PATROLS—TRANSMISSION OF REPORTS—CYCLISTS

I have already, in a former section, insisted on the fundamental proposition that reconnaissance and security are two diametrically opposite conceptions, and cannot on a large scale be confided to one and the same body of troops. This conflict of purpose becomes most evident when we come to the service of patrols in the field.

Reconnoitring patrols regulate their movements on those of the enemy. They must keep touch with and follow him, quite irrespective of the movement of their own side, often being compelled to creep after him—i.e., to utilize intersected ground in order to avoid the necessity of fighting.

Security patrols, on the other hand, flanking detachments, piquets, vedettes, and the like, have to choose their position with reference to the force it is their purpose to cover, and with which they must remain in communication. It is their duty to attack and beat off the enemy's patrols, as far as their strength will allow them, to prevent these latter gaining an insight into the conditions of the marching or resting troops whose safety they are intended to secure.

If they were to attempt to follow up their enemy to find out his position—i.e., to reconnoitre—they would lose their connection with their own troops, and endanger the security of the latter by relinquishing the special object they are set apart to provide for.

Hence it is absolutely necessary that the two systems should be kept separate one from the other, and that each patrol should know clearly and distinctly for which of the two purposes it is specifically intended. Only then can the troops in rear rely on being kept thoroughly informed, and at the same time secure from the possible attempts of the enemy.

The more clear and precise the mission, the more can the patrols be relied on to execute it; but this, of course, does not exclude the necessity for them to keep their eyes open for other things, and to report all they may notice.

Such a systematic arrangement brings other advantages in its train. It effects a marked economy of one's available forces, for being certain that every mission will be settled by a special party detailed for that purpose, it ceases to be necessary to keep on despatching fresh patrols again and again in the same direction, a practice most detrimental to the troops, which is constantly followed in peace-time; and it can never happen that a body is surprised by the enemy because its scouts are absent reconnoitring, or that it fails to receive information because its patrols are busy with security. If, therefore, all patrols thus naturally fall into one of these two groups—reconnoitring and security patrols—there is still another line of distinction to be observed between these patrols themselves, arising from the nature of the tasks which the circumstances impose upon them.

It is impossible to lay down any distinct rules in this matter—for War will always present new and changing problems—but broadly two points of view must be kept in sight, which require fundamentally different treatment, and are conditioned by our distance from the enemy.

If the opposing forces are still engaged in preliminary approaches one to the other, and separated by wide stretches of country, the procedure will be altogether distinct from that to be adopted when the outposts mutually confront one another.

Between the two extremes there are innumerable intermediate degrees, to which one's conduct must be adapted without losing sight of the guiding points involved.

Let us take first the period of approach, and consider the reconnoitring problem from this aspect, taking into consideration the broad requirements of modern War.

It will be apparent at once that there is here a double purpose to be fulfilled—viz., to ascertain the whereabouts and direction of movement of the elements of the enemy's main fighting force, the primary object of all reconnaissance; and, secondly, to find the enemy's preceding Cavalry screen, whose purpose it is, on the one hand, to prevent our object, and, on the other hand, to conceal their own main body. This cavalry we shall have to defeat, but we cannot afford to await this event, but must initiate our own reconnaissance before the decision, and endeavour to carry this through, even if the latter prove unfavourable to us.

Hence it follows that our patrols must be systematically divided from the first into strategical and tactical patrols, according as to whether they are intended to find the enemy's main army or to beat his Cavalry. The former must not allow themselves to be held up by the enemy's Cavalry, but must endeavour to ride through the opposing screen—straight for the heads of the enemy's marching columns. They must, therefore, avoid all fighting, and act by cunning and stealth, and hence their conduct should be entrusted always to officers. They will be directed against the probable lines of the enemy's approach, as determined by the general strategic situation, and will further be given all possible information as to the known whereabouts of the enemy, together with the intentions of their own Superior Command, in order that they may be in a position to distinguish between important and unimportant details, and adapt their action accordingly.

That the position of heads of columns in time and place, their depths, the flanks of the enemy's positions, extent of his outposts, districts in which troops are quartered, the appearance of new uniforms, indicating the presence of regiments believed to be elsewhere, etc., should all be carefully determined, forms part of their normal instructions; but, in spite of that, it is very desirable to direct their attention very particularly to all such points as are at the moment of preponderating consequence. They must also be kept well informed as to the mission of their neighbouring patrols, so that under all circumstances the systematic subdivision of their several tasks can be maintained intact.

For these patrols one must choose the best mounted officers and men and horses, since long distances must be covered under difficult circumstances, and it would be well to allot to each a competent non-commissioned officer, who can carry through the task if his Commander is killed or taken prisoner. If possible, they should also be supplied with a concentrated horse-ration, so as to be as far as possible independent of the resources of the country. (See Part II., Section I.)

As to the strength of these patrols, it will be necessary to keep within very narrow limits, because if they are large it is difficult for them to escape observation; on the other hand, a certain degree of strength is necessary, because one cannot, of course, count on being able to send back one's information by single messengers. Since it is a prime condition of the problem that a district thoroughly commanded by the enemy must be ridden through, the safe return of a single messenger can never be guaranteed; hence the Commander will either be obliged to send his reports in duplicate or triplicate, or in the last resort fight his way through with them himself. Hence it will be advisable to compose each party of two or three patrols, each of three men, assigning a smart lance-corporal to each.

One officer, one non-commissioned officer, two lance-corporals, and five men must, therefore, be considered as a fairly normal type.

The Commander can then despatch two reports, and the third he must bring in himself, and must well consider how long it will be safe to continue his observation, and what it is of real importance for his superiors to know.

But he must never allow himself to be hurried into the despatch of unimportant information. He must always keep before his mind the essential strategical elements of the whole situation. It seems to me altogether wrong to send off such patrols with general instructions to keep in touch with the enemy, a common manoeuvre practice. Since these latter generally last only a few days, there is not much difficulty in maintaining such a system, particularly when information is sent by single messengers. But in War everything is very different. One would very soon have got through all one's officers and still not be well informed. The patrols must, therefore, be told to return within a certain time limit, and their reliefs, who are to be fully instructed as far as the information available goes, must be despatched before this time limit is expired. Even then we shall soon exhaust the available supply of officers who will have been driven to the limit of their endurance in purely strategic missions, and in the end we shall have to fall back upon Non-commissioned Officers for tactical observation.

This tactical reconnaissance will, in the first place, devote its attention to the enemy's Cavalry. The patrols assigned to these duties will attack the enemy wherever they meet him, to find out what is going on, and as soon as possible establish a moral superiority over them.

But even they cannot remain permanently in touch with the enemy, because they, too, must send in their information by messenger, their strength thus rapidly diminishing, and they, in turn, will require relief.

If permanent observation of a yet distant enemy is necessary, we must turn to other means. It will, then, be as well to send out whole reconnoitring squadrons or troops (F.D.O.,[15] 128) towards the enemy, and through them maintain a permanent tactical observation.

These serve as a patrol reserve and collecting station for information, remaining day and night in touch with the enemy, and, of course, will also require periodical reliefs.

It goes without saying that, in addition to these squadrons, single patrols may be despatched in important directions from the main body of the Cavalry, whose duty it will be to report to the latter direct.

These, again, must send off their reports by several men, whilst those despatched from the patrols sent out by the reconnoitring squadrons will often, owing to the shorter distance and the nearness of the support, be able to avail themselves of the despatch riders. In general, it cannot be insisted upon too much that the despatch rider, so very popular in peace, can only be very occasionally employed in War in the interval before the enemy's Cavalry is completely beaten out of the field. In peace a man is always riding in his own country; if he himself has not a map, he has at least been instructed from a map, and every civilian will help him out. Even if he stumbles up against an enemy's patrol they will generally let him pass unnoticed; but it is quite different in War. Here even a patrol leader has rarely got a map. The despatch rider rides across thoroughly unknown districts, coming in contact with a foreign, perhaps hostile, population; he cannot make himself understood, if, indeed, he is not obliged to avoid them. The enemy's patrols are also everywhere, and if anything happens to his horse the message does not arrive. Further, the enormously increased distances to be traversed in modern War have to be taken into account, and these alone render the despatch of single horsemen a very doubtful undertaking. We must, therefore, recognise that the conveyance of reports by individual despatch riders is only possible under very limited conditions, and within the districts fully controlled by one's own troops, and that even in one's own country reconnoitring patrols sent out to a great distance can only be very occasionally employed.

Here we come upon an increased difficulty in the whole system of intelligence, and yet all reconnaissance is useless unless the return of information works without a hitch. We must, therefore, endeavour to regulate it accordingly.

Above all, the connection between the reconnoitring squadrons and the main body by relays must be very carefully assured, and their strength must be proportionate to the number of the enemy's patrols moving in the district. In these cases a co-operation between Cavalry and cyclists will be of service, whilst within the radius which we completely command the whole rearward intelligence service, so far as it can move upon roads, must be left as much as possible to cyclists.

Fundamentally, no Cavalry soldier should be allowed to ride to the rear without pressing circumstances. This is an absolute necessity if we are to spare our valuable and almost irreplaceable horses. Towards these safe lines of communication all reports must be directed, in order to be forwarded with the utmost rapidity by fresh horses or cyclists.

If these main roads do not run as far as the reconnoitring squadrons, in order to allow of the patrols making use of them without long detours, then further collecting stations, protected by other troops, must be interpolated. (F.D.O., 273.)

Occasionally the Cavalry Telegraph equipment may be of assistance, but we must not expect too much from it in periods of rapid movement, because since its application depends upon a number of favourable circumstances, its value in such changing conditions is more or less illusory.

Results obtained in manoeuvres, in my opinion, convey no correct experience in this matter.

Another point, however, must be specially brought out—namely, the necessity, not only of sending back information through the proper channels, but also of forwarding all important news direct to the principal Commander of the Cavalry or to the Army Headquarters. It is of the utmost importance that the Headquarters in each theatre of the War should receive information about the enemy simultaneously with their subordinates, so that they always remain in the position to dispose of their troops according to their own ideas, and do not find themselves bound by instructions previously issued by their subordinates. It is precisely this evil which made itself felt in 1870-1871. Very often the most important information never reached Headquarters at all, and hence no action could be taken upon it.

The fault lay chiefly in the fact that the subordinates, not being informed as to the connection of events, did not perceive the importance of the information, and therefore did not forward it on, and partly because the telegraph wires were overburdened by the private messages of distinguished persons who had nothing whatever to do with the conduct of operations.

The control of the wires for purely military purposes must, therefore, be maintained with rigid severity, and information to Headquarters or Army Commands must have precedence over all other business.

If collecting stations for information are not available, the question arises, Which groups should be Authorized to report direct to Headquarters? In my opinion this cannot be determined by the strength of the troops concerned, but must always depend on the strategic situation. Generally it may be laid down that the lie of the roads must decide.

Those detachments entrusted with the reconnaissance of a single line of road will report direct any important information gained within their own sphere if no stronger body should be moving along the same line, and this reporting body may, therefore, according to circumstances, be a patrol, a regiment, or a brigade. It is desirable from this point of view that all Cavalry officers down to patrol leaders should be kept so thoroughly informed as to the general situation that they may judge of the importance of the information obtained, and hence know where to send the information they have secured.

As the opposing Cavalries first, then the larger bodies of the Army, approach one another the situation changes. The reconnoitring squadrons clear the front and turn their attention to the enemy's flanks. The advanced squadrons are withdrawn, and the larger Cavalry bodies drawn off towards the wings of the Army, and seek shelter behind the Infantry columns, if they have been defeated in the Cavalry duel, or turn against flank and rear of the enemy's Army if they have been victorious. In front of the Armies reconnaissance now falls to the Divisional Cavalry. Here the strategical and tactical duties coincide. What the conduct of the Independent Cavalry will be must depend on whether it is still held in check by the enemy or not. If the latter have been finally beaten out of the field so that one has a free hand, then the strategic patrols will direct their attention to the enemy's rearward communications, and will seek to determine the approach of his reserves, but tactical reconnaissance will be directed against his flanks.

The principles governing our conduct remain the same, only the reconnoitring and advanced squadrons now act primarily as supports to the strategic patrols. If, however, a decision between the two Cavalries has not been finally arrived at, one will now endeavour to bring it about, and for this purpose unite all available forces, leaving meanwhile the reconnaissance to strong patrols, who in this period of the combat must never avoid those of the enemy, for now our object is to get information quickly, and the time for circumvention and evasion is at an end.

When the first battle has been decided, there follows either pursuit or retreat—operations in which the tactical reconnaissance cannot for one moment be omitted. Then by degrees, as the defeated side succeeds in disembarrassing itself of its pursuers, things revert to normal conditions again. The two Armies are separated by a certain area in depth, and a new series of operations commences, in which, as before, reconnaissance is required.

Matters are somewhat different as regards security. Here also in general a distinction must be drawn between safety obtained by bodies detached in advance and that derived from piquets, etc., immediately at hand. But too much importance cannot be laid upon the principle that, as above pointed out, reconnaissance alone cannot suffice to insure safety; the reconnoitring detachments must rather always be followed by a line of security troops, so that as a general type three lines of patrols result—viz., strategical patrols far in advance, tactical patrols, and security patrols, which latter, when the main body is halted, become the standing outposts.

Coming next to the measures of security necessary for Independent Cavalry when in movement, the tactical reconnoitring patrols, by sending in early information of the enemy, will make a far-spread line of security patrols unnecessary. In general, the ordinary point of the advance guard and flankers will suffice. For the latter the same holds good which has been said in the previous section on the subject of flanking detachments altogether—viz., that they must be worked by sections, and arranged in a proper system of reliefs.

If the necessity arises to screen, as well as to secure—i.e., to hide absolutely our movements from the enemy—then all roads leading towards him and the section of the ground comprised between them must be occupied in such manner that the enemy cannot find intervals at which to break through, and this will be best attained by a system of local patrols, tied to definite beats. These patrols must fight the enemy wherever he appears, and must, therefore, be given sufficient strength and be followed by small supports duly allotted to each section of the whole front.

When the main body is stationary, the conditions are different, because the troops require a certain time to turn out; therefore more precautions are necessary, and the end can be best attained by placing the patrols further to the front. Hence we arrive at a double system of security—the first line formed by outpost squadrons, with officers, non-commissioned officers, and small patrols, to which a certain district to be ridden over will be assigned, and which must maintain a systematic connection by patrols between its separate parts, to insure absolutely the control of the ground around them; and the second, formed of far advanced posts of observation at suitable points—road crossings, defiles, etc.—from whence they can detect at the earliest moment any approach of the enemy. These are indispensable at night, when reconnaissance is always more or less liable to break down, for darkness interferes with sight, and the horses require rest. Their importance also increases naturally with the vicinity of the enemy, and the consequent greater risk of surprise. In the case of the larger bodies, whole squadrons (see F.D.O., No. 272) must be detached for this purpose, and communication with them assured by strong relay lines. These strong advanced detachments can, under favourable circumstances, get shelter in villages, so that the horses at least obtain better rest and care for a few hours, and the same applies naturally to the reconnoitring squadrons. In all such instances the guiding idea must be to evacuate the village the moment the enemy appears, and evade collision with him. How this is to be managed has been already explained (Book I., Chap. VI.). Accurate knowledge of where all the roads lead to, the barricading of those running towards the enemy's position, and extreme alertness on the part of the patrols, are in such cases all-important.

Above all, the Commander must be confident in the steadiness and coolness of his men.

As to the immediate security of the Army itself, this depends in the first place on the Divisional Cavalry, but during the advance the Independent Cavalry on the front and flanks guarantees this security so thoroughly that the former can confine themselves to the most elementary precautions, which must include primarily the maintenance of connection with the latter for this purpose. Then they will not only have to provide for security in the most thorough manner, but will also have to reconnoitre, and for this purpose follow the same rules which we have laid down for the Independent Cavalry. If the enemy's horse prove overpowering, then they will use their power of defence to the utmost, and seek to increase it by cyclists belonging to the Infantry, Maxims, and Artillery, in order to beat off the enemy with loss, and to clear the path for the reconnoitring patrols.

Speaking generally, the system I propose is in harmony with the spirit, if not with the letter, of our Field Service Regulations, in which the systematic distinction between reconnoitring and security, as also between strategic and tactical patrols, is, in my opinion, not sufficiently defined. The essential point which necessitates this distinction has not been grasped with sufficient precision. If we are to follow literally the wording of the Field Service Regulations, and not the spirit which pervades it, which disregards all stereotyped formations and keeps always the practical in view, then it would be impossible to carry out screening operations on the scale which the conditions of modern War will render indispensable. Sufficient stress has not been laid on the necessary systematizing of the whole procedure. Finally, too, much weight has been laid upon the employment of the despatch rider (Meldereiter), although the experience of 1870-1871 has sufficiently shown that this system was unreliable. I recall as an instance the pursuit of Vinoy's Corps (after Sedan), in which case the most important report was entrusted to a despatch rider, who only reached his destination twenty-four hours after he was despatched, and by that time it was too late to take any action on the information he conveyed.

The Field Service Regulations should also contain detailed instructions as to the employment of cyclists with the Cavalry, for the rapid development of this mode of locomotion has rendered this absolutely indispensable. But the point must be brought out that the use of a cyclist is always only conditional, as it depends on the weather, the roads, and the country. On heavy, steep, and stony roads, on which the tyres are only too apt to be punctured, the cyclists are obliged to dismount; against a head wind they can only make progress with difficulty. Nevertheless, there can be no doubt that for the transmission of reports from the advanced lines, as well as for communication between separated bodies of troops within the district controlled by our Cavalry, they are of inestimable service. Granted that in particularly unfavourable weather and bad roads they must be supplemented by Cavalry, they, nevertheless, on the whole, make it possible to expedite materially the delivery of despatches. This is of all the greater importance because in case of War the German Armies will be relatively weak in Cavalry, and under certain circumstances they will have to fight against a great numerical superiority.

Even though the principal use of the cyclists lies in the transmission of information in which they can help the Divisional Cavalry most materially, nevertheless one must not base too sanguine hopes on their activity.

The reason is that because of their wheels they are tied to the roads, and in consequence they can neither reconnoitre nor provide for security independently. If for these purposes Cavalry patrols are attached to them, the chief advantage of their greater mobility is sacrificed, but without such supports in difficult country they are tolerably helpless against surprise attacks. If one further takes into account that a hill takes off from their speed to such a degree that a horseman can easily catch them up, one must admit that they afford no sufficient guarantee for the fulfilment of independent missions outside of the country which our own Cavalry commands. In such districts they can only be employed on relays, as already pointed out. Here the duty of providing safety can best be fulfilled by the Cavalry, because it is not a question of rapid advance, but only of the protection of stationary posts and certain defined road stretches. But for the defence of these posts, and for the transmission of intelligence, the cyclists will do even better service than the horsemen, because they can cover the ground faster, and when fighting are not hampered by their horses. Their employment here is all the more desirable because the relay service makes enormous demands upon the Cavalry. That was proved up to the hilt in the War of 1870-1871; the complaints under this head repeat themselves over and over again, as the records of the Campaign abundantly testify.

Besides, on these relay duties the cyclists can be tactically employed in the district which our Cavalry by its patrols commands, for the rapid occupation of far-advanced posts which neither Cavalry nor Infantry can reach with sufficient celerity and in adequate force; for the defence of defiles lying to our rear, which must be kept open to secure the retreat of the Cavalry; for the support of Independent Cavalry on outpost duty, particularly at night; and for other similar purposes. To satisfy all these conditions, these cyclist detachments require a sufficient tactical training, but in times of peace one sees in this respect feats performed whose impracticability in War are glaringly apparent. For instance, men keep their cycles with them right up in the firing line, and when they want to retreat or break off the fight they try to mount under fire. As they are generally tied to the roads, they then file off to the flanks. I have, indeed, often seen Cyclist detachments lay down their cycles in the front of the position, and then advance to mount them again in the teeth of the enemy's fire. All these kind of things are absurd. The cycles must be treated like the led horses of the Cavalry—that is to say, the men must dismount under cover, then move up to the firing line, and then move back to cover in order to mount again. The position must, moreover, be so chosen as to enable them to move off without exposing themselves. All these points, which in practice are rendered difficult, diminish very materially the usefulness of cyclists, and take away from them, above all, their power of offence; and in all missions entrusted to them these limitations must be carefully kept in mind.[Back to Contents]