THE PAN-GERMAN PROGRAMME.

INTRODUCTORY.

The two documents presented in this pamphlet are the fullest statement of the programme of the Pan-German party in Germany. They were both drawn up in the earlier months of 1915. After the series of rapid German successes in the West, with which the war opened, had seemed to come to a check, and month after month went by without the expected advance on Paris being resumed, it was felt to be necessary that the German people should get some more precise idea of what it was fighting for, what it had to obtain before it could consider that the war had attained its end.

In March, 1915, the rumour got about that the German Government was contemplating a peace of compromise, and Pan-German circles took alarm. Pan-Germanism was not strong in the working class and many of the Radical Intellectuals disapproved of it. But it was very strong among the country landowners, i.e. the class called Junkers, and the rich manufacturers, especially the great ironmasters of the Rhenish-Westphalian country, who wanted to get hold of the French iron-districts of Briey and Longwy. These interests were organised in a number of powerful Associations.

If there was danger of the Government under Bethmann Hollweg's direction weakening, it appeared necessary that pressure should be brought to bear upon it in time. Five Associations in March drew up a Memorandum to be presented privately to the Chancellor. They were afterwards joined by a sixth, and the Memorandum in its final form was laid before the Chancellor on May 20, 1915. This is the first of the two documents here translated.

The second is the so-called "Manifesto of the Intellectuals." It was read on June 20, 1915, to a great gathering of professors, diplomats, and high Government officials in the Artists' Hall (KÜnstlerhaus) in Berlin. It was not published, but circulated as a "strictly confidential manuscript," and was submitted to the Chancellor on July 8. When 1341 signatures had been appended to it the Government stepped in and forbade further canvassing. It is therefore claimed that the 1341 do not represent the amount of the support which the manifesto would have got in the country had it been allowed free course.

The Intellectuals' Manifesto has a more extensive programme than that of the Six Associations. It includes, not only the demands of the Associations, but the scheme commonly designated by the term Mittel-Europa, with its appendix, the control of the Turkish Empire by Germany, implying a great belt of German power across the world from the North Sea to the Persian Gulf—about which the Six Associations said nothing. Again, whereas the Six Associations say only in general terms that they demand the possession of "a colonial empire adequate to satisfy Germany's manifold economic interests," the Intellectuals state more specifically that this means an empire in Central Africa, and more—endorsing, therefore, the scheme labelled Mittel-Afrika.

These two documents will always be two of the most important documents of the Great War for students of history. Although they were not published in Germany till long after they had begun to circulate privately, their contents became rapidly known and they became main objects of attack for Radical and Socialist circles. Much has happened since they were drawn up. It has become clear to a much larger number of people in Germany that such schemes are unrealisable.

In July, 1917, the majority of the Reichstag passed a resolution in favour of a peace on the basis of the status quo ante. But we should guard against the error of supposing that, because the largest body of opinion in the country last summer was against annexations, all danger from German ambitions has passed away. We must take into account two things:

(1) The Pan-German opinion, even if that of a minority, is that of a very strong and desperately energetic minority. It has recently taken body in the Vaterlandspartei, which may be rendered "National Party." It carries on a vigorous propaganda backed by vast funds, and has on its side many men of influence upon the Government. It shows what the majority of the Germans would desire, if weakness on our side gave them any hope of getting it. And hopes seem to have risen again since the collapse of Russia and the repulse of Italy. The Reichstag majority which passed the "peace resolution" last July seems no longer solid. It is highly improbable that the majority of the Reichstag would now demand a peace "without annexations."

(2) Even those who oppose the Pan-Germans and stand for a "peace without annexations" cherish the design of laying a foundation for German power within the sphere of Germany and its allies, upon which later on a more ambitious structure of power could be reared. The trouble with "these gentlemen of the Vaterlandspartei," one Socialist writer explained, was not that they asked for too much but that they asked for it all at once. If Germany could strengthen its grip upon Central Europe, Bulgaria, and the restored Turkish Empire, one of the great schemes contained in the Intellectuals' Manifesto could be realised without annexations. It may be that when the German Government ultimately state their minimum requirements they will seem modest, compared with the Pan-German programme. Even so they will require careful scrutiny lest there should be more in them of the Pan-German spirit than appears on the outside, more than is compatible with the safety of the world.

EDWYN BEVAN,

January, 1918.

I.

THE PETITION OF THE SIX ASSOCIATIONS.

The following is the full text of the Petitions addressed to the German Chancellor, Dr. von Bethmann Hollweg, and to the Governments of the various Federated States of the German Empire, on March 10 and May 20, 1915, by the League of Agriculturists (Bund der Landwirte), the German Peasants' League (Deutscher Bauernbund), the Christian German Peasants' Unions (die christlichen deutschen Bauernvereine), the Central Association of German Manufacturers (Centralverband deutscher Industrieller), the Manufacturers' League (Bund der Industriellen) and the League of Middle-Class Citizens in the German Empire (Reichsdeutscher Mittelstandsverband):—

Together with the whole German people, those occupied in business pursuits, whether in agriculture or manufacture, in handicrafts or trade, are determined to endure to the end, notwithstanding every sacrifice, in this struggle for life and death which has been forced upon Germany, in order that Germany may emerge stronger in its external relations, assured of a lasting peace, and thus also assured of further national, economic, and cultural development at home.

Since the whole German people recognises these aims as its own, and has given tangible proof of its willingness to make sacrifices for their achievement, the rumours recently circulating in town and country were bound to be most disquieting. These rumours (confirmed, apparently, by certain announcements in the Press) were to the effect that preliminary steps were being taken to prepare the way for peace negotiations, and, in particular, for a separate peace with England, based on certain English wishes and demands.

Hence universal satisfaction has been caused by the declaration of the Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, that no competent judge would dream of sacrificing Germany's favourable military position in order to conclude a premature peace with any one of her enemies.

Even if the military situation were more unfavourable, or more doubtful, this ought to make no difference to our determination—unless, indeed, we are to lose sight of the aims in home and foreign policy which His Majesty the Emperor has himself proclaimed. These aims can only be attained by achieving a peace which will bring us better security for our frontiers in East and West, an extension of the foundations of our sea power, and the possibility of an unchecked and strong development of our economic resources; in short, those extensions of power, alike in politics, in the army, in the navy, and in our economic life, which will guarantee to us a stronger position in the world.

Any peace which does not bring us these results will make a speedy renewal of the struggle inevitable under circumstances essentially less favourable to Germany. Therefore no premature peace! For from a premature peace we could not hope for a sufficient prize of victory.

But also no half-hearted peace, no peace which does not include complete political exploitation of those ultimate military successes which we expect to obtain!

For it must be realised that, not only the security of our future international position, but also our power to utilise the present self-sacrificing spirit of the German people for the settlement of those questions of domestic policy, which will arise on the return of peace, both equally presuppose the complete exploitation of our military position so as to increase Germany's power abroad. Assuredly our people would understand any concessions which were wrung from them by a military situation so desperate as to oppose insuperable obstacles to any resistance, however determined and however self-sacrificing; but they would not tolerate any weak concessions at the conclusion of peace which were not justified and necessitated by the military situation. Concessions of this kind would be fraught with the most fatal consequences for the domestic peace of our Fatherland, since they might lead to the same result as a premature withdrawal from the conflict, and our soldiers would discover, on returning home, that the only reward for their splendid endurance was a crushing burden of taxation. Hundreds of thousands have given their lives: the prize of victory must correspond to the sacrifice.

The following Memorandum was drawn up on March 10 of this year and addressed to your Excellency by the League of Agriculturists, the German Peasants' League, the Central Association of German Manufacturers, the Manufacturers' League, and the League of Middle-Class Citizens in the German Empire. The Memorandum, to which the Christian German Peasants' Unions, who are also signatories to the present Petition, have given their adhesion, explains in detail the requirements which—the necessary military successes being assumed—must in the opinion of the undersigned Associations be fulfilled, in order to secure for Germany that political, military, and economic position which would enable her to look forward with confidence to all possibilities of the future.

The Memorandum was as follows:

The undersigned Corporations have carefully considered what measures are required to give practical effect to the formula, which has so often been heard during the last few months, viz., that this war must be followed by an honourable peace, corresponding to the sacrifices which have been made and containing in itself a guarantee for its continuance.

In answering this question, it must never be forgotten that our enemies continue to announce that Germany is to be annihilated and struck out of the rank of the Great Powers. Against such aims treaties will afford us no protection; for treaties, when the fitting moment comes, would once more be trodden under foot. We can only look for safety in a serious economic and military weakening of our enemies, sufficient to ensure peace for as long a time as can be foreseen.

We must demand a colonial Empire adequate to satisfy Germany's manifold economic interests, we must safeguard our future policy in matters of customs and commerce, and we must secure a war indemnity to be paid in a form suitable to our requirements: but our chief end in the struggle which has been forced upon us is, in our opinion, to strengthen and improve the foundations on which Germany's position in Europe rests, in the following directions:

In order to provide the necessary security for our influence at sea and in order to secure our future military and economic position as against England, Belgium, owing to the close connexion of Belgian territory (which is economically of such importance) with our main manufacturing districts, must be subjected to German Imperial legislation, both in military and tariff matters, and also in regard to currency, banking, and postal arrangements. Railways and canals must be incorporated in our transport system. In general, the government and administration of the country must be so managed that the inhabitants obtain no influence on the political fortunes of the German Empire; there must be separation of the Walloon and of the predominantly Flemish territory, and all economic and industrial undertakings and real estate, which are so vital for the government of the country, must be transferred into German hands.

We must consider the question of French territory from the same point of view, i.e. so far as it affects our position towards England. Hence we must regard it as a matter of vital importance, in the interests of our future influence at sea, that we should hold the French coastal districts from the Belgian frontier approximately as far as the Somme. and thus secure access to the Atlantic Ocean. The Hinterland, which must be acquired with them, must be so delimited as to secure to us the complete economic and strategic exploitation of those Channel-ports which we gain. Any further acquisitions of French territory, apart from the necessary annexation of the iron-ore district of Briey, must be determined solely by military and strategic considerations. After the experiences of this war, it may be regarded as self-evident that we cannot in the future leave our frontiers at the mercy of hostile invasion by allowing our opponents to retain those fortified positions which threaten us, in particular Verdun and Belfort and the Western slopes of the Vosges which lie between them. The acquisition of the line of the Meuse and the French Channel-coast would carry with it the possession, not only of the iron-ore district of Briey mentioned above, but also of the coal-country in the department of the Nord and the Pas-de-Calais. These annexations also—as is self-evident, after our experiences in Alsace-Lorraine—must be so arranged that the population of the annexed districts shall be precluded from exercising political influence on the fortunes of the German Empire; and all the economic resources of these districts, including both large and medium-sized estates, must be transferred to German hands on such terms that France shall compensate and take over their owners.

As to the East, the determining consideration must be that the great addition to our manufacturing resources, which we anticipate in the West, must be counterbalanced by an equivalent annexation of agricultural territory in the East. The present economic structure of Germany has shown itself so fortunate in this war, that it is hardly too much to say that every German is convinced of the necessity for maintaining it for as long a time as we can foresee.

The necessity of strengthening the sound agricultural basis of our economic system, of making possible a German agricultural colonisation on a large scale, of restoring the German peasants who are living abroad—especially those settled in Russia and at present deprived of their rights—to the territory of the Empire, so that they may take part in the economic life of Germany, and, lastly, the necessity of greatly increasing the numbers of our population capable of bearing arms, implies a considerable extension of the Imperial and Prussian frontiers in the East by annexation of at least parts of the Baltic Provinces and of those territories which lie to the south of them, whilst at the same time we must keep in mind, the object of making our Eastern German frontier capable of military defence.

The restoration of East Prussia requires a better safeguarding of its frontiers by placing in front of them other districts, nor must West Prussia, Posen and Silesia remain frontier marches exposed to danger as they now are.

With regard to the granting of political rights to the inhabitants of the new districts and the safeguarding of German economic influence, what has already been said about France applies here too. The war indemnity to be paid by Russia will have to consist to a large extent in the cession of land.

Of course these demands depend on the hypothesis that military results will enable them to be carried out. But in view of what we have already achieved, we confidently rely on our army and its leaders to gain a victory which will guarantee the attainment of these ends. We must pursue these ends, not from a policy of conquest, but because it is only by attaining them that we can secure that lasting peace which all classes of the German people expect in return for their sacrifices. Moreover, in our opinion, a voluntary surrender of hostile territories, in which so much German blood has been spilt and so many of our best and noblest have found a grave, would do violence to the sentiments of our people and to their conception of an honourable peace.

In the future as in the past, the want of harbours directly on the Channel would strangle our activity beyond the seas. An independent Belgium would continue to be a tÊte de pont to England, a point from which to attack us. If the natural line of fortifications of France were left in the hands of the French, there would be a permanent menace to our frontiers; and Russia, if she emerged from the war without loss of territory, would underestimate our ability and power to prevent her doing injury to our interests, while, on the other hand, the failure to win new agricultural territories on our Eastern frontier would diminish the possibility of strengthening the defensive power of Germany against Russia by a sufficient increase of the German population.

We have the honour to draw Your Excellency's attention to the views expressed above, which are not confined to the undersigned Corporations, but are widely held—possibly with occasional variations in detail—in many German circles which have not as yet publicly expressed them, and at the same time to inform you that we have simultaneously communicated this petition to the Ministries of the various Federated States.

As a supplement to this Memorandum, we must here lay special stress on the fact that the political, military and economic objects, which the German people must strive after in the interests of the security of their future, are inseparably connected with one another. It is clear, to start with, that the attainment of our great political objects depends on the offensive power and the successes of our army. But precisely our experiences in this war prove, beyond any doubt, that our military successes, particularly in a long war, and their further exploitation depend to a large extent upon the economic strength and ability of our people. If German agriculture had not been in a position to secure the food of the people despite all the efforts of our enemies, and if German manufacturers, German inventive genius and German technical skill had not been able to render us independent of foreign countries in the most different spheres, then, notwithstanding the brilliant successes of our victorious troops, we should have had to give way eventually in the struggle which has been forced upon us, if indeed we should not have been defeated already.

Hence it follows that even those demands, which seem at first sight to possess a purely economic significance, must be viewed in the light of the urgent necessity for the greatest possible increase of our national strength, and also from a military standpoint.

This applies with special force to the demands, which are set forth in the Memorandum, both (a) for the acquisition of territory suitable for agricultural settlement and (b) for the appropriation of the iron-ore district of the Meurthe and Moselle, of the French coaling districts in the Departments of the Nord and the Pas-de-Calais, and also of the Belgian coalfields.

The acquisition of sufficient territory suitable for agricultural settlement is indispensable—(a) in order to broaden the agricultural basis of our national resources, and thus to maintain that happy balance in our whole economic life which has been recognised as so necessary in the present war; (b) in order to strengthen our military power by safeguarding the sources of our national strength, which depend upon a vigorous agricultural policy, and more especially by assuring the increase of our population.

In the same way, acquisitions, such as that of the iron ore and coal districts mentioned above, are demanded by our military necessities, and not by any means only in the interests of our manufacturing development. This is clear from the following facts and figures:—

The monthly production of pig-iron in Germany has risen once more, since August 1914, to nearly 1,000,000 tons; that is, it has nearly doubled. The monthly output of steel has risen to more than 1,000,000 tons.

There is, however, no excess of pig-iron or steel; on the contrary, there is a deficiency in Germany, and an even greater deficiency in neutral countries.

The output of shells calls for both iron and steel, in quantities of which only a few persons originally had any conception. For cast-iron shells alone—the inferior substitute for drawn and cast steel shells—at least 4000 tons of pig-iron have been used daily during the last few months. The exact figures are not for the moment before us; but this much is certain, that, unless the output of iron and steel had been doubled since the month of August, a continuation of the war would have been impossible.

As a raw material for the production of these quantities of pig-iron and steel, minette is being employed more and more, for this ore alone can be obtained in this country in greatly increasing quantities.

The output of the other iron-ore districts of Germany is very limited, and the overseas imports, even of the Swedish ores, are so difficult to procure that in many places, in addition to Luxemburg and Lorraine, minette at the present time covers 60 to 80 per cent. of the output of steel and pig-iron. It the output of minette were interrupted, the war would be as good as lost.

But how do matters stand as regards the supply of minette in this or in a future war?

If the fortress of Longwy, with the numerous surrounding French blast-furnaces, were given back, then in another war, with a few long-range guns, the following works in Germany and Luxemburg could be ruined in a few hours:

By this destruction alone it may be estimated that 20 per cent. of the German output of pig-iron and steel would be lost.

But a glance at the map shows us further that, e.g., Jarny (the "Phoenix" minette pits) lies at a distance of 13 to 15 kilometres from Verdun, and that the western mining concessions near Landres and Conflans are not more than 26 kilometres at most from Verdun. To-day we are bombarding Dunkirk from a distance of 38 kilometres. Does anyone believe that the French, in the next war, would neglect to place long-range guns in Longwy and Verdun, and allow us to continue the extraction of ore and the production of pig-iron?

Incidentally it may be remarked that the extensive production of steel from minette offers at the same time the one and only possibility of providing German agriculture with the necessary phosphoric acid for the manufacture of the now excluded phosphates.

Hence the security of the German Empire in a future war imperatively demands the possession of the whole minette-bearing district of Luxemburg and Lorraine, together with the fortifications of Longwy and Verdun, without which this district cannot be held.

The possession of larger supplies of coal—and, in particular, of coal rich in bitumen, which is found in great quantities in the basin of Northern France—is at least as decisive for the result of this war as the possession of iron-ore.

Belgium and North France together produce over forty million tons.

Even to-day, as the British prohibition of coal exports (enacted on the 15th of May) shows us, coal is one of the decisive means of political influence. The neutral manufacturing States must do the bidding of that belligerent who can guarantee a supply of coal. We cannot do this at present in a sufficient degree, and are to-day already compelled to fall back upon the Belgian coal supply, in order not to let our neutral neighbours become entirely dependent upon England.

It is quite probable that the systematic increase of the Belgian coal output, even during the present war, will prove a weighty factor in determining various neighbour States to remain neutral.

That coal, which produces coke and gas, at the same time supplies the bases of our most important explosives, is presumably well known, as also is the importance of coal in the production of ammonia.

In benzol, moreover, it offers the only substitute for petrol, of which we are short; and, finally, it supplies coal-tar, which yields (a) the oil fuel so indispensable for the Navy, (b) anthracite oil, the most serviceable substitute as yet obtainable at home for lubricating oil, and (c) naphthaline, the probable base of synthetic petroleum.

It may in this connection be remarked that we should probably be unable to develop our destroyer and submarine warfare to the requisite intensity without an abundance of liquid fuel. The course of the war has so clearly proved the superiority of oil fuel over ordinary coal-firing in torpedo-boats, that we should be guilty of unpardonable folly if we failed to base our future conduct on this experience.

If our hostile neighbours secure the possession of the oil wells, Germany must take care to secure for herself the necessary supplies of gas-producing and bituminous coal, and must in time of peace develop these until they constitute inexhaustible sources of oil, benzol, toluol, ammonia, and naphthaline; and that, not merely in order to increase our prosperity in time of peace, but as an indispensable part of our equipment for war.

To recapitulate: The realisation of the war-aims, which are proposed above with a view to our permanent economic security, will also guarantee our military strength, and consequently our political independence and power: moreover, we shall thus secure an extended field for our economic activity, which will afford and guarantee increased opportunities for work, and thus benefit our working classes as a whole.

"The Six Associations," states Grumbach, in his Annexationist Germany, "did not confine themselves to presenting their Petitions to the Government, but printed them and circulated them in the form of a confidential pamphlet amongst their members, who are domiciled in all parts of Germany. The anti-annexationist league, Neues Vaterland (New Fatherland), which got to know of it, kindly circulated the Petitions amongst its own members in the form of a confidential report, thus bringing them to the notice of a fresh public. Nevertheless, the great majority of the German people has, to this day, no accurate knowledge of the annexationist desires set forth in the Petitions, since the German newspapers were forbidden to reproduce them. In foreign countries the complete text of the Petitions was first published in the Parisian Socialist newspaper, HumanitÉ, for August 11, 1915, after the Socialist Berner Tagwacht had published an abridged version on June 22, 1915."

II.

THE MANIFESTO OF THE INTELLECTUALS.

The following is the full text of the Petition agreed on by a number of German professors, diplomatists, and superior Government officials, at a meeting held on June 20, 1915, in the KÜnstlerhaus, Berlin, for the purpose of its being presented to the German Imperial Chancellor:—

The German people and their Emperor have preserved peace for forty-four years, preserved it until its further maintenance was incompatible with national honour and security. Despite her increase in strength and population, Germany never thought of transgressing the narrow bounds of her possessions on the European Continent with a view to conquest. Upon the world's markets alone was she forced to make an entry, so as to ensure her economic existence by peacefully competing with other nations.

To our enemies, however, even these narrow limits and a share of the world's trade necessary to our existence seemed too much, and they formed plans which aimed at the very annihilation of the German Empire. Then we Germans rose as one man, from the highest to the meanest, realising that we must defend not only our physical existence but also our inner, spiritual, and moral life—in short, defend German and European civilisation (Kultur) against barbarian hordes from the east, and lust for vengeance and domination from the west. With God's help, hand in hand with our trusty allies, we have been able to maintain ourselves victoriously against half a world of enemies.

Now however, although another foe has arisen, in Italy, it is no longer sufficient for us merely to defend ourselves. Our foes have forced the sword into our hands and have compelled us to make enormous sacrifices of blood and treasure. Henceforth our aim is to protect ourselves with all our might against a repetition of such an attack from every side—against a whole succession of wars which we might have to wage against enemies who had again become strong. Moreover, we are determined to extend our territory and to establish ourselves so firmly and so securely upon it that our independent existence shall be guaranteed for generations to come.

As to these main objects, the nation is unanimous in its determination. The plain truth, which is supported by evidence from all sides, is this:—In all classes of the people there is only one single fear, which is most prevalent and deep-seated in the most simple-minded sections, viz. the fear that illusory ideas of reconciliation, or even perhaps a nervous impatience, might lead to the conclusion of a premature and consequently patched-up peace which could never be lasting; and that, as happened a hundred years ago, the pen of the diplomats might ruin what the sword has victoriously won, and this perhaps in the most fateful hour of German history, when popular feeling has attained an intensity and unanimity, which were never known in the past and will not so easily recur in the future.

Let there be no mistake. We do not wish to dominate the world, but to have a standing in it fully corresponding to our great position as a civilised Power and to our economic and military strength. It may be that, owing to the numerical superiority of our enemies, we cannot obtain at a single stroke all that is required in order thus to ensure our national position; but the military results of this war, obtained by such great sacrifices, must be utilised to the very utmost possible extent. This, we repeat, is the firm determination of the German people.

To give clear expression to this resolute popular determination, so that it may be at the service of the Government and may afford it strong support in its difficult task of enforcing Germany's necessary claims against a few faint-hearted individuals at home as well as against stubborn enemies abroad, is the duty and right of those whose education and position raise them to the level of intellectual leaders and protagonists of public opinion. We appeal to them to fulfil this duty.

Being well aware that a distinction must be drawn between the objects of the war and the final conditions of peace, that everything of necessity depends on the final success of our arms, and that it cannot be our business to discuss Austria-Hungary's and Turkey's military objects, we have drawn up the following brief statement of what, according to our conviction, constitutes for Germany the guarantee of a lasting peace and the goal to which the blood-stained roads of this war must lead:

1. FRANCE.—After being threatened by France for centuries, and after hearing the cry of revanche from 1815 till 1870, and from 1871 till 1915, we wish to have done with the French menace once for all. All classes of our people are imbued with this desire. There must be no misplaced attempts at reconciliation, which have always been opposed by France with the utmost fanaticism; and as regards this we would utter a most urgent warning to Germans not to deceive themselves. Even after the terrible lesson of this unsuccessful war of vengeance, France will still thirst for revanche, in so far as her strength permits. For the sake of our own existence we must ruthlessly weaken her both politically and economically, and must improve our military and strategic position with regard to her. For this purpose, in our opinion, it is necessary to effect a thorough rectification of our whole Western frontier from Belfort to the coast. Part of the North French Channel-coast we must acquire, if possible, in order to be strategically safer as regards England and to secure better access to the ocean.

Special measures must be taken, in order that the German Empire may not suffer any internal injury owing to this enlargement of its frontiers and addition to its territory. In order not to have conditions such as those in Alsace-Lorraine, the most important business undertakings and estates must be transferred from anti-German ownership to German hands, France taking over and compensating the former owners. Such portion of the population as is taken over by us must be allowed absolutely no influence in the Empire.

Furthermore, we must have no mercy upon France, however terrible the financial losses her own folly and British self-seeking have already brought upon her. We must impose upon her a heavy war indemnity (of which more hereafter), and indeed upon France before our other enemies.

We must also not forget that she has disproportionately large colonial possessions, and that, should circumstances arise, England could indemnify herself out of these, if we do not help ourselves to them.

2. BELGIUM.—On Belgium, in the acquisition of which so much of the best German blood has been shed, we must keep a firm hold, political, military, and economic, despite any arguments which may be urged to the contrary. On no point is public opinion so unanimous. The German people consider it an absolutely unquestionable matter of honour to keep a firm hold of Belgium.

From the political and military standpoints it is obvious that, were this not done, Belgium would be neither more nor less than a basis from which England could attack and most dangerously menace Germany—in short, a shield behind which our foes would again assemble against us. Economically Belgium means a prodigious increase of power to us.

Belgium may also bring us a considerable addition to our population, if in course of time the Flemish element, which is so closely allied to us, becomes emancipated from the artificial grip of French culture and remembers its Teutonic affinities.

As to the problems which we shall have to solve, once we possess Belgium, we would here confine ourselves to emphasising the following principles:—(1) The inhabitants must be precluded from exercising any political influence whatever in the Empire; and (2) the most important business undertakings and estates (as in the districts to be ceded by France) must be transferred from anti-German ownership to German hands.

3. RUSSIA.—On our Eastern frontier the population of the Russian Empire is increasing on an enormous scale—about 2-½ to 3 millions yearly. Within a generation a population of 250 millions will be attained. Against this overwhelming pressure of numbers on our eastern flank, undoubtedly the greatest danger to the German and European future, Germany can hold her ground only—(a) if a strong boundary-wall be erected both against the advancing tide of Russification, which encroaches imperceptibly in times of peace, and also against the menace of an aggressive war; and (b) if we adopt all possible measures to maintain the past healthy increase of our population. But the realisation of both these conditions demands land, which Russia must cede to us. It must be agricultural land for colonisation—land which will yield us healthy peasants, the rejuvenating source of all national and political energy; land which can take up part of the increase of our population, and offer to the returning German emigrants, who wish to turn their backs on hostile foreign countries, a new home in their own country; land which will increase Germany's economic independence of foreign countries, by developing her own possibilities of food-production, which will constitute the necessary counterpoise to the advancing industrialisation of our people and the increase of town-dwellers, thus conserving that equilibrium of our economic resources, whose inestimable value has been proved during the war, and saving us from the dangerous one-sidedness of the English economic system; land which will arrest the decline of the birth-rate, check emigration, and alleviate the dearth of dwelling-houses; land whose re-settlement and Germanisation will provide new possibilities of livelihood for the professional classes also. Such land for our physical, moral, and intellectual health is to be found above all in the East.

The measure in which our Eastern frontier is to be advanced will depend on the military situation, and in particular also it should be determined by strategic considerations. As far as the rectification of the eastern frontier of Posen and Silesia and the southern frontier of East Prussia is concerned, a frontier zone, accessible to German colonisation and as far as possible free of private ownership, must be created. This German frontier zone will protect the Prussian Poles against the direct and excessive influence of Russian Poland, which will perhaps attain its independence. Moreover, in this connection, we have no hesitation whatever in drawing special attention to that ancient territory in the Russian Baltic Provinces, which has been cultivated by Germans for the last 700 years. It is sparsely populated, its soil is fruitful, and it therefore promises to have a great future as a field for colonisation, whilst its Lithuanian, Lettish, and Esthonian population is derived from a stock alien to the Russians, which may prove a reliable source of that supply of journeyman-labour which we so urgently need.

We based our demand for land for colonisation from Russia on two grounds—the need for erecting a "boundary-wall" and the need for maintaining the increase of our population. But, in the third place, land is the form in which Russia's war-indemnity ought to be paid to us. To obtain an indemnity from Russia in cash or in securities will probably be just as impossible after this war as it proved after the Russo-Japanese war. On the other hand, Russia can easily pay an indemnity in kind. Russia is excessively rich in territory, and we demand that the territory which Russia is to surrender to us in lieu of a war-indemnity shall be delivered to us for the most part free of private ownership. This is by no means an outrageous demand, if we bear in mind Russian administrative methods. The Russian population is not so firmly rooted in the soil as that of Western and Central Europe. Again and again, right up to the early days of the present war, Russia has transplanted parts of her population on an enormous scale and settled them in far distant provinces. The possibilities of the scheme here proposed must not be judged in accordance with the modest standards of German civilisation (Kultur). If the acquisition of political control over territory is to bring with it that increase of power which we so urgently need for our future, we must also obtain economic control and have in the main free disposition over it. To conclude peace with Russia without ensuring the diminution of Russian preponderance, and without acquiring those territorial acquisitions which Germany needs, would be to lose a great opportunity for promoting Germany's political, economic, and social regeneration, and to impose upon future generations the burden of the final settlement with Russia—in other words, Germany and European civilisation would be confronted with the certainty of a renewal of their life-and-death struggle.

4. ENGLAND, THE EAST, COLONIES, AND OVERSEA TRADE.—The war between us and Russia has been waged with extraordinary violence, and has led to a glorious success for our arms; and we must never forget the menace to our future presented by the enormous Russian mass encamped on our Eastern frontier, if we should fail to disintegrate it. Nevertheless, we must never for one moment lose sight of the fact that this war is, in its ultimate origin, England's war upon the foreign trade, the naval power, and the world-prestige of Germany.

Since this is the motive of England's hostility and war against us, our war-aims against England are clear. We must wrest a free field for our foreign trade, we must enforce the recognition of our naval power and our world-prestige in spite of England.

We admit that England has taught us one lesson by her blockade, which has compelled Germany to reorganise herself for the duration of this war as a self-contained industrial state; for we have learned that, before and above all, we must win and secure a wider territorial basis in Europe (as is explained in detail above), in order that we may stand before the world in the utmost possible political, military and economic independence. And we must also create on the Continent the widest possible sphere of economic interest, directly contiguous with our country's frontiers (i.e. avoiding sea-routes), so as to free ourselves as far as possible from dependence upon the good pleasure of England and of the other world-empires, whose self-sufficiency and exclusiveness are constantly increasing. In this respect our political friendship with Austria-Hungary and Turkey, which is bound to throw open the Balkans and Western Asia to us, is of the first importance. It is therefore necessary that Austria-Hungary, the Balkans, Turkey, and Western Asia, down to the Persian Gulf, should be permanently secured against the covetousness of Russia and England. Commercial relations with our political friends must be furthered by all available means.

But, in the second place, it must be our aim to re-enter the world's oversea markets, in spite of England, and even though we have already safeguarded our foundations on the Continent. Undoubtedly it will be necessary to change the direction of a considerable part of our oversea trade; but we shall also have to conquer anew our old trade and shipping connections. Herein we shall in future stand upon our own feet, and shall, e.g., eliminate the hitherto customary mediation of English bankers and brokers, English arbitrage and exchange business, and the preponderance of English marine insurance companies. England has wantonly destroyed in us the trust and confidence which all such transactions require, and must pay the penalty by losing the profits which she has hitherto derived from them at the expense of German trade. In Africa our aim must be to rebuild our Colonial Empire, making it more self-contained and stronger than before. Central Africa alone would, it is true, give us a great extent of territory, but the value of the colonial products which it contains does not correspond to its size. We must therefore look to other quarters of the globe also, if we are to secure adequate acquisitions. From this point of view the importance of a permanent connection with the world of Islam and the vital necessity of a safe ocean highway are once more plainly evident. Those, therefore, who insist upon colonies at the sacrifice of our security against England's naval tyranny over the Channel—those who insist upon colonies in return for, and subject to, our surrender of Belgium—not only fail to realise that the acquisition of an extended European basis for our Fatherland is far more important than all colonial possessions; they are also guilty of the grave political blunder of aspiring to colonial possessions without securing their maritime communications, i.e. colonial possessions which will once more be dependent on England's arbitrary will.

We must have the freedom of the seas. For this—which is to benefit all peoples alike—we are wrestling with England. And if we are to enforce it, the first requisite is to establish ourselves firmly upon the Channel, facing England. As we have already explained above, we must retain a firm hold upon Belgium, and we must, if possible, conquer part of the Channel-coast of Northern France in addition. Further, we must break the chain of England's naval bases, which encircles the globe, or weaken it by a corresponding acquisition of German bases. But Egypt, which connects English possessions in Africa with those in Asia and converts the Indian Ocean into an English sea with Australia for its distant opposite shore; Egypt, which forms the connecting link between the mother country and all her Eastern colonies:—Egypt is, as Bismarck said, the neck of the British Empire, the vice in which England holds East and West in subjection. There a blow may be dealt at England's vital nerve. If it is successful, the international trade route of the Suez Canal must be freed from the domination of a single Power, and the ancient rights of Turkey be protected as far as possible.

But England's power is also essentially based upon the overwhelming influence which she exercises on the Governments and the Press of the whole world. In order to remedy this state of affairs and to secure counter-influence for Germany, it is vitally necessary to destroy England's monopoly of the cable-service and press-agencies. Our best ally in our fight against England's influence over the world's public opinion is freedom—freedom which we shall bring to all nations by fighting for our own liberation from the yoke imposed by England upon the world. We must not strive to dominate and exploit the world, like the English: our aim should be to safeguard our own special needs, and then to act as pathmakers and leaders of Europe, respecting and securing the free self-development of the peoples.

5. INDEMNITY FOR THE WAR.—Finally, as regards indemnity for the war, we naturally desire such an indemnity as will, so far as possible, cover the public cost of the war, make restoration possible in East Prussia and Alsace, guarantee the establishment of a pension fund for cripples, widows, and orphans, indemnify private individuals for losses inflicted on them contrary to international law, and provide for the renewal and further development of our armaments.

But we are aware that these matters depend not only upon the extent of our military successes but also upon the financial capacity of our enemies. If we found ourselves in a position to impose a war-indemnity upon England—England, which has always been so niggardly in sacrificing the lives of its own citizens—no sum in money could be great enough. England has set the whole world against us, and chiefly by her money. The purse is the sensitive spot in this nation of shopkeepers. If we have the power, we must strike at her purse above all else and without any consideration whatever. In all probability, however, we shall have to look to France (primarily, if not exclusively) for our financial indemnification. And we ought not, from a mistaken idea of generosity, to hesitate to impose upon France the heaviest indemnity. Let France turn to her ally across the Channel for the alleviation of this enforced burden. If England refuses to fulfil her financial obligations towards her ally, we shall have secured an incidental political advantage with which we may be well contented.

But we are primarily concerned to insist that, important as it is to adopt retrospective measures for the mitigation of the injuries we have already suffered, it is still more vitally important to secure such terms of peace as will throw open to our people new paths for a vigorous future development; and in proportion as a financial indemnity is unobtainable, increased political and moral justification attaches to all the demands set forth above for the acquisition of territory, for an additional supply of productive labour for our manufactures, and for colonies. If we win in this titanic struggle, we must not emerge from it with losses. Otherwise, despite all our victories, posterity will view us as the conquered party.

We refrain from expressing any decided opinion on the weighty question of the mode of payment, but we would draw attention to the following point. It would be greatly to our interest, if a considerable part of the indemnity were paid in the form of foreign securities of such a kind that their possession would strengthen our economic position in the countries of our political friends, whilst freeing the latter from the preponderant influence of England and France.

6. A POLICY OF CIVILISATION (KULTURPOLITIK) CAN ONLY BE BASED ON A POLICY OF POWER.—If the signatories of this Petition—particularly the men of science, the artists, and ecclesiastics—are reproached, on the ground that the demands which they put forward are solely to promote Germany's political and economic power, and perhaps also to satisfy some of her social requirements, whilst the purely spiritual tasks of Germany's future have been forgotten, our answer is as follows:—

Care for the development of the German Mind and Genius (die Sorge um den deutschen Geist) cannot be made a war-aim or a condition of peace.

If, nevertheless, we are to say a few words on this subject, our position is briefly this. The German Mind is, in our opinion, beyond all doubt our one supremely valuable asset. It is the one priceless possession amongst all our possessions. It alone justifies our people's existence and their impulse to maintain and assert themselves in the world; and to it they owe their superiority over all other peoples. But, in the first place, we must emphatically insist that, if Germany is to be free to pursue her spiritual vocation, she must first of all secure her political and economic independence. And, secondly, to those who advocate the so-called Policy of Civilisation (Kulturpolitik) alone, to those whose watchword is "The German Mind without the Policy of Power," we reply: "We have no use for a 'German Mind' which is in danger of becoming, as it were, an uprooted national spirit, in danger of being itself disintegrated and the cause of disintegration in others. We have no use for a Mind which, having no healthy national body of its own, is driven to seek vainly in every country for a home and to become 'all things to all men'—a Mind which is forced to be untrue to its own character and a spurious imitation of the character of the nation that is its host. If the demands which we have formulated are satisfied, we shall create the necessary healthy body for the German Mind. The expansion of the national body which we have demanded will do the German Mind no injury, provided the precautions upon which we have also insisted are observed. On the contrary, subject to those precautions, such an expansion will strengthen the German Mind by providing it with wider opportunities."

We are well aware that the aims which we have proposed are great, and that their attainment is impossible without a spirit of resolute self-sacrifice and the most energetic skill in negotiation. But we appeal to a sentence of Bismarck's: "It is palpably true in Politics, if it is true anywhere, that 'faith removes mountains,' that Courage and Victory are not cause and effect, but identical with one another."