Throughout the 1960s Romanian foreign policy increasingly diverged from that of the Soviet Union and its allies in Eastern Europe as the Romanian leaders asserted the country's national interests. In early 1972 the government continued to declare that its foreign policy was based on national independence, sovereignty, and the principle of noninterference in internal affairs. Government and party leaders asserted that Romania would continue to seek development of friendly and cooperative relations with all states without regard to differences in sociopolitical systems.

Foreign policy was formulated under the direct control of the Standing Presidium of the Romanian Communist Party (Partidul Communist Roman—PCR) and administered through the government ministries. Although the regime of PCR General Secretary Nicolae Ceausescu has steadfastly sought to maintain an independent stance in foreign affairs and to develop political and economic relations with both communist and noncommunist states, it has continued to assert the Marxist-Leninist character of both its domestic and foreign policies. PCR leaders have repeatedly affirmed the party's commitment to the international communist movement and to the solidarity of all socialist states.

In the development of an independent foreign policy position the PCR has sought to shift away from economic and political domination by the Soviet Union and to develop a form of communism geared to the country's national interests and in keeping with the regime's perspective on world affairs. Although such a course brought the Romanian party and government into frequent conflict with the Soviet Union, the Romanian leadership continued to insist on its own interpretation and adaptation of communism.

In early 1972 Romania maintained full diplomatic relations with more than ninety governments, over forty of which maintained embassies in Bucharest. In addition, trade and cultural relations were conducted with a number of other states with which formal relations had not been established. Romania is a member of the United Nations (UN) and a number of several UN specialized agencies. It is also a member of the communist military alliance known as the Warsaw Treaty Organization (Warsaw Pact) and the communist economic alliance called the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON).

During 1970 and 1971 the regime made increased efforts to cultivate and strengthen the country's relations with the developing states of Asia and Africa and to extend its relations with the nations of Latin America. Personal diplomacy by Ceausescu and other ranking party and government leaders served as an important means for maintaining the country's international relations.

DETERMINANTS OF FOREIGN POLICY

Historical Factors

After coming under full communist control in the early post-World War II period, the country was closely aligned with the international policies and goals of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Romania's international and domestic policies generally supported the political and economic goals of the Soviet Union. Beneath the surface, however, an internal party struggle was being waged in Romania between certain communist leaders who were fully oriented toward the Soviet Union and others who sought an orientation that was less Soviet dominated (see ch. 2).

Although the internal struggle involved personal ambitions as much as political and ideological goals, the group surrounding party First Secretary Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej urged the attainment of national goals through cooperation with the Soviet Union rather than a position of complete integration and exclusive dependence on the Soviets. By mid-1952 Gheorghiu-Dej was able to gain full control of the party, purge his leading opponents, and assume the dual role of party chief and head of the government. Shortly after assuming the premiership, Gheorghiu-Dej began a slow and cautious disengagement from Soviet domination, being careful, however, not to advocate goals that were at variance with the policies of Soviet Premier Josef Stalin. Domestic politics, in fact, remained strongly Stalinist in orientation, and it was not until after Stalin's death in March 1953 that the first significant steps were taken to diminish Soviet control.

To a significant degree the country's foreign policy during the Gheorghiu-Dej era reflected the Romanian leader's struggle for his own political survival, particularly in the face of Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev's campaign to weaken the power of Stalinist-oriented Eastern European communist leaders. Important also was the growing Romanian determination to limit the influence of the Soviet Union in the country's internal affairs, especially in the realm of economic development. Political events within the communist world during the remainder of the 1950s and the early 1960s provided Gheorghiu-Dej the opportunity to assert an increasingly independent stance and to gain concessions from the Soviets.

Faced with Khrushchev's emphasis on de-Stalinization and his demands for communist unity under Soviet leadership, the Gheorghiu-Dej regime responded by giving lip service to Soviet policies while, at the same time, supporting moves aimed at weakening Soviet hegemony in the communist world. In early 1954 Gheorghiu-Dej sensed the political significance of Khrushchev's "peaceful coexistence" theme for Romania and began to exploit the situation to gain leverage for the extracting of concessions from the Soviet Union. The first significant achievement came later that same year when negotiations led to the dissolution of the joint Soviet-Romanian industrial enterprises that had been the primary instrument of Soviet economic exploitation during the postwar period.

The regime also sought to gain increased domestic support by emphasizing the country's historical traditions, by calling for "Romanian solutions to Romanian problems," and by cautiously exploiting the population's latent anti-Soviet sentiments. In August 1954, on the occasion of the tenth anniversary of the country's liberation from Nazi forces, Gheorghiu-Dej asserted that the primary credit for driving out the occupiers belonged to Romanian Communists rather than to the Soviet army, a view that was subsequently condemned by the Soviets and supported by the Communist Chinese.

Although the Gheorghiu-Dej regime formally supported the Soviet action in suppressing the 1956 Hungarian revolt, the Romanian leaders attempted to exploit the situation in order to obtain additional concessions from the Soviets and to gain recognition of the legitimacy of the so-called Romanian road to socialism. At that time, one of their primary aims was the removal of Soviet occupation forces that had remained in the country throughout the post-World War II period. Although the regime was not successful in obtaining formal Soviet recognition of a Romanian variant of communism, an agreement was reached placing a time limit on the presence of the Soviet troops, the forces finally being withdrawn in 1958.

Important problems were posed to the Gheorghiu-Dej regime by the reactivation of COMECON and the Soviet intentions to integrate the economies of the member states. Initially established in 1949 as the Soviet counterpart to the European Recovery Program (Marshall Plan), COMECON was largely dormant until 1955, when Khrushchev decided to revitalize the organization as an instrument of Soviet economic policy in Eastern Europe. COMECON plans called for the subordination of national economic plans to an overall planning body that would determine economic development for the member states as a whole. Romania was to be assigned the role of a supplier of raw materials and agricultural produce for the more industrially developed members (see ch. 2).

Gheorghiu-Dej rejected such a subservient role for Romania and proceeded with his own plans for the country's industrial development, asserting the right of each COMECON member state to develop its own economy in accord with national needs and interests, a position that was, in turn, rejected by the Soviets. As a reaction to Soviet pressures and the need to lessen Romanian dependence on COMECON, the regime initiated a gradual and cautious expansion of economic relations with noncommunist states.

In 1957 Ion Gheorghe Maurer became minister of foreign affairs and, under the direction of Gheorghiu-Dej, initiated programs that emphasized the national character of Romanian foreign policy. Included in these programs were plans for the attainment of self-sufficiency in the machine-tool industry and in the production of iron and steel. At the same time, additional steps were taken to increase trade with Western Europe and the United States.

The conflict with the Soviet Union became more acute in 1962 when Gheorghiu-Dej again rejected the COMECON plan for Romania and, later in the year, announced that a contract for the construction of a large steel mill at Galati had been concluded with a British-French consortium. Romanian statements in support of Albania further antagonized the Soviet leaders. During 1963 and 1964 Romanian-Soviet relations continued to deteriorate as the Gheorghiu-Dej regime sought to exploit the Sino-Soviet dispute and moved closer to the Communist Chinese position on the equality of communist states and the rejection of the leading role of the Soviet party. In November 1963 Maurer declared the readiness of Romania to mediate the Sino-Soviet dispute, a suggestion that Moscow considered arrogant and anti-Soviet.

A statement issued by the party Central Committee in April 1964 declared the right of Romania and all other nations to develop national policies in the light of their own interests and domestic requirements. During the remainder of that year the volume of economic and cultural contacts with Western nations increased significantly. The increased role of the United States in the Vietnam hostilities, however, served to curb the Gheorghiu-Dej regime's efforts to improve relations with the United States, and the sudden death of Gheorghiu-Dej in March 1965 raised questions as to the future direction of Romanian foreign policy.Under Gheorghiu-Dej's successor, Nicolae Ceausescu, Romania's foreign policy continued to diverge from that of the Soviet Union and the other members of COMECON and the Warsaw Pact. Increasingly assertive of national interests, the Ceausescu regime antagonized the Soviet Union by its establishment of diplomatic relations with the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany) in 1967 and by its refusal to follow the Soviet lead in breaking relations with Israel in the wake of the 1967 Arab-Israeli War.

The invasion of Czechoslovakia by Soviet-led forces of the Warsaw Pact in August 1968 posed a particular threat to Romania. Observers of Eastern European political affairs saw the invasion as a severe blow to the basic assumptions of Romanian foreign policy, which included the belief that the Soviet Union would not intervene militarily against another member of the Warsaw Pact as long as the system of communist party rule was firmly maintained and membership in the pact was continued.

From the outset of the Czechoslovak crisis the Ceausescu regime asserted that the only basis for relations between states was respect for national independence and sovereignty and a policy of noninterference in another state's internal affairs. The actual invasion, however, marked a reversal for Romanian foreign policy and, although the initial response was one of condemnation and defiance, Romania was put on the defensive.

The invasion of Czechoslovakia marked something of a turning point in Romania's relations with COMECON and the Warsaw Pact. The Soviet enunciation of the so-called Brezhnev Doctrine—the concept that the protection of socialism in any communist state is the legitimate concern of all communist states—was intended as a clear warning to the Ceausescu regime.

Pressures mounted on Romania to cooperate more fully in the Warsaw Pact and to agree to a supranational planning body within the framework of COMECON. Economic conditions as well as the political and military pressures pushed the Ceausescu regime toward closer cooperation with COMECON, although the Romanians continued to resist the Soviet efforts toward economic integration.

As a result of these pressures, the 1968-70 period was one of relative passivity for the Romanians in foreign affairs, although the period was marked by several important events, including the visit of President Richard M. Nixon to Romania in August 1969 and the long-delayed signing of the friendship treaty with the Soviet Union in July 1970. By early 1971 the Ceausescu regime again became more assertive of its independent line in foreign policy.

Principles of Foreign Policy

According to the 1965 Constitution, the foreign policy of the country is based on strict respect for the principles of national independence and sovereignty, equality of rights, noninterference in internal affairs, and interstate relations based on mutual advantage. The Constitution declares the nation's desire to maintain friendly and fraternal relations with all socialist states as well as to promote friendship and cooperation with states of other sociopolitical systems. Participation in international organizations is directed toward the furthering of peace and international understanding.

Spokesmen for the regime have repeatedly asserted these principles as the only acceptable basis for relations between states both within and outside the world communist movement. In contrast to the Soviet position that socialism can only be fully realized by transcending national forms, Romanian policy gives primary emphasis to the distinct requirements of the nation. At the same time, however, Romania recognizes the duties of each socialist state toward cooperative and mutually advantageous relations with all socialist nations and fraternal communist parties.

In keeping with these principles the PCR has rejected the so-called Brezhnev Doctrine of limited sovereignty of socialist states. Instead, regime spokesmen have asserted that within the socialist system all Marxist-Leninist parties are equal and have the exclusive right to determine appropriate solutions for their own problems and manage their own affairs. Romanian policy maintains that relations between socialist states must be based on equal rights, complete trust, mutual respect, and fraternal cooperation. In defending the country's policies, PCR leaders have repeatedly argued that, because the construction of communism is being carried out under a great variety of conditions, there will inevitably be different opinions regarding the forms and procedures employed as well as different points of view regarding international problems. Such differences, however, should not affect relations between socialist states or the unity of the socialist movement.

In response to Soviet calls for socialist solidarity, a ranking member of the PCR Standing Presidium declared, "it would be unrealistic to think that fourteen socialist countries spread over three continents, each with its specific characteristics, should show themselves strictly identical in the building of a new society." Additional party statements insisted that each country must be allowed to apply the principles of Marxism-Leninism to its own particular conditions and that no general line for all parties could be established. In adjusting Marxism-Leninism to national needs each party must be able to make its own unique contribution to the enrichment of the entire communist movement.

During the negotiations for the renewal of the friendship treaties with the other Warsaw Pact countries, the Ceausescu government repeatedly stressed that its own formula for developing international relations with noncommunist nations was based on the same principles as those applied to socialist states and that Romania was open to the establishment of such relations "without regard for difference in the social order." A party spokesman asserted that the country's foreign relations are not determined by short-term circumstances that are valid at one moment and superseded the next but by policies directed at long-term cooperation in all fields of common interests.

PCR policy has sought to support the country's independent political stance by increasing its economic independence. This has led to the rejection of COMECON attempts to integrate the economies of its member states and to establish a division of labor among them. Instead, the PCR has followed a policy aimed at the industrialization of the country, based on the proposition that an expanded industrial base is what is most needed for Romania's overall economic development.

In the same manner that the PCR has resisted complete integration into COMECON, the regime has also opposed Soviet plans for the fuller integration of military forces under the Warsaw Pact. Romanian objections to such integration stem from a concern for the preservation of the country's national sovereignty and a desire to limit Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe. PCR leaders have described military blocs and the existence of foreign troops and military bases on the territory of other states as being incompatible with national independence and as the primary obstacles to cooperation among nations. On the other hand, party spokesmen have frequently stated that, as long as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is continued, the socialist countries will be forced to maintain the Warsaw Pact.

CONDUCT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Policy Formation

The Constitution assigns to the Grand National Assembly the responsibility for establishing the general line of foreign policy and assigns its implementation to the Council of Ministers. It is the Council of State, however, that is given the overall executive functions of ratifying international treaties and establishing diplomatic relations with other states. As the head of state, the president of the Council of State is charged with representing the country in its international relations.In practice, however, the basic foreign policy decisions are made by the Standing Presidium of the PCR rather than the Grand National Assembly. Owing to the fact that the same men occupy leading positions in both party and government, decisions reached in the Standing Presidium are promulgated as decisions of the Council of State. Party spokesmen have described the country's foreign policy as being the result of the "unitary thinking and action of the leading party bodies based on the principle of collective leadership" (see ch. 8; ch. 9).

Within the PCR, foreign policy decisions are channeled through the Central Committee's directorate for international affairs, which in turn transmits them in the form of directives to the appropriate government agencies and oversees their implementation. A commission on foreign policy in the Grand National Assembly functions largely to channel party decisions to the assembly for its official approval.

As head of the PCR and president of the Council of State, Ceausescu personally exercised the primary decisionmaking powers in matters of foreign policy just as he did in domestic affairs. Observers of Eastern European politics also ascribe influential roles in the determination of foreign policy to Prime Minister Maurer and Foreign Minister Corneliu Manescu.

Since coming to power in 1965 Ceausescu has been the dominant figure in the political life of the country and its principal spokesman in international affairs. Believing in the importance of personal diplomacy, Ceausescu has made frequent visits to other nations and cultivated personal relationships with other heads of state. The prime minister and the minister of foreign affairs have also made frequent visits to other states to foster international support for the country's foreign policy. Manescu had developed broad international contacts during his term as president of the twenty-second session of the UN General Assembly in 1967.

Administration of Foreign Affairs

The Council of Ministers is charged with the coordination and implementation of foreign policy and exercises these responsibilities through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Foreign Trade. Since decisionmaking powers rest in the top echelons of the party, the ministries function almost exclusively as administrative agencies. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is responsible for the implementation of party directives in the country's foreign diplomatic relations and in the areas of educational, cultural, and scientific relations with other states and with international organizations. The Ministry of Foreign Trade functions as the central organ for the country's international trade and economic activities.

In early 1972 the organizational structure of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs remained essentially the same as it had been established after the adoption of the new Constitution of 1965. The ministry is organized into six geographical departments, twelve functional directorates, and three administrative offices. The geographical directorates are designated as: the Soviet Union, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary; the Balkans and the Near East; Western and Central Europe; North America and South America; Africa and the Middle East; and the Far East and Southeast and South Asia.

The functional directorates are: international organization; cultural relations; political synthesis; economic relations; legal and treaties; consular; press; protocol; personnel; finance, accounting, and work organization; technical and administrative; and secretariat. The three administrative offices are designated the Chancellery, the Office of Services to the Diplomatic Corps, and the Legal Office. The entire organization functioned under the direction of the minister of foreign affairs and five deputy ministers.

The Ministry of Foreign Trade is organized into nine bureaus, a legal office, and an office for protocol. Bureaus listed under the ministry in 1970, the latest year for which information was available in early 1972, included: economic relations with socialist countries; economic relations with developed capitalist countries; economic relations with emerging nations; currency and plan coordination; imports and exports; personnel and training; administration; budgets; and accounting. The ministry functions under the direction of the minister of foreign trade, four deputy ministers, and a secretary general.

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

In early 1972 diplomatic relations were maintained with ninety-six countries and the so-called Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam (Viet Cong). Of these, forty-two governments maintained embassies in Bucharest. Nine other governments conducted relations through their embassies in Moscow; seven, through their embassies in Belgrade; two through their embassies in Prague; and one, through its embassy in Athens. The total includes Brazil, with which relations were maintained at the legation level, and Spain and San Marino, where Romania maintained consulates. Thirty-two of the states with which Romania maintained diplomatic relations had not established permanent embassies or legations in the country as of early 1972. Trade relations were conducted with several other states with which the government had not established formal diplomatic ties (see ch. 14).

Relations with Communist States and Communist Parties

The Soviet Union

Romania's pursuit of an independent foreign policy has resulted in frequent conflicts with the Soviet Union and tense relations between the two states. In general, the policy disagreements have centered on Romania's unwillingness to participate more fully in the Warsaw Pact, rejection of the concept of economic integration under COMECON, refusal to take sides in the Sino-Soviet dispute, and development of a foreign policy toward the West that runs contrary to Soviet desires. Soviet leaders have interpreted the Romanian policies as a direct challenge to the leading role of the Soviet party in the world communist movement and a rejection of the PCR's obligations to promote "socialist solidarity."

The general policy differences between the two countries were repeatedly demonstrated during the 1967-71 period in such instances as the Romanian establishment of diplomatic relations with West Germany, the refusal to follow the Soviet lead in regard to the Arab-Israeli conflict, the refusal to participate in the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia and Ceausescu's strong denunciation of the action, and the rejection of the Brezhnev Doctrine of limited sovereignty.

Perhaps the most important element complicating relations with the Soviet Union has been Romania's refusal to take the Soviet side in the Sino-Soviet dispute. In keeping with its policy of maintaining friendly and fraternal relations with all socialist states, the Ceausescu regime has cultivated relations with the People's Republic of China and is thought by some observers to have played a role in the establishment of contacts between the Communist Chinese and the United States. In mid-1971 Romanian leaders also mediated the restoration of relations between the People's Republic of China and Yugoslavia. These actions led to charges in the Soviet press that Romania was organizing an anti-Soviet bloc in the Balkans under the patronage of the People's Republic of China.

Despite the ups and downs of Soviet-Romanian relations throughout the period of the Ceausescu regime, the two states signed a twenty-year treaty of friendship, cooperation, and mutual assistance in July 1970. This treaty replaced a similar 1948 accord that had been set to expire in 1968 but continued in force under an automatic five-year renewal clause. Negotiated before the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia, the actual signing of the treaty was delayed because of strained relations between the two states and Soviet attempts to insert a clause containing the essence of the Brezhnev Doctrine. The Ceausescu government refused to renegotiate the original agreement, however, and the treaty was finally signed at ceremonies in Bucharest.

Brezhnev did not attend the ceremonies and, in contrast to similar Soviet treaties with other Eastern European communist states, which were signed by both the party leaders and the prime ministers of each country, the Soviet-Romanian treaty was signed only by the prime ministers. Coming in the midst of serious disagreements between the two countries, the signing of the treaty was considered by some observers as a formality and something of a smokescreen intended to cover a widening split.

Other Communist States

In general, relations with Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic (East Germany), Hungary, and Poland mirrored Romania's relations with the Soviet Union. The communist leaders of these countries followed the Soviet lead in the policy differences with the Ceausescu regime and, although each state had friendship treaties that expired in 1968 and 1969, only the treaty with Czechoslovakia was renewed before the Soviet-Romanian treaty was signed. The Czechoslovakia treaty was concluded during the period of the government of Alexander Dubcek before the 1968 invasion.

In its relations with the Eastern European communist regimes Romania had adhered to the principle of cultivating fraternal relations with all socialist countries despite policy differences. Long-term bilateral trade agreements were concluded with Hungary and Bulgaria in late 1969, and the major portion of the country's foreign trade continued to be with COMECON states throughout 1970 and 1971. Visits on the ministerial level were regularly exchanged. Relations with the East German regime proved more difficult, however, the major obstacle being Romania's establishment of diplomatic ties with West Germany in early 1967. Despite the recognition of the West German government, however, the Ceausescu regime has continued to insist on the reality of two German states and has pressed for international recognition of East Germany.

Relations with Bulgaria had been generally cool throughout the latter period of the Gheorghiu-Dej regime but improved significantly after Ceausescu came to power in Romania in 1965. By the beginning of 1968, however, the policies pursued by the Ceausescu regime led to serious differences, although formal amenities continued to be observed. Relations remained correct but not cordial until after the signing of the Soviet-Romanian treaty of friendship and alliance in July 1970. This action paved the way for improved relations with Bulgaria, and in September Ceausescu met with Bulgarian prime minister Todor Zhivkov, marking the first top-level bilateral contact between the two governments in three years. This meeting was followed by the exchange of a series of high-level delegations with the announced purpose of improving relations and increasing cooperation.

Friction with Hungary arose in mid-1971 over the Romanian region of Transylvania and the sizable Hungarian minority residing there. In the period of strained—Soviet-Romanian relations, the Budapest regime revived the Transylvanian minority question in order to put pressure on the Ceausescu government. Frequent visits of Soviet embassy personnel to Transylvania added to the concern of Romanian leaders, who initiated increased efforts to meet the needs and expectations of the country's minority groups (see ch. 4; ch. 9). By February 1972, tension between Hungary and Romania had eased and a friendship treaty was renewed.

Relations with Albania and Yugoslavia differed from those with the other Eastern European communist regimes, as neither participated in the Warsaw Pact and both had also pursued policies independent of the Soviet Union. In 1960 Albania sided with the Communist Chinese in the Sino-Soviet dispute and withdrew its ambassadors from all the Eastern European countries after Khrushchev denounced the Albanian regime at the Twenty-second Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 1961. The Romanian position of neutrality in regard to the Sino-Soviet dispute opened the way for improved relations with Albania, and the Ceausescu government returned its ambassador to Tirana in 1964.

The Ceausescu regime has maintained that the policies of the Albanian Communists (the Albanian Workers' Party) are legitimate manifestations of socialism developed according to national needs. Common fears of Soviet designs against their countries after the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia brought about increased cooperation between the two governments.

Relations with Yugoslavia had progressed along lines of mutual interest throughout the period of the Ceausescu regime, and close cooperation had developed between the Romanian and Yugoslav heads of state as they sought each other's support for their independent foreign policies. The PCR was the only Eastern European party to send a delegation to the Ninth Congress of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia in 1969.

Although the two governments indicated almost identical views on all important international issues, they manifested widely divergent approaches to domestic affairs and, owing to the fact that their economies are not complementary, economic relations between the two countries have not kept pace with political relations. Efforts to increase economic relations resulted in a new five-year trade agreement in 1971 designed to increase the exchange of goods by 128 percent in the period covered. Cooperation between the two states was also demonstrated in the joint construction of the Iron Gate hydroelectric station on the Danube (see ch. 3).

During 1971 the PCR renewed efforts to promote cooperative relations among the Balkan states. The regime emphasized that the geographical isolation and the socialist systems of Albania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, and Romania make for common interest in increased economic, political, and cultural cooperation. Observers of Eastern European politics pointed out that Romania shares lengthy borders with Bulgaria, Hungary, and the Soviet Union and that improving relations with the other Balkan states would serve to overcome the country's relative physical isolation.

PCR leaders have also called for all of the Balkan area, including both the communist and the noncommunist states, to be designated a nuclear free zone and for the removal of United States military bases from the area. Observers pointed out that the Ceausescu regime believed that such actions would serve to reduce the strategic significance of Romania in the eyes of the Soviet leaders and possibly result in greater tolerance for Romanian deviation from the Soviet line. Political observers also attributed the growing willingness of Albania and Yugoslavia to increase cooperation and give support to Romania's initiatives for the Balkan area to the growth of Soviet naval power in the Eastern Mediterranean.

The Ceausescu regime successfully cultivated relations with the People's Republic of China and persisted in the development of these relations despite tremendous pressures from the Soviet Union and other Warsaw Pact states. An important byproduct of these relations has been increased economic exchanges between the two countries; in late 1970 the Communist Chinese extended Romania a long-term, interest-free credit amounting to the equivalent of US$244 million.

In June 1971 Ceausescu made a twenty-five day visit to Asia that included nine days in mainland China, the first such visit by a party leader of a Warsaw Pact state since the Sino-Soviet dispute became public. In a joint communiquÉ the Communist Chinese and Romanian leaders emphasized the necessity of sovereign and equal relations among all communist states and parties. Ceausescu reiterated his government's support for the admission of the People's Republic of China to the United Nations and asserted that the rightful sovereignty over Taiwan belonged to the Peking regime. In August 1971 a Communist Chinese military delegation attended the twenty-seventh anniversary celebrations of the liberation of Romania from Nazi occupation.

Maintenance of friendly relations with the People's Republic of China has also gained the Ceausescu regime support from other communist parties that have been critical of the Soviet Union in its conflict with the Communist Chinese, most notably the French and Italian parties. The PCR has taken special pains to cultivate relations with nonruling communist and workers' parties, efforts that were reflected in visits of top leaders from at least thirty of these parties to Romania during 1970. All of these visitors were received personally by Ceausescu. Observers pointed out that the cultivation of relations with the nonruling parties was an important means of gaining support for Romania's independent policies.

Relations With Noncommunist States

Romania has continued to improve relations with Western nations and has sought to cultivate ties with the developing countries of Africa and Asia. The expansion of relations beyond the Soviet alignment system was cautiously initiated in the mid-1950s by the Gheorghiu-Dej regime when pressures were building for Romania's full economic integration into COMECON. In addition to the desire to develop trade relations with Western nations, the government was interested in utilizing Western technology and in seeking an increased measure of detente in the cold war.

West Germany

In the period that followed the initiation of limited relations with noncommunist states, Romania's resistance to the Soviet Union contributed to a receptive attitude on the part of several Western states. Aside from the gradual development of trade relations, however, significant political relations with Western Europe did not materialize until January 1967, when the Ceausescu regime agreed to establish formal diplomatic relations with West Germany, becoming the first of the Warsaw Pact states, other than the Soviet Union, to do so.

Romanian leaders based the establishment of relations with West Germany on the so-called Bucharest Declaration issued by the leaders of the Warsaw Pact countries in 1966. The declaration affirmed that there were in West Germany "circles that oppose revanchism and militarism" and that seek the development of normal relations with countries of both the East and the West as well as a normalization of relations "between the two German states." Also included in the declaration was a statement affirming that a basic condition for European security was the establishment of normal relations between states "regardless of their social systems." The Ceausescu regime interpreted this as implying that bilateral relations could be developed between Eastern European states and West Germany.

Although the West German government made overtures to other Eastern European communist states, Romania was the only one to agree to the establishment of formal diplomatic ties at that time. Political observers saw the move as a means for Romania to dramatically demonstrate independence from the Soviet Union and, as well, a means of avoiding COMECON integration pressures by increasing trade and the possibility of obtaining economic aid from the West.

The establishment of diplomatic ties with West Germany did not alter the PCR position on the existence of two German states. Each country, at the time the diplomatic exchange was made public, simply reasserted its own positions: the West German government reiterated its right and obligation to speak for the entire German people, and the Bucharest government asserted that one of the fundamental realities of the post-World War II era "is the existence of two German states." Although Romania reaffirmed the existence of East Germany as a separate state, it did not make recognition of the East German regime by West Germany a precondition for the establishment of diplomatic relations with the West German government.

The East German regime was highly critical of the Romanian establishment of relations with West Germany, and there followed a serious decline in Romanian-East German relations. PCR leaders responded to East German criticisms by declaring that "the foreign policy of a socialist state is laid down by the party and the government of the country in question and they need render account only to their people."

In the period since 1967 relations with West Germany have continued without major difficulties. Although the Ceausescu regime has not hesitated to criticize elements of German policy with which it does not agree, the two governments have sought to minimize differences in ideology and in foreign and domestic policies in the interest of maintaining good relations. In economic exchanges between the two countries Romania has had a continuous balance of trade deficit, a situation that both countries were attempting to correct. In mid-1970 Prime Minister Maurer paid an official visit to Bonn, becoming the first Eastern European head of government to do so. In May 1971 the West German government reciprocated, President Gustav Heinemann making a state visit to Romania.

The United States

Relations with the United States were initiated on a limited scale in the early 1960s, and ambassadors were exchanged in 1964, but relations declined with the increasing United States role in the Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam). After the opening of the Paris peace talks and particularly after the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia that same year, relations between the two states improved significantly. Trade relations remained minimal, however, partly because of United States legal restrictions on trade with Eastern European countries.

The improved relations between the two nations were demonstrated by the visit of President Nixon to Romania in August 1969, marking the first visit of a United States head of state to a communist country since the 1945 Yalta Conference. Press reports indicated that the president received an enthusiastic welcome from the Romanian people and that in meetings with Ceausescu a wide range of international problems were discussed.

At the close of the visit President Nixon reaffirmed that the United States "respects the sovereignty and equal rights of all countries, large and small, as well as their right to preserve their own national character." The two heads of state agreed upon the reciprocal establishment of libraries, the opening of negotiations for the conclusion of a consular convention, and the development and diversification of economic ties.

The presidential visit was reciprocated by Ceausescu in October 1970 when the Romanian leader traveled to New York to attend the twenty-fifth anniversary session of the UN General Assembly. Ceausescu followed the UN visit with a two-week coast-to-coast tour of the United States and talks at the White House with President Nixon. The Nixon administration moved to increase economic relations with Romania, and in early 1972 legislation was pending in the United States Congress to grant that country most-favored-nation status (see ch. 14).

Other States

As part of its campaign to improve relations among the Balkan states and in keeping with its policy of establishing relations with all states regardless of their political systems, the Ceausescu regime initiated efforts to ameliorate its relations with Greece and Turkey. The development of ties with Turkey has progressed without serious setback throughout the period of Ceausescu's rule, but Greco-Romanian relations have fluctuated. Although the regime has followed a policy of noninterference in the internal affairs of another state, it left the Romanian embassy in Athens without an ambassador for a year after the 1967 Greek military coup. In July 1968 the Romanian government returned an ambassador to Greece as a first step in improving relations between the two states. Increased trade and cultural exchanges followed, although the differing ideologies of the two regimes have kept official relations at a correct but cool level.

Although Turkey did not respond positively to the Romanian call for a nuclear free zone in the Balkans and the removal of foreign military bases from the area, asserting that such an agreement would have to be included in a wider accord between NATO and Warsaw Pact nations, relations between the two states have continued to improve. Ceausescu paid a state visit to Turkey in 1969, and the Turkish president visited Romania in April 1970. The satisfactory political ties have resulted in a number of cultural and economic agreements, Romania obtaining Turkish raw materials, particularly iron, chrome, and manganese, and exporting machinery to Turkey.

Political, economic, and cultural ties were expanded with a number of other Western countries during the 1965-70 period, particularly with Austria, France, Italy, and the United Kingdom. The Ceausescu regime placed primary emphasis on the cultivation of economic relations with these states, and several substantial trade agreements were concluded and high-level visits were exchanged during 1970 and 1971.

PCR policy statements have proclaimed that one of the principal guidelines of Romanian foreign policy is the steady cultivation and broadening of political and economic relations with the young independent states of Asia and Africa as well as with the countries of Latin America. The regime has also repeatedly affirmed its support for "the struggle of the peoples of Africa, Asia and other regions of the world for liberation and national independence against neocolonialism and the aggressive actions of imperialism."

Policy statements have also consistently voiced support for the communist effort in South Vietnam. The communist Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam (Viet Cong) is recognized as the legitimate government of South Vietnam and maintains an embassy in Bucharest.

The Middle East situation has posed a dilemma for the Ceausescu government, which has sought to maintain relations with both sides in the conflict. When, in August 1969, Romania and Israel announced an agreement to elevate their relations to the ambassadorial level, Syria and Sudan retaliated by breaking relations with Romania, and Iraq and the United Arab Republic reduced the level of their representation in Bucharest. Despite these actions by the Arab states, PCR leaders continued to voice support for "the struggle of the Arab people to defend their national independence and sovereignty" but called for a negotiated settlement of the conflict.

The Ceausescu regime systematically cultivated relations with the developing countries, and particular efforts were directed toward increasing relations with African nations during 1970 and 1971. Ceausescu made a state visit to Morocco, and other high Romanian officials visited Congo (Brazzaville), Congo (Kinshasa)—in late 1971 became the Republic of Zaire—Burundi, Kenya, the Malagasy Republic, Nigeria, Tanzania, and Zambia. Several prominent African leaders, among them President Jean Bedel Bokassa of the Central African Republic and President Joseph Mobutu of Zaire visited Romania. Trade agreements were signed with a number of African nations, but little had been done to implement these agreements as of early 1972. As another means of increasing its influence in Africa and broadening relations there, the Ceausescu government established more than 400 scholarships for African students to study in Romania.

Relations With International Organizations

Romania became a member of the UN in 1955 and as of early 1972 also held membership in the following UN specialized agencies: the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO), and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). It also participates in the work of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD).

The two most important communist organizations to which the country belongs are the Warsaw Pact and COMECON. The Warsaw Pact was established in 1955 as a twenty-year mutual defense pact between the Soviet Union, Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, and Romania. (Albania ceased its participation in the organization in 1961 and officially withdrew in 1968 as a symbol of protest against the invasion of Czechoslovakia). As an instrument of Soviet foreign policy, the Warsaw Pact has served to maintain Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe and to provide the legal basis for the presence of Soviet troops on the territory of some of the participating states.

Romania has consistently refused to acquiesce in Soviet proposals for greater integration of the military forces of the Warsaw Pact states and did not participate in the invasion of Czechoslovakia. After the Czechoslovak invasion the Ceausescu government established a defense council and proclaimed that foreign troops were not to enter Romania for any purpose without prior approval of the Grand National Assembly. During the 1968-71 period the Romanians limited their participation in pact activities as much as possible. Rather than Romanian troops taking part in joint maneuvers of pact forces, participation has generally been limited to a small group of staff officers who attend the exercises as observers.

Official Romanian views on the integration of Eastern European communist forces under the pact were forcefully reiterated in early 1970 after the Soviet chief of staff spoke of "combined" or "unified" pact forces. Ceausescu responded by declaring that Romania's armed forces are not subordinated to any authority other than "the Romanian party, government, and Supreme National Command." Although he pledged continued cooperation with the pact and a fulfillment of his country's responsibilities, he asserted that no part of the party's and government's right to command and lead the armed forces would be ceded to any other body. In addition, Ceausescu gave emphasis to the defensive nature of the Warsaw Pact and reiterated the Romania position on noninterference in the internal affairs of another country.

Romanian policy toward COMECON has been cooperative in regard to mutually advantageous trade relations with the other member states but has consistently opposed pressures for the integration of their economies. The Soviet Union and the more industrialized of the Eastern European communist states have pressed for economic integration that would include a division of labor among COMECON members and a specialization of production. Romanian leaders, preferring to develop a diversified national economy, have refused the role of supplier of agricultural goods and raw materials that COMECON would have assigned to their country.

During the mid-1960s Romania successfully reoriented a substantial share of its trade toward the West and reduced its participation in COMECON. Trade with the West, however, produced sizable deficits and, along with other economic problems, including the disastrous floods of early 1970, forced the Ceausescu regime to again rely on its economic ties with the COMECON states. Despite these difficulties, the country has continued to develop its trade relations with noncommunist nations and has continued to resist COMECON integration pressures.

In 1970 a prominent Romanian economist proposed that COMECON become an open-ended organization in which all countries, socialist and nonsocialist, could participate on a voluntary basis. In mid-1971 an official PCR party spokesman declared that economic cooperation with COMECON must "in no way affect the national economic plans or the independence of the economic units in each country."