THE HIGHER EDUCATION OF OUR OFFICERS

The consideration we have devoted in the foregoing chapters to the various fields for Cavalry action opened out by the changed conditions of modern War have shown us what tremendous demands will be made upon the leader of a great Cavalry 'Mass' in the future. He must be an absolute master of the technical side of his own Arm. He must be ready to enter into the spirit of the widest strategical considerations of the Superior Command, and according to circumstances to act in harmony with them on his own initiative. He must know the spirit, the methods of fighting, and the peculiarities of the other Arms, so as to be able to intervene at the right time and place in the action. He must with swift determination combine boldness with circumspection; and in addition, he must not only be a bold horseman, but must possess inexhaustible activity of mind and body.

If these are the demands modern War will make upon the higher leaders of the Arm, those which fall on the lower ranks have been intensified in similar fashion; for, quite apart from their bodily and mental qualifications, they will need, for the solution of the various problems with which they will be confronted, an immensely increased amount of military knowledge and executive ability.

The amount of initiative which will be required in simple Cavalry engagements between the larger groups, and in strategic operations of the Arm, from subordinate leaders has been already discussed above, and it will be clear that only a thorough comprehension of the whole situation will enable the individual to act opportunely when such moments may arrive. It is not merely a general military education which will be required, but greatly increased endurance, boldness, and, above all, a wider understanding for the whole connection of the great operations, and the power of judging a military situation with accuracy, which must prevail through all ranks, down to the leader of an independent patrol. The whole method of observation and the results deduced therefrom will assume quite a different form when managed by Officers who have learnt to understand and to judge operations on a large scale. Without such training only isolated facts will be reported—deductions will not be drawn. There will be no discrimination between important and unimportant details, and the Officer himself will not be able to come to a correct decision as to the direction in which to pursue his mission. But this is exactly what it is most important that all Officers should be relied on to perform. They must understand how, from a given mass of observations, to deduce the strength, bearing, and condition of the enemy in general, to divine the probable connection of his operations, and hence to determine the most important points and directions in which to follow up any available clue.

If an Officer comes upon an outpost or an occupied position, he should be able from the indications on the spot and from his map to determine where the flanks are likely to rest, and hence on what point to direct his further advance.

If he happens on troops at rest or on the march, he must be able to decide whether it is more important to follow or watch their subsequent movements, or to carry out his reconnaissance in some other direction. He must, in fact, judge what it is of the greatest importance for the superior staff to know when his instructions in face of altered circumstances leave him in momentary uncertainty.

Such illustrations could be extended indefinitely, but the sum of all points to the same conclusion—viz., that a comprehensive military education, and at least a general grasp of the principles of the Higher Strategy, are essential for every reconnoitring Officer. The history of previous campaigns points the same moral by innumerable examples, and how much more frequent must such incidents be in the future.

Let us take the case of the Battle of Gravelotte only—the point was to determine whether the French were still clinging to the fortress or were marching away from it. Not one of the patrols, however, whose doings can still be traced, or whose reports are still in existence, seems to have possessed the comprehension of the situation which would have enabled it to report on what it was of the utmost importance for the Army Headquarters to know. None of them even noted the direction in which the troops they saw were moving—a matter of most vital importance—or estimated the strength of the several encampments, or reported the fact that certain roads were clear, although they were all moving in the immediate vicinity, and might easily have ascertained these facts had they realized their importance. Thus, because they were uncorroborated, the most important observations led to false conclusions. The point of transcendent consequence—the actual position of the French right flank—could not be determined until hours after the battle had been begun under an entire misapprehension of the actual circumstances. Similar experiences have repeated themselves times without number.

When we now reflect upon the greatly increased importance of reliable information in Modern War, we cannot escape the conclusion that a proper training of our Cavalry Officers to meet their requirements is of vital importance. Their present-day education does not sufficiently guarantee their competence.

The knowledge of the military sciences acquired at the War schools is on a very modest scale, nor is it, indeed, the business of these schools to give higher education in such subjects. Hence it is all the more deplorable that the higher intellectual training of our Cavalry Officers practically ceases after the War School, because the practical day-to-day duties of their profession furnishes them with nothing which can replace the need for a higher theoretical training. Generally, their attention is absorbed by the smallest of details, which, though each is of immense importance to the efficiency of the whole Arm, are not calculated to widen their intellectual horizon, and in the few great manoeuvres in which an Officer might find an opportunity of enlarging his knowledge, he finds himself lacking in the foundation necessary to make full use of it.

The usual course of instruction, in fact, is not adapted to the needs of the Cavalry Officer, who already in early youth may find himself in situations requiring adequate strategical knowledge for their solution; hence there is urgent need for the supreme military authorities to concern themselves at once both with his theoretical and practical education.

The latter could best be provided for in connection with the development of the Field-Service training of the Troops already dealt with above. The former—i.e., the scientific side—could be most adequately met by the creation of a 'Cavalry School' on the lines of the special Artillery and Engineer Schools which already provide for the further education of the Officers of these Arms after they have spent a couple of years or more in responsible command of men in their own units.

If on the broader foundations of the military sciences—principally those relating to the conduct of operations, to Strategy and Tactics—thus supplied, the Regimental Commanders were to build up by practical instruction, as above indicated, and the whole spirit of the training were modified in conformity with the views therein already expressed, then I consider that, with the admirable material amongst our Officers which already exists, and which for the most part needs only opportunity to prove its value, most important results might be achieved.

Such a school would be most fittingly affiliated to the existing School of Equitation in Hanover. The bright, attractive side of Cavalry life, as we there find it, would be a useful counterpoise to the risk of too much theory, and the district lends itself admirably to practical exercises in reconnaissances and endurance rides. So long as this most desirable reform remains only an ideal, we must strive to do the utmost we can within the limits of our existing educational system, for the need is urgent, and admits of no delay.

We must devote increased attention to this portion of our officers' training from the very commencement of their career, and see that they are so far initiated into the nature both of tactical and strategical relations that they may be able, on the one hand, to reconnoitre an enemy in the spirit of the intentions of the Supreme Command; on the other, that they are capable of commanding their units in any given strategical situation.

All means must be strained towards the attainment of this purpose.

One of the first stepping-stones in our progress must be the actual horsemanship of the Officer himself. A man who under every circumstance feels himself firm in the saddle does not need to exert force to fight with or restrain his horse, and having learnt both how to think and command at a gallop, will lead Cavalry and reconnoitre before the enemy with far greater certainty and much better results than one to whom these things are hardly second nature.

Bold and determined horsemanship acts and reacts on all a man's other soldierly characteristics, and forms thus a basis for further progress of the highest order, apart from the fact that it impresses the men most favourably, and induces them to follow with greater confidence.

Hence, even from the standpoint of the higher education, the standard of horsemanship can never be raised too high. Given this, and the remainder can be acquired in the practical day-to-day work of the unit, in the training of the men themselves, and in the exercises in Field-Service duties, in manoeuvres and Cavalry exercises, always provided that these are all conducted in conformity with the spirit of modern operations. But since we have seen this practical duty, as at present carried on, nowhere meets the above conditions, we must find a supplement to it by recourse to systematic training in Field-Service rides, War Games, and Staff Tours, for which, of course, the necessary funds must be provided.

These exercises must be begun in the regiment, and continued through each successive grade up to the 'Inspection,' the sphere of each being enlarged with the increase in the importance of the Command.

But they will only then possess value and importance when based on connected military situations arising from the operations of modern Armies, and afford opportunities to the participants for the solution of problems far above their existing rank, for thus only can their mental horizon be extended. Within the radius of action of his own Command each Officer is already in daily contact with all that it is necessary for him to understand, and in minor tactical situations he has abundant opportunities for training his faculties. It seems to me, therefore, mere waste of time to give him further employment with these matters, and the attempt could only end in depriving them of all interest. On the other hand, the Regimental Officer is seldom if ever placed in positions which would enable him to form any adequate conception of the execution and connection of the greater operations, to realize the importance of the action of the unit within the framework of the whole, or to notice how faults in details, apparently trivial in themselves, can mount up in the mass until they may jeopardize the success of any given undertaking.

The higher the intellectual pinnacle on which he is placed, the wider becomes his horizon, and consequently his appreciation of the relative importance of each individual link in the chain.[Back to Contents]