I now turn to the discussion of some questions of organization, but it is not my intention to ventilate all the needs and aims connected with this subject that occupy our military circles at the present time. I shall rather endeavour to work out the general considerations which, in my opinion, must determine the further development of our army, if we wish, by consistent energy, to attain a superiority in the directions which will certainly prove to be all-important in the next war. It will be necessary to go into details only on points which are especially noteworthy or require some explanation. I shall obviously come into opposition with the existing state of things, but nothing is further from my purpose than to criticize them. My views are based on theoretical requirements, while our army, from certain definitely presented beginnings, and under the influence of most different men and of changing views, in the midst of financial difficulties and political disputes, has, by fits and starts, grown up into what it now is. It is, in a certain sense, outside criticism; it must be taken as something already existing, whose origin is only a subject for a subsequent historical verdict. But the further expansion of our army belongs to the future, and its course can be directed. It can follow well-defined lines, in order to become efficient, and it is politically most important that this object should be realized. Therefore I shall not look back critically on the past, but shall try to serve the future.

The guiding principle of our preparations for war must be, as I have already said, the development of the greatest fighting strength and the greatest tactical efficiency, in order through them to be in a position to carry on an offensive war successfully. What follows will, therefore, fall naturally under these two heads. Fighting strength rests partly, as already said, on the training (which will be discussed later), the arming, and the personnel, partly on the composition of the troops, and, therefore, in the case of line regiments, with which we chiefly have to deal, since they are the real field troops, on the strength of their peace establishment. It was shown in the previous chapter how essential it is to have in the standing army not only the necessary cadres ready for the new formations, but to make the separate branches so strong that they can easily be brought up to full strength in war-time.

The efficiency and character of the superiors, the officers and the non-commissioned officers, are equally weighty factors in the value of the troops. They are the professional supporters of discipline, decision, and initiative, and, since they are the teachers of the troops, they determine their intellectual standard. The number of permanent officers on the establishment in peace is exceedingly small in proportion to their duties in the training of the troops and to the demands made of them on mobilization. If we reflect how many officers and non-commissioned officers from the standing army must be transferred to the new formations in order to vitalize them, and how the modern tactical forms make it difficult for the superior officer to assert his influence in battle, the numerical inadequacy of the existing personnel is clearly demonstrated. This applies mainly to the infantry, and in their case, since they are the decisive arm, a sufficient number of efficient officers is essential. All the more important is it, on the one hand, to keep the establishment of officers and non-commissioned officers in the infantry at full strength, and, on the other hand, to raise the efficiency of the officers and non-commissioned officers on leave or in the reserve. This latter is a question of training, and does not come into the present discussion.

The task of keeping the establishments at adequate strength is, in a sense, a financial question. The amount of the pay and the prospects which the profession holds out for subsequent civil posts greatly affect the body of non-commissioned officers, and therefore it is important to keep step with the general increase in prices by improved pecuniary advantages. Even for the building up of the corps of officers, the financial question is all-important. The career of the officer offers to-day so little prospect of success and exacts such efficiency and self-devotion from the individual, that he will not long remain in the service, attractive as it is, if the financial sacrifices are so high as they now are. The infantry officer especially must have a better position. Granted that the cavalry and mounted artillery officers incur greater expenses for the keep of their horses than the infantry officer has to pay, the military duties of the latter are by far the most strenuous and require a very considerable outlay on clothing. It would be, in my opinion, expedient to give the infantry officer more pay than the cavalry and artillery officers, in order to make service in that arm more attractive. There is a rush nowadays into the mounted arm, for which there is a plethora of candidates. These arms will always be well supplied with officers. Their greater attractiveness must be counterbalanced by special advantages offered by the infantry service. By no other means can we be sure of having sufficient officers in the chief arm.

If the fighting strength in each detachment depends on its composition and training, there are other elements besides the tactical value of the troops which determine the effectiveness of their combined efforts in action; these are first the leadership, which, however, depends on conditions which are beyond calculation, and secondly the numerical proportion of the arms to each other. Disregarding provisionally the cavalry, who play a special role in battle, we must define the proportion which artillery must bear to infantry.

With regard to machine guns, the idea that they can to some extent replace infantry is quite erroneous. Machine guns are primarily weapons of defence. In attack they can only be employed under very favourable conditions, and then strengthen only one factor of a successful attack—the fire-strength—while they may sometimes hinder that impetuous forward rush which is the soul of every attack. Hence, this auxiliary weapon should be given to the infantry in limited numbers, and employed mainly on the defensive fronts, and should be often massed into large units. Machine-gun detachments should not overburden the marching columns.

The relation of infantry to artillery is of more importance.

Infantry is the decisive arm. Other arms are exclusively there to smooth their road to victory, and support their action directly or indirectly. This relation must not be merely theoretical; the needs of the infantry must ultimately determine the importance of all other fighting instruments in the whole army.

If we make this idea the basis of our argument, the following is the result. Infantry has gained enormously in defensive power owing to modern weapons. The attack requires, therefore, a far greater superiority than ever before. In addition to this, the breadth of front in action has greatly increased in consequence of the former close tactical formations having been broken up through the increase of fire. This refers only to the separate detachment, and does not justify the conclusion that in the future fewer troops will cover the same spaces as before. This assumption applies at the most to defence, and then only in a limited sense. In attack the opposite will probably be the case. The troops must therefore be placed more deeply _en Échelon _than in the last wars. Now, the average breadth of the front in attack must regulate the allotment of artillery to infantry. No definite proportion can be settled; but if the theoretical calculation be compared with the experiences of the last wars, conclusions may be obtained which will most probably prove appropriate. No more than this can be expected in the domain of military science.

If we agree to the above-mentioned proportion of breadth and depth in an infantry attack, we shall be driven to insist on a reduction of artillery as compared with the past; but should we think that modern artillery helps the attack, especially by indirect fire, we must advocate, from the standpoint of offensive warfare, an increase of the artillery. Actual war experiences alone can find the true middle path between these two extremes.

If the frontal development of the artillery of a modern army corps, or, better still, two divisions, be regarded from the point of view that the guns cannot advance in connected line, but that only the specially adapted parts of the field can be used for artillery development, the conclusion is certain that by such frontal extension the infantry is reduced to a covering line for the artillery. In forming this opinion we must not assume the normal strength of the infantry, but take into account that the strength of the infantry in war rapidly melts away. If we estimate the companies on the average at two-thirds of their proper strength, we shall be above rather than below the real figures. Such infantry strength will, of course, be sufficient to defend the position taken up by the artillery, but it is hardly enough to carry out, in that section of the field, a decisive attack, which, under present conditions, requires greater numbers and depth than before.

In this connection it is very instructive to study the second part of the Franco-German War, and the Boer War, as well as the Manchurian campaign.

Some of the German infantry had in the first-named period extraordinarily diminished in numbers; companies of 120 men were not rare. The artillery, on the contrary, had remained at its original strength. The consequences naturally was that the powers of the Germans on the offensive grew less and the battles and skirmishes were not so decisive as in the first part of the war. This condition would have shown up more distinctly against an enemy of equal class than in the contest with the loosely-compacted, raw French levies. In the former case the offensive would have been impracticable. The strong artillery, under the existing conditions, no doubt gave great support to the weak infantry; but an unbiassed opinion leads to the conclusion that, under the then existing proportion of the arms to each other, the infantry was too weak to adopt energetic offensive tactics against a well-matched enemy. This is irresistibly proved if we consider what masses of infantry were needed at WÖrth and St. Privat, for instance, in spite of the support of very superior artillery, in order to defeat a weaker enemy of equal class.

Again, in South Africa, the overwhelming superiority of the English in artillery was never able to force a victory. In Manchuria the state of things was very instructive. Numerically the Russian artillery was extraordinarily superior to the enemy's, and the range of the Russian field guns was longer than that of the Japanese; nevertheless, the Japanese succeeded in beating an enemy stronger in infantry also, because, in the decisive directions of attack, they were able to unite superior forces of infantry and artillery, while the Russian artillery was scattered along the whole of their broad front.

The lesson of this war is that, apart from the close relation of the arms to each other in the separate units, the co-operation of these units must be looked at, if the strength of the two sister arms is to be appropriately determined.

The requirement that each separate tactical unit should he made equal or superior in artillery to the corresponding hostile unit is thoroughly mechanical, as if in war division always fought against division and corps against corps! Superiority at the decisive point is the crucial test. This superiority is attained by means of an unexpected concentration of forces for attack, and there is no reason why the superiority in artillery should not also be brought about in this way. If by superior tactical skill two army corps, each with 96 guns, combine against a hostile army which brings 144 guns into action, that signifies a superiority of 48 guns and a double superiority in infantry. If it is assumed that on both sides the army corps is armed with 144 guns, and that in consequence of this the tactical superiority has become so slight that neither side can claim a superiority in one direction, then equal forces meet, and chance decides the day. Since the Japanese were tactically more efficient than their enemy and took the offensive, they were enabled to unite the superior forces in the most decisive directions, and this advantage proved far greater than the numerical superiority of the Russian army as a whole.

If we look at the whole matter we shall come to the conclusion that the artillery, if it is not a question of pure defence, need never occupy within a line of battle so much ground that the concentration of a considerably superior force of infantry for attack is rendered doubtful. In this respect we have, in our present organization already exceeded the expedient proportion between the two arms in favour of the artillery. The conclusion is that this latter arm never need, within the separate divisions, be made so strong that the attacking capacities of the army are thereby prejudiced. This is the decisive point. Any excess in artillery can be kept on the battlefield in reserve when space is restricted; if the attacking efficiency of the troops is reduced, then artillery becomes a dead weight on the army instead of an aid to victory. It is far more important to be able to unite superior forces for a decisive attack than to meet the enemy with equally matched forces along the whole front. If we observe this principle, we shall often be weaker than the enemy on the less important fronts; this disadvantage may be partly counterbalanced by remaining on the defensive in such a position. It becomes a positive advantage, if, owing to an overpowering concentration of forces, victory is won at the decisive point. This victory cancels all the failures which may have been recorded elsewhere.

The operative superiority of an enemy is determined by the greater marching capacity of the troops, by the rapid and systematic working of the communications with the rear, and, above all, by the length of the columns of the operating troops. Under the modern system of colossal armaments, an army, especially if in close formation, cannot possibly live on the country; it is driven to trust to daily food-supplies from the rear. Railways are used as far as possible to bring up the supplies; but from the railhead the communication with the troops must be maintained by columns of traction waggons and draught animals, which go to and fro between the troops, the rearward magazines, and the railhead. Since traction waggons are restricted to made roads, the direct communication with the troops must be kept up by columns of draught animals, which can move independently of the roads. The waggons of provisions, therefore, which follow the troops, and are filled daily, must come up with them the same day, or there will be a shortage of food. This is only possible if the troop column does not exceed a certain length and starts at early morning, so that the transport waggons, which, at the end of the march, must be driven from the rear to the head of the column, can reach this before the beginning of the night's rest. The fitness of an army for attack can only be maintained if these supplies are uninterrupted; there must also be a sufficient quantity of tinned rations and provisions which the soldiers can carry with them. If the length of the columns exceeds the limit here laid down, the marches must be proportionately shortened. If unusually lengthy marches are made, so that the provision carts cannot reach the troops, days of rest must be interposed, to regulate the supply. Thus the capacity of an army to march and to carry out operations is directly dependent on the possibility of being fed from the rear. A careful calculation, based on practical experiences, shows that, in order to average 20 to 22 kilometres a day—the minimum distance required from an army—no column on a road ought to exceed a length of about 25 kilometres This consideration determines the depth of the army corps on the march, since in an important campaign and when massing for battle troops seldom march in smaller bodies than a corps.

This calculation, by which the conditions of modern war are compulsorily affected, makes it highly necessary that the system of supplies and rations should be carefully organized. The restoration of any destroyed railways, the construction of light railways, the organization of columns of motor transport waggons and draught animals, must be prepared by every conceivable means in time of peace, in order that in war-time the railroads may follow as closely as possible on the track of the troops, and that the columns may maintain without interruption continuous communications between the troops and the railhead. In order to keep this machinery permanently in working order, and to surmount any crisis in bringing up supplies, it is highly advisable to have an ample stock of tinned rations. This stock should, in consideration of the necessary mass-concentration, be as large as possible. Care must be taken, by the organization of trains and columns, that the stock of tinned provisions can be quickly renewed. This would be best done by special light columns, which are attached to the army corps outside the organization of provision and transport columns, and follow it at such a distance, that, if necessary, they could be soon pushed to the front by forced or night marches. There is naturally some reluctance to increase the trains of the army corps, but this necessity is unavoidable. It is further to be observed that the columns in question would not be very long, since they would mainly convey condensed foods and other provisions compressed into the smallest space.

An immense apparatus of train formations, railway and telegraph corps, and workmen must be got ready to secure the efficiency of a modern army with its millions. This is absolutely necessary, since without it the troops in modern warfare would be practically unable to move. It is far more important to be ahead of the enemy in this respect than in any other, for there lies the possibility of massing a superior force at the decisive point, and of thus defeating a stronger opponent.

However careful the preparations, these advantages can only be attained if the troop columns do not exceed the maximum strength which can be fed from the rear, if the necessary forward movement is carried out. Everything which an army corps requires for the war must be kept within these limits.

Our modern army corps without the heavy artillery of the field army corresponds roughly to this requirement. But should it be lengthened by a heavy howitzer battalion, with the necessary ammunition columns, it will considerably exceed the safe marching depth—if, that is, the necessary advance-guard distance be included. Since, also, the infantry is too weak in proportion to the space required by the artillery to deploy, it becomes advisable in the interests both of powerful attack and of operative efficiency, within the separate troop organizations to strengthen the numbers of the infantry and reduce those of the artillery.

In addition to the length of the column, the arrangement of the division is very important for its tactical efficiency. This must be such as to permit the most varied employment of the troops and the formation of reserves without the preliminary necessity of breaking up all the units. This requirement does not at all correspond to our traditional organization, and the man to insist upon it vigorously has not yet appeared, although there can be no doubt as to the inadequacy of the existing tactical organization, and suitable schemes have already been drawn up by competent officers.

The army corps is divided into two divisions, the division into two infantry brigades. All the brigades consist of two regiments. The formation of a reserve makes it very difficult for the commander to fix the centre of gravity of the battle according to circumstances and his own judgment. It is always necessary to break up some body when a reserve has to be formed, and in most cases to reduce the officers of some detachment to inactivity. Of course, a certain centre of gravity for the battle may be obtained by assigning to one part of the troops a wider and to the other a narrower space for deployment. But this procedure in no way replaces a reserve, for it is not always possible, even in the first dispositions for the engagement, to judge where the brunt of the battle will be. That depends largely on the measures taken by the enemy and the course of the battle.

Napoleon's saying, "Je m'engage et puis je vois," finds its application, though to a lessened extent, even to-day. The division of cavalry brigades into two regiments is simply a traditional institution which has been thoughtlessly perpetuated. It has not been realized that the duties of the cavalry have completely changed, and that brigades of two regiments are, in addition to other disadvantages, too weak to carry these duties out.

This bisecting system, by restricting the freedom of action, contradicts the most generally accepted military principles.

The most natural formation is certainly a tripartition of the units, as is found in an infantry regiment. This system permits the separate divisions to fight near each other, and leaves room for the withdrawal of a reserve, the formation of a detachment, or the employment of the subdivisions in lines (Treffen), for the principle of the wing attack must not be allowed to remain merely a scheme. Finally, it is the best formation for the offensive, since it allows the main body of the troops to be employed at a single point in order to obtain a decisive result there.

A special difficulty in the free handling of the troops is produced by the quite mechanical division of the artillery, who bring into action two kinds of ordnance—cannons and howitzers. These latter can, of course, be used as cannons, but have special functions which are not always required. Their place in the organization, however, is precisely the same as that of the cannons, and it is thus very difficult to employ them as their particular character demands.

The object in the whole of this organization has been to make corps and divisions equal, and if possible superior, to the corresponding formations of the enemy by distributing the batteries proportionately according to numbers among the divisions. This secured, besides, the undeniable advantage of placing the artillery directly under the orders of the commanders of the troops. But, in return, it robbed the commanding General of the last means secured by the organization of enforcing his tactical aims. He is now forced to form a reserve for himself out of the artillery of the division, and thus to deprive one division at least of half its artillery. If he has the natural desire to withdraw for himself the howitzer section, which is found in one division only, the same division must always be subjected to this reduction of its strength, and it is more than problematical whether this result always fits in with the tactical position. It seems at least worth while considering whether, under these circumstances, it would not be a more appropriate arrangement to attach a howitzer section to each division.

The distribution of the heavy field howitzers is another momentous question. It would be in accordance with the principles that guide the whole army to divide them equally among the army corps. This arrangement would have much in its favour, for every corps may find itself in a position where heavy howitzer batteries can be profitably employed. They can also, however, be combined under the command of the General-in-Chief, and attached to the second line of the army. The first arrangement offers, as has been said, many advantages, but entails the great disadvantage that the line of march of the army corps is dangerously lengthened by several kilometres, so that no course is left but either to weaken the other troops of the corps or to sacrifice the indispensable property of tactical efficiency. Both alternatives are inadmissible. On the other hand, since the employment of heavy howitzers is by no means necessary in every engagement, but only when an attack is planned against a strongly-posted enemy, it may be safely assumed that the heavy howitzers could be brought up in time out of the second line by a night march. Besides, their mobility renders it possible to detach single batteries or sections, and on emergency to attach them to an army corps temporarily.

There is a prevalent notion that the heavy howitzers are principally used to fight the enemy's field artillery, and therefore must be on the spot in every engagement. They have even been known to stray into the advance guard. I do not approve of this idea. The enemy's field artillery will fire indirectly from previously masked positions, and in such case they cannot be very successfully attacked by heavy howitzers. It seems to me quite unjustifiable, with the view of attaining this problematic object, to burden the marching columns permanently with long unwieldy trains of artillery and ammunition, and thus to render their effectiveness doubtful.

No doubt the Japanese, who throughout the war continually increased their heavy field howitzers, ultimately attached artillery of that sort to every division. The experiences of that war must not, however, be overestimated or generalized. The conditions were quite sui generis. The Japanese fought on their whole front against fortified positions strengthened by heavy artillery, and as they attacked the enemy's line in its whole extension, they required on their side equally heavy guns. It should be noticed that they did not distribute their very effective 12-centimetre field howitzers along the whole front, but, so far as I can gather, assigned them all to the army of General Nogi, whose duty was to carry out the decisive enveloping movement at Mukden. The Japanese thus felt the need of concentrating the effect of their howitzers, and as we hope we shall not imitate their frontal attack, but break through the enemy's front, though in a different way from theirs, the question of concentration seems to me very important for us.

Under these circumstances it will be most advantageous to unite the heavy batteries in the hand of the Commander-in-Chief. They thus best serve his scheme of offence. He can mass them at the place which he wishes to make the decisive point in the battle, and will thus attain that end most completely, whereas the distribution of them among the army corps only dissipates their effectiveness. His heavy batteries will be for him what the artillery reserves are for the divisional General. There, where their mighty voice roars over the battlefield, will be the deciding struggle of the day. Every man, down to the last private, knows that.

I will only mention incidentally that the present organization of the heavy artillery on a peace footing is unsatisfactory. The batteries which in war are assigned to the field army must in peace also be placed under the orders of the corps commanders (TruppenfÜhrer) if they are to become an organic part of the whole. At present the heavy artillery of the field army is placed under the general-inspection of the foot artillery, and attached to the troops only for purposes of manoeuvres. It thus remains an isolated organism so far as the army goes, and does not feel itself an integral part of the whole. A clear distinction between field artillery and fortress artillery would be more practical.

This view seems at first sight to contradict the requirement that the heavy batteries should form a reserve in the hands of the Commander-in-Chief. As the armies do not exist in peace-time, and manoeuvres are seldom carried out in army formation, the result of the present organization is that the tactical relations of the heavy artillery and the other troops are not sufficiently understood. This disadvantage would be removed if heavy artillery were assigned permanently to each army corps. This would not prevent it being united in war-time in the hands of the army leaders. On the contrary, they would be used in manoeuvres in relation to the army corps in precisely the same sense as they would be in war-time in relation to the armies.

The operations of the army in the enemy's countries will be far more effective if it has control of the railways and roads. That implies not merely the restoration of railroads that may have been destroyed, but the rapid capture of the barrier forts and fortresses which impede the advance of the army by cutting off the railway communications. We were taught the lesson in 1870-71 in France how far defective railway communications hindered all operations. It is, therefore, of vital importance that a corps should be available, whose main duty is the discharge of these necessary functions.

Until recently we had only one united corps of pioneers, which was organized alike for operations in the field and for siege operations, but these latter have recently been so much developed that that system can no longer supply an adequate technical training for them.

The demands made by this department of warfare, on the one hand, and by the duties of pioneering in the field on the other, are so extensive and so essentially different that it seems quite impracticable to train adequately one and the same corps in both branches during two years' service. The chief functions of the field pioneer are bridge-building, fortifying positions, and supporting the infantry in the attack on fortified places. The most important part of the fortress pioneer's duties consists in sapping, and, above all, in mining, in preparing for the storming of permanent works, and in supporting the infantry in the actual storm. The army cannot be satisfied with a superficial training for such service; it demands a most thorough going previous preparation.

Starting from this point of view, General v. Beseler, the late Inspector-General of Fortresses and Pioneers, who has done inestimable service to his country, laid the foundations of a new organization. This follows the idea of the field pioneers and the fortress pioneers—a rudimentary training in common, followed by separate special training for their special duties. We must continue on these lines, and develop more particularly the fortress pioneer branch of the service in better proportion to its value.

In connection with the requirements already discussed, which are directly concerned with securing and maintaining an increase of tactical efficiency, we must finally mention two organizations which indirectly serve the same purpose. These diminish the tactical efficiency of the enemy, and so increase our own; while, by reconnoitring and by screening movements, they help the attack and make it possible to take the enemy unawares—an important condition of successful offensive warfare. I refer to the cavalry and the air-fleet.

The cavalry's duties are twofold. On the one hand, they must carry out reconnaissances and screening movements, on the other hand they must operate against the enemy's communications, continually interrupt the regular renewal of his supplies, and thus cripple his mobility.

Every military expert will admit that our cavalry, in proportion to the war-footing of the army, and in view of the responsible duties assigned them in war, is lamentably weak. This disproportion is clearly seen if we look at the probable wastage on the march and in action, and realize that it is virtually impossible to replace these losses adequately, and that formations of cavalry reserves can only possess a very limited efficiency. Popular opinion considers cavalry more or less superfluous, because in our last wars they certainly achieved comparatively little from the tactical point of view, and because they cost a great deal. There is a general tendency to judge cavalry by the standard of 1866 and 1870-71. It cannot be emphasized too strongly that this standard is misleading. On the one hand, the equipment was then so defective that it crippled the powers of the mounted man in the most important points; on the other hand, the employment of the cavalry was conducted on a wholly antiquated system. It was, consequently, not armed for independent movements. What they then did must not be compared with what will be required from them in the future. In wars in which mounted forces were really effective, and not hampered in their movements by preconceived notions (as in the American War of Secession and the Boer War), their employment has been continuously extended, since the great value of their operative mobility was convincingly shown, especially in Africa, notwithstanding all modern weapons. These are the wars which must be studied in order to form a fair opinion. They will convince us that an increase of our cavalry is absolutely imperative. It will, of course, only be valuable when the divisions of the army cavalry are equipped with columns and trains in such a way that they can operate independently. The effectiveness of the cavalry depends entirely on the fulfilment of this condition. It is also imperatively necessary, when the measures of our opponents are considered, to strengthen the fighting force of the cavalry by an adequate addition of cyclist sections. This is the more requisite, as, on the one hand, the attack on the enemy's communications must expect vigorous opposition, and, on the other hand, the screening duties, which are even more important for the offensive than the reconnaissances, are likely to be specially successful if cavalry and cyclists combine. Again, an increased strength of cavalry is undeniably required to meet the reconnoitring and screening troops of the enemy.

Besides the strengthening of this arm and the addition of cyclists, another organization is required if the cavalry are to do useful service. Brigades of two regiments and divisions of six regiments are in war-time, where all depends on decisive action, far too small, as I have repeatedly demonstrated without being refuted.

The brigades must in war be three regiments strong. The strength of the divisions and corps may vary according to the requirements of the time being. Just because our cavalry is so weak, the organization must be in a high degree elastic. There can, besides, be no doubt on the point that the side which commands the services of the stronger cavalry, led on modern lines, will have at the outset quite inestimable advantage over the enemy, which must make itself felt in the ultimate issue.

I might remark incidentally that the mounted batteries which are attached to the army cavalry must be formed with four guns each, so that the division with its three parts would have the control of three batteries, and, if necessary, a battery could be assigned to each brigade. That is an old suggestion which the Emperor William I. once made, but it has never yet been considered. It is not with cavalry usually a question of protracted artillery engagements, but of utilizing momentary opportunities; the greatest mobility is required together with the most many-sided efficiency and adaptability. There can obviously, therefore, be no question of a systematic combination with the artillery. Such a thing can only be of value in the case of cavalry when it is important to make a decisive attack.

The reconnaissance and screening duties of the cavalry must be completed by the air-fleet. Here we are dealing with something which does not yet exist, but we can foresee clearly the great part which this branch of military science will play in future wars.[A] It is therefore necessary to point out in good time those aspects of it which are of special weight in a military sense, and therefore deserve peculiar consideration from the technical side.

[Footnote A: The efficiency and success of the Italian aviators in Tripoli are noteworthy, but must not be overvalued. There were no opponents in the air.]

The first requirement is that airships, in addition to simplicity of handling and independence of weather, should possess a superior fighting strength, for it is impossible effectively to screen the movements of the army and to open the road for reconnaissances without attacking successfully the hostile flying-machines and air cruisers.

The power to fight and destroy the hostile airships must be the leading idea in all constructions, and the tactics to be pursued must be at once thought out in order that the airships may be built accordingly, since tactics will be essentially dependent on the construction and the technical effectiveness. These reciprocal relations must be borne in mind from the first, so as to gain a distinct advantage over our opponents.

If the preceding remarks are epitomized, we have, apart from the necessity of enforcing universal service, quite a long list of proposed changes in organization, the adoption of which will considerably improve the efficiency of our army.

The whole organization must be such that the column length of the army corps does not exceed the size which allows a rapid advance, though the supplies are exclusively drawn from magazine depots.

In case of the larger formations, and especially of the army corps as being the tactical and operative unit, the principle of tripartition must be observed.

The infantry must be, in proportion to the artillery, substantially strengthened.

The artillery must be organized in such a way that it is possible to concentrate the fire of the howitzers where required without breaking up the units.

The cavalry must be increased, strengthened by cyclist sections, and so organized as to insure their efficiency in war.

The formation of reinforcements, especially for supplies, must be so elaborated that, on a rapid advance, an efficient system of feeding the troops entirely from magazine depots can be maintained.

The air-fleet must be energetically developed with the object of making it a better fighting machine than that of the enemy.

Finally, and this is the most important thing, we must strain every nerve to render our infantry tactically the best in the world, and to take care that none but thoroughly efficient formations are employed in the decisive field war.

The fulfilment of all these requirements on the basis of our present organization offers naturally great difficulties and can hardly be carried out. It is impossible to imagine a German Reichstag which, without the most extreme pressure of circumstances, could resolve to make for the army the sacrifices called for by our political condition. The temptation to shut the eyes to existing dangers and to limit political aims in order to repudiate the need of great sacrifices is so strong that men are sure to succumb to it, especially at a period when all political wisdom seems summed up in the maintenance of peace. They comfort themselves with the hope that the worst will not happen, although history shows that the misery produced by weakness has often surpassed all expectations.

But even if the nation can hardly be expected to understand what is necessary, yet the War Department must be asked to do their utmost to achieve what is possible, and not to stop short out of deference to public opinion. When the future of a great and noble nation is at stake there is no room for cowardice or inaction. Nothing must be done, as unhappily has too often been the case, which runs counter to the principles of a sound military organization.

The threefold division of the larger formations could be effected in various ways. Very divergent ideas may be entertained on this subject, and the difficulties of carrying out the scheme need extensive consideration. I will make a few proposals just by way of illustration.

One way would be to split up the army corps into three divisions of three infantry regiments each, and to abolish the superfluous intermediate system of brigades. Another proposal would be to form in every corps one of the present divisions of three brigades, so that the extra brigade combined with the light field howitzers and the JÄger battalion would constitute in event of war a separate detachment in the hands of the commanding General. This last arrangement could be carried out comparatively easily under our present system, but entails the drawback that the system of twofold division is still in force within the brigades and divisions. The most sweeping reform, that of dividing the corps into three divisions, would have the advantage of being thorough and would allow the separate groups to be employed in many more ways.

The relations between the infantry and the artillery can naturally only be improved gradually by the strengthening of the infantry through the enforcement of universal service. The assignment of a fifth brigade to each army corps would produce better conditions than exist at present. But so soon as the strengthening of the infantry has gone so far that new army corps must be created, the artillery required for them can be taken from existing formations, and these can be diminished by this means. It will conduce to the general efficiency of the army if the artillery destined for each army corps is to some degree limited, without, however, reducing their total. Care must be taken that only the quantity of ammunition necessary for the first stages of the battle should be habitually carried by the columns of the troops engaged. All that exceeds this must be kept in the rear behind the commissariat waggons, and brought forward only on necessity—that is to say, when a battle is in prospect. The certainty of being able to feed the troops and thus maintain the rapidity of the advance is far more important than the more or less theoretical advantage of having a large quantity of ammunition close at hand during the advance. The soldiers will be inclined to be sparing of ammunition in the critical stages of the fight, and will not be disposed to engage with an unseen enemy, who can only be attacked by scattered fire; the full fire strength will be reserved for the deciding moments of the engagement. Then, however, the required ammunition will be on the spot, in any event, if it is brought forward by stages in good time.

A suitable organization of the artillery would insure that each division had an equal number of batteries at its disposal. The light field howitzers, however, must be attached to a division in such a way that they may form an artillery corps, without necessarily breaking up the formations of the division. The strength of the artillery must be regulated according to that of the infantry, in such a way that the entire marching depth does not exceed some 25 kilometres. The heavy field howitzers, on the other hand, must in peace be placed under the orders of the General commanding, and in event of war be combined as "army" artillery.

It would, perhaps, be advisable if the cavalry were completely detached from the corps formation, since the main body is absolutely independent in war as "army" cavalry. The regiments necessary for service with the infantry could be called out in turn during peace-time for manoeuvres with mixed arms, in order to be trained in the work of divisional cavalry, for which purpose garrison training can also be utilized. On the other hand, it is, I know, often alleged that the TruppenfÜhrer are better trained and learn much if the cavalry are under their orders; but this objection does not seem very pertinent.

Another way to adapt the organization better to the efficiency of the arm than at present would be that the four cavalry regiments belonging to each army corps should be combined into a brigade and placed under the commanding General. In event of mobilization, one regiment would be withdrawn for the two divisions, while the brigade, now three regiments strong, would pass over to the "army" cavalry. The regiment intended for divisional cavalry would, on mobilization, form itself into six squadrons and place three of them at the service of each division. If the army corps was formed into three divisions, each division would only be able to receive two squadrons.

In this way, of course, a very weak and inferior divisional cavalry would be formed; the service in the field would suffer heavily under it; but since it is still more important to have at hand a sufficient army cavalry than a divisional cavalry, quite competent for their difficult task, there is, for the time being, no course left than to raise the one to its indispensable strength at the cost of the other. The blame for such a makeshift, which seriously injures the army, falls upon those who did not advocate an increase of the cavalry at the proper moment. The whole discussion shows how absolutely necessary such an increase is. If it were effected, it would naturally react upon the organization of the arm. This would have to be adapted to the new conditions. There are various ways in which a sound and suitable development of the cavalry can be guaranteed.

The absolutely necessary cyclist sections must in any case be attached to the cavalry in peace, in order that the two arms may be drilled in co-operation, and that the cavalry commander may learn to make appropriate use of this important arm. Since the cyclists are restricted to fairly good roads, the co-operation presents difficulties which require to be surmounted.

The views which I have here tried to sketch as aspects of the organization of the army can be combated from several standpoints. In military questions, particularly, different estimates of the individual factors lead to very different results. I believe, however, that my opinions result with a certain logical necessity from the whole aspect of affairs. It is most essential, in preparing for war, to keep the main leading idea fixed and firm, and not to allow it to be shaken by question of detail. Each special requirement must be regarded as part of that general combination of things which only really comes into view in actual warfare. The special standpoint of a particular arm must be rejected as unjustified, and the departmental spirit must be silenced. Care must be taken not to overestimate the technical and material means of power in spite of their undoubted importance, and to take sufficient account of the spiritual and moral factors. Our age, which has made such progress in the conquest of nature, is inclined to attach too much importance to this dominion over natural forces; but in the last resort, the forces that give victory are in the men and not in the means which they employ.

A profound knowledge of generalship and a self-reliant personality are essential to enable the war preparations to be suitably carried out; under the shifting influence of different aims and ideas the "organizer of victory" will often feel doubtful whether he ought to decide this way or that. The only satisfactory solution of such doubts is to deduce from a view of warfare in its entirety and its varied phases and demands the importance of the separate co-operating factors.

"For he who grasps the problem as a whole
Has calmed the storm that rages in his soul"