In 1836, the aggressive acts of Persia, influenced by Russian gold, were sufficiently alarming, but all doubt was removed when the Shah invaded Afghanistan, and laid siege to Herat.

At this moment the united influence of Persia and Russia would seem to have been established in all the Afghan dominions with the single exception of Herat, and the existence of that influence in those countries, viewed in conjunction with the course which those powers had recently been pursuing, and the measures that had resulted from their joint diplomatic exertions, was so obviously incompatible with the tranquillity of India, and even with its security, that no measures could be more unequivocally measures of self-defence than those which the British Government were called upon to adopt for the purpose of counteracting the evils with which India was threatened; Persia had no provocation to complain of. The course pursued by the British Government towards this Government had been one of uniform friendship and forbearance; and it appeared a hazardous and costly line of policy to adopt were the British Government any longer to permit Persia, under shelter of her treaty with Britain, to open the way to India for another and far more formidable power.

Although that city of Herat held strongly out, and finally repulsed the Persians, the country generally was anxious for their alliance, and to check an influence that might prove truly dangerous hereafter, the Indian government decided on an armed intervention, and the restoration of Shah Shoojah was made the apology for a hostile demonstration.

The entrance of an invading army into Afghanistan was heralded by the Simla declaration, and a strong force, termed “the army of the Indus,” in due time penetrated this mountain country by the route of the terrible Bolan Pass, a huge chasm, running between precipitous rocks to the length of seventy miles, and rising in that distance to the height of 5,637 feet above the plains below, which are here about 750 feet in height above the level of the sea. The dangerous defiles which abound in these mountains are infested by the poorest and wildest tribes of the country, who live entirely by plunder; but they fortunately refrained from molesting the troops to the extent which they might have done.

The occupation of Afghanistan was disastrous from the first. The troops were severely harassed and half-starved, and the blunders of the political agents, want of cordiality in the commanders, dissension between the contingents of Bengal and Bombay, all gave little promise of ultimate success. Early in April, Sir John Keane joined, and took the chief command, and on the 7th he advanced on Candahar. The march was extremely oppressive. Intense heat, want of water, desultory attacks, all made the movement a distressing one, but Candahar was at last reached, and Shah Shoojah restored to the Musnad.

Sir John’s next operation was the reduction of Ghuznee, and it would appear rather unaccountable that with this strong fortress before him, he should have left his siege-train at Candahar.

Ghuznee, instead of being, as had been represented, almost defenceless, was a place of remarkable strength, and was found by the engineers to possess a high rampart in good repair, built on a scarped mound, about thirty-five feet high, flanked by numerous towers, and surrounded by a fausse-braye and wet ditch. The irregular figure of the “enceinte” gave a good flanking fire, whilst the height of the citadel covered the interior from the commanding fire of the hills to the north, rendering it nugatory. In addition to this, the towers at the angles had been enlarged, screen-walls had been built before the gates, the ditch cleared out and filled with water, stated to be unfordable, and an outwork built upon the right bank, so as to command its bed.

Sir John, however, seemed to hold Peninsular practice in fortunate recollection, for he repeated at Ghuznee what Brochard, a French engineer, had tried so successfully at Amarante, blew down a barricade, and carried the place by storm. Khelat was subsequently taken by assault, and the army of the Indus soon after broken up—the Bombay contingent retiring to cantonments, and the Bengal retaining military occupation of Cabul.

The next epoch in Indian history is painfully unfortunate, and the military occupation of Afghanistan forms a fearful experience in Monson’s retreat. Monson was as brave as any officer in the British army; second to none in undaunted valour at storming a breach, but he wanted the rarer quality of moral intrepidity, and the power of adopting great designs on his own responsibility. On the 6th of July, Holkar was engaged in crossing the Chumbul; the fortunate moment of attack, never to be recalled was allowed to escape; and two days afterwards the British general commenced his retreat. He did what ordinary officers would have done at Assaye, when it was ascertained Stevenson’s division could not come up; and what was the result? In a few hours the subsidiary horse, now four thousand strong, which was left to observe the enemy, was enveloped by clouds of the Mahratta cavalry, and after a bloody struggle, cut to pieces with their gallant commander.

Painful as the sequel proved, it may yet be briefly told. Colonel Monson gained the Makundra pass, and afterwards retreated to Kotah and Rampoora, after abandoning his artillery. Reinforced by two battalions and three thousand irregular horse, he quitted the fort and marched directly for the British frontier. Heavy rains fell; and on reaching the banks of the Bannas, he found the stream impassable. The position of this ill-fated corps was truly desperate. In their front was a raging torrent, in their rear twenty thousand horsemen, continually receiving fresh accessions of strength in infantry and guns, as they successively came up. The river having at length become fordable, four battalions crossed over; and the enemy, seeing his advantage, immediately commenced a furious attack on the single battalion and pickets, which now remained alone on the other side. With such heroic constancy, however, was this unequal contest maintained by these brave men, that they not only repulsed the whole attacks made upon them, but, pursuing their success, captured several of the enemy’s guns—an event which clearly demonstrated what results might have followed the adoption of a vigorous offensive in the outset, when the troops were undiminished in strength and unbroken in spirit.

Disasters followed fast upon each other. The sepoy guard who accompanied the military chests was attacked by the cavalry of Scindiah, their own ally; and when the Mahrattas were defeated, they treacherously deserted to Holkar. The whole of the irregular horse, which had reinforced Monson at Rampoora, followed the example; and a few companies of Sepoys—a rare occurrence among those faithful people—quitted their ranks, and joined this enemy. Formed in oblong square, the greater portion of the latter part of the retreat was executed—fifteen thousand horse incessantly harassing in front, flank, and rear, the retiring column, and only kept at bay by the indomitable courage and unbroken formation of the remnant of this glorious division. At last, worn down by fatigue, and reduced by casualties and desertion of twelve thousand men, scarcely a thousand entered Agra, without cannon, baggage, or ammunition, and only fit for the hospitals, and afterwards to be invalided.