THE TRAINING FOR MOUNTED COMBAT

In the same manner as, in the previous chapter, I have endeavoured to show that in many points in equitation, in the school of individual combat, and in the 'training' both of man and horse, we can, by alterations of method, attain more directly to a possibly higher standard in our performances than is at present achieved, I now propose to consider the tactical education of the troops as a whole, with a view to their best utilization in mounted engagements.

According to the existing Regulations, the chief importance is still laid on the efficiency of the small and medium-sized combinations. Squadrons, Regiments, and Brigades are prepared with the utmost care and attention, but exercises of the larger bodies only take place more or less exceptionally, and on a very restricted scale. The systematic education of the Cavalry does not, in fact, extend beyond the Brigade.

That this state of affairs no longer responds to the changed nature of Warfare follows from all that I have already said, and does not require to be insisted on.

If in War the employment of 'Masses' has become the decisive element, our system of training must be correspondingly extended, so as to insure the existence of the skill and power needed for their successful application. To this end all, even the most elementary, exercises must be permeated thoroughly by the idea of preparing the troops for united action in adequate numbers; and the relative importance of the several periods of training, the allotment of time to each step in the progression, as well as the exercises themselves, must all be dominated by the same idea.

The foundation of all sound tactical training will remain now, as ever, the school of the squadron. The cohesion of this unit and the ease with which it can be moved is the first condition of its useful employment at the right time and place, and the importance of thoroughness in this branch of training grows with every increment in the total number to be handled. Even more attention, therefore, should be given to squadron drill in the future than in the past.

Next comes the question of regimental drill. Here, as we shall presently see, the chief point is to develop the independence of the Squadron Commander and the tactical handiness of his unit; and as I understand the problem, this calls for a more extended framework, within which the regiment must be prepared, than was formerly the case.

If, even under present conditions, it is scarcely possible in the few days allowed by the Field Service Regulations to train the squadrons up to the requirements of active service, even on a level drill ground, it is obvious that in the future this difficulty will become intensified. It is a question, therefore, to be considered, whether it would not be better to remove these time limitations altogether, and leave it to the Cavalry Commanders themselves to determine everywhere, with regard to local conditions, how to make the best use of the total time available. Where considerable expense would be incurred in bringing in squadrons detached at a distance, the consent of the War Ministry would, of course, have to be obtained.

Brigade drill, however, stands on quite a different footing; it forms, as it were, the preparatory school for the movement of 'Masses,' in which the principle of the employment of the constituent parts of the 'Mass,' whether in 'Lines' or by 'Wings,' has to be inculcated. But as one has now to deal with tactically thoroughly trained bodies, less time is required than for either squadron or regimental drill.

On the other hand, it is most essential that the 'Mass' itself, consisting as it does of several Brigades, should be thoroughly drilled as a Division or Corps, for it is with these units, and not with Brigades, that one has to deal in War, and their duties are so many-sided, and require for their due performance such thoroughly-trained Commanders, that perfection is not to be attained in a few days, which are not even available every year. On this point, in my opinion, there is no room for doubt, and hence it becomes absolutely essential that, if necessary, Brigade drill must be curtailed in order to give to all Brigades an annual opportunity of exercising, as part of the higher units.

It might well be possible to allow a wider latitude to the Brigade Commanders in regard to the choice of time for their special exercises, in which they might be guided by the special circumstances of the locality in which they are quartered, and by the advice of their superiors.

For the exercise of the greater 'Masses,' for which, under all circumstances, troops have to be brought together from considerable distances, a particular period must, of necessity, be fixed by regulations; but it must be borne in mind that these 'Masses' should not always be formed of equal strength in Divisions of three Brigades, for the danger to the higher education which lies in always working with units of similar composition has already been sufficiently dwelt on. The conditions of War absolutely demand that the higher Cavalry Leaders should be equally at home in handling 'Masses' with certainty and precision, no matter what their composition, and the troops themselves must learn to apply the principles on which efficiency in action really depends under all and every circumstance.

As regards the manner in which the several periods into which the training is divided should follow one another, the question arises whether the squadron, regimental, and brigade drill periods should follow one another as a continuous whole, or whether they should go hand in hand with Field Service Exercises.

This seems to me to need a specific reply, because, as a fact, it is differently answered in different Army Corps.

Where the troops have to leave their garrisons in order to be quartered in the vicinity of the ground specially selected for those purposes, the question of expense must play an important part in the decision; but the principle involved can hardly be affected by these exceptional circumstances, for in by far the greater number of cases the troops can find room to drill either within the district of their own garrisons or on the manoeuvre grounds in the vicinity, and in these latter the question of extra cost should hardly stand in the way of an extension of the time allowance. Hence, if such an extension, due to the intercalation of Field Service practices, really does offer advantages, one could decide in principle in favour of this solution, in spite of all other circumstances; but it still seems to me open to discussion whether it is advisable to make the same principle applicable in equal measure to all the time intervals.

For the squadron drill, which begins with an entirely untrained troop, the conditions are obviously quite different to those in the subsequent exercises, in which the point lies in the working together of units already finished and completed in themselves; and taking these differences into account, we must first examine more especially the case of the squadron.

At the beginning of its drill season, the exertions demanded are comparatively slight. The distance covered either at the trot or gallop is only gradually increased, and the paces are at first kept somewhat below the regulation limits—at least, from practical experience I should recommend that they should be, for the Instructor can control and correct the precision of all movements, and the individual conduct both of man and horse, better at the slower paces than when moving fast. Riders and horses accustom themselves gradually, and hence more easily, to movement in closed bodies, and it is of decisive importance for the whole subsequent course of their training that at the very beginning of the drills this harmony between man and horse under the new and unaccustomed conditions should be secured to the utmost possible degree.

If this point of view be kept in mind, then I think the drills should be continued daily, for, on the one hand, there is no risk of overtiring the horses, and, on the other, the object is to weld the men into a cohesive whole, and impress on them the essential principles of the elementary tactical evolutions, in order to make them as soon as possible into a combatant unit.

Towards the latter end of the squadron drills, however, the conditions change. Now, it becomes necessary to drive into the whole body a proper appreciation of the several 'paces,' to fit them for long gallops, and to train them for actual combat. At this period I consider it better to interpolate one or more Field Service days, partly because it is of practical moment to press on this side of their training as quick as possible, and, further, because the drills now begin to make very considerable demands upon the horses. These Field Service days afford an opportunity to rest the horses, and thus to prevent small and inconsiderable injuries developing into severe lameness and ultimate breakdowns. Further, a quiet ride in the country gives those horses which have become nervously excited by the unaccustomed conditions of the drill ground a chance of cooling down, and thus saving themselves very materially; and this must certainly be considered as one of the most important functions of the Commander, whether in Peace or War, to keep his horses fresh on their legs, and ready to turn out in good condition at whatever hour the call may sound. Of course, these precautions must not go so far as to endanger the training for service of the squadron, but drill and manoeuvre results at excessive cost of horseflesh must be absolutely condemned.

If these reasons speak for an intercalation of Field Service exercises between the drill days, I am further of opinion that the result which would be arrived at by this system would give a better standard of the drill efficiency of the unit for War than can be attained by continuous drill alone.

With the latter, it is certainly much easier to secure unity, cohesion, and precision in the movements; but we must remember that in War the emergency calling for drill performances may arise after weeks of marching, during which no drill has been practised at all, and our Peace training must take into account such conditions, and accustom the troops to execute with safety and cohesion such drill movement as may be necessary without having practised them day for day.

In still greater degree do these principles apply both to regimental and brigade drills; since in these the demands on the horses are constantly increasing, the need to give them opportunity for rest and recovery becomes even more pronounced.

Moreover, the purpose of these exercises is not so much to secure a single representation of acquired skill in the exhibition of drill evolutions, but rather to develop and confirm in the men an ever-increasing familiarity with the principles of their tactical employment, and this will only then be attained when, as far as possible, these practices are continued during the whole summer, so that the Grand Manoeuvres either in the Division or in the Corps form the natural conclusion of the whole series. In the period of combined manoeuvres, it is, of course, impossible, in order to save the horses, to lengthen the fixed period allotted to them; but all the more necessary, therefore, does it appear to spare them as much as possible by the introduction of these Field Service days (exclusive of the ordinary 'rest days') during the time of the drill exercises. In the course of the subsequent considerations, we shall see that not only will our horses gain thereby, but many other important objects of our training be served as well.

Turning now to the subject of these exercises themselves, it must be laid down generally that throughout a steady intensification of the exertions demanded must be maintained, and that the gallop is not to be employed except when, under service conditions, its use would be practicable. Further, whatever the Regulations prescribe must be practised, no matter what the views of the Commanding Officer as to their practicability or otherwise may be. This is absolutely essential to secure a uniform standard of execution throughout the Arm.

Nevertheless, it makes a very essential difference in what spirit the Regulations are approached, for the result will depend upon which points in the training the chief stress is laid, and generally on the character given to the exercises.

In drilling the squadron this point is of less importance. Here, in accordance with the spirit of the whole Arm, it is a matter of formal drill, and nothing more. It is here that the foundation has to be laid for smart, never-failing 'drill,' for the unconditional cohesion of the squadron in itself, and for the certain interpretation of its Leader's views, whether the latter makes use of commands, signals, or merely rides in the required direction.

Here the paces must be hammered into the troops till they become mechanical habit, and the several forms of movement and attack be practised, so that they can be executed in any direction, whether the squadron has been told off or not. No matter how hasty the rally may be, the troop must charge at the moment and without hesitation.

The only difference that can arise here will be due to the individuality of the Leader, and all are good which lead to the required end, only the Regulations are not quite clear as to practising the charge, and the guiding points might be laid down with rather greater precision.

In the charge against Cavalry cohesion is the first and dominating condition. It must be absolutely impossible for the horses to swerve either to right or left. Accurate dressing and the maintenance of the two ranks come only in the second place. Against Infantry or Artillery, on the other hand, the essential is that every horse should have room to gallop in his own form, so that no crowding or jostling arises, thus giving the horses a chance of avoiding or jumping clear over falling men or animals. Hence, although on the level drill ground the requirements of Regulations as regards dressing and the maintenance of the two well-defined lines must be attended to, one must remember that it may be impossible to comply with these demands across country and be prepared in such cases to stick to the spirit, not to the letter, of the law.

In both cases it will hardly be of advantage to lay too much stress on dressing and touch. Against Cavalry it is rather a case of jamming the files together by pressure from the flanks, and the men must hold as a vital article of faith that only the closest knee-to-knee riding will guarantee either victory or their personal safety. Against Infantry, on the contrary, the files must be loosened, and every horse go in his normal stride, as in hunting; nor must anyone allow himself to be squeezed out of the ranks to the rear or remain behind as long as the strength of his horse holds out.

Utmost speed consistent with closely-locked files against Cavalry, a natural extended gallop against Infantry or Artillery—these are the two cardinal points to be observed in attacking. Maintenance of dressing or of the ranks become positive evils if the above are sacrificed to either. There, in my opinion, should be the essentials to guide the decision of superior officers in their criticisms.

With these exceptions the lines for the squadron training are so closely drawn that differences in practice can scarcely arise. The matter, however, assumes quite a different aspect with the regiment, and still more with the higher units.

Here it is not only a case of consolidating the cohesion of the troops by the agency of the discipline of the drill ground, or of teaching the forms of movement and of fighting, although, of course, these points of view cannot be entirely disregarded; but the essential is to teach the methods of employment of the forms laid down in the Regulations for the combat.

A regiment which can work through the Drill Book smoothly and with precision is still far from being trained for battle, but at the most has merely laid the foundations on which such a training can be subsequently built up. The same applies to a Brigade or Division, each of which has practised and made certain of the execution of such movements as passages of defiles, deployments, attacks, changes of front or of lines, and so forth. All these things are in themselves necessary and useful, but they make no great demands on the skill of the Leaders, only requiring an accurate knowledge of the book, and a certain degree of routine in the application of its prescriptions; but War makes quite different demands on their ability, and it is for War that we have to be prepared.

First of all, in the purely formal side of the training, stress must especially be laid on those forms of movement which can actually be applied on the battle-field.

Then, the troops must be exercised to apply these forms not only on the drill ground, but over every kind of country. Further, the tactical judgment and independence of the Leaders of all ranks must, be thoroughly developed. They must not only learn to act on fundamentally sound principles, but to apply these principles everywhere where circumstances require rapid decision, utilizing at once the tactical advantages the ground may offer, and adapting practically the few forms which can be employed before the enemy in the field instinctively; and, finally, opportunities must be granted to the Commanders to practise the combination of locally separated bodies to a single tactical purpose.

In face of these requirements, it seems to me that our tactical training remains far too elementary in character, and does not tend with sufficient directness towards what is alone possible in War.

The blame for this state of affairs rests by no means only on the shoulders of the troops, but is due to a variety of complex causes which are difficult to disentangle. In the first place comes the passive resistance, that moment of inertia which custom and tradition everywhere oppose to changes, and it is not to be expected that the troops of their own initiative will be able to abandon the accustomed ruts, when more especially the methods applied in our inspections are not always of a nature to encourage such attempts.

A further cause is to be found in the Regulations themselves. These give no firm foothold for the decision of the question as to what forms and movements really are practicable in War-time, and, probably in the endeavours not to hamper too much the initiative of the Leaders, does not express the principle on which the conduct of the combat is based with sufficient precision to preclude very different opinions as to what these principles really are. Finally, the local conditions of many of our garrisons often create an almost insuperable difficulty for the proper training of the troops over country.

In face of these conditions, we must strike out new paths for our guidance if we do not intend to remain behind the times altogether.

We must first, however, be perfectly clear in our own minds as to which of the Regulation forms are really practicable, and hence require increased attention. Then we must endeavour to formulate the guiding principles for the conduct of an engagement in a manner so clear and definite that they can easily be fixed in the memory, and then work out the best way in which the troops can be thoroughly grounded in their application. Finally, we must acquire a quite distinct grasp of what can be practised over country, and from what points of view such exercises are to be undertaken in order to make them of direct utility in the solution of the problems modern Warfare will set before us.

To clear up the first point it will be best to sketch in its general outline the course in which events succeed one another in an engagement, and then to deduce the forms of movement which are essentially practical.

Taking the case of Cavalry in combination with the other Arms, at the commencement of the action we find the squadrons in 'rendezvous' formation under cover outside the immediate danger sphere, either on the flanks or behind the general line of battle.

When the moment to act arrives, they advance at a rapid pace, either in closed-up column of route or in any other dense formation which permits of ready deployment in the direction of their allotted target. Often in this movement they will have to overcome difficulties of the ground—defiles and the like, of varying breadth.

Arrived in the vicinity of the field of attack, they deploy into lines of squadron columns, form line to the front, and execute the charge.

In such cases it may often become necessary to secure one's own flanks by forming protective Échelons, or to endeavour to surround those of the enemy by corresponding offensive movements.

In the case of Cavalry acting alone, it will often be necessary to form for action directly from column of route, and it will be essential to establish co-operation not only between the advance guard and the main body, but also between columns concentrating from different directions upon the field of coming action.

It is at once evident that for these few manoeuvres few and simple formations and movements will suffice, and that, in view of the excitement of the battle-field, only such are, in fact, applicable.[25] Hence it follows that all complicated movements and changes of lines, and similar formations occurring in the Regulations, may be classed in the category of evolutions intended mainly for disciplinary purposes. On the other hand, we must practise, as thoroughly as practicable, long movements at a rapid pace in the closest formations for manoeuvre—i.e., in double and Regimental Columns; changes of direction in these columns by shouldering, passage of defiles, deployments into fighting formations with simultaneous slight alterations in the line of advance; further, measures to secure one's own flanks, or to threaten those of the enemy; deployments to the front immediately out of column of route or after the passage of defiles; the combination of detachments arriving from different directions; and, finally, the charge itself under the most varied assumptions, the transition from the mÊlÉe to pursuit, and rallying in order to attack again in a new direction against a fresh enemy. Naturally, the most rapid deployments out of any and every formation against a suddenly appearing enemy must also be practised, for such surprises are always possible in War-time.

To be avoided, on the other hand, as for the most part quite impracticable, are all movements of a dilatory nature for the formation of fronts of attack, as well as long movements of manoeuvres and considerable changes of front when already deployed into line.

In all these exercises, as a general and fundamental principle, such a grouping of the available forces must be striven for that the units can be employed by 'Wings'; for, as I have endeavoured to point out, it is this form of employment which best satisfies the requirements of the combat and meets the needs of the Commander.

For instance, under many circumstances the Regimental Column can be employed as a practical tactical formation. Thus, if against Infantry or Artillery, it is desirable to attack in many following 'Lines.' The need is at once satisfied if our advance is made in a number of Regimental Columns, wheeled into line to a flank. For a flank attack, if the movement is initiated in a number of Regimental Columns formed to the front and following one another, forming line by a subsequent wheel. In both cases—in the latter after the wheel—one has only to insure that the laterally adjacent squadrons move off together at 'Treffen' (i.e., Line) distance to have all one's Lines complete. Such a formation can secure its flanks with the greatest ease by the retention of closed units, or, by bringing up the rearward squadrons, can prolong its front to either flank. In any case it is preferable to the triple column of troops, which makes all influence of the leader impossible, mixes all units in the charge, and hence would best be left out of the Regulations altogether. Nevertheless, practice in the employment of 'Treffen' (i.e., 'Lines' as opposed to 'Wings') must not be entirely neglected, as under certain circumstances this form may also become necessary. This tendency to group the available forces by 'Wings' in the larger units from the Brigade upwards must also be extended downwards to the regiment, which represents the fundamental tactical unit of the Cavalry, and those formations for manoeuvre which favour the arrangement of its constituent squadrons one behind the other—formations which, at the same time, are both handier and susceptible of more convenient control—must be constantly practised.

That Squadron Columns to the Front hardly meet these demands ideally can scarcely be denied. They are unhandy, render all changes of direction materially more difficult, lose direction and distance very easily, and necessitate complex movements in order to arrange them one behind the other. Already in Brigade formations these drawbacks are apparent, and in larger masses they prove most formidable. The Squadron Column is, in fact, a formation derived exclusively with a view to 'Line' tactics, and for this reason alone they hamper all other demands. There is, however, no compelling reason why they should be retained as the principal working formation for Cavalry, and therefore as fundamentally beyond the reach of criticism.

It seems to me that a formation which would group every two Squadron Columns as a unit would be far preferable. The Regimental Commander would then have only two units to direct, which would maintain their mutual relations of distance and interval more easily than four, could change direction more readily, and form line quicker, and allow of a far easier transition to wing formations and other columns than is possible at present.

The Regulations certainly do not mention this formation specifically, but, on the other hand, this regimental double column offers advantages for certain circumstances greater than can be found in any of the forms it suggests. It allows in the simplest manner of deployment into 'Lines,' either to the front or flank, the formation of Échelons in any desired direction; it is very mobile, easily concealed in folds of the ground, and combines the advantages of reduced depth both as a marching and as a manoeuvre formation. As the latter, it is peculiarly adapted to the purposes of large units in close country; for, as already pointed out, it is easy to conceal, and whilst keeping the troops well in the hands of the Regimental Commander, allows also of the most rapid deployments into 'Lines' either to the front or to the flank. It confers also the same advantages in brigade when the regiments are formed side by side, and is particularly applicable to flanking movements in which it is especially desirable to be able at any moment to develop strong fighting power in the direction of the movement, and after the wheel into line, to be formed in successive lines and protected on the uncovered flank.

It would take us too far at this point to compare in detail the advantages and disadvantages of this or alternative formations. I only desire to indicate in what direction practical progress is possible, even in the domain of formal tactics, without exceeding the limits laid down by Regulations, although it can only be most desirable that changes in the Regulations[26] themselves should be forthwith undertaken. I would, in conclusion, only bring forward one point which seems to me of particular importance.

The more this employment of Cavalry by 'Wings' gains ground, the more apparent becomes the advantages of the use of the bugle-calls assigned to the several units, particularly of the regimental call; because when it is used, the regiment or other unit remains as a closed body, unmixed with other units, and hence can be employed as a distinct tactical entity, which is not so much the case when working in 'Lines.'

These sounds are the only ones which never lead to confusion, if they are employed not as cautions only, but as a call on which the unit moves at once, whether in line or in column—preferably the latter—in the direction from which the call is heard. With the call the Commander would have the means of collecting his men behind him, and leading them in the direction he desires, no matter in what degree of order or the reverse they might be, without any verbal commands or instructions.

Used in this sense these sounds—but particularly the regimental call—might become the principal drill and manoeuvre calls for the Cavalry.

Thus it appears to me we could achieve a considerable reduction in the amount of practical drill necessary, and the change would tell all the more the more frequently the call was employed, until at last it became ingrained in the very flesh and blood of each man in the ranks. Unfortunately the Regulations do not allow their employment in this sense, but permit them only as cautionary sounds (Section 115, note); but even in this restricted sense they deserve most constant use in drilling, for they are always a means of preventing, in a measure, misapprehensions in the execution of other sounds.

We come now to the second portion of our requirements—viz., how to obtain clearness in the appreciation of tactical principles. Fortunately they are few in number, but it is absolutely indispensable that every Cavalry Leader should most fully have mastered their meaning. No knowledge, however accurate, of the formal prescriptions of the Regulations can in any way compensate for a deficiency in this respect. They are certainly not indicated as 'General Principles' in the Regulations themselves, but may be read between the lines with more or less precision from its several paragraphs.

For Cavalry versus Cavalry.

1. The German Cavalry must always endeavour to attack first in order to utilize to the utmost its superior 'moral,' and to catch the enemy in the act of deployment. If an opening for such an attack is offered, then even the risks of a long preliminary gallop must be accepted (Section 339).

2. The leading lines must always be followed by supporting squadrons in adequate numbers (Section 843, and note also Section 346); that is to say, the enemy's Cavalry will always be attacked in two 'Lines,' unless special circumstances compel departure from this prescription. 3. One must always endeavour to keep the last closed Reserve in hand, because in the mÊlÉe the impetus of the last closed body generally decides. One must never, therefore, as long as one suspects that the enemy has still further Reserves in hand, engage a greater number of squadrons than he shows, in order to save up Reserves.

4. Success must be looked for in the vehemence of the onslaught, not in superiority of numbers (Section 313). The greatest importance must be attached to cohesion; hence, unless necessary to surprise the enemy in the act of deployment, the 'gallop' should not be sounded too soon, or the 'charge' too late (Section 339).

5. Outflanking detachments, or troops in the following lines, turn against the enemy's Reserves, or remain in reserve. They must never, except in most pressing circumstances, throw themselves into a mÊlÉe already formed (Section 313). Following Lines must therefore not keep too close to the leading ones—a mistake often committed in peace—as otherwise they are committed to an attack in the same direction. They should therefore keep so far to the rear that they can overlook the line of collisions, and move in full freedom wherever their intervention is most called for. This important principle was always observed by Frederick the Great's Cavalry.

6. One must always try to cover at least one flank by obstacles of the ground or by one's own troops; but having satisfied this condition, then attack on the outer Lines, and endeavour to gain them by previous strategical directions.

7. Superfluous forces, which do not follow the front as supporting squadrons, Échelon themselves in general, forwards or backwards of the outer (unsupported) wing, to protect one's own flank and threaten that of the enemy, also to be ready to engage the enemy's Reserves (Sections 323, 343, 345), or they are kept together as Reserves behind the fighting line, if it is not possible to foresee in what direction they may be required. They must not be too weak.

8. Attempts to surround us made by the enemy are best met by a flank movement on the original line without change of front (cf. Section 338). Defensive flanking cover, with the front turned outwards, gives the worst conceivable direction for attack, since in case of failure one is thrown back across the line of retreat of one's main body.

9. Being in 'rendezvous formation,' the leading units are, if possible, sent off for offensive flank movements, as they have the shortest way to traverse. Such attacks only then promise success if they are unnoticed by the enemy—i.e., can be executed under the concealment of the ground—or if the enemy has neither time nor space to encounter them. The object of flank attacks is to induce the enemy to use up his rearward Reserves to oppose them, or to induce him to undertake manoeuvres before attacking.

10. Those units which are to be committed to the attack simultaneously must never be arranged so that a part follows in Échelon backwards—they must always be disposed on the same alignment.

11. In case of a mÊlÉe, which threatens to terminate unsatisfactorily, the Reserves must be put in on a broad front and straight forward, not directed against the flanks. For the longer the line of collision, the less effect do such flank attacks exercise; they are only too often mere blows in the air, and lead to waste of energy. 12. Out of every victorious mÊlÉe one must endeavour, as soon as possible, to rally closed detachments (Section 326). For immediate pursuit only fractions of the available troops will be employed (Section 325). This pursuit, however, must be carried out with the utmost energy, and the complete expenditure of the horses' power—if possible, to the total extermination of the enemy. The forces employed must be adequate for the attainment of this end.

Cavalry against Infantry and Artillery.

1. The attack must be as concentric as possible, and from different directions, to compel the defender to scatter his fire. The units are always to be employed by 'Wings.'

2. If possible, the defender must be surprised, and if Artillery, he should be attacked from the flank.

3. Where a wide zone of fire has to be ridden through, though even against Artillery, successive 'Lines' must be employed, and the less shaken the enemy appears to be the greater the number of such 'Lines' (Section 350). Artillery attacked frontally must be compelled by the leading 'Lines' to change both elevation and the nature of their fire.

4. The result, however, depends less on the Form employed than on the rapid seizure of momentarily favourable circumstances.

5. Only closed 'Lines' on a broad front can be relied on for success. Where the squadrons each seek independently for an object of attack, they generally miss it altogether, and to assign each individual squadron a special target will mostly be impossible, for the attack will be launched from such a distance that separate objects in the defender's lines will hardly be recognisable. Once within the zone of serious losses it will be obviously impossible to undertake those changes of direction which one sees unhappily so constantly in peace. One rides, in general, straight at a long fire line, and penetrates through as far as one can.

6. Such frontal attacks require, generally, reserves on both flanks for security against possible disengaging efforts of the enemy's Cavalry.

7. As the crisis of the engagement approaches, one must close well up on the fighting line, no matter whether one incurs loss or not, in order to be at hand to take advantage of opportunities.

8. Deployment, changes of direction and of front, are only possible outside the principal fire zone of the enemy.

9. The distance between following lines varies according to the nature of the enemy's fire.

To make these principles familiar to the troops must be one's constant care from the commencement of the regimental drill season onwards. At the same time, the subordinate Leaders must learn to apply them independently, even if no direct order reaches them, or if compelled to act on only the shortest indication of the Superior Commander (Sections 330, 333, 348), and this independence of the subordinate must be the more practised the greater the size of the units (Section 317).

To attain this object, as soon as the troops have sufficient mastery of the purely mechanical part of their drill, it will be necessary to append a series of exercises designed both to bring out the essentials of these principles, and, at the same time, to develop the judgment and independence of the junior officers. Such exercises must hence always be based on a well-defined tactical situation, from which it clearly appears whether the Cavalry is 'Independent,' or whether it is acting on the flank or behind the middle of a fighting line; and the corresponding conditions on the enemy's side must also be readily deducible, and on such foundation, under constantly changing assumptions, as to strength and distance of the enemy, all such movements as changes from one tactical formation to another—flank attacks, deployment from column of route or after the passage of defiles—must be practised. In all these exercises the point at issue must be clearly and comprehensively expressed. When one has attained a certain degree of security in the application of these principles, these exercises must be repeated under conditions of ever-increasing difficulty.

The order for deployment must be given whilst the troops are in rapid motion. Observation, thought, and command when in full gallop have to be learnt; they do not come naturally. The most various movements, without command or bugle-call, must be executed from a message brought by a galloper. The troops will be practised against a suddenly appearing enemy on simple warnings such as 'Against Cavalry,' 'Against Infantry,' or merely on the sound 'Alert,' and pains must always be taken to see that the fundamentally right formation is adopted. In these exercises it must be left to the initiative of the subordinates to judge the situation for themselves, and always move to their proper place in the prescribed formation by the shortest path. Of course, in such movements the first principle is that the troops nearest the enemy furnish the first 'Line'; the remainder fall into their places as flank coverers, supporting squadrons or reserve.

If, in this manner, we succeed in imparting to the junior Leaders thorough clearness as to the principles of the game, and to make them both quick and skilful in their appreciation of the situation, then the work of education on the drill ground is complete, and the troops are ready for exercises over country. No pains must be spared to separate the purely formal and ceremonial side of drill from the practical field-training. The former keeps always, as I have indicated in the first section, its full value for the creation of discipline and alertness, but leads only too easily to a routine which has nothing in common with the battle-field, and to that poverty-stricken 'schematisimus' to which human nature so readily inclines.

To the formal school of training, which I have hitherto only had in mind, a whole series of exercises must now be coupled, having for their purpose the application of the acquired forms and principles under all circumstances of the ground. But before we proceed to their detail consideration, we must answer the question how far the drill ground only suffices for the purpose of training. Generally, one can subscribe to General von Schlichting's principle—that forms and principles must be learnt in the drill book, but their application in action only in the open country. Tactical exercises on the drill ground, which have not for sole purposes to bring to expression certain formal principles, are always an evil, and mislead the troops. On the other hand, the principles of the tactical employment of Cavalry are particularly suited to representation on the drill ground because they are frequently of a purely formal nature.

Keeping firmly to these established principles, then, to define the limits of usefulness of the drill ground, we have only to answer the question within what tactical units this formal drilling is still instructive or possible. My opinion is that the Brigade marks the highest limit, as within it all tactical principles find their application, and it is the largest body which can still in any way be handled by drill methods only. In the Division, and still more in the higher units, the strategical element preponderates so greatly that anything approaching real drill is out of the question, and all movements which they can execute are based on a complete command of these principles already. Of course, it is not intended to prohibit altogether the formal working together of these masses at the beginning in order to secure complete control and knowledge of them for further instruction; but one must not delay over these formal movements a moment longer than absolutely necessary, since the real centre of gravity lies in the practical training, and no doubt must be allowed to exist as to which exercises are intended as purely drill and which as practical preparation for War.

Nor would I have it implied that brigade and regimental training should be entirely confined to the drill ground. On the contrary, the exercises over country are absolutely essential for practical training, and form the keystone of the whole edifice; but it seems to me not merely permissible but desirable that a portion of these exercises should be carried out on the drill ground in order to expedite this portion of the work. But all the more energetically must it be insisted on that the remainder of the programme—the greater part in regard to time—should be executed, as far as possible, in variable ground, and that all exercises of the larger formations should be confined to such ground as we shall have to work over in War; not alone are they by far the most important for the higher tactical education of the Arm, but they cannot be represented on drill grounds at all; their whole essence is too entirely out of harmony with the conditions of a level plain.

That the degree of cultivation existing in the vicinity of the garrisons may interfere seriously with these demands is obvious, and in the absence of the necessary spaces to work over we must fall back on the great training grounds (TruppenÜbungs PlÄtze); even the possibilities of these are very soon exhausted. But this, at least, is certain: that it is better to hold these exercises on these training grounds than to confine them exclusively to the drill field. Every effort must, therefore, be made to transfer all exercises of bodies above the regiment to the training grounds, on which one will always find some portion sufficiently suitable for the amount of drill required, and to extend the period of work on these grounds so that in all periods it will be possible to interpose between the drill days a sufficient number of field service days, always supposing that these training grounds offer sufficient diversity of contour, etc., for our purposes. Where this is not the case, then, in spite of the expense entailed by possible damage to crops, etc., suitable ground will have to be acquired. The extra cost of a few thousand pounds cannot be allowed to stand in the way of the adequate training of the Arm which, owing to its numerical strength, relatively small in comparison with the magnitude of its tasks, is in the last resort dependent for its success on its internal excellence alone.

As concerns the nature of these exercises, with special reference to the larger formations, first of all we must secure, by means of a graduated series, the certain co-operation of the constituent elements and of their leaders. Next, it must be insisted on that, for the further actual practical training, as well as for the purely formal drill, a systematic procedure should be the fundamental principle, so that all who participate in them may become clearly aware of the conditions of Warfare, and the means of dealing with them. It is evident that these conditions must form the foundation of the required system.

As in War these are constantly changing, there seems a certain degree of contradiction in this demand; but in reality this is not the case, for no matter how the situation may vary, there will always be for its proper criticism some one chief point which will characterize the whole procedure, and thus be decisive for the systematic arrangement of these exercises.

The latter can then be divided into two principal groups, according as to whether they are based on the assumption of a Cavalry force acting as an independent unit or in combination with the other Arms. The general conditions in both cases must be clearly brought out, and give them the point of attachment for the further subdivision of the exercises.

Thus, with regard to the first case:

Reconnaissance from a great distance. Deployment of one or more columns out of defiles or in open country. The land in the vicinity of the training ground can here be advantageously employed. It is not desirable to place the heads of the separate columns at once on the scene of action, using these points as starting-points for the forthcoming exercise. One must give the columns longer marches, and demand that—assisted by a properly-working mechanism for circulating information and orders—they should arrive at the point of action at the proper time, in spite of possible delays or interference on the road. The enemy, whether skeleton or otherwise, must, of course, be handled so that collision occurs within the limits of the training ground.

Transition from the relations of advance (or rear) guard and main body to the order these assume on the battle-field.

Attacks on a railway or hostile post.

Government boundaries form no support for the flanks; these can only be considered as secure when protected by natural obstacles; hence, as a rule, measures must be taken to cover both flanks.

Transition from the tactical to the strategical form after completion of an encounter; pursuit of the enemy with one fraction of the force, and continuation of the operation with the remainder; for the latter, only orders need be issued; but it is a matter of considerable importance how this division of force rendered necessary by the tactical encounters is arranged.

Retreat after a repulse, in one or several columns.

Retirement through defiles.

In the second case:

Selection of position on the battle-field in a proper relation to the fighting line, zone of danger, etc., and reconnaissance to front and flanks.

Advance from a position in reserve to attack on the enemy's Cavalry round one wing of an Army. Transition from a victorious charge against Cavalry to a further attack against the enemy's flank.

Protection of the outer flank in either case.

Retreat after defeat by the enemy's Cavalry to the protection of one's own Army wing.

Advance for frontal attack against the enemy's line of battle; passage through the intervals of one's own Artillery and Cavalry. Protection of both flanks. Attack upon Infantry, Artillery, or both; disengaging a front attacked by Cavalry; combat against the latter.

Flank attacks against retreating columns; ambushes at defiles.

Of course, it is not intended in the above to lay down a hard-and-fast scheme of instruction, but only to indicate how the work to be done can be systematically arranged, and brought under one point of view, so that the lessons they are intended to convey become impressed on the mind. It is also evident that by the supposed conduct of the enemy, and the strength assigned to him, the utmost variation can be brought about in the grouping and representation of the several conditioning circumstances. In short, these exercises must be taken direct from the most diverse demands of War, and be based, as far as possible, on an assumed general situation. They must never be allowed to descend to mere fighting on horseback backwards and forwards across the training ground, and with often quite unnatural sequence of ideas, having no connection with the natural order of events. It is also most desirable that Infantry and additional Artillery should be made available for their execution.

How far the dismounted action of the Arm is to be represented in these series will be gone into in the next section; but in all cases, whether working mounted or on foot, the Leader must insist that the troops are handled in accordance with tactical precepts suitably applied in every case to the special circumstances of the given situation; and for this, even on the smallest training grounds, a proper utilization of the features of the country is essential.

The desire to suit the formation to the ground; to carry out turning movements under cover; to find support for the flanks in natural obstacles, so that they cannot be surrounded; to choose the actual field of encounter, so that every advantage of the ground, the direction of the wind, of the sun, of covered approach, etc., all fall to our advantage; to deal with defiles and passes on correct principles; to utilize suitably strong defensive positions—all these must be clearly brought to light, and in the 'Critique' these points must be particularly borne in mind, for they are by no means universally current in the Cavalry, which has a tendency always and everywhere in peace to revert to the levellest ground obtainable. I have seen at Cavalry Division Exercises troops handled without the slightest regard to the nature of the country, and without the fact attracting attention at the 'Critique'; but these are conditions which, thanks to the energetic action of the Inspector-General, we may hope, are now everywhere overcome.

It must, further, be brought out in the clearest possible manner under what conditions the employment of the units by 'Wings' is to be recommended, and under which others their employment in 'Lines' becomes necessary. The principles regulating this matter have already received attention in Book I., Chap. V. The freedom which, as we have seen, is given us by Section 346 of the Regulations must be utilized to the fullest extent, for it alone answers to the demands of the modern battle-field.[27]

One last point requires further consideration, which is of considerable importance for Cavalry exercises—viz., the use of skeleton enemies.

In no Arm does the skeleton enemy replace an actual enemy less than with the Cavalry.

If it rides the prescribed paces, then, as a consequence of the ease of movement and rapidity of deployment, it has an unfair advantage; if it rides slowly or halts altogether as a target, it makes things altogether too easy for the other side. Besides, it is a very much easier matter to judge a number of flags correctly than to estimate the actual strength of a rapidly moving body of horse. Most movements in practice develop so quickly, and, owing to the ground, the direction in which the dust drives, etc., give such changing pictures, that it is most difficult to judge them accurately when one's self is in rapid motion.

Often the Cavalry Commanders must decide, at least in general, on the instant, strength, tactical distribution, and direction of movement of a rapidly approaching enemy almost hidden in dense dust clouds; in the same instant he must make up his mind with reference to the conditions disclosed by the adversary and the nature of the ground, and issue his orders clearly and intelligibly. The demand is such a great one that both the physical and mental sight even of a born Leader needs constant practice against real objects in order to be in any way equal to it. Hence the necessity for bringing great Cavalry 'Masses'—at least, Divisions—as frequently as possible together to manoeuvre against one another, and in such a manner that the strength of the opposing forces remains unknown, which, with a little management, can easily be arranged. If one knows beforehand the precise number of the opposing forces, as with Divisions of uniform composition will generally be the case, the matter is very much simplified indeed, but in proportion it is less practical, a consideration which still further supports our already formulated demand for Cavalry Divisions differing as far as possible in their composition.

Thus, it is clear that the field is wide indeed which opens itself for the practical training of Cavalry as soon as one gets down to the bed-rock conditions which determine success in actual War, and frees one's self of all conventional suppositions. Whether we shall succeed in satisfying the new conditions which press upon us from every side, taking into consideration the excellence of our existing material, equal to the highest performances, will depend in the main on the support of the superior authorities. For the manner in which Cavalry are inspected decides how they practise and what they learn, just as the way in which they are led determines what they can do.[Back to Contents]