Our revels continued until the morning; and in the morning, while many a Spanish fair with waving hands and glistening eyes was seen in the balcony, we marched out of Tarifa with aching heads but glowing hearts.

Towards evening we halted, and the army was modelled. The leading division was placed under the command of General Lardizabal, an officer in every way qualified for the post. The Prince of Anglona was appointed to the centre or principal body of the Spaniards; but with this body La PeÑa remained. Two regiments of Spanish guards, the Walloons and that of the Royal City, were attached to the British troops, commanded by General Graham; this corps were termed the reserve. The artillery were attached fortunately to the troops of their respective nations; but by some courteous mismanagement two squadrons of German hussars were united to the Spanish cavalry under the command of Colonel Whittingham, and thus attached to the Spanish army. This officer held higher rank in the Spanish army, and, if I recollect right, commanded a corps of Spanish cavalry, clad and paid by England; but their movements were peculiarly Spanish.

On March 1st La PeÑa moved towards Casa Vieja, and marched the whole army in column of companies nearly within gunshot of that post; and while moving along the plain close to the “Blessed old House,” the column was reduced to subdivisions, giving the enemy full opportunity of counting every man in the army. Whether this extraordinary mode of procedure arose from treachery or ignorance cannot be asserted, for at that time it was difficult to distinguish one from the other in the movements of Spanish generals. However that may be, the circumstance was loudly censured by all. As soon as the army halted, General Graham mentioned this oversight to La PeÑa; yet it was not until next morning and after the whole allied army had passed the post mentioned on its route to Medina Sidonia, that the British general obtained permission to dislodge the enemy from the convent. The light company of the 28th Regiment, having made close acquaintance with the post not long previously, were sent on this duty. On our approach the enemy evacuated the convent. As we were not able to come up with them, a party of the German hussars were sent in pursuit, by whom they were soon overtaken. But although thus threatened by cavalry, they considered it unadvisable to form square as the light company were fast approaching; they therefore turned round and formed line. Here some untoward work took place on both sides. The French, seeing no possibility of escape, remained steady until the Germans were close upon them, when they deliberately fired a volley at them and then threw down their arms; two of the cavalry were killed and others wounded. The Germans, enraged at their loss and justly considering it an act of wanton and useless bloodshed, charged the unfortunate defenceless wretches, sparing not a man; all were cut down. I never in my life witnessed in so small an affair such mutilation of human beings. When they were carried into the convent yard the doctor of the 82nd Regiment, attached to the flank battalion, declined to dress their wounds, as it was totally impossible that any one of them could survive. The light company were left on piquet or rearguard in the convent during the day, with orders to join the army after dusk at Medina Sidonia. Not long after this we were all astonished at seeing the whole army retiring, but could descry no enemy to account for the movement; however, it appeared that as La PeÑa moved on Medina he was informed by some roving Spanish soldiers whom he met that Medina had lately been reinforced. Upon this information alone he made the retrograde movement, which cost the Spaniards many lives and might have been fatal to the Spanish cause; but of this in its place. Thenceforth La PeÑa was distrusted by every British soldier, and the constancy of General Graham in accompanying him farther is to be much admired. At nightfall the piquet joined its own battalion, not at Medina, but on the very ground whence the army moved that morning.

On the morning of the 3rd, taking nearly an opposite direction to that of Medina, the army moved towards Vejer. This day’s march was excessively harassing. A causeway, along which we must pass, was constructed over the edge of a lake; and the heavy rains had so swollen the waters that not a vestige of the causeway was perceptible. Our guides were guerillas, but imperfectly acquainted with the place; and thus many of our men in attempting the passage fell into the deep. Even along the causeway, when discovered, we were up to our middle in water; the track was marked by placing men on the submerged road. The British general with his staff stood in the water to guide and animate the soldiers during their aquatic movement. Having passed this obstacle, which occupied much time, we pushed on to Vejer, from which we dislodged the enemy there posted. The town is built on a high conical hill looking down on the celebrated Bay of Trafalgar, where every breast was filled with thoughts of the immortal Nelson. From this eminence the enemy had a full view of the surrounding country, and not only could discover all our movements as we approached, but, as on the preceding day when we were passing the convent, were enabled to ascertain our exact strength.

On the afternoon of the 4th, about three o’clock, the army again moved forward, before the men’s clothing and appointments were dry. General Graham, previous to leaving Tarifa, requested La PeÑa to make short marches, and thus bring the troops fresh into action. But the Spanish general, as is common with the weak, imagining that genius was marked by diversity of opinion and mistaking mulish obstinacy for unshaken determination, disregarded this sound advice. He acted on the principle of differing from the British general in everything; and accordingly he marched the army for sixteen hours, the greater part of the time during a cold night, making frequent momentary halts, which always tend to harass rather than refresh troops.

On the dawn of the 5th our advanced guard of cavalry (Spanish) were encountered and worsted by a few French dragoons; the affair was trifling, yet its moral influence was sensibly felt throughout the day. Cold, wearied, dejected but not disheartened, we still moved forward, until the sun, rising with unusual splendour and genial warmth, dissipated the drowsiness, which but a moment previously bowed down every head, and roused us to wonted animation. On opening our eyes to broad daylight, we found ourselves on the south-west skirts of Chiclana plain.

On the evening of February 27th La PeÑa had written from Tarifa to General Zayas communicating his intention to move forward next day, and stating that Medina Sidonia would be in his possession on the 2nd of the ensuing month, and that he would be close to the Isla de Leon on the evening of the 3rd. Zayas, acting on mailcoach time, regardless of unforseen contingencies, badness of roads or any other obstacles which might retard La PeÑa’s advance, and without ascertaining whether that general was close at hand or not, trusting only to his watch for regulating his measures, laid down the bridge on the night of the 3rd. The following day passed without any appearance of La PeÑa or the British troops. The enemy, taking advantage of this delay, attacked the bridge on the night of the 4th with their piquets and small detachments, killed and wounded many Spaniards, took three hundred prisoners and broke two links of the bridge. It was through mere good fortune that the Isla did not fall into their hands. At the critical moment Captain A. Hunt, R.A., with the ten-inch howitzers, arrived and supported a charge made by a Spanish regiment over the bridge of boats, and so the enemy were repulsed. But if Marshal Victor had been more active, and had marched down six or eight thousand men during the 4th and screened them behind Bermeja Castle until night, and then made his attack with such a force, instead of with some six or seven hundred, there is not the slightest doubt but that he would have taken the Isla, and then either defended or destroyed the bridge. Under such circumstances the allied army would have been compelled to retire to Gibraltar to avoid Sebastiani, who, upon learning that Victor was in possession of the Isla, would of course have come forward with an overwhelming force. It was in consequence of the losses sustained at the bridge on the night of the 4th and morning of the 5th, together with the imminent danger in which the Isla de Leon was of being taken, that I ventured to say that La PeÑa’s dastardly retreat from Medina Sidonia cost the Spaniards many lives, and might have been fatal to the Spanish cause. La PeÑa’s proceedings on our arrival at the plain of Chiclana were equally absurd and dangerous. Early on that morning (the 5th) he ordered General Lardizabal down to the Santi Petri point without giving or receiving any information whatever. Not even a gun was fired to give notice to those in the Isla of our arrival, nor was it ascertained whether the bridge was strongly defended or in whose possession it actually was. The proceedings of Zayas and La PeÑa offer a correct specimen of the manner in which combined movements were executed by Spanish generals; all acted independently and generally in direct opposition to each other. On this occasion Lardizabal acted gallantly. Having beaten away a strong force of the enemy from the Santi Petri point, he established communication with Zayas, thus enabling him with three thousand Spanish troops and an immense park of artillery to pass from the Isla over the bridge.

The army, as already mentioned, entered the plain of Chiclana early on the morning of the 5th, close to a low mountain ridge called Cerro de Puerco, or “the boar’s neck,” from its curving shape bristling with pine trees, and from the number of those animals always to be found there. This ridge, distant from the point of Santi Petri about four miles, gradually descends for nearly a mile and a half to the Chiclana plain. On its north side the plain is broken by ravines, pits and rugged ground; a large pine forest hems it on all sides at unequal distances. Situated midway between the hill and Santi Petri point, close to the western point of Cerro de Puerco, stands La Torre, or the Tower of Barossa. The eastern point of this ridge looks upon the space between Chiclana and the Santi Petri; whilst its western boundary looks down upon the boat road leading from Vejer to Bermeja and the Isla de Leon, passing within less than half a mile of the tower above mentioned.

In preparing for the battle General Graham, like an experienced soldier, pointed out to La PeÑa all the advantages which the ground offered, insisting on the absolute necessity of occupying the ridge of Barossa with their strongest force, it being the key of the whole ground. But the Spanish general, indignant at having his proper line pointed out by a foreigner, spurned his advice and being borne out by his Adjutant-General Lacy, ordered the British general to proceed to Bermeja to maintain the communication between the allied troops in the field and those in the Isla. General Graham, although naturally courteous and through policy yielding, yet on this occasion absolutely refused obedience until the Spaniard pledged himself to post on the heights of Barossa a Spanish force at least equal to that commanded by the British general. Long before his movement down to Bermeja, he detached Colonel Browne with his battalion to occupy the western point of Barossa. There we were shortly afterwards joined by the Walloon and the Ciudad Real regiments of guards. To this body were subsequently added three other Spanish battalions, four guns, and all the allied cavalry, commanded, as I have already said, by Colonel Whittingham. The whole were under the orders of General Cruz-Murgeon, accompanied by Brigadier-General Beguines, and all, as we thought, determined to do their duty. Soon after General Graham with the British division had moved from the plain through the pine grove towards Bermeja, Marshal Victor, who anxiously watched the movements of the allies, seeing their troops at three different points, Barossa, Santi Petri and Bermeja, moved forward from Chiclana towards the road which leads from Vejer. This movement was not immediately perceived by us, the Spaniards being placed between our battalion and the point mentioned; but a confused and hasty movement on their part induced the colonel to send me to ascertain the cause. I was told by General Cruz-Murgeon that they merely wished to take ground to our left; but seeing the hurry of the Spaniards increase, I instantly galloped beyond their extreme flank, and now discovered the French cavalry moving towards the coast road and rather inclining towards our position. Retiring quickly, I reported the circumstance to Colonel Browne.

By this time the greater part of the Spanish troops had passed between us and the coast road and were soon in rapid march towards the beach leading to Bermeja. Colonel Browne strongly and rather indignantly remonstrated against their conduct. At this period Colonel Whittingham rode up, and addressing Colonel Browne said, “Colonel Browne, what do you intend to do?” The reply was, “What do I intend to do, sir? I intend to fight the French.” Whittingham then remarked, “You may do as you please, Colonel Browne, but we are decided on a retreat.” “Very well, sir,” replied Browne; “I shall stop where I am, for it shall never be said that John Frederick Browne ran away from the post which his general ordered him to defend.” Generals Murgeon and Beguines were present during the conversation, and as they expressed a wish to know its exact import, I informed them word for word in plain Spanish, which I pledge myself was a correct and full interpretation, and could not be misunderstood. Colonel Whittingham again addressed Colonel Browne, saying, “If you will not come with us but wish to retire on General Graham’s division, I shall give you a squadron of cavalry to cover your retreat.” Browne wheeled round, making no answer; and thus a formidable corps, composed of two regiments of Royal Spanish Guards, three regiments of the line, a park of artillery and a strong force of cavalry, all well armed clad and appointed, undaunted by the scowling frowns of their allies and the reproachful taunts of their own countrymen, were not afraid to run away. They retrograded with firm tread; nor faltering step nor slow was seen, and not one longing lingering look was cast behind. They left four hundred and seventy British bayonets bristling on the neck of the boar.

The Spaniards being now out of the way and soon out of sight, Colonel Browne directed Lieutenant Sparks, 30th Regiment, who acted as engineer, to loophole a chapel which stood on the summit of the hill. Some men were loosely thrown in, and the remainder of our little battalion formed three sides of an oblong square, the low tower or chapel supplying the fourth face.

By this time the French cavalry had gained the coast road, probably either to cut off the retreat of the allies by that route or to prevent any troops coming by way of Vejer. Be that as it may, they now turned directly towards us. On approaching nearly within musket range, they opened right and left, apparently to gain both our flanks; and now for the first time their artillery were discovered not far behind, and at the same moment their infantry were seen moving forward, darkening the distant part of the plain which skirts the town of Chiclana. Hesitation would now be madness. Our men were instantly withdrawn from the chapel, and forming column of quarter distance we proceeded quickly down the hill towards the pine forest which shut out Bermeja from our view. The enemy’s horsemen were soon on every side of our little column and kept gradually closing in; but dreading that, before we could get away to a sufficient distance from the hill, the artillery, which we had seen whipping over the plain, would open their fire upon us, we durst not halt to form square; our situation was rather perplexing, but we were determined. In this order we moved rapidly down the hill, which being uneven and woody favoured our retreat; but on crossing a ravine we became more exposed, having entered on comparatively level ground, scarce of wood. Colonel Browne now threw out a few loose files, but not far from each angle of the column, to warn the cavalry off, some few of whom were hurt by their fire. To say the truth, the cavalry showed rather a wavering inclination than a firm determination to charge us. Having passed over the level ground, we touched the skirts of the forest, and on our forming line the cavalry drew off.

During these operations General Graham, entangled in the pine forest, was pressing forward towards Bermeja, when two peasants rode breathless up to him, stating that the whole French army, headed by Marshal Victor, were rapidly crossing the plain of Chiclana and coming down on his rear. Upon this he immediately turned round and soon perceived the Spaniards, who had fled from the hill, posting along towards the coast; and since these were mistaken for French, the English troops were on the point of firing into them. At this moment Captain Calvert, having discovered something red through the thick foliage of the wood, cried out, “That must be Colonel Browne’s flank battalion,” and darting forward soon discovered his surmise to be fact. General Graham came forth instantly to meet us, saying, “Browne, did I not give you orders to defend Barossa Hill?” “Yes, sir,” said Browne; “but you would not have me fight the whole French army with four hundred and seventy men?” “Had you not,” replied the general, “five Spanish battalions, together with artillery and cavalry?” “Oh!” said Browne; “they all ran away long before the enemy came within cannon-shot.” The general coolly replied, “It is a bad business, Browne; you must instantly turn round and attack.” “Very well,” said the colonel; “am I to attack in extended order as flankers, or as a close battalion?” “In open order,” was the reply, and the general returned to the troops in the wood.

All this time we never saw our English comrades, though they were close before us, so dense was the wood. The flank battalion were instantly extended into skirmishing order, which had scarcely been done when the general again rode back to Colonel Browne, saying, “I must show something more serious than skirmishing; close the men into compact battalion.” “That I will, with pleasure,” cried the colonel; “for it is more in my way than light bobbing.” The order to close on the centre was instantly bugled out, during which movement the colonel sent to know from the general, who had again retired, if he was to advance as soon as formed, and whether he was to attack immediately in his front or more towards his right. The answer was, “Attack in your front, and immediately.”

All being now ready, Colonel Browne rode to the front of the battalion and taking off his hat said in a voice to be heard by all, “Gentlemen, I am happy to be the bearer of good news: General Graham has done you the honour of being the first to attack those fellows. Now follow me, you rascals!” He pointed to the enemy, and giving the order to advance broke into his favourite air:

Thus we moved forward with four hundred and sixty-eight men and twenty-one officers to attack the position, upon which but three-quarters of an hour previously we had stood in proud defiance of the advancing foe, but which was now defended by two thousand five hundred infantry and eight pieces of artillery, together with some cavalry. To this force were added two battalions of chosen grenadiers, commanded by General Rousseau, the whole under the orders of the General of Division, Rufin.