Commencing, then, our relation, and first as regards the loss of Hermosa Island, I say that it was and is a certain and notorious fact that the Dutch enemy, carried away by his evil desire and damnable intentions (as at the beginning has been stated), attacked Hermosa Island about September in the past year of 1641;1 and, not being able to capture it, since God had blinded and hindered him, remained more obstinate and hardened in his first object and pretension. Accordingly, he desisted only until the following year, 1642, and about August he returned with a stronger force—so large a one that with it he could overcome ours; and so he seized the island, and made himself master of it, which occurred thus.

Having obtained a foothold, the said Dutch enemy spent part of April and almost all of May in that year, with two champans and a round sailing vessel called “filipote” [i.e., flyboat], near the headland which they call Punta del Diablo, in sight of our forts,2 awaiting the succor which about that time was to come from Manila. They retired to the river of Tan-Chuy, with a prize which they made there, a small champan from China, which came from that kingdom to Hermosa Island to carry supplies and merchandise; in it was traveling a religious of St. Dominic, in the garb of a Sangley. With this prize, and for another reason, that a sharp north wind suddenly arose, they retired, as I have said, to Tan-Chuy. Just at this time came the succor which the governor of Manila was sending; this ship, arriving at the cape called Santa Catalina, received news that the enemy was expecting it. On this account, our people took refuge in the port of San Lorenzo, as they carried orders from Manila to do so, in case they encountered enemies. They remained there seven or eight days, until, having received information from the island that the enemy had gone away, they left that port, and pursuing their voyage, entered our harbor and fort.

Afterward (but not until the thirteenth of the month of August), one afternoon at nightfall there arrived at our port a little champan, so small that it made the Spaniards wonder at it when they saw it approach. This vessel came, despatched in all haste, from the island that they call Isla de Pescadores, which is twelve leguas from the Dutch fort. In that island is an excellent harbor, in which the great galleons of the Dutch anchor, because they cannot make an entrance at their forts on account of the shallow water there. The little champan came for the sole purpose of warning an infidel Sangley named Gui-nu—who was captain of a champan that had arrived not long before from Manila, to get wheat and cloth to carry to that city—that the Dutch were ready to attack Hermosa Island within four or five days. For this they had five ships, with five hundred Dutchmen, and large supplies of provisions, besides other ships which had not yet arrived; accordingly, word was sent to Gui-nu to leave our port at once. He who wrote and sent the despatch, who was a friend of the said Sangley, told him further to go away at all events, since the enemy was coming, not as in the previous year, but with a much greater force; and therefore it seemed to the writer that the Dutch would seize the island without fail.

With news so reliable as this, and with the information obtained from the Indians, the governor was persuaded of its truth, and that the enemy was returning with the strength and force that was stated; besides, he had heard of it in letters from Manila. Accordingly he immediately took measures to put himself in as good a state of defense as possible. As he was warned by Indians from the river of Tan-Chuy that this year the enemy would come from the east side, where there is a low sand-bank which extends from the sea to the harbor, and on it is a fort or small tower, not very strong, he ordered two pieces of artillery to be placed on an eminence which commands the said tower. While they were finishing this fortification, on the nineteenth of the month of August, the armada of the enemy appeared in sight. This was composed of four large ships, a patache, a large champan, and a flyboat; and besides all these vessels there were four other ships which had not arrived. Each vessel trailed two faluas astern, besides other and smaller boats which they carried for landing their men. On that day when the enemy appeared, about twelve or one o’clock, they stood inshore with the largest ship and the patache, making for the eminence to which our men had retired; but they tried to protect themselves from our artillery behind a small hill that stood there, in order thus to land their men more easily and safely. But as they could not shelter themselves as fully as they wished, on account of the currents which drove the ships beyond the hill, the artillery of our stronghold (the commander of which was Don Martin de Arechaga) compelled the enemy to retire to the sea—the chief pilot of their ship and other men having been killed, as the Dutch afterward told us. The ship being pierced with three or four cannon-balls, they retreated; on seeing this, the governor sent what men he could spare to the lookout station.

That night the enemy remained at anchor in the place to which they had retreated, until the morning of the next day. Then, having held a council, they set sail, and all five of their sailing-vessels directed their course toward the low sand-bank I have mentioned, which is at the eastern side of the island, in order to attempt a landing there, as we had already been informed. But the flagship, on approaching and reconnoitering the narrow entrance, saw that it had a new defense and guard in the tower below. The commander of this tower, who was AlfÉrez Diego Felipe, commanded that a cannon-shot be fired; the enemy, seeing by this that they were recognized and their designs forestalled, and that now they could not gain any advantage there, turned the flagship back toward the sea, where the rest of the ships were waiting for it. Having reached their station, the Dutch commander called another council of the leaders and captains; the upshot of this was, that, considering that their antagonists there were already on the defensive, they should make an attack at once, come what might, as they knew very well, through the Sangleys, how many men we had. For even if they lost many of their own men they were not in absolute need of so many [as they had], and they might kill our men with but little loss; and, the lookout once gained, all would be theirs, for they would have such an advantage over us that they could always injure us, without our being able to harm them.

Their consultation being concluded about one o’clock, they forthwith proceeded to take men with the faluas from two of the ships, which remained with a few men, and with the champan and the flyboat, to guard the entrances to the harbor; and the three other ships, with many small boats which they carried for this purpose, approached near the land, behind the shelter of the hill, where they would be entirely out of the range of the artillery in our stronghold. Having cast anchor there, they proceeded to send ashore their soldiers with the faluas and small boats, landing them at the edge of the sea, because they feared some of our musketeers who were on land. On this account, having embarked the men [in the boats], they rowed rapidly toward the shore, and meanwhile kept the field clear, from the ships, with their artillery and musketry, while their trumpets sounded the attack. Thus they came to land, where our men awaited them—twelve of our Spanish soldiers, eight Pampangos, and thirty or forty Indian natives [i.e., of Formosa] who were bowmen. The governor had resolved to send this number of men into the field, and no more, for he suspected that the enemy would attempt to land more troops in another place. Our men made a brave stand, and went down to the shore, and killed many of the enemy as they landed, on account of the latter coming, as they did, so crowded together in their boats. Thus our men fired their guns at a crowd, and some used three balls at one shot; and the Indian bowmen, who were very skilful, also inflicted much damage on the Dutch, all the more as they came boldly on. They followed out their design until they landed their men; and then, as they were numerous and our men few, they steadily gained the upper hand and wounded some of our soldiers. Thereupon the latter began to retreat slowly, three of their men being seriously wounded—one of whom remained on the field, where he soon died; the two others made their way as best they could to the fort, where one died and the other recovered.

Thus the enemy proceeded to ascend the slope until they succeeded in obtaining possession of the lookout and the height, where they immediately stationed more than three hundred white men; this gave opportunity for the rest of their men, five hundred more, to disembark and come to land. Then they set up their tents, in a place where they could store much food, and immediately sent ashore all their supplies, on the side from which it could not be seen from our forts. Afterward they also sent ashore much artillery and a mortar; of these pieces they carried two to the lookout station—cannons of eight and ten pound balls—and with other small pieces with which they bombarded us, not only in the stronghold, but in the great fort below. Their balls reached everything, on all sides, and everything was visible and uncovered from the lookout station; this was very evident, since a cannon-ball [struck] the parapet of the fosse belonging to the great fort, and passed on, carrying away a stone from the cavalier of San Sebastian in the same fort.

Affairs being now in the said condition, we continued to make ready our retirade,3 and were expecting that the enemy would begin with baskets [i.e., filled with earth] or would be fortified in some other manner in order to make an assault; but this did not occur, as they made no fort at the lookout, which would rise above the land about. However, on the side next the sea they made on the mountain a large esplanade, from which they fired the cannons; and, this done, they opened in the mountain itself two mouths, as it were, in the shape of trenches, through which they brought the cannons to bear, and bombarded us openly, while from our retirade we could not discover their men or more than barely see the mouths of the cannon in their artillery.

After this manner the war lasted five days, until the day of the glorious apostle St. Bartholomew, the twenty-fourth of August, when they bombarded and overthrew the wall of our retirade—which we had finished building, but it was not finished inside, nor did it contain any lodgings. As the Dutchmen afterward said, they fired that day, with the two cannon and from the fleet, one hundred and eight times; it was so arranged that while the cannon were being loaded there was no cessation of firing from all the musketry—which they had stationed at the top of the lookout, in files, directing the men to shelter themselves behind the hill, and to load their muskets while the artillery was at work. This they did so incessantly that it seemed to be the Judgment Day; and they gave no respite to our men, who were few in number and worn out with fatigue.

The wall being now thrown down, and many men being slain—among them AlfÉrez Juan de Valdes, a very valiant soldier—and many others wounded, and the rest of the troops being exhausted with the incessant fighting for five days and nights, and a palisade which we occupied having been broken into with iron bars: the enemy formed four troops for assaulting the retirade. This they did, and entered without ladders, since the walls were thrown down, as I said. This being perceived from above by our men, some of these, of the baser sort, fled through the gate; while others leaped over the wall, on the side next our fort, which they succeeded in reaching. Others who were above with Captain Valentin de Arechaga, fighting with the enemies, and, as they say, retreating, drove the enemy back on their haunches; and thence they retreated to the fort below. Two others, Spanish boys, hid themselves—one in the powder-house, the other in a water-tank; the enemy slew the former, thinking that he intended to set fire to the powder, and the other they took captive.

Being now masters of the retirade, they trained a cannon from it (for they had no other left), mounted, against our men; and at the same time they sent a white flag with one of their men, demanding that, since they now held all the place as their own, we should surrender, since there was still opportunity to escape with our lives. He said that if we did not yield there would be no advantage for us in doing so, and there would be nothing to expect but death. The governor received this envoy, for he saw that what they said was true, and that we had no hope or refuge in the world, nor could even hope to delay the catastrophe; and he considered that by not accepting their proposal he was exposing to death more than four hundred innocent souls—children, women, servants, roadmakers, and soldiers—and that the soldiers did not amount to forty effective men. He saw that there was no hope of doing more than to die for the sake of dying; but if relief could be hoped for by any means, or he could see any indication that they could resist the enemy, he and his men were all determined to die rather than yield up anything of their rights. But he concluded that they were able to resist no longer, as I have said; and considered that any one who understood the occasion well, and who knew the opportunity and advantage and superior strength that the enemy had, and what our men had done in every way, would not rashly condemn his course. For in order to form a proper judgment of anything, to see it and be on the spot is very different from hearing it afar, and, as they say, talking from behind the palings. The governor replied to him who came to offer this settlement that he would consult his officers as to what ought to be done and what should seem most expedient; and that afterward he would return answer in accordance with such decision. Thereupon the bearer of the white flag went away, and the governor placed the matter before his followers and the religious who were there. It seemed to all that, considering that the enemy had now demolished and gained the retirade and the eminence, which was the mainstay and guard of the fort below, and that now without any doubt the fort was practically in their possession—[which they could accomplish] without the loss of a single man, but with the death of all our people; without need for attacking us, but simply by driving us out—the best possible terms ought to be secured, and that accordingly we should surrender. For [they considered that, to justify] exposing all those people to death there must be some hope [of success or relief], of which there was none at that time. Nor were they ignorant of the requirements of military honor and usage, but these passed sentence [upon surrender] when the enemy were not so sure of victory, and when they themselves had some grounds for hope; but without such hope neither did God, nor consequently human law, hold them under such rigorous obligation; and one law states that no one is obliged to do what is impossible.

The conference being concluded, answer was made to the enemy in conformity with the above decision. When they came to the terms of surrender, our men stipulated that they should leave the fort with their arms, flags flying, drums [beating], guns loaded, and matches lighted. At first the enemy refused this, being willing only to spare our lives; for they saw very plainly that everything was in their power, and that what they were giving was only a favor. They were not willing to give us the vessels that we asked from them, but said that we all must go to Tay-Chuan, their fort; and that if the governor of that place had orders he would give us boats. If he did not, they said that we must voyage to Jacatra, to see the commander-in-chief,4 and that he would give us transportation; for they themselves carried no orders for anything else [than the seizure of the island]. With this the affair was ended—which is the truth of the matter, without any pretense or cloak.

Having departed from the fort with the said terms they placed us all in the convents of St. Domingo and St. Francis, with guards, while they arranged their affairs; then they sent us to Tay-quan, a fort of theirs on the other side. At the convents, the Dutch proceeded to take from all our men their weapons and flags, on the pretext that they must embark the Spaniards without these, for fear of some mutiny or uprising. This was afterward told to the commander-in-chief at Jacatra [now Batavia], and he replied that the guns and flags had been left at Tay-quan; but that if the governor of that place, who was coming by March or April, should bring them [to Jacatra], he would give them up. On this account the [Spanish] governor remained at Jacatra to await them, and to send away his men, and to be the last one. There was great danger that some men would remain there, by their own choice; or that, urged by the Dutch, they would say that they preferred to remain. The Pampangos and Cagayans remained with the Dutch, who refused to give them to us, although they had granted liberty to all [of our men]. Although many remonstrances were made to them on this point, they replied that they would pay those Indians as the Spaniards had done, and that the former should serve them. Accordingly, some of the Indians remained in Tay-quan, and the rest were taken by the Dutch in their ships that were going against Amboino and Terrenate. Some free servants were seized by certain Dutchmen in Tay-quan and in Hermosa Island, who refused to give them back; and afterward we learned that they had sold these servants to some of their countrymen. When this was told to the commander-in-chief, he said that it could not be true, and that he would make them give back all who remained in Tay-quan, twelve in number. The affair remained thus, unsettled, a matter which is certainly worthy of consideration; and it is sufficient cause for keeping back, whenever opportunity offers, some of their men until they return to us all those free and Christian people, who remain with them at the risk of losing the faith.

From the convents where they had kept us, they embarked us in four ships to convey us to the fortress of Tay-quan; and at the same time six companies of the Dutch who remained in our forts set out by land to go to the province of Torboan, in the eastern part of the island, to find the gold mines that the natives possess there. The latter obtain some gold from the sands of a river, of which fact the Dutch were informed; and this was a powerful motive for their seizing our forts. In order to carry out their purpose to search for gold mines, they came provided with men who were skilled in such work. This expedition marched until they reached the village of Santiago, eight leguas of the journey, [where they were stopped] by some precipices; they turned back, as they were not able to go any farther on account of the bad weather and roads, and as their provisions gave out—difficulties which, it seemed, they could ill overcome. But, although they could make no farther progress, they sent men with a champan to examine and reconnoitre the port of San Lorenzo, of which some inconsiderate person, or the Indians, had informed them; and they explored it very thoroughly.

The commander returned to the island with the said six companies, and hanged six Indians of the natives of Hermosa Island, from the three villages friendly to us—Santiago, Guimarri, and Taparri—because they had not supplied the Dutch with food, nor gone with them, nor guided them as the Dutch wished, the natives having promised to do so, although through fear. The enemy were unmindful that, since the Indians were our friends, they usually act thus, as it is their nature. The Dutch also hanged another, a TagÁlog boy, who served their commander, because he ran away to the natives of that country; and two Dutchmen whom they found in our garrison, in the pay of his Majesty. These things, and the knowledge that the Indians have of them, have had such an effect on the latter that whenever they can they will break the heads of the Dutchmen, and will not accept their friendship. On the contrary, they now deplore our absence, and in the shadow of the Dutchmen the Spaniards are now almost saints; and the natives only ask when the Spaniards will return.

They immediately fortified themselves on the river of Tanchuy, where they erected a fort of logs, in the same place where our fort was first built, and left their artillery and sixty soldiers—as afterward we were told by some of our roadmakers whom they carried there to work. All this was to make them masters of the trade—in sulphur, rattan, pelts, and many other products that are found along that river and in its vicinity. They also built at once a fort of stone, although without lime, on the highest point of the island where our forts were, the lookout station by which they won the retirade from us.

Finally, while our men were voyaging to their forts of Tay-quan, we encountered the four other ships that were going to them with succor, and with these came the general and leader of them all, who had been unable to arrive before.5 He went to our island, and began to govern it and direct its affairs; and it was he who went to look for gold, and who hanged the said Indians, and built a fort at Tanchuy. He despatched four ships to the coasts and routes of Japon, in order that they might attack the champans of the Sangleys who might go to trade in that empire; for the Dutch say that those traders go without chapa (or license) from their king. In Tay-quan they detained some of our men a month and a half, or more; others they immediately sent away, with our governor, in the first ship that sailed to Jacatra; and afterward, at the end of October, those who remained in Tay-quan went in four other ships.6 Having thus sent all our men to Jacatra, the Dutch again undertook an expedition to discover the gold mines at Torboan; and they actually set out with a large force of men in November, which is a rainy season in the Tay-quan region. On this account, and because it is nearer, they crossed by land the middle ridge which Hermosa Island has, from Tay-quan to Torboan; but, as we afterward learned in Jacatra from the people on the other ship (which sailed later from Tay-quan), they did not reach the river of gold, on account of the great ruggedness of the mountains, and the bad weather which through November and December prevails in the Torboan region. Therefore they only punished some villages which lay nearer; and they burned these because, years before, the natives had killed a [Dutch] factor. With this they returned, leaving that expedition for the spring-time; this will cost them much hardship and perhaps many lives, for there is great difficulty in both the entrance and the ascent; and the Indians who are now among them will have changed their settlements, and will make great resistance to them—and will do so quite safely—since in the mountains they are very dextrous and experienced, and the Dutch clumsy.

It is certain that if they do not succeed in the search for gold they will abandon our forts, retaining only that of Tan-chuy on account of that river and its trade, as some of them said—since for their trade with the Chinese and Japanese they occupy Tay-quan. That region is a very pleasant one, with a good climate; and they have very good fortifications, dwellings, and storehouses for their goods. They have spent there more than one hundred thousand pesos, as one of them told me; and there they possess a considerable trade and commerce with the Chinese. Through this, they learn by means of the Chinese all that passes in Manila and its provinces; for after the latter have sold to the Dutchmen, at the proper time, what they need and what they have to send to Jacatra, the Sangleys are occupied during the rest of the year in bringing from China cloth and other commodities which find a market in Manila and Pangasinan; [they bring these to Tay-quan] in small champans, and immediately lade some large ones which they keep at Tay-quan, and sail for Manila. Besides this, the reason why the Dutch have made so great efforts to capture Hermosa Island, going to attack it year after year, was that they had promised the Japanese that they would do so, and would expel the Spaniards from it. I was told this by a religious who was in the kingdom of Tonquin—where, he said, this was related to him by a Christian from Antuerpia, who was in the service of the Society [of Jesus]; and this occurred even before the island was taken.

As for the second [topic], the power which the Dutch enemy possess in those regions, which is greater than we could imagine of them: According to what I myself have seen, and what trustworthy and reliable persons who have traded have told me, the Dutch have at this time more than one hundred and fifty ships and pataches, at a moderate estimate—all equipped and provided with seamen, soldiers, artillery, and other necessary supplies. And they are under such discipline that even when they are in the port of Jacatra—as I saw, and was well informed thereon—every ship keeps its people on board, so that no one may go ashore without special permission; and when they come from any voyage, before entering the port, all engage in repairing and cleaning and calking their ships. As a result, when they reach their anchorage in the port they can immediately, without delay, again go forth and make a voyage, save when some ship needs unusual repairing; in short, all their men serve as if they were servants receiving wages.

In Tay-quan, during the months of September and October, 1642, there were seventeen ships and a patache, all belonging to the enemy. Of these, nine had come to Jacatra for the capture of Hermosa Island, four of them having first remained in the Embocadero of Manila, waiting for our ships from Castilla. Four others had come from Japon, and the rest were held in reserve at Tay-quan. Of these seventeen ships, five went to carry our people to Jacatra, and were laden with sugar and preserved ginger for Holanda; iron or steel from Japan; loaves of sulphur; and stuffs, silver, and other merchandise. Four other ships departed to seize the champans of Chinese who were coming from Japon; and the eight vessels that were left remained in Tay-quan, in order that their men might go to search for the gold that was reported to exist in Torboan. This last-named fleet was to sail afterward (by February of 1643) from Tay-quan, with the governor of that place, to Jacatra; and on the way they were to inflict punishment on the king of Cochinchina for the death of some Dutchmen who were wrecked on that coast, in two ships.

Besides the said ships, we found when we arrived at Jacatra more than twenty others, very well equipped with supplies and artillery; and more than thirty or forty cannon, which I myself counted there. Besides all these vessels another was there, the great three-decked carrack or galleon from Yndia, which the Dutch had captured from the Portuguese at the bar of Goa. Five other ships had sailed a few days before for Malaca, and these were met by the vessels that were carrying our people from Tay-quan. Six others were then blockading the bar of Goa; but on account of the treaty of peace, the Dutch have ordered these to withdraw, and as yet these have not come back. [Still another squadron of] five vessels well equipped was sent at the beginning of November, 1642, to Terrenate, to await the relief ship from Manila; and with them was another ship, which they keep in reserve at the fort of Malayo. They will wait there until the end of April, or May, until the arrival of thirty-two other ships, which were besieging Amboino, with more than fifteen hundred men; and all together will go to attack Terrenate. For this purpose they took from Jacatra, in December, 1642, great quantities of supplies, as was seen by myself and by our men who came hither; and when they go to Terrenate, after making the Amboino expedition, it will be a question whether they seize the relief ship for Terrenate—although, perhaps, they will not capture it at all, confident in their own power.

Besides the said ships, I was told by a sub-factor of the English that the Dutch have seventeen more ships on the coasts of Yndia, Ceilan, and Persia, and all of these are supplied from Jacatra. In this number are not included the vessels that they send to their factories, to each of which sail one, two, or more, according to the amount of trade there; and their factories are so numerous that there is not any kingdom, whether of infidels or Moors, in those regions where they have not an establishment—Japon, Tonquin, Camboja, Siam, the kingdom of Achen, Bantan Xambi, Mazarmasin,7 Macasar, Solor, and Amboino (which is entirely in their power, and where there is a great quantity of cloves, so that it is exceedingly valuable). In other regions also they have factories and much trade; I would never end if I were to enumerate all. Moreover, there went to Holanda this year, in December and January, eleven large ships, which I saw, and almost every month fresh ships arrive from that country; so that there are always ships coming and going between Holanda and these islands.

Then as for the men that they have here, there is a large force. For, besides those who are engaged or sail in all the ships that I have mentioned, those in the garrisons of their forts and presidios, and the men in the six ships that were blockading Goa, who have not yet come back, they are now sending a large armada against Amboino and Terrenate—all the men in which are experienced and trained soldiers, as I saw in Jacatra. Not only this, but all the men who were engaged in the capture of Hermosa Island remained there (where they now are), to support the pretensions of the Dutch which I recounted above, to discover the gold mines in Torboan, and for the punishment of Cochinchina. Besides all the said troops, another ship arrived at Jacatra from Holanda in January, which carried more than one hundred and fifty fresh soldiers; and this year these Dutch have urgently requested more men from Holanda, for the purpose of attacking Manila, now that they see an opportunity for it and that the affairs [of Spain] are in a disturbed condition.

As for provisions from Holanda—biscuit, pork, beef, wine, oil, vinegar, etc.—the amount that they have cannot be told or imagined; for of these articles alone they have enough for two or three years. I mention only the Castilian wine, of delicious quality, which they consume more freely than if they were in EspaÑa; and when they go to draw it [from the keg], they rinse the glasses with it, and waste it; and yet this goes on without causing a scarcity of it. Then they have storehouses full of ammunition and military supplies, an enormous number of anchors, and stables that contain fifty war-horses, to handle which they are well trained.

As for the great wealth that they have acquired: In December of this year, 1642, when I was in Jacatra, they sent ten large galleons, and another in January of 1643, all the eleven ships laden with drugs of the highest value in Europe—such as cloves, pepper, cinnamon—sugar, silks, precious stones, gold, and many other rich articles. According to what they said, these ships carried goods to the value of thirteen millions here—which, delivered in Holanda, would amount to an incredible sum. With this wealth they wage war on us in Flandes, in these regions, and throughout the world. On this account we might expect that if his Majesty the king of EspaÑa would wage war against them in this quarter, he would certainly subdue them very soon in Flandes. For he who would cut off a great river, and stop its flow, does not undertake to do this near the sea, where its current is broad and deep, and it already seems like [a part of] the sea, where such attempt will be exceedingly difficult, or even impossible; but he goes to the beginning or origin of the stream, where the task will be very easy for him. And so, to wage war against the Dutch in Flandes alone is to try to cut off a river near the sea, where it has a great flow; it is therefore almost impossible to do so by sending there more troops and money. But if vigorous measures were taken to send four thousand men to Filipinas, it would be very easy thus to destroy them here, where they are so successful, and make an end of their power.

As for the third and last topic that I mentioned—the designs and intentions of the Dutch enemy, now that they have made peace in Yndia with the Portuguese: It is very important to consider this, since they have always been eager, as I have related, to get possession of Manila and its fortified places, and to drive out the Spaniards from these regions. This was doubtful until now, when they find themselves puissant, and disengaged from other wars; and, on the other hand, they know that Manila has not very strong defenses, and that it will not receive abundant aid because the affairs of EspaÑa are so disturbed. Accordingly they will exert all their strength to carry out these desires of theirs, as greedy as of long standing; and this is so much the fact that, as I know perfectly well, they talk among themselves of nothing else than how they will gain Manila, and load themselves with silver. Therefore they have urgently demanded troops from Holanda; and until these shall come they are making every effort to capture the ships from Castilla, and are actually undertaking this with a large and powerful fleet. If they cannot capture the Spanish ships, they will try to burn them, even if it be by burning two or more of their own; and they will take with them some old ships for this purpose.

Besides this, they intend, as I have related, to take Terrenate; and they have actually gone to those forts to deprive them of the relief sent, with as large a force as they can send. Likewise, they will be continually infesting and harassing the coasts of Manila and its environs, and will not allow any ships worth mention to enter or leave that port, and will do this, even if it causes them great expense; and for this purpose they will be continually receiving succor—either by way of Terrenate, in May, June, and July; or else from Hermosa Island, from September until April—since for all this they have extra ships, much wealth, and great energy.

They intend, also, to seize or to obstruct the champans from China which may go to trade at Manila; and to avail themselves secretly of the Sangleys to cause a diversion [of the Spanish forces] in Manila at the time when the Dutch shall attack it. All this was fully explained to me by a religious person who was in Jacatra, and was on very intimate terms with some of the Dutchmen, as he understood their language and customs. The expedition against Manila would be, as they thought, in May or in October of the year 1644; and, if at the latter time, it would go by way of Tay-quan.

Among the injuries which they will meanwhile try to inflict upon us, not the least will be an attempt to burn the galleons and our vessels that may be in Cavite, or in other places; or corrupting through clandestine spies whomsoever they can among our men, or effecting an entrance at night, and by stratagem—both of which they did at Goa. Recently they burned the galleons of the Portuguese, which lay within the port, at anchor, and with the usual guard. With this they tied the hands of the Portuguese, and rendered it impossible for them to sally out and resist the Dutch. There is no doubt that they will, if they have the opportunity, do much worse than what I have told; for this is an astute and cautious enemy, who knows whatever occurs among our people; and we live in anxieties. Dated in the kingdom of Macasar, in March, 1643.

Fray Juan de los Angeles
of the Order of St. Dominic.

[To this document we append the following additional information, obtained from Ferrando and Fonseca’s Historia de los PP. Dominicos en las Islas Filipinas (Madrid, 1870), ii, pp. 440–447:]

Governor Corcuera, who regarded with much indifference that goodly conquest,8 failed to recognize its importance as an advanced and strategic point for checking the aggressions of the Dutch; and, engaged in making new conquests which he could not preserve, he had entirely abandoned it [i.e., Formosa]. A wretched company of invalids and raw recruits was the only force allotted for the defense of that island against a victorious enemy, who, flushed with the triumphs that they had obtained over the Portuguese possessions, believed (and with some reason) that everything must give way to their triumphal progress through these seas, [Their first attack on Tanchuy, in 1641, is “almost miraculously repulsed by its feeble garrison;” but in this expedition the Dutch learn the topography of that region, the condition of the Spanish forts, etc., and plan anew its conquest.] Their plans were not hidden from the commandant of the fort, nor from our good religious, who mingled their counsels with those of the men who were defending the cause of religion and native land. All quickly saw the urgent necessity of reËnforcing the garrison, and of demanding fresh troops from the government at Manila.

With this honorable commission finally departed from Formosa, surrounded with a thousand perils, Father Juan de los Angeles, vicar and superior of the Dominican fathers who had in charge the spiritual administration of that island.... He gave to the governor an account of the recent conflict; explained with deep feeling the melancholy and precarious situation of the colony; and declared how certainly the honor of the Spanish flag in Formosa was greatly compromised unless effort was made as soon as possible to reËnforce its garrison. This demand was received at the time with some appearance of interest, but it did not receive the prompt attention which the importance of the matter demanded. The preservation of Formosa did not interest Corcuera or his private counselors; but he was finally forced to save appearances to some extent, in order not to take upon himself, at all events, the scandalous responsibility of what must unavoidably occur in such an extreme case. He actually despatched the messenger, with a weak reËnforcement, in a wretched hulk—which, without any provision for its safety or good condition, was miserably shipwrecked on the northern coast of Luzon, at the first attack of a slight storm. It was possible to save, nevertheless, the men and the outfit of the ship; and Father Angeles was able to fit out another and safer vessel, which carried them safely to Formosa, with the little aid sent from Manila. This consisted of some food and military supplies, eight Spanish soldiers, and the ship’s crew, undisciplined and unarmed, who could only serve as a hindrance, in any case.

[Tanchuy is taken from the Spaniards by the Dutch, as is related by Father Angeles; Ferrando adds:] Forty pieces of heavy artillery fell into their hands, with large quantities of gunpowder and military supplies, twenty-five thousand duros from the treasury, and a great deal of merchandise owned by private persons, which might amount to nearly a million in value. This was the first disgraceful victory which the Dutch could obtain over the Spanish arms in that great Oceania, [and that] because the island was neglected and abandoned by an unlucky governor—a victory that was a thousand times more unfortunate, since it inflated their arrogance to the extreme of believing themselves powerful enough to dispute with us at last the envied possession of the Filipinas Islands.

It was the province of the most holy Rosary which felt the deepest pain at this lamentable result; for besides [being compelled to] abandon their beloved flocks, they lost various churches and convents, with their precious images and sacred ornaments; the provisions destined for the missionaries at Fo-gan; three priests and two lay brethren, who were sent prisoners to Jacatra (now Nueva Batavia); and, finally, their hopes of seeing in the bosom of religion and of the Church all the inhabitants of that island, whose conversion to Christianity had already made considerable progress. [These converts, however, long retain the faith that they had received from the missionaries, and shun both heathen observances and the heresies of their Dutch conquerors.]

The Dutch, now masters of that Spanish island, celebrated during eight days the signal triumph of their arms, carrying away to the fort of Tay-quan all the Spanish soldiers and religious. From that place they transferred these prisoners to the capital of Java, now adding to their number the zealous Father ChÁves,9 who since the preceding year had remained a prisoner in their hands. They were not so ill received or treated in the Netherlandish colony as they would have feared. The governor of Java was a very generous man, and showed consideration and respect in every way to the Spanish prisoners—our religious securing the fullest liberty to exercise their apostolic labors, not only among the Catholics, but even among the infidels and sectaries of those foreign possessions. At last, all the difficulties were overcome which would naturally arise in the way of restoring them all to Manila without exchange or ransom, or compensation of any kind—thanks to the influence and great prestige which our excellent missionaries were able to acquire among even the enemies of the Catholic religion. Only the governor of Formosa remained among the Dutch, because he feared the results of the rigorous residencia which would be required from him in Manila for the loss of that island, and more especially of the fortress of Tanchuy—notwithstanding that his responsibility was freed from blame in the consciences of all; and the most skilful leader would have yielded, without fail, with the small and wretched garrison of that fort. He had done quite enough; and the responsibility, in any case, must be sought higher up....

The Spanish soldiers were greatly disturbed by the desertion of the governor of Formosa. Destitute of a chief and leader to govern them, and unable to agree on the nomination of another, they almost resolved to abandon the voyage; but the religious, to whom they owed their liberty, and whose opinion they still respected, gained their good-will anew, and induced them to consent to a reasonable agreement—which they accepted only on condition that father Fray Juan de los Angeles would accept the office of their leader, which they conferred upon him by acclamation. At the command and under the direction of the said father, they were immediately shipped to Macasar, where the ruler of the island sent them their rations on account, until an officer arrived from Manila with orders to pay all their just expenses, and to conduct them at last to the capital of Filipinas, where they arrived safe and sound on the twenty-ninth of June in 1643. Thus the province of the most holy Rosary obtained some consolation for that great misfortune, by receiving to its bosom four excellent religious whom it already regarded as lost to it.

[La ConcepciÓn (Hist. de Philipinas, vi, pp. 89–113) blames the Jesuits for the loss of Formosa—alleging, as grounds for this, their desire to monopolize the missions to China, to which Formosa was a stepping-stone for other orders; and their resentment against the friars (especially the Dominican Morales) for accusing them at Rome of undue laxity and conformity to heathen observances (in the noted controversy over the “Chinese rites”). To this end, he thinks, they exerted their influence with Corcuera, inducing him to neglect Formosa and to send his troops to Mindanao, where the missions were in charge of the Jesuits.]