As the haughty heretic had not shown himself on these coasts during the months of April and May of this year, some believed that he was so severely punished, and even weakened, by the encounters and battles of the previous year, that they declared he would not dare return this year to molest these islands. But although it may be the fixed rule of the good soldier always to suppose the worst, Don Diego Faxardo, governor and captain-general of these islands, with his caution and long experience, determined that all precautions should be taken as if it were certain that the enemy would come to Manila this year, and with a greater force than before. To this end, in the council which was called for the despatch of the relief ships from Nueva EspaÑa, opinions agreed that, for this year, only one vessel should sail; and order was given that the building of another ship should be completed as speedily as possible in the shipyard in the islands of Leyte; and that in the port of Cabite the galleons, galleys, and other vessels there should be repaired. He ordered his sargento-mayor and commander of the garrison in Manila, who has in charge the fortifications, to exert every effort and spare no expense in making the walls of the city impregnable. The royal cavalier of San Diego, which commands the bay and that part of the shore which would be most dangerous [in case of attack], has been finished; it is truly a regal work, and the largest of its kind that has been seen in these parts. In like manner the ramparts are going up on both sides [i.e., sea and land], causing general surprise and admiration that so great a work can be carried on, without special cost or oppression to the colony, and with economy of the royal funds. The artillery was brought from Cagayan and other places, and provisions and ammunition were continually collected and stored; and finally his Lordship appointed a general, admiral, and other officers, that he might in any emergency have ready for immediate use as large a naval force as possible, in order to go out with it against the enemy. The condition of affairs, limited means, and lack of supplies, and above all the destitution of the natives in such calamitous times, prevented his Lordship, as regards the Armada, from giving to it his close attention. It therefore resulted that at the beginning of June, although men were at work on all of the vessels, only one galleon and two galleys were ready. On the ninth of the said month, the feast of the Holy Spirit [i.e., Pentecost], the commander of a champan which had gone with an armed guard, to carry twelve thousand pesos from the royal treasury to the presidio of Oton for the relief of Terrenate, came to port, and said that he was fleeing from three vessels of high freeboard which he had sighted near Luban, and he had fought with their lanches. On the afternoon of the same day this information was verified, for several vessels were seen to enter through the channels of Mariveles. His Lordship ordered that despatches be instantly sent to the alcaldes-mayor and military officers along the coast, so that they could be on their guard, and, besides, warn those who were sailing [in those waters], especially the galleon “Nuestra SeÑora de Guia,” which was on her way from the Leyte shipyard; and so diligently was this latter commission executed that the warning thus given enabled that galleon to elude the enemy. So important is it to have an officer who is faithful and diligent in carrying out the orders of his commander-in-chief. Two hundred Spanish infantry belonging to the garrison of this city marched to the port of Cabite well supplied with gunpowder and other munitions. With them was General Don Pedro de Almonte Verastegui, who had been selected for commander of the Armada on account of his high standing and distinguished services in the highest positions in these islands; Admiral Don Andres Axcueta, heir to the valor and services of his father, Master-of-camp Christoval de Axcueta Menchaca, who went as commander of the troops who were to aid the naval force; Captain Don Lope de Colindres, commander of the galleon “San Andres;” Don Pedro de Figueroa, sargento-mayor of the armada; and others, gentlemen and half-pay officers, who arrived at the port at dawn on the second day of the festival.

After the sun rose, eleven of the enemy’s vessels were seen half-way up the bay. General Andres Lopez de Azaldiqui was castellan and chief magistrate of that military post, as also of the royal galleys. During the past year, when the general public was feeling least anxiety about enemies his solicitude and care had led him to construct several defenses which were very important. There was a palisade of heavy timbers, and a parapet, with earthworks and gabions, with their platforms, on the side next the bay, which was the most exposed and defenseless position. Other palisades and fortifications were constructed in the village of the Indians, and in other places. Additional sentinels and guards were stationed along the beach and in the open country. His great prudence was made evident when, on the said day of the feast, the news arrived, and the ships of the enemy’s fleet began to come in sight. The call to arms was immediately sounded in the port; the posts and vessels were manned by Spanish infantry, and the shore, from San Roque to what is called EstanÇuela, by Japanese and Indians, as assistants to the Spaniards; and a patrol was formed of horsemen who were hastily summoned from the neighboring ranches.

Between nine and ten o’clock in the morning the heretics, leaving two ships to guard the entrances of Mariveles, proceeded with the nine others to the port of Cabite. Between ten and eleven o’clock they arrived within a gunshot of the land, the drums beating on the flagship, and the entire squadron making a fine display. Seeing the enemy within range, it was thought best to favor him with some shots, which were fired from the towers and platforms near by. The shots must have taken effect, for the flagship turned away, and directed its course seaward; and it fired a single cannon-shot—apparently to summon a patache which, going somewhat ahead, approached the shore, sounding the port and reconnoitering the vessels. The enemy went on to Pampanga, where they amused themselves until the following day, the last of the festival; then they returned to Cabite with ten ships. At nine o’clock in the evening, they anchored off the point called Punta del Sangley, at a legua from shore. When the moon had almost set an attempt was made by the enemy to reconnoiter the coast in that quarter with three lanchas; but the sentinels and patrols, who were forewarned, did not permit this. That night the fortifications were strengthened, two platforms were added, and other desirable precautionary and defensive measures were taken.

On Wednesday morning, June 12, the ten vessels and a champan were anchored in the same place; and at eight o’clock, two others appeared, coming under full sail from Mariveles. As soon as these were close to the enemy, the flagship weighed anchor, and the entire squadron sailed after it in line, making a beautiful sight, until they came within gunshot of the port, and abreast of the tower on the new gate, where a white flag with the royal arms was displayed; the flagship lowered its flag and maintopsail to half mast, and hoisted it again to the sound of drums and fifes. The fight at once began with the discharge of artillery from this tower, which was in charge of Sargento-mayor Don Pedro de Figueroa. The enemy responded with a furious volley, and boldly venturing into the harbor, anchored their six largest vessels at a suitable distance for bombarding our vessels, forts, and settlement; the other six vessels, with their sails trimmed to the wind, sailed to and fro, briskly skirmishing. Both sides fought sharply and incessantly, for eight hours, from eleven o’clock until almost seven in the evening. According to the count of our captain of artillery, one thousand eight hundred cannon-shots were fired by our side, and by the enemy over three thousand. Our fire was effective, for two Dutch prisoners, who were on the enemy’s flagship during the battle, deposed that the ship was struck by over one hundred and twenty balls, some of them piercing the hull through and through; others struck at the water-line, making so large a hole that it was necessary to get assistance from the other vessels to repair the damage. It is considered certain that if the flagship had not been anchored—and even run aground, as many say—she would have gone to the bottom. As many as thirty men were killed on that ship. If this vessel, which is the strongest in the whole squadron, and best equipped with guns—carrying twenty-four cannon, in two tiers, on each side—was so badly damaged, from this it may be inferred the loss to the other ships, as compared with this one. The champan which accompanied the enemy’s ships was a fireship, intended to set fire to our squadron. It approached very near ours, so that we heard their talk; and we noticed some unbecoming actions, with which they enraged us. But soon their insolence was repaid, one of the cannon-balls hitting their ship and kindling the fire-devices that it contained, which consumed it without doing any harm to our vessels. The balls discharged by the enemy were so numerous, that they fell like hailstones; they weighed thirty or thirty-five libras, and from that down—some were of forty libras, but the greater number of ten or twelve, besides bar-shot, cylinders, and lanternas [fireballs?]; and it seems a miracle that they caused us so little damage.

Our galleon “San Diego,” which carried the colors as flagship, and faced the enemy, received over two hundred cannon-balls, but not one penetrated her hull, and only two men were killed—one a Spaniard, on the poop; and the other an Indian, in the ship’s waist. The commodore’s galley was hit more than thirty times, but only one Spanish soldier and seven galley-slaves were killed; the second galley lost two men, and the other vessel at a similar rate. Almost every roof on house and church, in the Spanish town, was damaged, and many shots took effect on the cathedral. One, an eighteen-libra ball, went through the main entrance, and hit a pillar of the large chapel, passing over the head of a child, who fortunately remained uninjured. In the convent of St. Francis over thirty balls were picked up; in that of St. Dominic, six; in the residence of the Society of Jesus, nine; in the government storehouses, seventy-four. Notwithstanding, there was not in any house, convent, or church a single person killed or wounded; and the entire number of killed and injured in all the vessels and military posts during this engagement, did not exceed five Spaniards and four Indians killed, and eight Spaniards and one Indian wounded, who all together did not equal the number of killed on the enemy’s flagship alone.1 This good fortune was due, in the first place, to the mercy and protection of heaven, besought by the prayers and supplications offered in all of the churches—in Cabite, the city of Manila, and other places all along this bay from which the battle could be seen and heard—while the blessed sacrament was exposed. In the second place, to the promptness and speed with which, by the orders of his Lordship and the energy of the sargento-mayor and garrison commander, Manuel Estacio Vanegas, reËnforcements [and supplies] were sent from Manila. Much also was due to the excellent arrangements, the courage, and personal supervision of everything by the governor of the military post, General Andres Lopez de Azaldigui; also to the bravery, spirit, gallantry, and military experience of the chiefs and captains in charge of the different posts: General Don Pedro de Almonte, as commander of the armada—the vessels on sea, and the Arsenal on shore; Admiral Don Andres Axcueta, in command of the galleon “San Diego,” which displayed the colors as flagship; Sargento-mayor Don Pedro de Figueroa, Captain Don Lope de Colindres, and other captains and officers in charge of the ramparts, towers, and bastions. Especially [praise is due] to the commander of the principal fortress, San Felipe, over which floated the royal standard of red damask; this was the target for innumerable shots, and, although some perforated it, none were able to tear it down—a sign that the victory was to remain with us. The result was, that the enemy, who about noon had entered the harbor so daringly, were constrained to retire at midnight. The next day was begun, on our side, with six cannon-shots, but the enemy did not accept our challenge, and sailed out of the range of our forts—many lanchas carrying succor to the flagship, from which may be inferred the great injury that it had sustained. It is considered certain that the enemy would have retired within a few hours after the commencement of the battle, had the tide been favorable to the three largest vessels. During the battle, a reËnforcement of one hundred and fifty infantry, a few pieces of artillery, and a large supply of powder were despatched from Manila; and with these went several prominent persons who asked that they might be present at the scene of battle.

It was considered a special favor from heaven that at the height of the conflict, when all the enemy’s ships were off Cabite, one of our pataches, in command of Admiral Luis Alonso de Roa, which was coming from the kingdom of Camboja—whither Don Luis had gone as an envoy, in regard to establishing there a plant for building ships, and conveying to it provisions and other supplies—entered the bay through the smaller channel of Mariveles, and reached a place of safety.

On the day after the battle, which was Thursday, June 13, the enemy was still in the bay of Maribeles and Batan; and in the afternoon they approached the island, and landed their men. They burned the sentry-post, which is situated on the highest point, and established themselves in the corregidor’s house and in the huts of the Indians. Then, with the aid of the vendaval, they [brought up and] repaired two of their vessels which had come with most damage out of the fight.

On Friday morning three of the vessels set sail, and, landing at a place called Rio de CaÑas, sent a crowd of people ashore. These proceeded to the huts of some Sangleys who were making salt, intending to seize some fresh food, and especially some of the cattle which wander about those shores. But the chief commander at Cabite, being informed of what the enemy were doing, quickly despatched a hundred Spanish infantry, in command of Don Marcos de ZapalÁ, alcalde-in-ordinary of this city, and seventy horsemen with Captain Christoval Velazquez y Lorenzana—who, although they were not so fortunate as to encounter the enemy, compelled them to embark in haste. This they did in seven lanchas and two long-boats abandoning on the shore one of the cattle which they had killed (which were only two).

On Saturday, the boatmen on the Cabite ferry brought in a Dutch lancha of large size, and with a mast, which was dragging its anchor about the bay. On Tuesday, the eighteenth, two ships appeared at Punta del Sangley at daylight, I know not with what design; but at eight o’clock in the morning they proceeded to Bantan. On Wednesday, the nineteenth, at four o’clock in the afternoon, the entire squadron assembled at the small channel of Maribeles, and after firing a cannon at seven o’clock in the evening, when the moon rose, all the twelve vessels, four of them with lighted lanterns, weighed anchor, and sailed away through the large channel. Then they separated, six taking their course toward the shipyard of Mindoro, and the other six, returning on the very morning of Corpus Christi, entered the bay, and dropped anchor in the same place from which they had sailed.

On Saturday, the twenty-second, at daybreak, the enemy appeared close in shore off Abucay, the principal village in the province of Pampanga. This village has a very costly substantial church and convent, built of stone, in sight of the sea, belonging to the fathers of St. Dominic. His Lordship the governor and captain-general, being informed of this, and foreseeing the damage which might result if the enemy should land there, ordered the alcalde-mayor of the province to fortify the church and thwart the designs of the enemy, with the assistance of the resident Spaniards and natives of Pampanga, who had proved their bravery so well on all occasions. He also sent an adjutant and other men from this city to aid them, and directed that the money, which had been removed from a champan belonging to Chinese traders and placed in the church to prevent it from falling in the hands of the enemy, should be put in a safe place or be forwarded to this city.

Although the alcalde-mayor2 had come to these islands as a captain of infantry, he could not have been so good a soldier as he was a trader, nor so brave in spirit as great in stature. He replied that the place was better fortified than La Rochelle, and that if the heretics landed there none would be left to carry the tidings back to the vessels. He left that place on Friday, the twenty-first, leaving there one hundred and fifty Pampango soldiers and five Spaniards, all in command of Don Pedro Gamboa, a retired master-of-camp of the Pampanga nation. The following day, Saturday, the six Dutch ships came in sight off Abucay, with as many more lanchas, and sent ashore an officer with as many as one hundred and thirty men. They entered the village boldly, by the bridge from the landing-place, and, firing their guns, approached the gates of the church and convent; but they were repulsed by our men so successfully that they took to flight. They left in the court three men dead, with some firearms; and they retreated so hastily that they jumped into the water with their clothes and shoes on. At the same time when this was occurring in Abucay, they also attacked Samal, the second village of the same province, with three other lanchas, but with no better fortune; for, when they reached the village, hardly had they set fire to the huts in the outskirts when they were repulsed, with the same courage as at Abucay. As soon as the enemy had gone, the master-of-camp destroyed the bridge across a small river, over which it is necessary to cross from the beach to the convent. He then sent a despatch to the alcalde-mayor of the province telling what had occurred, and that it was presumed that the pirates would return to the attack with a larger force. The alcalde-mayor was in another village, collecting soldiers to send to the relief of Manila; but he reached Abucay that very night, with the recruits whom he already had and some whom he had secured from other places. He held a consultation with the Pampango commanders as to the measures to be taken in case the enemy should return. All were of opinion that the convent should be fortified, and a sufficient number of men stationed therein to defend it, and that the body of the troops should await the Dutch in the field; and that at the landing, at the ford of the stream, and in other places suitable for ambuscades, they should inflict all the damage possible on the enemy. But the alcalde thought that they should avoid shutting up themselves in the convent so that they might be able to flee to the woods if pressed by the enemy; accordingly, he did not submit to their opinion, and the only defense that he made was to lock the gates of the buildings.

The Dutch commander piqued at the retreat, and the loss of his men, and, it is supposed, having received information through a negro and some Sangley fishermen that the money belonging to the traders of the Chinese vessel which had escaped him, was concealed in the said church, would not entrust the exploit [of seizing the money] to any one but himself. On the following day, Sunday, he appeared at dawn on the beach, with all of his lanchas and in view of all our men who were inside the convent; and landed with as many as four hundred men, and two pieces of field artillery, displaying seven ensigns. Without meeting any opposition they marched, in order, to the stream and the little bridge which had been destroyed by the Pampangos. The water was deep; so, seizing some small boats belonging to the natives, which they easily found, they coolly transported their men and guns. Our Pampangos were burning to go forth to attack them, and were so impatient that, had they not been restrained by their innate loyalty, they would have turned against the alcalde.

After crossing the river, the general marched his troop in regular files until he came near the court [patio] of the church, which was of stone, and very suitable for defensive and even offensive warfare. Here he halted; but quickly observing how feeble was its defense, he entered the court, halted in front of the main entrance of the church, and fired his artillery against it. But as his guns were small, and the gates very strong, he could accomplish no more than to splinter off a piece, making a hole through which one could hardly thrust a hand. Meanwhile, there were volleys on both sides from the muskets and arquebuses. The alcalde remained in the highest part of the convent; a Pampango fell dead near him, and when he saw the latter’s blood, his own immediately ran cold. When he was told that the powder would soon give out—which was quite true, for he had not brought for this occasion all that had been sent from Manila—he left his post, under pretext of going to consult two religious of that convent (who were in retreat in the farthest cell, praying to God for our success), and never returned to see what was going on; but he discussed with the religious the desirability of displaying a flag of truce, in order to negotiate [with the enemy] for saving our lives.

Among those in the convent were the principal men of all Pampanga, many of them veteran soldiers of long experience in Terrenate. They told the alcalde that our forces were superior in number to those of the enemy; that on various occasions they had shown themselves equal to the foe, and did not acknowledge him as their superior on land; and that when their ammunition and weapons were exhausted they would hurl themselves against him tooth and nail, and die like good soldiers, fighting in the service of God and the king. They declared that they would not consider a flag of peace, which would serve to encourage the enemy and deliver them all into his hands.

The religious (who could have prevented what was done) supported the opinion of the alcalde, and even tried to use their authority as ministers to compel the Pampangos to agree with it; and, in spite of the objections made by the Indians, they finally hung out a peace-flag from one of the windows. The Dutch general was greatly delighted, and promised favorable terms. One of the religious, accompanied by the Spanish adjutant who was there, descended, and conversed for a long time with the general. While this parley was going on, the Dutchmen did not cease to try the other doors and windows of the convent, in order to effect an entrance; nor did the Pampangos discontinue their resistance, wounding and killing many of the enemy. The general, irritated at this, and noticing that one of his men had scaled the convent wall by means of a workmen’s scaffolding, and entering, had rung the bells as a signal of victory, said that this was no time for treating of peace; and seizing in the crowd the negotiators as prisoners, he commanded a renewal of hostilities, and ordered his men to enter the church and convent on all sides. The bravest and most prominent Pampangos defended themselves gallantly, refusing to hear any talk of surrender to a heretical prince, although the Dutch promised to spare their lives if they would do so. But as their weapons were inferior [to the enemy’s] and their powder had been exhausted, the Pampangos were finally defeated; nearly two hundred were barbarously put to death, and forty others together with the alcalde and the other religious3 who was in the convent, were taken prisoners.

To make matters worse for us and fortunate for the heretics, there was not lacking an informer, who disclosed to the enemy the silver from the Sangley ship, which had been hidden in a deep hole; the Dutch carried it away, to the amount of twenty thousand pesos. They burned the convent, and the woodwork of the church, but the fire did not extend to the altar; and they retreated to their lanchas on the same day, without sacking the village.

At the same time, another but smaller body of their troops attacked the village of Samal; but the Pampangos who were in garrison there, under command of Sargento-mayor Don Alexo Aguas, went out against them and compelled them to retreat, as those in Abucay would have done if the religious and the alcalde had allowed them to fight.

When the news of this affair reached Manila, it aroused unspeakable resentment; and prompt measures were taken to avenge it. Large reËnforcements of men and ammunition were despatched under General Juan de Chavez, a soldier of the courage and ability which the occasion demanded.

The Order of St. Augustine—which maintains all the religious ministries of Pampanga except the two at Abucay and Samal, which, however, belong to the actual ministers of the province—was charged to send thither other religious, of unexceptionable character. As such, went the father master Fray Alonso de Caravajal (who was formerly provincial), and the present prior of the Manila convent, the father preacher Fray Diego de Tamayo. These with their discretion and zeal, and the long experience and general popularity which they had in that province, undertook to give it consolation. As a result, in less than four days six hundred soldiers had been recruited to oppose the enemy if they should return to make another attack—which, in fact, was made on Thursday, July 11. The enemy placed in the field two hundred and fifty men, in command of the fiscal, who in rank is third in the armada, to pillage the village of Abucay, and kill the cattle and swine which are usually kept there.

General Juan de Chavez, who was fortified in Samal, was informed of the attack, and despatched ahead a troop under Captain Francisco Gomez Pulido, while he followed with the remainder of his men. They found the enemy in the village, pillaging the houses and killing the cattle. Our General opened fire, and made the enemy retreat toward the church; Captain Francisco Gomez Pulido, with the force under his command, went across the fields by another road, and the heretics were so taken by surprise that they turned their backs and fled to their lanchas. At the same time Adjutant Francisco Palmares arrived on the beach with another detachment of troops from another post, and attacked the enemy, compelling them to return to their boats through water that reached their mouths; they left fourteen dead and two prisoners on shore. The number of killed and wounded by the time they reached their vessels is unknown, but it was doubtless great.

This good fortune, and the grants and favors conferred by the governor, in the name of his Majesty, on the widows and orphans of the Pampango chiefs, who had lost their lives, have somewhat mitigated the sorrow and suffering caused by the late disaster. In order that pious feeling should find an opportunity for expression, solemn funeral rites were celebrated in the royal chapel, by his Lordship’s orders, for the dead Pampangos, at which all the Spanish and Pampango troops were present, under command of their master-of-camp, Don Sebastian de Guzman. The Order of St. Augustine, as the [religious] mother of that people, performed the same rites in the convent at Manila, and in all of the others throughout their province.

Through the said two Dutch prisoners was obtained all information that we desired of the enemy’s fleet. These men declared that they had sailed from Jacatra in Batabia, early in March, having been despatched by Cornelio Fandelin,4 governor of that place, under command of General Martin Gercen [Gertzen?] a Frisian by birth; and that the fleet consisted of thirteen vessels, one of which was lost on the voyage. The voyage lasted three months, and they halted only at Pulolaor for provisions. As for the size of the ships, the flagship is a vessel of seven hundred toneladas; the ships of the admiral, fiscal, and sub-fiscal, of eight hundred; and the others from three hundred to four hundred; and the pataches from sixty to one hundred toneladas. The flagship carries forty-eight guns: eighteen of these are of bronze, carrying balls of eighteen, twenty-four, and thirty-six libras; the others are of iron, with balls of nine to fifteen libras. The almiranta, and the ships of the fiscal and sub-fiscal carried forty, thirty-eight, and thirty-six guns respectively, some of bronze, with balls of twenty-four libras or less. The four other ships carried thirty-libra cannon. The guns on the pataches, some of bronze, carried balls of eighteen to twenty libras. The flagship was also supplied with many devices for using fire, with a German inventor who manufactures them, so that on occasion these could be placed in some one of their smaller vessels, in order to burn our fleet. The flagship left Batabia with two hundred and twenty men, all white, of various European nations, unmixed with men from any of the peoples in these regions; the almiranta and the fiscal’s ship carried each two hundred and ten, and the sub-fiscal’s two hundred; the other vessels seventy or eighty each. The flagship had already lost from its quota seventy men, and the other vessels proportionately, many having been killed in the fight at Cabite and in other engagements; moreover, there is a disease, known as Verber [i.e., beri-beri], which is now prevalent throughout the fleet, by which most of the men have been attacked. The orders carried by the Dutch ships are, to capture the vessels coming from Nueva EspaÑa and prevent the voyage of those that must go to that kingdom for aid. They were also to ascertain, at the same time, the condition in which these fortified posts are, so that they can prepare for a larger fleet to follow in the succeeding year. It was said that he who will come in that fleet as commander is Antonio Can [i.e., Caan], former governor of Malayo, who had come last year from Olanda, and now is in Jacatra as second in command at that place. The season here will be favorable to them, as the monsoon will give them time [enough], and their provisions will hold out; and within a month four of the said ships will set out for the kingdom of Japon, with merchandise which they are carrying, and will go with the proceeds to the kingdom of Siam. Such is the information which the prisoners have thus far given us regarding the Dutch armada; and it is confirmed from other sources.5

Our armada at present is composed of three large galleons and one of medium size, two pataches, and two galleys, with other oared vessels of less size. All hands are at work on it, without any cessation—with eager desires and no less assured hopes, under God’s favor, whose cause this is, of gaining success and good fortune against the heretical and rebel squadron.

Nor can my unskilful pen rightly deny the glory of such a victory, as of all the rest that has been thus far accomplished and is mentioned above, to the prime mover of all the influences and actions of this government—the sargento-mayor and governor of this garrison, Manuel Estacio Venegas, one of the old and prominent citizens of this city, and a brave son of the royal army at Granada. He was chosen by Don Diego Faxardo for these and greater undertakings on account of his honorable, successful, and extraordinary services of thirty-four years in this region in the royal armadas of galleons and galleys, on the Northern Sea and in these islands. In military service, he was sargento, alfÉrez, and captain of infantry; and in political affairs he served as regidor of this city, and as chancellor and registrar of the royal Audiencia—in which latter post his Lordship found him, filling it with approval and distinction, as is well known to all this kingdom. The victories and successes described in these relations are due to his unwearied personal efforts in sending out troops and supplies, and to his thorough understanding and excellent arrangements of all matters. His courage and dexterity in difficulties and hindrances, his subordination and military obedience, and execution of orders given by his superiors, [are all worthy of praise]; for ever since his Lordship placed in his charge the office of sargento-mayor, there have been few nights which he has not passed in the guardroom, or making the round of the city and its walls.

It fell to his lot to destroy such parts of the fortifications as appeared inadequate for the defense of this post and he strengthened the walls with new ones which, it has been said, are without doubt impregnable. I know not which to admire most, the strength of the fortification, or the rapidity with which the work was performed, without any burden or injury [to the people].

The thorough knowledge which he had of all his officers was doubtless the reason for the wise and fortunate selection that he made in naming to his Lordship, the year before, the leaders who were best qualified for positions of authority in the armadas—through which he obtained the so glorious results which we have described, providing the fleets with all that was necessary to gain success. The rapidity with which he carried on the work was sufficient to make ready [for battle] anew the two galleons “Encarnacion” and “Rosario” in one single week, in order that they might convoy the galleon “San Diego;” they gained the third victory, which was the complement of the others that were gained the year before.

All this being known to his Lordship, as soon as the news came this year of the enemy’s armada he gave the sargento-mayor full and adequate commission to arrange and order everything as should appear best to him, in order not to delay sending aid, as occasion might demand, not only at the storehouses but in the provinces—to which he sent supplies with the promptness which the case required. Thus the islands have been freed, on land and sea, from the attacks of the enemy, and the vessels which have come to us from other lands have made port in safety—thoroughly frustrating the designs of the heretics. This was especially the case in the attack on Abucay, where the sargento-mayor sent very opportune aid of men and ammunition—so greatly to the satisfaction of the alcalde-mayor, Diego Antonio, that he wrote to him that all was done very promptly, and he was expecting to achieve some great exploit. If the alcalde had carried out this promise, as he could have done, or at least had allowed the brave Pampangos to fight, neither would the above-related defeat have occurred, nor would the enemy have obtained any results from their attack.

However, by promptly despatching General Juan de Chaves, his vigilance and skill were able to harass the heretics—much to their own cost, as it was not lack of foresight, but the little military exercise in the commander of that province, which occasioned that defeat. Finally, through the sargento-mayor’s vigilance and care, and the valor of the generals and chiefs, much has been, and we hope will be, accomplished in these islands for the success of our arms and the reputation of this military post—which is so destitute of aid, as being remote from his Majesty, whom may God protect.

Printed with permission, at Manila, in the printing-house of the Society of Jesus, in the year 1647.