dawn of the third of October, a sally was made by 2,000 Pampangos arranged in three columns: the first in command of Francisco RodrÍguez and their valiant leader Manalastas; the second in command of Santiago OrendaÍn; and the third, in command of the volunteers Esclava and Busto. The first reached the church of Santiago, which they found empty, but were driven thence by the British. The second bore down upon Ermita, where they were at first successful, but were speedily driven back by the British, with a loss of 200 men, OrendaÍn fleeing at the beginning of the engagement, which is regarded as proof of his treachery. The third column, which was to have attacked by the sea side, grew faint hearted and retreated. Many natives, alarmed because the British had hanged more than sixty Pampangos whom they had captured, returned to their homes. See Montero y Vidal, ii, pp. 22, 23.?

18 The military men who were mainly Americans, counseled surrender, at the council held by the archbishop on the third of October, but their advice was overruled by the marquis de Monte-Castro, the magistrates, the religious, and the merchants. This council, as is evident from the record by OrendaÍn, the government secretary, was called on account of a threatening letter from the British. See Montero y Vidal, ii, pp. 23–25, and note; and post, pp. 206–208.?

19 Some religious were ordered by the marquis de Monte-Castro to lead some Indians to the foundry to make tools for making the ditch. But this was not done, in spite of Father Pascual FernÁndez, of the Society of Jesus, teacher of mathematics, and the other religious, having worked with the greatest zeal. See Sitio y conquista, p. 56.?

20 The governor continued to give various orders which were not obeyed, and the master-of-camp limited himself to ordering the religious to prevent the Indians from mounting the bastions, on this account great confusion reigning in the city.?

21 As the British troops debouched into the square of the palace, their column could have been annihilated by the batteries of the fort of Santiago, but the archbishop did not permit them to fire, as he feared the vengeance of the English general. See Montero y Vidal, ii, p. 28.?

22 At the PariÁn gate, the resistance was but slight. Seventeen of the British were killed there, and but five of the Spaniards. See Sitio y conquista, p. 61.?

23 The archbishop promised the conquerors 1,000,000 pesos for the expenses of their squadron if they were exempted from the sack.?

24 Ferrando (iv, p. 631) says: “Finally the killing ceased, but the sack continued contrary to the previous agreement, without the lewdness of the soldiers pardoning either the honor of the married women or the virginity of girls, who were everywhere the victims of their brutal appetites …. According to old histories, many young women, who had taken refuge during the danger, at the beaterio of Santa Rosa of this city of Manila, were violated. The venerable mother Paula, foundress and directress of said institution, asserted that not one of the girl boarders and collegiates of the house had been violated by the brutal soldiery.”

“There also entered the plaza de armas on this day [October 5], five hundred marines, dressed, armed, and uniformed like the regular English troops, who committed all kinds of excesses in the convents, churches, and houses.” A MS. by Alfonso Rodriguez de Ovalle entitled Sitio de Manila (written in 1763), cited by Marquis de Ayerbe, p. 60.?

25 Evidently Lieutenant Hardwick.?

26 The following account of the assault is taken from Le Gentil, ii, pp. 252–255:

“Archbishop Roxo was a capable man for the good management of finances. He was clever in business and very zealous for the service of the king. But he did not understand anything of military affairs. Consequently, the factions which were formed, and which he was unable to resist, were the cause of his not capitulating in time, and those factions caused the misfortune of Manila.

“It would be difficult to form an idea of the embarrassment in which this prelate found himself, and of the consternation of the entire village. I have been assured that the name of Arandia, that man whom the friars had, two years previously, dubbed a heretic, and toward whom they had been so hostile that no one could be found who would take charge of his funeral oration, was heard pronounced several times. ‘If Arandia were living,’ said one, several times during the siege. It was perceived then that they lacked a man to direct. Several times the archbishop wished to capitulate, but he was prevented. Don Andres Roxo has assured me very emphatically, that had the archbishop been alone, and had he not been besieged on one side by the auditors, and on the other by the friars, he would not have waited until the English had mounted to the assault. It was in fine a notorious fact at the time of my stay in Manila, that the fiscal and especially an auditor, who has died since my departure, were the cause of Roxo not capitulating in time. Many councils, indeed, were held, but nothing was determined there. These councils, besides, were very illy made up; for, if the military men were excused from it, what good could come from appealing from the auditors there, who knew nothing in this line, and from fanatic friars. The latter made use of Mother Paula, whom they pretended had had visions of St. Francis. They carried the news of those visions to the archbishop, and did what they could to support him in the flattering idea that St. Francis would work a miracle in favor of the inhabitants of Manila and that one would see him on the breach, with his cord in his hand, defending and sustaining the assault, as he had formerly repulsed the Chinese, who, so they said at Manila, had risen against this city to the number of more than twenty thousand.

“While the English were pressing Manila, the auditors were besieging the archbishop, and prevented any one from approaching to speak with him. Monsieur Fayette, more experienced than the other officers, seeing the evident danger which was threatening the city, tried, in spite of the difficulty in penetrating thither, into the presence of the archbishop, to leap the barrier. Auditor —— was performing constant guard duty in the anti-chamber. It was impossible for Monsieur Fayette to get nearer. He told the auditor what brought him. The latter sent him back very roughly, giving him to understand that he was an ignoramus in the trade; that the governor was better informed than he; that the ministers of the king, who were there to assist the governor by their counsels, knew all that was to be done. ‘Do you take us,’ said he in wrath, ‘do you take us for traitors to our fatherland? Do we not know our obligations?’

“Monsieur Fayette retired. That same afternoon, the archbishop desired to go in person to view the breach (a fact that has been attested to me) but Auditor —— and the fiscal prevented him. They did not wish, they said, to have his most illustrious Lordship expose himself to so evident a danger. It is true that, since they were near his person in order to assist him with their counsels, it would have been necessary for the two auditors to have accompanied him in his visit.

“Don Andres Roxo has shown me a copy of one of the letters written to the king by this prelate, when he was near death, in which he gave his Majesty an account of his conduct, and asked his pardon for the errors which he had committed. When speaking of the matter that we have just seen concerning the visit to the breach, he says ‘Would to God that a cannon ball had then shortened my days.’

“Next morning bout six o’clock, the same officer (Monsieur Fayette) returned to make a second attempt. He succeeded finally in getting quite into the apartment of the archbishop, but it was after he had deceived and thrown the watchful auditor off his guard. It was then too late to deliberate. A messenger announced that the enemy were at the breach, in possession of the bastion of the foundry.

“The English were divided into three columns. The one which was to mount the breach was preceded by thirty volunteers and pioneers who were the first to mount, but who probably well knew that they would find but very little or no opposition.

“The breach was scarcely practicable, and these volunteers had some difficulty in mounting. Arrived at the bastion, they saw no one to dispute the ground with them. They cried out to their comrades that they had found no obstacles, and in fact, the few people that had been stationed on the bastion had become affrighted, and had fled in both directions along the wall. Some even threw themselves down from the walls. The column seeing that these volunteers met no resistance on the bastion, bravely mounted the breach, and took the bastion. The volunteers went to the royal gate, where they found a feeble guard, who, frightened, had taken refuge under an altar of the Virgin which was in the guardhouse, and before which all the guard were wont to recite the rosary night and morning. The guard thought that they were safe from all danger, but the English, having few scruples, massacred them. They opened the gates to the rest of the troops, who were only Sepoys, who composed the second column. Thus was Manila taken by assault.”?

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           

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