Donald W. Bernier

At the beginning of 1972 the country's political system continued to be based on the leading position of the Romanian Communist Party (Partidul Communist Roman—PCR). Within the party, political power was centralized in a small group of men who occupied the leading party and government offices. Political authority was particularly concentrated in the hands of the general secretary of the PCR, Nicolae Ceausescu, who was also the head of state.

Regarding itself as the leading force of the society, the PCR has made the government apparatus an instrument of party policy and, through a broad network of subordinate mass organizations, has mobilized all elements of the society in support of its programs and goals. Individual and group participation in the political process was limited to the forms and means permitted by the PCR.

The concentration of all political authority in the central bodies of the party has effectively precluded the emergence of any open opposition to the PCR leadership as well as the assertion of any particular group interests. Under Ceausescu's leadership the party has sought to strengthen its role in all spheres of social, economic, and political life and, at the same time, to broaden its base of support by taking steps to increase its membership. Although the party leaders have periodically demonstrated a cautious relaxation of the highly centralized system of control, the PCR has continued to be extremely sensitive to any potential threats or challenges to its position.

In attempting to build a broad base of popular support the party has drawn upon the symbols of nationalism and has made extensive use of Romanian history and tradition. Its independent stance in relation to Soviet domination has served to enhance its image among the general population; at the same time, the fact that membership in the party has been made relatively easy has helped the PCR become one of the largest communist parties of Eastern Europe.

In mid-1971 Ceausescu initiated a campaign to strengthen ideological and cultural orthodoxy and, for the first time in the six years since he had come to power, some political observers believed they were able to detect opposition to his proposals both within and outside the party. There was no indication, however, that the resistance was organized or was strong enough to affect Ceausescu's position. Throughout the period of Ceausescu's control there have never been any recognizable factions in the party in opposition to his leadership.

MAJOR POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS, 1965 TO 1970

The leadership of the PCR changed hands in March 1965 when Nicolae Ceausescu became first secretary after the death of Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, who had headed the party almost continually since 1944 (see ch. 2). Ceausescu's emergence as head of the party came in the midst of a period of growing Romanian nationalism that had begun in the early 1960s. Initiated by Gheorghiu-Dej, the policy of greater national autonomy was given additional form and substance by Ceausescu, who sought to cast himself in the role of the restorer of Romanian history and the country's national traditions.

As Gheorghiu-Dej's successor, Ceausescu was confronted with the necessity of consolidating his power. No member of the party Secretariat owed his position to Ceausescu, and he found particular challenges to his authority from three men who had been among Gheorghiu-Dej's closest associates: Chivu Stoica, a veteran party leader; Gheorghe Apostol, first deputy premier and a former PCR secretary; and Alexandru Draghici, minister of internal affairs and, as such, head of the powerful state security apparatus.

A temporary solution to the problem was found in a system of collective leadership by which Ceausescu became head of the party and Stoica took over Gheorghiu-Dej's other leading position as president of the Council of State and, as such, head of state. Apostol continued as first deputy prime minister, and Draghici remained as minister of internal affairs. Ion Gheorghe Maurer, who had served as prime minister under Gheorghiu-Dej, continued in that position. At the same time, changes were made in the party statutes to prevent one man from holding dual party and government offices as Gheorghiu-Dej had done.

In April, just one month after taking over as head of the PCR, Ceausescu announced that a party congress would be convened in July. During the month of June, while preparations were being made for the congress, he revealed plans to redefine the character and structure of the party and announced that its name would no longer be the Romanian Workers' Party, as it had been known since 1948, but would again be the Romanian Communist Party. Observers of East European political affairs saw the change of name as an assertion of the equality of Romanian communism with the communist parties of the Soviet Union and other communist states. During the same month the new PCR leaders also proclaimed that the official designation of the state would be the Socialist Republic of Romania rather than the Romanian People's Republic as it had previously been known (see ch. 8).

At the July party congress Ceausescu was successful in adding a number of his supporters to an enlarged PCR Central Committee and in having his own title changed to general secretary. At the same time the party structure was changed to add a new body, the Executive Committee, between the Standing Presidium (Politburo) and the Central Committee. Although he was not able to gain full control of the Executive Committee immediately, in time this new body provided Ceausescu with the means for including his supporters in the leading organs of the PCR and for implementing his own policies.

During the party congress Ceausescu was able to turn the PCR proscription against an individual's holding dual party and government positions to his own advantage by engineering the election of Draghici to the party Secretariat, a move that resulted in Draghici losing his power base as minister of internal affairs as well as his direct control over the state security forces. Later in the year the appointment of two additional "first deputy prime ministers" undermined the power of Apostol who had been, until that time, the only first deputy. Simultaneously, Ceausescu was making preparations for even more definitive actions against his rivals, preparations that took the form of an unpublicized decision of the PCR Central Committee, in November 1965, to establish a commission of inquiry to reexamine the political trials conducted by the Gheorghiu-Dej regime during the 1950s. The commission was particularly directed to investigate the 1954 trial and execution of Lucretiu Patrascanu, who had been the Romanian minister of justice from 1944 to 1948 and an important member of the party hierarchy. The formation of the commission of inquiry and its findings were not announced publicly until April 1968.

Political observers identified three principal factions within the PCR during the 1965-67 period: Ceausescu and his supporters; the veteran party men led by Stoica, Apostol, and Draghici; and the intellectuals, of whom Maurer was perhaps the nominal representative. Those allied with Ceausescu, who was forty-seven years old when he came to power, tended to be men of his own generation and outlook, and whenever possible he engineered their appointment or promotion into important party, government, and military positions.

One of Ceausescu's foremost concerns was what he termed the revitalization of the PCR. To achieve this end, he not only brought his own younger men into the top party organs but also sought to broaden the professional skills represented in these bodies through the recruitment of technically trained men and academicians. At the same time, increased technical and scientific contacts were permitted with Western nations, and previously banned works of foreign writers and artists were allowed to be reintroduced—moves that helped Ceausescu gain additional support among the PCR's intellectuals.

Although the party encouraged a revival of nationalism and introduced several limited domestic reforms, it did not relax its tight political control and continued to direct the country's economy through a highly centralized system. The maintenance of strict party control was evidenced in the congresses of the youth and labor union organizations in mid-1966, when the delegates were informed that the PCR would begin to enforce the "patriotic education" of their members.

The 1967 National Party Conference

At a specially convened National Conference of the PCR in December 1967—the first such conference in twenty-two years—Ceausescu continued to strengthen his own position. The conference was attended by the members of the Central Committee as well as by 1,150 delegates from local party organizations. Ceausescu elected to employ the technique of the party conference rather than a special party congress in order to have his proposals approved by a larger body than the Central Committee. At the same time, he wanted to avoid the requirement of having to elect a new Central Committee, which would have been the case had a congress been held.

In his address to the conference, Ceausescu declared that in order to modernize Romania as a socialist state it was imperative to adopt new organizational and ideological forms. To achieve this end, he proposed a number of reforms in the structure and functioning of both the party and the government and defended the country's policy of independent development. Speaking of the relationship between party and government responsibilities, Ceausescu asserted the need to eliminate overlapping and duplication in party and government functions. As a remedy, he proposed that only one individual, whether in the party or in the government, should deal with a particular sector of activity. In addition, he called for a clearer delineation of the responsibilities of the government and the party. It was not necessary, he declared, for the Central Committee to decide all questions of economic affairs and continue to maintain a number of economic departments that duplicated the functions of the Council of Ministers and the economic ministries. He proposed that the Central Committee limit itself to basic decisions of economic policy and that the specific matters of implementation be left to the government ministries.

Political and ideological activity, Ceausescu proposed, would remain under the control of the Central Committee and would be given greater emphasis and direction through the creation of an ideological commission that would work to develop an intensified program of political education. A defense council, composed of the party's Standing Presidium and other members, would be established to deal with most military questions, but the basic questions of guidance for both the armed forces and the state security apparatus would continue to be the responsibility of the Central Committee. Major foreign policy questions would be decided by the Standing Presidium (see ch. 8).

Ceausescu also proposed reforms in the organization and responsibilities of governmental organs. In addition to proposing a reorganization of the state's territorial subdivisions, he asserted the need to broaden the activities of the Grand National Assembly and to increase the responsibilities of the assembly commissions in order to give that body a greater role in the government. Ministers and other high government officials were to be more aware of their responsibilities to keep the assembly informed of the activities of their departments. Ceausescu also declared the need to strengthen the role and organization of the Council of Ministers to enable it to provide for long-term economic planning. In addition, he suggested that the heads of three of the more important mass organizations—the General Union of Trade Unions, the Union of Communist Youth, and the National Union of Agricultural Production Cooperatives—be included in the government and be given ministerial ranking.

The party conference represented a major success for Ceausescu in his drive to gain undisputed political control. All of his proposals were unanimously adopted, and the party statutes were changed to enable him to become the head of state, as president of the Council of State, as well as head of the party, a reversal of the 1965 proscription against one individual simultaneously holding prominent posts in both the party and state. The nomination of Ceausescu was made by Stoica, the incumbent president of the Council of State, on the grounds that uniting the highest offices of the party and the state would eliminate the duplication of functions and increase efficiency. Stoica was given a position in the party Secretariat and later, in 1969, was named chairman of the Central Auditing Commission, a post he continued to hold in early 1972.As a result of the approval of Ceausescu's recommendations, a number of changes were effected in local government and party organizations. Certain positions in the party and state organizations were fused, the county or city party first secretary also becoming chairman of the local people's council (see ch. 8). The secretaries of local party units and labor union representatives were included on the councils of the industrial enterprises.

Following the recommendations of the party conference, the day after the conference adjourned the Grand National Assembly convened to elect Ceausescu as president of the Council of State, and it approved legislation to implement most of the other conference decisions. At the same time, the assembly elected a new Council of State consisting of (in addition to Ceausescu) three vice presidents and fifteen other members. A new Council of Ministers was also elected, with Maurer again named as prime minister. Apostol was demoted from his position as a first deputy prime minister to his previously held post as chairman of the General Union of Trade Unions. Draghici was removed from the party Secretariat and given a position as a deputy prime minister under Maurer. With the successful demotion of his chief rivals, Ceausescu emerged at the close of 1967 as the undisputed leader of both the party and the state.

Rehabilitation and De-Stalinization

With his power base firmly established, Ceausescu acted to fully disassociate his regime from the Gheorghiu-Dej era. In April 1968, at a plenary session of the Central Committee, the report of the commission of inquiry, which had been secretly established in late 1965, was made public. The Gheorghiu-Dej regime was severely indicated for fraudulently conspiring to arrange the trial and execution of Patrascanu in 1954 and for violations of justice in the other political show trials of the 1950s. Patrascanu was exonerated of all charges, and several other of the trial victims were officially rehabilitated.

Because of this close association with Gheorghiu-Dej and his position as head of the internal affairs ministry during the period of the trials, the Central Committee dismissed Draghici from all his positions. Apostol and Stoica were censured but were allowed to remain in their posts, although their standing in the party was considerably weakened.

Throughout the 1968-70 period the Ceausescu regime continued a gradual and cautious policy of de-Stalinization in domestic affairs and continued, as well, to assert the country's independent stance in international relations. The domestic relaxation was limited, however, and, in an address to an association of artists in April 1968, Ceausescu cautioned both intellectuals and artists not to overstep the bounds established by the party.

The invasion of Czechoslovakia by Soviet-led forces of the Warsaw Treaty Organization (Warsaw Pact) in August 1968 posed a crisis to the Ceausescu regime and raised the possibility of Soviet intervention in Romania. Ceausescu's firm denunciation of the invasion, however, served to unify the population behind him. His call for national mobilization and the creation of a home guard for national defense elicited broad popular support and gained him stature as the defender of Romanian independence.

In late 1968 the PCR leadership acted to establish a new national political organization, the Socialist Unity Front, in order to bring representatives of the major mass organizations and other associations into a party-dominated framework for the political mobilization of the population (see ch. 8). As a replacement for the older and largely ineffective People's Democratic Front, the new front organization was structured around a national council and, theoretically, was given advisory powers on important policy matters.

In addition to the PCR, the Socialist Unity Front's National Council included representatives of: labor unions; cooperative farmers' organizations; consumers' cooperatives; professional, cultural, and scientific associations; women's youth, and veterans' organizations; religious bodies; and the councils of the Hungarian, German, Serbian, and Ukrainian minorities. Ceausescu was elected president of the front, and Maurer, the vice president.

The first major activity of the Socialist Unity Front was the conducting of national elections on March 2, 1969. As only the front was allowed to nominate candidates, just one candidate was named for each Grand National Assembly seat. The official results indicated that over 99 percent of the eligible voters cast their ballots and, of these, 99.75 percent endorsed the Socialist Unity Front slate. Elections to the newly organized bodies of local government took place at the same time (see ch. 8).

Convening ten days after the election, the new Grand National Assembly reelected Ceausescu as president of the Council of State and renamed Maurer as prime minister. At the same time, the assembly enacted legislation establishing the Defense Council that Ceausescu had earlier proposed. Observers of East European political affairs considered the timing of this enactment, coming just three days before an important meeting of the Warsaw Treaty Organization, as a further assertion of Romania's independent course in international affairs (see ch. 10).

The Tenth Party Congress

Almost 2,000 delegates attended the Tenth Party Congress of the PCR held in Bucharest from August 6 to 12, 1969. In addition, delegations were present from sixty-six foreign communist parties (see ch. 10). The main features of the congress included Ceausescu's unanimous reelection as general secretary of the party for a five-year term, the enlargement of the Central Committee from 121 to 165 members, and the approval of revisions of the party statutes.

Among other things, the statute revisions provided for the election of the Central Committee by secret ballot and transferred the responsibility for electing the general secretary from the Central Committee to the party congress. It was also decided that party congresses would be convened every five years rather than every four so that each congress could discuss and adopt a five-year economic plan for the country. A unique feature of the congress was the division of the delegates into five working commissions, with their sessions open to foreign journalists.

When it came time for the congress to elect the Central Committee, nearly half of the remaining older members were replaced by younger men who were supporters of Ceausescu. Apostol and Stoica were conspicuously not reelected and, immediately after the congress, Apostol was discharged from his position as chairman of the General Union of Trade Unions after being charged with "serious breaches of Communist morality."

Although the modifications in the party statutes were designed to allow for more democratic procedures in party affairs, the principle of centralized control continued to be strongly maintained. Whereas all party members were encouraged to voice their opinions on any given issue, once a decision was adopted the minority was expected to yield to the majority and aid in implementation of policies. The congress resolved that party control and ideological guidance must reach into all aspects of the life of the people.

POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS

The Romanian Communist Party

Originally founded in 1921, the Romanian Communist Party was declared illegal in 1924 and forced into a clandestine existence until the closing years of World War II. After the war, fully supported by the Soviet Union, the party gradually consolidated power and sought to extend its base of popular support through intensified propaganda activity. In early 1948 the PCR merged with one wing of the Social Democratic Party to form the Romanian Workers' Party. By the end of 1952, however, almost all of the former Social Democrats had been expelled from the leading party bodies and replaced by active Communists (see ch. 2).

Organization

Basic decisions concerning the organization, operation, and membership of the PCR are contained in the party statutes, the fundamental document of the party. Originally adopted in May 1948, the statutes have undergone several modifications, with more significant revisions being made in 1955, 1965, 1967, and 1969.

All organs of the party are closely interrelated and operate on the principle of democratic centralism. Derived from the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the concept of democratic centralism provides for the election of party bodies at all levels but requires a firm hierarchical subordination of each party organ to the next higher unit. In practice, this means that party programs and policies are directed from a single center and that decisions of higher organs are unconditionally binding on all lower organs as well as on individual members. The statutes call for the free and open discussion of policy questions at congresses, conferences, local membership meetings, and in the party press; however, discipline requires that once a decision is made the minority fully submits to decisions of the majority.

According to the party statutes, the supreme organ of the PCR is the party congress consisting of delegates elected by the county (judet) conferences on the basis of one delegate for every 1,000 party members. As revised in 1969, the statutes call for the convening of a party congress every five years. Duties of the congress include the election of the PCR general secretary, election of the Central Committee and the Central Auditing Commission, and the discussion and adoption of programs and policies proposed by the central organs of the party.Between congresses the leading party organ is the Central Committee. Consisting of 165 full members and 120 alternate members, the Central Committee is responsible for the overall direction of all party activities and the implementation of policies established by the party congress. In addition, the Central Committee screens nominations for the more important party and state positions. Party statutes require a plenary session of the Central Committee at least four times a year (see fig. 9).

Figure 9. Organization of the Romanian Communist Party, 1972.

After its election by the party congress, the Central Committee in turn elects, from among its own number, the members of the leading party bodies: the Standing Presidium, the Executive Committee, and the Secretariat. The election is largely a formality, however, for in practice the Standing Presidium is the primary center of political power and is a self-perpetuating body. Any change in its membership or in that of the Secretariat is generated from within rather than through a democratic decision of the Central Committee. As general secretary of the party, Ceausescu heads both the Standing Presidium and the Secretariat and chairs the Executive Committee.

To accomplish its administrative tasks the Central Committee is provided with an extensive bureaucratic structure that in many instances parallels the organization of the government ministries. A chancellery office, headed by a chief and three deputies, coordinates the committee's overall administrative activities. Party work is organized under three directorates, each headed by a supervisory secretary, and a number of administrative sections and functional commissions. The directorates, designated as international affairs and propaganda, party organization, and press and cultural affairs, supervise and direct the work of the administrative sections. Not all of these sections are listed in the party statutes or by the party press. A partial listing includes sections for the economy, local administration, propaganda, press, international affairs, party organs and personnel, national minorities, and state security.

In addition to the directorates and administrative sections there were, in 1970, eight formally established commissions directly tied to the Central Committee. These were listed as the commissions for agriculture and forestry; economic problems; ideological and cultural-educational problems; international relations; organizational problems and internal party activity; training of cadres, education, and science; development of the social and state system; and social questions, public health, and living standards.

Two party training institutions, the Stefan Gheorghiu Academy of Social-Political Education and the Training of Leading Cadres and the Institute of Historical and Social-Political Studies, operate under the direct supervision of the Central Committee. Located in Bucharest, both of these institutions are designed to train and indoctrinate key bureaucratic personnel. The Central Committee also maintains a museum of party history in Bucharest.

In charge of all of the political machinery of the PCR, the Standing Presidium of the Central Committee is the party's center for decisionmaking and policy control and, as such, is the most powerful body in the country. There were, at the beginning of 1972, four party leaders who held positions concurrently on the Standing Presidium, the Executive Committee, and the Secretariat: Ceausescu, Manea Manescu, Paul Niculescu-Mizil, and Gheorghe Pana. Political observers considered these men to be the most powerful in the party and, hence, the nation. All of the nine members of the Standing Presidium are also members of the Executive Committee.

Little information is available on the responsibilities given the Executive Committee, although some observers have described it as providing an administrative link between the Standing Presidium and the Central Committee. In practice it has functioned as a rump Central Committee when the latter is not in session. The Secretariat serves as the continuing administrative unit of the party. It supervises the execution of policies decided upon by the Standing Presidium. Three members of the Secretariat serve as the supervising secretaries of the major directorates of the Central Committee.

Two other important party organs function under the supervision of the Standing Presidium and the Secretariat: the Central Auditing Commission and the Central Collegium, formerly known as the Party Control Commission. Consisting of forty-five members (none of whom may belong to the Central Committee), the Central Auditing Commission is empowered to exercise general control over party financial affairs and examine the management of finances by the various party organs. The nine-member Central Collegium deals with matters of party discipline and serves as a type of appeals court for penalties imposed on members by county or local party committees.

An interlocking of authority and functions at the highest level of the party and state is evidenced in the frequency with which the senior party officials also hold important government posts. All of the members of the Standing Presidium, the Executive Committee, and the Secretariat are also deputies to the Grand National Assembly, and most of them hold other prominent government positions in the Council of State, the Defense Council, or the Council of Ministers.

The party statutes describe the local cell, the basic party unit, as the foundation of the party. Cells exist in factories, offices, cooperatives, military and police units, social and cultural organizations, and residential areas. Some of these cell groups consist of as few as three members, whereas those in the larger enterprises may have as many as 300 members. In 1969 there were an estimated 69,000 of these local party units.

Functions of the local and occupational cell units include the implementation of party directives and programs, the recruitment and indoctrination of new members, and the dissemination of propaganda directed at those outside the party. Members have the duty to participate in social, economic, and cultural activities, particularly in the direction of the economic enterprises, and to critically examine production and community life in the light of party ideology and goals. In all of its activities the local cell is required to uphold the discipline of the party and to adhere to the policies established by the ruling bodies of the PCR.

Between the local cell unit and the higher organs of the PCR stands a hierarchy of party committees organized on the county, town, and communal levels. Each of these units is directly subordinate to the next higher level of the party organization. In Bucharest a city party committee supervises the activities of the communal and enterprise cells. Each party committee sets up its own bureau and elects a secretariat. In most cases the secretariat consists of a first secretary, a first vice chairman, and three or more vice chairmen or secretaries.

The activity of the bureaus is conducted through several functional departments, which generally consist of sections on personnel, administration, agitation and propaganda, economic enterprises, youth, and women's affairs. The county and city committees also have their own control commissions and training programs. The first secretary of the county committee also serves as chairman of the county people's council, interlocking the party and government offices (see ch. 8).

The party leadership decided in late 1967 to require the active participation of the party secretaries in the administrative organs of the enterprises and other institutions in their respective areas. County committees are aided in their administrative duties by economic commissions that oversee the general economic development of the county and fix both current and long-range goals. In addition, the economic commissions are charged with the coordination of all economic activity, the conducting of studies and making of proposals for setting production goals, and the allocation of material and human resources in the county.

At each of these levels—county, city, town, and commune—the highest authoritative organ is the party conference, which fills a role on these lower levels similar to that of the party congress on the national level. The party statutes as revised in 1969 call for the convening of conferences every fourth year in the counties, in the city of Bucharest, and in the larger towns. In the communes and smaller towns the conference is required to be held once every two years. Although the conferences are held ostensibly to discuss problems and formulate policies, they serve in practice as transmission belts for the official party line set down by the central PCR authorities. County conferences and the Bucharest city conference elect delegates to the national party congress.

Membership

The PCR emerged at the close of World War II with only about 1,000 members. Four years later, just before its merger with the Social Democratic Party and after an intensive propaganda campaign and a strong membership drive, the party reported over 700,000 members. When the PCR merged with the Social Democratic Party to form the Romanian Workers' Party in 1948, some 200,000 Social Democrats were added to the membership roll. A purge of so-called hostile and nominal members during 1950 resulted in the expulsion of 190,000 persons from the party, reducing the total membership to about 720,000 at the beginning of 1951.

During the early years of full communist control of Romania, the party considered itself the vanguard of the working class and made a sustained effort to recruit workers into party membership. By the end of 1950 the PCR reported that 64 percent of the leading party positions and 40 percent of the higher government posts were filled by members of the working class. The efforts to recruit workers into the party have consistently fallen short of the set goals, however, and from time to time throughout the period since 1950 party leaders have decried the fact that the social composition of the membership has not included an adequate proportion of workers.

By 1964 the party membership was reported at 1.2 million. This total was increased to 1.5 million by 1966, a figure that represented about 8 percent of the country's population. Membership composition, in 1966, was reported as 40 percent workers, 32 percent peasants, and 22 percent intelligentsia, with the remaining 6 percent not classified.

After Ceausescu's accession to power in 1965, he sought to increase the party's influence, broaden the base of popular support, and bring in new members. At a first step, he eliminated the probationary period, which had varied from one year for industrial workers to two years for peasants, white-collar workers, and intellectuals. Additional members were also sought by enticing those who had belonged to the old Social Democratic Party and the former Socialist Party by dating their membership from the time of their entry into those parties.

The result of the membership drive, announced at the 1967 party conference, was the addition of 230,000 new PCR members, bringing the total to 1,730,000. At the 1969 party congress it was announced that the PCR had 1,924,500 members, representing about one-seventh of the total adult population. In February 1971 the Central Committee reported that the membership had grown to 2.1 million, making the PCR one of the largest communist parties in Eastern Europe.

Statistics reported by the party press indicated the nationality composition of the PCR as consisting of 88.8 percent Romanians, 8.4 percent Hungarians, and slightly over 1 percent Germans, with the remainder encompassing other nationalities. As the 1966 census had shown that Hungarians represented 8.4 percent of the total population, the Germans 2 percent, and other nationalities about 2 percent, the nationality composition of the party compares favorably with that of the country as a whole.

Workers reportedly made up 44 percent of the party membership; peasants, 26 percent; and intellectuals and white-collar workers, 23 percent. Seven percent were unclassified as to status. Statistics indicating the age composition of the party were also published, revealing that 24 percent of the membership was under thirty years of age; persons between the ages of thirty and forty made up 36 percent of the membership, and 40 percent of the members were over forty years old.

The PCR membership campaign had been given particular emphasis in the major industries, such as the metal, machine-building, coal, petroleum, and chemical industries, where 27 to 36 percent of the workers were reported to belong to the party. Female membership was reported as 23 percent, up from 17 percent in 1960 and 21 percent in 1965. The report contained a recommendation that a larger number of women be assigned to responsible positions. Statistics for the army revealed that 90 percent of the officers and 55 percent of the noncommissioned officers were party members. The fact that over 926,000 members lived in rural areas was asserted by the PCR leaders to be proof of peasant support and a demonstration of the effectiveness of the party in organizing at the village level.

In 1970 the party press reported that an analysis of the leading national and local PCR bodies revealed that the greater proportion of their memberships consists of those drawn from the ranks of the working class. Of the 285 members and alternate members of the Central Committee, 197, or nearly 70 percent, were workers or persons who had come from the workers' ranks. Of the 4,698 members of county party committees, 2,144 or 45.6 percent were said to be workers or from the working class. Together, workers and peasants were reported to make up over 64 percent of the membership of county committees. As many as 81 percent of the activists of the county, municipal, and communal party committees were—according to their basic professions—workers, foremen, or technicians.

Party Training

In early 1970 the PCR carried out a major reorganization of its primary institution for the training of leading party workers, the Stefan Gheorghiu Party Academy. With the reorganization, the full name of the institution became the Stefan Gheorghiu Academy for Social-Political Education and the Training of Leading Cadres. Its tasks were defined as the training of party activists and the development of party leaders capable of resolving problems and "applying the science of political leadership to the party and society."

Ceausescu explained that the reorganization was necessary for upgrading the training of activists for the party as well as for various sectors of economic and state life. He also stated that the combination of party training with state and economic activity is based on the principle that the PCR is the leading force of the society and, as such, must ensure the proper training of the personnel needed to guide all sectors of activity.

As reorganized, the academy is divided into two departments, one for the training of cadres in the party and in mass organizations and a second for the training of personnel who work in the economy and state administration. Each department is subdivided into a number of institutes, sections, and training centers. Within the first department is the Institute for Training Cadres in Social-Political Management, which in turn is subdivided into sections for political-organizational activity, political-ideological activity, and political-economic activity. Also within the same department are the Journalism Faculty, the Center for the Education and Training of Party and Mass Organization Cadres, the Center for Improving the Political-Ideological Training of Teachers of Social-Political Sciences in State Schools, and the Center for Activist Training Courses. The Center for Activist Training Courses provided programs of study for activists in the party, the youth organization, labor unions, and workers in offices of foreign affairs. The last two centers are divided into several sections that specialize in the training of particular classes of activists.

The second department, that which provided training for state employees and for those working in economic activities, consists of the Central Institute for the Education of Leading Cadres in the Economy and State Administration, a section for short-term courses, and a section for training in specialized management and organizational problems. The institute includes sections on the organization and management of industrial activity, of construction, of transport and telecommunications, of agriculture, of circulation of goods and services, of planning, and of state administration. In addition, the department organizes courses for chairmen of agricultural production cooperatives.

Admission to the academy programs is carefully controlled by the party. Courses in the first department last for four years, and candidates are selected from among the activists in the county and city party committees and the central PCR bodies and from loyal party workers in the mass organizations. Political activists in the Ministry of the Armed Forces, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and the State Security Council are also eligible for training in the first department.

PCR regulations stipulate that candidates for training in the first department must have worked for at least three years in production and have had at least three years' experience in mass organizations. In addition, the candidate must have completed at least a five-month course in one of the lower level party schools, have a high school diploma or its equivalent, and be thirty-five years of age or younger.

Courses in the second department last for two years. Requirements for admission into this department include extensive experience in organization and management related to industry and labor, at least eight years of service, membership in the PCR, graduation from a higher education institute, and an age of forty years or younger.

In addition to the broad program of the academy, the PCR also maintains other ideological training institutions. These include the Institute of Historical and Social-Political Studies in Bucharest, which functions under the direct supervision of the Central Committee, and lower level training programs that operate under the county party committees.

During 1971 the PCR placed increased emphasis on both the political and general education of all party workers, and the Central Committee decreed that only those who can keep up to date in their fields of activity would be promoted. As a followup to the decree, the Central Committee initiated a series of twenty- to thirty-day training programs and required some 15,000 persons from party, state, and mass organizations to attend the sessions. The order included a warning that those who did not successfully complete the courses would lose their jobs.

Observers of Romanian politics stated that the decision to require this additional training of state and party workers stemmed from the fact that the majority of personnel on both the central and local levels had been named to their positions on the basis of faithful party activity rather than their professional qualifications. The stipulation that those who do not successfully complete the courses would lose their jobs enables the party to replace those who are not qualified to fill their positions.

The study programs, designed to include practical work, discussion of specific problems, and field trips, cover a number of subjects including "the basic Marxist-Leninist sciences of management and organization," automatic data processing, the utilization of electronic calculators, methods of socioeconomic analysis, and the projection of plans, as well as a number of special subjects related to the various fields of activity of the participants. To facilitate the training of larger numbers, branches of the Stefan Gheorghiu Party Academy's Center for the Education and Training of Party and Mass Organization Cadres were set up in Bucharest and in seven counties.

Mass Organizations

The PCR has fostered the development of a large number of mass organizations that function as its auxiliaries. Comprised of members of an interest group or a profession whose welfare they purport to serve, the mass organizations provide channels for the transmission of policy and doctrine from the party to the general population. PCR leaders have described the duties of mass organizations as the mobilization of the working people for the fulfillment of party policies and the provision for their participation in the economic, political, and cultural life of the country. Leaders of the mass organizations are always reliable PCR members.

Citizens are constitutionally guaranteed the right to join together in organizations. At the same time, the Constitution defines the leading role of the party in relation to the mass organizations, asserting that through such organizations the PCR "achieves an organized link with the working class, the peasantry, the intelligentsia, and the other categories of working people" and mobilizes them in "the struggle for the completion of the building of socialism."

Two broad classes of organizations are included under the rubric of mass organizations: those based on common interests or common categories or persons, such as youth and women's associations, and those based on professions, such as the General Union of Trade Unions. Several of the organizations belong to international organizations and associations, such as the World Federation of Trade Unions and the World Federation of Democratic Youth.

Among the more important of the mass organizations are the Union of Communist Youth, the General Union of Trade Unions, and the National Council of Women. The chairmen of the Union of Communist Youth and the General Union of Trade Unions sit on the Council of Ministers and have ministerial rank; the chairman of the youth union serves simultaneously as head of the Ministry of Youth Problems.

The Union of Communist Youth

At the time of its founding in early 1949 the Union of Communist Youth (Uniunea Tineretului Comunist—UTC) was looked upon as the youth branch of the PCR. It was set up with much the same organizational structure as the party and, in practice, functioned both as a youth political party and mass organization. Resulting from the party-decreed merger of all existing youth organizations, the UTC was given the task of educating the young in the spirit of Marxism-Leninism and mobilizing them, under the guidance of the party, for the building of socialism.

In early 1972 the UTC continued to be one of the most powerful of the mass organizations in the country, with an estimated membership of 2.5 million. Membership was open to young people between the ages of fifteen and twenty-six; those who have reached the age of eighteen could also become members of the PCR. The Tenth Party Congress, meeting in 1969, introduced the requirement that young people up to the age of twenty-six would be accepted into the party only if they were UTC members. Decisions on persons to fill the most important leadership positions in the UTC were made by the PCR Central Committee.

The structure of the UTC has undergone a number of changes since it was originally established. In early 1972 the organization functioned on the national level with an eight-member Secretariat, including the first secretary who is also the UTC chairman, and a bureau of twenty-one full and seven alternate members. In each of the thirty-nine countries and the city of Bucharest there exist UTC committees that are similarly organized with secretariats and bureaus. The UTC has its own publishing facilities and publishes its own propaganda organ, The Spark of Youth (Scinteia Tineretului).

Statistics on the composition of the youth organization, reported at the Ninth UTC Congress held in February 1971, indicated that the membership consisted of 30 percent workers, 39 percent students, and 17 percent peasants. The remainder consisted of those who were classified as intellectuals, clerks, and office workers.

Periodically throughout the 1960s PCR leaders demonstrated growing concern for what they termed as shortcomings in the political education of the nation's youth. In 1968 this concern led to the establishment of the Research Center for Youth Problems and an increased effort to instill in the young people a sense of "socialist patriotism." Ceausescu asserted the need for all levels of education to be permeated with Marxist-Leninist ideology and placed particular emphasis on ideological training in the universities.

Political education of young people, both members and non-members, and their mobilization in support of PCR policies is considered the primary duty of the UTC. It is charged with the organization of political and patriotic courses in schools, among peasant groups, and among workers and members of the armed forces. The UTC also guides and supervises the activities of the Union of Student Associations.

A second youth movement, the Pioneers Organization, was created for young people between the ages of nine and fourteen. In late 1971 the Pioneers Organization reported a total membership of 1.6 million. The organization's responsibilities toward those of its age group parallel those of the UTC and involve political and patriotic training. Until 1966 the Pioneers Organization functioned as an integral part of the UTC, but since that time it has been under the direct control of the party Central Committee.

The General Union of Trade Unions

As the official organization incorporating all blue-collar and white-collar workers, the General Union of Trade Unions (Uniunea Generala a Sindicatelr din Romania—UGSR) is the largest of the country's mass organizations, with a reported membership in early 1972 of 4.6 million. Headed by a general council, the UGSR consists of twelve component labor union federations and forty area councils, one for each county and the city of Bucharest. The Central Council is structured with a chairman, appointed by the PCR Central Committee, seven secretaries, and an executive committee of twenty-seven full and nine alternate members. There are an estimated 12,000 local union units.

The primary function of the labor unions is the transmission of party policies to the rank and file. The UGSR statutes specify that the organization will carry out all of its activities under the political leadership of the PCR, and a similar provision is also included in the statutes of the county UGSR committees. In addition, the statutes of the central body require the organization to work to mobilize labor union members to ensure the implementation of party policy. A 1969 resolution of the Central Council of the UGSR declared that all labor union activities would focus on the mobilization of the working people to fulfill the state economic plan.

In early 1971, after a period of increased labor discipline problems and following a time of severe labor unrest in Poland, the PCR took steps to reform the labor union organization. Announcing what he termed as the democratization of the UGSR and its component unions, Ceausescu promised the workers genuine protection of their interests and a voice in the appointment of industrial management. The goal of the PCR program was to improve the unions without losing party control, and Ceausescu defined democratization as meaning that the labor unions would serve the party as a framework for the organization of consultations with the masses and as a forum where workers can debate the country's economic and social development.

New UGSR statutes were introduced in mid-1971. Observers of Romanian political affairs asserted, however, that there were no major changes in the system and pointed out that the new statutes still did not give labor unions the right to take the initiative in matters concerning wages or the living standard. In this regard the unions could fill only a watchdog role to assure that the regulations approved by the appropriate party and management bodies were being correctly carried out.

PARTY POLICIES AND PROGRAMS

The major domestic programs that the party sought to promote centered on the country's economic development, the integration of national minorities, the extension of so-called socialist democracy, and the PCR's cultural-ideological campaign. As a means of strengthening its leading role, the party leaders acted to improve communication between the central PCR organs and the county, city, and commune organizations and, at the same time, took additional steps to win mass support.

The Economy

In the area of economics the PCR continued its primary emphasis on industrial development and was only secondarily concerned with agriculture and consumer goods. This emphasis was evidenced in the economic plan adopted for the 1971-75 period, approved by the 1969 party congress, which concentrates on heavy industry at the expense of consumer goods. Although Romania was primarily an agricultural country, the PCR leadership in the early 1960s, rejected the plan of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON) for a division of labor between the participating communist states that would have had Romania place the greatest emphasis on the development of agriculture. Instead, the PCR launched a drive to modernize the country through industrialization (see ch. 14; ch. 10).

The policies pursued by the PCR are designed to maintain firm party control of the economy. In the formulation of Romania's economic development plans, the will of the party is predominant, and the degree of party control was augmented by the territorial and administrative reorganization of 1968 when economic commissions were established in each of the new counties to function under the direct supervision of the county PCR committees. These commissions made it possible for the party to have a direct hand in the local economic programs.

During 1970 and 1971 party leaders noted that, whereas the annual production increase envisaged by the Five-Year Plan (1971-75) had been fulfilled for industry, that for agriculture fell far short. Ceausescu called for a renewal of intensive efforts in both industry and agriculture to meet the requirements of the people and to enable the country to achieve the true socialist state of development.

National Minorities

The integration of the major non-Romanian national groups into the life of the country has posed periodic problems for the PCR throughout the post-World War II era. Each of the communist constitutions guaranteed equal rights to the national minorities, rights that included the opportunity to use their own language and to have representation on local bodies of government. The Hungarian Autonomous Region had been created by the 1952 Constitution but was not continued under the 1968 territorial reorganization (see ch. 8; ch. 4).

Party leaders explained the decision to abandon the concept of an autonomous region for the Hungarian population in terms of the need to integrate all of the minority groups fully into the Romanian political community. Spokesmen asserted that it is the policy of the PCR to respect the heritage of the various nationality groups and extend to them full political rights but at the same time to work to create conditions that will serve to unite all of the country under the leadership of the party.

PCR leaders have feared the possibility of attempts by foreign elements to foster unrest among the country's larger minority groups. This was particularly true at the time of the Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia, when Romanian leaders were apprehensive about the possibility of a similar intervention in their country. At that time PCR officials visited the areas where there were concentrations of Hungarian and German minorities, stressing national unity and equal rights for all national groups.

These efforts were followed in November 1968 by the establishment of nationality councils: the Council of Working People of Hungarian Nationality and the Council of Working People of German Nationality. Units of the Hungarian council were established in fifteen counties, and units of the German council were established in nine counties. In counties where there existed substantial Serbian or Ukrainian populations, similar local councils were established for these groups, although only the Hungarian and German minorities maintained councils on the national level. The nationality councils were affiliated with the Socialist Unity Front. A month after the establishment of the councils the Grand National Assembly, on the initiative of the party, passed legislation granting the minorities increased representation on local government bodies.

In explaining the purposes of the nationality councils, Ceausescu declared that they would "cultivate socialist patriotism, socialist internationalism, and devotion for our new order and for the common fatherland ... against any backward nationalistic concepts and manifestations." Observers of Romanian political affairs pointed out, however, that the councils are closely tied to the party and, although they can serve as means of communication between the PCR and the minority groups, they function primarily as transmission belts for party policies and as instruments for PCR political and educational activities.

Social Democracy and Party Ideology

At the same time that the PCR has sought to present itself as a progressive force seeking the participation of the people in political affairs, it has also carried on a campaign to strengthen what it calls the Marxist character of all ideological, cultural, and educational activities. Within limits, Ceausescu has encouraged what he has termed as "socialist democracy"—open communication between the masses and the party leadership—and he has publicly called for the people to express their views on political issues.

Socialist democracy is defined by Ceausescu as a spirit of social responsibility by which the citizens are inspired to perform their duties in accordance with the needs and imperatives of the society as a whole. The goal of socialist democracy is to stimulate the masses to support the cause of socialism by involving them in the programs of the PCR to such an extent that the individual identifies his personal goals and values with those of the party.

In mid-1971 Ceausescu announced a new ideological program and the tightening of party controls over government, science, and cultural life. Observers gave various interpretations to the campaign. Some saw it as a move to respond to Soviet criticism of Romanian foreign policy by reminding Moscow that socialism was not endangered in Romania and that this pretext could not be used to justify Soviet interference; others considered it as an assertion of authority by Ceausescu at a time when he judged it necessary to combat ideological laxity at home. The action may also have been prompted by a concern that party authority and discipline were being undermined by Western cultural influences.

Partially directed at the youth of the nation, the campaign included curbs against alcohol in youth clubs and the screening of foreign television programs and music. Another objective of the campaign was increased party control over literature and cultural life; new ideological guidelines were issued for writers, publishers, and theaters. In speaking of the role of the arts, Ceausescu declared that they must serve the single purpose of socialist-communist education. At the same time, he called for increased guidance of the arts by all levels of the PCR and requested that works of art and literature be judged for their conformity with party standards and their service to the working class. Ceausescu ruled out repressive measures, however, and asserted that the party would rely on persuasion to implement the new ideological program (see ch. 7).

The campaign encountered some resistance, although more passive than overt. A number of writers boycotted the literary magazines in protest against the restrictions imposed on publishing and, despite the fact that the official writers' union circulated a statement in support of the party's stand, many of the more prominent writers refused to endorse it. In August 1971 the editor of a leading literary journal, who was also a member of the PCR Central Committee, resigned both positions as a protest against the stricter party controls.

Resistance was also evident in the party and state bureaucracy, where the ideological campaign was welcomed in principle but frequently ignored in practice. Many of the nation's youth also manifested disagreement with the restrictive content campaign. Assessing the progress of the program in late 1971, Ceausescu admitted that the new approach had not been generally adopted among the youth and asserted that the party organizations had not been diligent enough in the enforcement of the code. Particular criticism was directed at the Executive Committee and Secretariat for having failed to implement the decisions taken for the improvement of ideological activity.

Although it is difficult for outside political observers to detect differences within the top bodies of the party, in regard to the ideological campaign tensions have been more evident. For the first time since Ceausescu came to power in 1965, the Central Committee plenum, meeting in November 1971, did not report unanimous agreement on all issues. Some observers indicated that the effect of the campaign has stimulated opposition to some of Ceausescu's policies. There was no evidence, however, that such opposition is organized or that it provides any serious threat to Ceausescu's position, and no leading figure in either the government or the party has openly expressed views that differ from those of the general secretary.

POLITICAL VALUES AND ATTITUDES

The Regime and the People

Inasmuch as the PCR has proclaimed itself to be the only legitimate source of political power and, as well, the leading force in all aspects of economic and cultural life, the development of independent political and cultural values has been thoroughly circumscribed. Party control extends to all aspects of the society and embraces educational and professional opportunities. Although PCR leaders have promised changes in the manner of selection for advancement, promotions have been based more frequently on party activity and doctrinal reliability than on professional competence.

Because of the breadth of party control, accurate information on the attitudes of the people toward the regime and toward specific political issues is difficult to obtain. The Romanian press functions under the direct supervision of the PCR, and tight restrictions are placed on foreign correspondents reporting on events inside the country. Observers have indicated, however, that not all of the regime's domestic policies have been welcomed by all segments of the population and that some party policies have left a wake of latent resentments.

Some observers have pointed to the decrease in the number of peasants in the party (down 3 percent in the 1969-71 period) as an indication of peasant dissatisfaction with the poor living conditions in the rural areas and the low income of most of the agricultural cooperatives (see ch. 2). Frequently the party responds to signs of discontent by any segment of the population by increasing the ideological propaganda directed toward it, but the regime has also attempted various reforms to counter obvious inadequacies.Among the more overt examples of discontent with party policy is the resistance to accepting job assignments in rural areas shown by technical school graduates. Other graduates have also refused to leave their home areas to work on collectives; all of these were criticized in the party press for giving priority to personal interests instead of considering the interests of the society as a whole. PCR officials declared that the graduates had been trained at state expense and that their refusal to fulfill their obligations as assigned by the party could not be tolerated. This resistance to party-decreed transfers was also evident among other groups during 1969 and 1970, including teachers, builders, and administrative workers.

Observers consider such situations as evidence that the party is having difficulty reconciling an essentially authoritarian system with a policy of socialist democracy that encourages public initiative and participation. The persistence with which Ceausescu pursued the new ideological campaign during 1971 gave some observers the impression that he had opted to put his weight down on the side of continued authoritarianism.

Romanian Nationalism

The regime scored a marked success in basing its appeal for popular support on nationalistic sentiments and in giving emphasis to Romanian history and cultural traditions. Ceausescu has attempted to broaden the communist movement to include the aspirations of the people as a whole. Whereas in the past the PCR leaders made reference only to communist achievements and attributed everything positive to the work of the party, Ceausescu has praised Romanian national heroes and has given positive emphasis to specifically Romanian contributions to socialist development.

To a significant degree the revival of nationalism has gone hand in hand with anti-Soviet attitudes. The image of the party was bolstered by the PCR leader's refusal to follow the Soviet line on a number of significant national and international issues (see ch. 10). At the time of the Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968, Ceausescu's denunciation of the action and his call for national mobilization in the face of the crisis served to unite the population and strengthen his position. Observers have pointed out, however, that this unity has appeared to wane with the ebbing of the crisis and with the return to the realities of everyday life in Romania.